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Preface 
On the day I am writing this preface, a national newspaper published a four column 
article on the bureau for drivers license examinations CBR. It read: CBR nearly bankrupt.1 
It might be that at the time of the defence of this thesis, it is know what solution has been 
found to solve CBR‟s problems. CBR is an institution that fits the definition of the 
research topic of this study: unilateral authoritative decision making on behalf of 
government outside central government‟s hierarchical structure. Politicians and civil 
servants who might have thought that the implementation as of 2008 of the framework 
law on ZBOs would lead to a decrease of political attention for the difficult relation 
between autonomy and control on ZBOs are again faced with the problematic facts. 
The study focuses on a particular form of autonomisation on the level of Dutch central 
government. The idea goes back to my early experiences in the Dutch social security 
industry which has been transformed from a really arm‟s length non controlled public 
service to an industry in which political control seems to be daily routine. Given the 
enormous amounts of public money spent in the industry, political attention is to be 
expected, but should it lead to strict control on operations as well?  
This PhD study would never have been written if changes in my career and the 
opportunities that resulted from it had not happened. Some 15 years ago, I restarted 
studying and changed my professional career in local government to one in the social 
security industry. Not much later an even more fundamental opportunity emerged, which 
allowed me to operate both in the academic world of public financial management as well 
as to continue my practitioner role. The combination of activities allowed observing what 
happened in organisations beyond the usual daily rush and ultimately led to a research 
proposal discussed at the Cigar 2003 conference. From that time I spent some of my 
time on the dissertation, resulting in the publication you are reading right now. Yes, it took 
a while to write it down, but rest assured that motivation improves if you are not only 
focusing full time on a PhD study. Practical experience and spending time on other issues 
allow making progress on the days, weeks or months that are actually used to write the 
thesis.  
 
Although writing is a personal activity, discussions on the research project are an 
essential part of completing the project. Dear Nico, your comments have first of all 
contributed to my knowledge and understanding of neo-institutional economics in the 
public sector, an issue that was only developing when I started taking university classes. 
Furthermore, you have contributed to finding a balance between the abstract structure of 
the study and the attention for the details that can help to illustrate abstract concepts. 
Dear Sandra, your knowledge on the field of ZBOs and your methodological contributions 
                                                 
1 NRC Handelsblad, January 24, 2011. 
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helped mapping the field and developing a research strategy that has brought this study 
beyond a mere case based study. Whether on individual cases or the general theme of 
controlling arm‟s length organisations, you were willing to discuss problems and provide 
directions for solutions to unresolved issues. Dear Sjoerd, you have had the difficult task 
to fill in a gap in knowledge on legal issues, discussing them with someone who only had 
some basic education in law. Thank you for spending time on this study even in a time in 
which you had other things on your mind. 
Without the academic support of many at the School of Management and Governance 
and the Department of Finance and Accounting, this thesis would not be what it has 
become. I would particularly like to mention prof. dr P.B. Boorsma and dr J.M. Bos who 
regularly reminded me of my academic duties and were always willing to discuss issues 
at hand. Of course, the support of Annette, Manon and Jolande for many practical issues 
was always available whether I was at my Enschede office or somewhere else. The 
academic world does not end at the campus of the University of Twente. I would like to 
thank the academics in the Cigar and EIASM networks for their time and comments on 
drafts and thoughts that ultimately have resulted in this book. 
A special word of thanks is needed for all the respondents who were willing to answer 
my questions on the individual cases. Their contributions are at the heart of the practical 
empirical findings in this study. I hope that the comparative elements in the book can 
contribute to a better understanding of control issues and the differences observed 
between the individual cases.  
Let me not forget the colleagues and the management of the UWV control directorate 
who were faced with a colleague who spent most of his time doing things that were 
beyond the daily control routines of the organisation. This project has now come to an 
end allowing for more flexibility in prioritising tasks to be realised. I can‟t promise to be at 
my Amsterdam office more regularly but there will be more time available for your 
questions and UWV issues. 
 
The last part of this preface focuses on my family. My parents made it possible to choose 
for the unusual lines of education, both in secondary school and later at University. 
Directly and indirectly they stimulated my interest in politics and public administration 
which have resulted in sometimes lively discussions. Their support during the years of 
education has been crucial.  
The question most asked at home was „when will this booklet of yours finally be 
completed?‟  Lisanne and Mathieu do not know better than having a father who was in 
his study writing or reading or somewhere outside for meetings and conferences. Only in 
the weekends and during holidays some spare time remained for family life. They will now 
be confronted with the results and there will be structurally more time, especially in the 
weekends. My beloved Frederike, the final word is to you. Having a serious full time job is 
still not common for Dutch women, whether it is the glass ceiling or other cultural issues 
that play a role is for a later debate. Fact is that you had to find your way in managing 
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your job, and finding time for children as well on all these days that I have spent on doing 
the job I felt I had to do. We don‟t know what the future will bring to us, but rest assured, 
without your backup and support, I would never have finished this project. Therefore, the 
book is dedicated to you. 
Preface   
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 Management summary 
 Introduction 
In the last three decades, autonomisation and decentralisation of government services 
have been important trends. In very general terms, (new) organisations were set at arm‟s 
length of government, often based on arguments of improved efficiency. In this study I 
have assessed a particular Dutch variety of arm‟s length organisations, Zelfstandige 
Bestuursorganen (ZBOs), from a legal and economic perspective. The research question 
in the study is:  
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
The idea is that legal and economic control tools must be aligned to prevent conflicts 
affecting the autonomy of ZBOs. Furthermore, based on the control tools used, an 
indication can be given of the actual autonomy in operations of a ZBO. In this 
management summary, emphasis is on results. A more elaborate summary of the study is 
given in chapter 19. 
 
ZBOs are organisations delivering services on behalf of central government. The key 
feature of ZBO services is delivering unilaterally binding decisions by an organisation 
outside the hierarchical structure of central government. An example of a ZBO is the land 
registry office „Kadaster‟, whereas the state owned railway company „Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen‟ does not qualify as a ZBO. Depending on counting methods and 
interpretation of definitions, the number of ZBOs ranges from over 100 to over 600. I 
have grouped ZBOs based on government publications to 128 different (groups) of 
organisations by July 2007, spending some € 7 bln on operations and over € 80 bln on 
program costs. Total costs of ZBOs are equivalent to some 40% of total Dutch national 
government spending. 
 Theoretical approach 
The arm‟s length position of ZBOs towards central government raises some problems. On 
the one hand autonomy is intended; on the other politicians regularly want to reclaim 
control over these organisations. In some cases, budgets of ZBOs are clearly disclosed in 
budget documents submitted to Parliament, in other cases budgets are not disclosed at 
all. This makes it difficult for Parliament to assess operations and performance of ZBOs. 
After a long debate, initiated by a critical report in 1995 by the Netherlands Court of Audit 
[NCA], in 2008 a new law - „Kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen‟ [kZBO] - was 
implemented that is intended to standardise control measures on ZBOs. The law does not 
solve the problem of transparency of budgets towards Parliament and does suggest that 
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although deviations from the standard are possible, a one size fits all approach for 
controlling ZBOs is needed. 
 
My study was started during the debate on kZBO and takes a different approach. Earlier 
studies showed that there is variety between ZBOs, which is based on differences in legal 
status but also on funding of operations of ZBOs. Based on this knowledge, I have 
decided to study the legal measures and the economic characteristics of individual ZBOs. 
Together these dimensions determine the possibilities for planning and control and thus 
ultimately control of ZBOs by Parliament. If inconsistencies between legal and economic 
control tools exist, actual control of ZBOs is likely to be problematic and results in 
unintended increase or decrease of autonomy.  
 Results 
It is not possible to cover all ZBO cases in the study due to the number of ZBOs that exist. 
I have selected 11 cases from within two main groups of ZBOs (income transfer and 
monitoring ZBOs respectively). Based on the theoretical framework, document studies 
were realised based on legislation and control documents available. Furthermore, 
interviews with staff of ZBOs and of the relevant principal-ministries were held. The 
combination of document study and interviews allows assessing not only the formal but 
also actual control on ZBOs as used on behalf of Parliament. 
 
In developing the theoretical framework, three different general legal perspectives were 
used: budgeting legislation, general public law including the general control measures 
available on ZBOs and civil law. The latter is needed because several ZBOs have a civil 
law status. Furthermore, civil law can be used to describe relations of service provision 
between two formally independent organisations. The general legal framework is used as 
a yardstick for the formal measures in individual ZBO cases as reflected in ZBO-case law. 
Many of the legal measures are mentioned in the current kZBO but still need to be 
included in ZBO-case law. 
From an economic perspective, I have used three lines of theory. First Neo-
institutional economics provides tools to be used in cases where management and 
ownership of organisations are not in the same hands. Issues such as incentives for 
management, control tools available to management as well as transaction costs 
associated with monitoring management are discussed. The second line in economic 
theory is based on product- and production characteristics. It covers discussions on mass 
production versus unit production and on measurement of services. The third line of 
theory covers market characteristics including fully integrated versus fully privatised 
production, on funding of services delivered and the related topic of the origins of 
demand and use of services. These economic perspectives are ultimately reflected in a 
set of possible control tools that fit to the particular characteristics of services of a ZBO. It 
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means at least theoretically that differentiation in control of ZBOs is needed from an 
economic perspective. 
 
When services delivered by ZBOs are similar, one might expect that control tools as 
designed and actually used are similar as well. Theoretically this means that a set of 
expected standard controls can be developed and used for assessment. I have tested the 
hypothesis on six income transfer ZBOs and five monitoring ZBOs. 2  The classification in 
subgroups of ZBOs was based on the core services delivered by the individual ZBO as 
found in their annual reports. 
 
The following conclusions and observations were found in this study: 
1. After testing designed and actual control tools in eleven cases, in only three cases 
a match of actual legal and economic control tools is found. 
2. In eight cases, emphasis is on legal controls rather than on economic controls. 
3. Public law ZBOs are controlled on a more restrictive basis than was expected. 
4. Income transfer ZBOs are faced with more restrictive controls than monitoring 
ZBOs. 
5. Ownership and commissioning role are not clearly separated and in some cases 
ministries act inconsistently. 
6. Budgetary control, often based on lump sum budgets prevails over activity based 
budgetary controls. 
7. Performance information is not provided on a consistent basis. 
 
The answer to the research question is thus that in most cases studied here, formally 
designed and actual control do not match because legal controls restrict the possibilities 
for control given the economic characteristics of the services delivered by the ZBOs 
studied here. 
 Comments 
In a nutshell some comments on the results are given. First, full generalisation of the 
results to all ZBOs is not possible. However, NAK and FBKVB are ZBOs that are single 
cases within groups of identical ZBOs. In these two cases, it is likely that the other ZBOs 
in these clusters will be controlled similarly. Second, based on interviews with some 
members of Parliament [MPs], it was found that on the one hand information provision is 
problematic and rather minimal. On the other hand, MPs cannot handle the information 
overload they are faced with. A more structured approach on information provision on all 
                                                 
2 names in Dutch (see list of abbreviations) Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM); Centraal Fonds voor de 
Volkshuisvesting (CFV); College voor Zorgverzekeringen (CVZ); Fonds Beeldende Kunsten, Vormgeving 
en Bouwkunst (FBKVB; Nederlandse Algemene Keuringsdienst voor Zaaizaad en Pootgoed (NAK); 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa); Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (NZA); Raden voor 
Rechtsbijstand (RvR); Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB); Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen 
(UWV); Vervangings- en Participatiefonds (Vf/Pf). 
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ZBOs and not only those funded by government would be helpful. Furthermore MPs 
indicated that except for ZBOs that provide impartial judgement services (such as the 
market regulators studied here), a different and less restrictive control is needed than for 
other ZBOs. A last point to be made here is that the analysis is based on ideas of 
improving public management as expressed in the new public management paradigm. 
The findings in this study show a great variety in controls applied and raise questions on 
consistency in creating ZBOs in the Dutch context. It was even observed that in some 
cases, ministries act inconsistently towards ZBOs they control. It seems that issues such 
as historic background, culture and complexity also have an impact on how control in 
particular cases is organised. 
 Recommendations 
Based on what has been found in this study the following recommendations are worth 
considering: 
1. Develop a standard for information provision on ZBOs. 
2. Create one Ministry-principal for all ZBOs. 
3. Use control structures aligned to services provided. 
4. Change kZBO legislation on multiyear budgets, providing assessed annual 
reports to Parliament, appointment of PLB boards and some other technical 
issues. 
5. Authorise investments of ZBOs. 
6. Define a standard for the level of equalisation reserves. 
 
Finally, from a research perspective it might be worthwhile to focus on political relevance 
and stability of services provided as a driver for decisions on organisational structure for 
public service delivery. 
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2 Part A: Research problem and Dutch institutional context 
 
  Introduction and research question 
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1. Introduction and research question 
Around 1990, a number of reorganisations carried out at Dutch central government level 
resulted in the creation of various forms of quasi autonomous executive organisations as 
well as privatisations. In this study, I will focus on a particular type of quasi autonomous 
organisation – „Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan‟ [ZBO].3/4 These organisations provide 
services on behalf of government but are not under direct control of a minister. This 
implies that there is a lower level of democratic control on these organisations compared 
to a traditional government unit. 
My objective is to assess the actual autonomy of ZBOs in relation to their political 
masters from an economic and legal perspective. Are ZBOs really autonomous as their 
name suggests or is autonomy reduced or even only a matter of window dressing 
because legal provisions are not consistent with the economic characteristics of the 
services provided? In several reports, the Netherlands Court of Audit [NCA] 5 has 
discussed the position of ZBOs in relation to accountability towards minister and 
Parliament.  I will focus on task assignment and control of ZBOs because when no 
standards are set, a legitimate question would be: “Accountability - to whom and for 
what?” Basically there is a control relationship between the responsible minister and the 
ZBO. However, ultimately Parliament is the key democratic institution at the national level 
and a minister only holds office as long as Parliament has confidence in the minister. This 
means that ultimately tasks assigned and controls upon ZBOs are subject to decisions in 
Parliament. Therefore a draft research question for this study is: How does Parliament 
control ZBOs?  
The study is organised into four separate parts. In Part A, the research problem and 
questions are developed and a general context on ZBOs is given. In Part B, the legal 
dimension of autonomy is discussed from a general level, ignoring particular measures 
for individual ZBOs. Part C focuses on the economic dimensions relevant for autonomy. 
Finally, in Part D, legal and economic aspects of autonomy are brought together. This 
results in 1) observed formal legal autonomy; 2) observed actual implementation of legal 
measures; 3) observed economic characteristics of individual ZBOs and 4) (mis)match 
between the legal design, economic characteristics and actual control.  The answer to the 
research question will provide indicators for improving legal and economic control tools 
and thus implicitly improving ZBO accountability to the political system. 
1.1. Balance between political control and managerial autonomy 
Dutch central government traditionally executes most of its activities in ministries, 
politically led by ministers. The budgets of these ministries are subject to authorisation by 
                                                 
3 ZBO can be translated as Autonomous Authoritative Body. 
4 All translations of Dutch texts are mine, unless otherwise stated. 
5 A comparison of the Dutch NCA to the UK National Audit Office is given in Lonsdale (2007). 
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Parliament.6 The details of the authorisation process are regulated by the 
„Comptabiliteitswet‟ ([CW] 7; Budgeting and Accounting Act). Even before the first CW was 
created in 1927, it was recognised that in some cases, a more business oriented model 
of financial management for government activities might be suitable (Van den Bent, 
1989, p. 154-155). The role of Parliament in the authorisation process in these cases 
was restricted compared to its role of authorising ministry budgets. After World War II, the 
development of the welfare state and later on, debates on privatisation and 
autonomisation8 of production of government services resulted in the creation of 
numerous semi-public or semi-private organisations. Each of these at arm‟s length 
organisations has different roles and positions in the political system (e.g. Boxum, de 
Ridder & Scheltema, 1989, p.1-2; Van Thiel, 2001, p. 5-6).  
In 1974, Scheltema coined the concept Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan.  He 
characterises ZBOs as entities that execute part of the government‟s authority with some 
degree of freedom (Scheltema, 1974, p. 4). Scheltema focuses on the tension between 
autonomy and political control, basically from a legal point of view. In his opinion, full 
ministerial authority does not match with the intention to manage a civil service unit at 
arm‟s length (Scheltema, 1974, p. 13). Scheltema does not consider the financial 
connection between a minister and a ZBO. When authoritative tasks are carried out, one 
would expect Parliament to be able to exercise its budget authorisation prerogatives on 
the same basis as in case of authoritative tasks executed by traditional government units 
like in this case, ministries. This is based on the rule in public finance which states that 
when government wishes to achieve objectives by raising taxes and spending funds, this 
can only be performed after the consent of a democratically elected institution (e.g. 
Goedhart, 1958, p. 282-283; Schick, 2000, p. 9; Lauth, 2002, p. 43). This principle still 
holds, but is complicated by the fact that government activities provided by traditional 
government units such as ministries or cities may be funded by resources other than 
taxes (e.g. Wagner, 1991). It is also possible that services on behalf of government are 
provided by other institutions that are not immediately identified as institutions of 
government. Dutch ZBOs are an example of institutions providing services on behalf of 
government, which are not part of government. The odd thing in the Dutch budget 
process is that in some cases, budgets of ZBOs are not included in the budget laws 
authorised by Parliament. Does this mean there is no control at all or do other measures 
compensate for this lack of budget authorisation by Parliament? 
Take for example the case of the re-organisation of the production of social security 
services management system, implemented on January 1 2002. This social security 
reorganisation involved, amongst other things, merging five former private companies 
and one public organisation into one new large ZBO called „Uitvoeringsvoeringsinstituut 
                                                 
6 I use Parliament when both Tweede Kamer (House of Commons/House of Representatives) and Eerste 
Kamer (House of Lords/Senate) are meant. Where necessary I refer to the specific House.  
7 Acronyms will be indicated between [ ]. A list of acronyms is included in the appendices. 
8 Autonomisation is used as a catch all phrase for granting some degree of operational and/or legal 
autonomy for public service providers other than full privatisation to the market. 
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Werknemersverzekeringen‟ [UWV]. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
[minSZW]9, budget includes some €34 million to cover reorganisation costs (Parliament, 
2001a, p. 105). Somewhere, almost hidden in an explanatory memorandum (Parliament, 
2001b, p. 151), the actual total operating10 costs (€1.8 billion!) of all three social security 
ZBOs are to be found. In the same explanatory memorandum, social security program 
costs are presented, totalling €57.2 billion but this is not immediately related to the 
organisations that are responsible for distributing program benefits. A Member of 
Parliament has to invest some time to find the UWV full program budget and the 
operating cost budget as it is spread over two main categories and a number of programs 
(Parliament, 2001b, p. 148-150 and p. 182-191). As of 2005, information on individual 
ZBO operating budgets are presented in an appendix to the ministerial budget document, 
but in the case of UWV there is still no formal operating cost budget proposal (Parliament, 
2004a, p. 225). Although some additional information is disclosed in the 2009 
ministerial budget document, this is still essentially the case (Parliament, 2008a, p. 177-
178). 
 
Some 20 years after Scheltema‟s remarks, three reports put the issue of controlling ZBOs 
seriously onto the political agenda. First, in 1989, Cabinet submitted a document to 
Parliament on „functional delegation‟. In functional delegation one single activity of 
government is transferred to a separate unit, not fully controlled by Parliament and a 
minister. With respect to ZBOs in particular, Cabinet stated that ministerial responsibility 
is restricted to key issues and not to individual decisions. The precise legal context is 
irrelevant; the key is that authority is transferred (Parliament, 1989, p. 3-4). Second, 
there was a report by a government appointed committee – the Sint Committee (1994) – 
which analysed the motives for creating11 ZBOs. This report was the result of earlier (Sint 
Committee, 1994, p. 6) debates on autonomisation of central government units.  
Around the same time, the NCA published its FY1994 annual report. In this report, the 
NCA concluded that governance and control of ZBOs was insufficient. The key issue 
according to the NCA is that a minister has “insufficient powers to be able to carry out his 
general responsibility for the policy area in which ZBOs operate as well as for the budgets 
required for the ZBO to execute public tasks” (Parliament, 1995a, p. 4). The Dutch 
Cabinet12 responded that it intended to “restore the political primacy by means of more 
precise control of executive government units by Cabinet and Parliament” (Parliament, 
1995b, p. 1). 
                                                 
9 minXXX will be used as a general shorthand for all Dutch ministries, see also list of abbreviations. 
10 I use „cost of operations‟ or „operating costs‟ when I address the full scope of costs that are incurred to 
run the ZBO; the concept of operational costs is only used when expenses excluding investment related 
expenses (depreciation, interest) are meant. 
11 I will use „creating a unit‟ when I mean that some organisational unit is set at arm‟s length of government 
irrespective of the legal form. I will use „establishing an entity‟ when the unit at arm‟s length is given a 
separate legal status outside the legal entity „State‟.  
12 An elaboration on the Dutch Constitutional setting will be given in chapter 2. 
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In the more than 10 years that have elapsed since publication of the NCA-report, 
several initiatives have been started to improve control and restore political primacy. By 
the end of 2006, a framework law had passed through Parliament – „Kaderwet 
Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen‟ [kZBO] - in which general measures for creating and 
controlling ZBOs are laid down. The law is effective for all newly created ZBOs as well as 
for existing ZBOs if the legislative framework for the individual ZBO explicitly refers to 
kZBO (kZBO:2a).13 Also at the end of 2006, the NCA presented a new report regarding a 
larger group of organisations at arm‟s length of government in which it concluded that 
improvements have been achieved. There are still accountability and control gaps: public 
accountability “can be improved” and “information provision towards Parliament requires 
improvements”, especially because “Parliament has insufficient understanding of 
operations… and on the cash flows and equity of the organisations at arm‟s length of 
government” (Parliament, 2006a, p. 9). In early 2007, the Council of Economic Advisors 
of Parliament [REA] made comments on ZBOs by stating “that there is only a limited 
overview on the operations of government because authority and responsibilities are not 
clearly defined” (Parliament, 2007a, p. 3).  
Both the NCA and REA opinions indicate that despite all efforts, there is still a problem 
regarding control of at arm‟s length government entities14 such as ZBOs. On the other 
hand, managers of at arm‟s length entities express their feelings that government should 
not draw back from the path of granting autonomy (Tokmetzis, 2006, p. 5).  Although the 
conclusions of NCA and REA do not cover exactly the same groups of organisations, they 
are an indication of a problematic situation. The NCA comments seem to focus only on ex-
post control themes on at arm‟s length entities. REA however, seems to point out that 
there is still a more fundamental problem regarding control of ZBOs. Following the line of 
argument given by REA, being held accountable implies that service delivery standards, 
perhaps merely a fixed budget, exist beforehand. In the example of UWV, I indicated that 
Parliament does not have the proper information to set these standards in the form of a 
budget authorisation. In my opinion, this means that what Janse de Jonge (1993, p. 1) 
referred to as the “most fundamental right of Parliament” is apparently not working 
properly when applied to entities at arm‟s length of central government. Without proper 
authorisation, no expenditure compliance standards can exist. Additionally, the standards 
for a statement on accountability cannot be set at all without an ex-ante framework.  
 
The problem of balancing autonomy and political control of ZBOs is not just a Dutch 
issue. Under the labels of Quasi non governmental organisations [Quangos] (e.g. Barker, 
1982; Ridley and Wilson, 1995), Public Law Administrations [PLA] and Private Law 
Bodies [PLB] (OECD, 2002) and Hybrids (e.g. Kickert, 1998; Koppell, 2003) similar 
                                                 
13 References to legislation have the following structure: YY:x.z; YY= acronym of relevant law, x= relevant 
article number, z= relevant sub article number. 
14 In some cases arm‟s length organisations are not separate legal entities but units within an organisation. 
This is for example the case in executive agencies. 
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control issues regarding organisations at arm‟s length of government are described for 
many western countries. Greer, Hoggett and Maile (2003, p. 41) refer to the fact that in 
studying control of organisations at arm‟s length of government, one should take into 
account that the context and history of each organisation should be examined to be able 
to assess actual autonomy and political control. I note here that, although it is not 
explicitly discussed in the literature, control is about controlling operations and resulting 
output. Quangos, including ZBOs, are generally used to execute programs as efficiently as 
possible. The program itself is given. If a program includes income transfers, these are 
subject to separate control mechanisms which in most cases do not affect the debate on 
quangos. 
The case of UWV described above confirms Greer et al.‟s point. Superficially studied, it 
seems that UWV has quite a lot of autonomy because Parliament does not authorise the 
budget of the organisation. This is not the case as can be seen from a letter from the 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment to Parliament in early 2006, in which he stated 
that he did not approve the UWV 2006 budget proposal (Parliament, 2006b). This 
example shows a paradox in the political control of ZBOs. On the one hand no formal 
budget authorisation by Parliament is realised in a number of cases. On the other hand 
political intervention by ministers on ZBO managerial decisions do occur, just as if a ZBO 
is nothing more than a classic government entity under full budgetary scrutiny of 
Parliament. To put it in even stronger terms, in a debate on organisations at arm‟s length 
of government, representatives of both the opposition and the majority demanded 
transparency on all cash receipts and cash payments15 processed by these organisations 
(Parliament, 2004b).  
Hogwood (1995, p. 31) noted that in the UK organisations at arm‟s length of 
government sometimes have the power to raise their own funds, resulting in reduced 
Parliamentary budgetary control. In the Netherlands some ZBOs are also able to raise 
their own funds. When such funds can be regarded as compulsory contributions, there is 
a strong similarity to raising taxes, which is regarded as the prerogative of the legislature 
(for the Dutch case see e.g. Goedhart, 1958, p. 282-293). The rationale behind 
democratic consent on raising taxes is the compulsory character of taxes, affecting 
individual‟s wealth (Lauth, 2002, p. 43). In cases where government provides a service 
funded by taxes, authorisation by Parliament is required. From a budgeting perspective, 
providing a compulsory service for which citizens have to pay a fee16 rather than having to 
pay taxes, the effect is actually the same. The effect on someone‟s wealth is achieved 
indirectly because the citizen cannot avoid using the service and making the 
                                                 
15 In the Dutch text the words „inkomsten en uitgaven‟ are used. I have chosen to use the wording used in 
the International Public Sector Accounting Standards IPSAS1 and IPSAS: Financial reporting under the 
cash basis of accounting to provide a uniform definition of financial terms. Using IPSAS here does not 
mean that these standards are used in the Dutch context. See the financial definition in Appendix 10 
16 „Fee‟ is used to denominate all forms of funding that cannot be regarded as general purpose taxes such 
as income tax, VAT, corporate tax and local general taxes. An elaboration on fees is given in Part C. 
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corresponding payment. Hence, the compulsory nature of either a payment or the use of 
a service requires a priori consent by the democratically elected institutions. 
1.2. ZBOs: a brief introduction 
1.2.1. The concept ZBO 
Until now I have used two different concepts for entities that are not fully part of central 
government. I used the term „at arm‟s length entity‟, which is fairly standard in the 
international literature (e.g. Flinders, 1999a, p. 4; OECD, 2002, p. 10) and the term 
„ZBO‟. Generally speaking, ZBOs are a subset of the larger group of entities which are at 
arm‟s length of government in the Netherlands (Greve, Flinders and Van Thiel, 1999). The 
acronym ZBO consists of two concepts. First and foremost, „Bestuursorgaan‟, which is a 
concept from public law that means authoritative body. Without elaborating on details 
here, a Bestuursorgaan has the power to impose unilateral decisions upon citizens. The 
second concept is „Zelfstandig‟, which may either be translated as autonomous or 
independent. It is meant to express the idea that the entity is outside the hierarchical 
structure of central government ministries or in some cases that it may decide on matters 
between citizens and government impartially. In this study I will use autonomy when I 
refer to the organisational status of an entity outside the government hierarchy.  
I will focus on ZBOs for two reasons. First, ZBOs have authoritative powers that allow 
them to impose decisions upon citizens. Other groups of entities at arm‟s length of 
government perform a task within the public domain which is generally an executive – 
non authoritative - task such as teaching or operating a museum. Having authoritative 
power implies unilateral decision making on the position of a citizen in a specific case. 
Such a power requires forms of democratic control that go beyond mere accountability 
issues as the NCA seems to suggest in its 2006 report (Parliament, 2006a). Second, 
most of the political debates on attributing autonomy concern ZBOs. The debate has 
been going on for more than three decades, mainly focusing on ministerial responsibility 
and ex post accountability. There has been no systematic evaluation of the political 
control of ZBO operations from creating an entity and attributing operational authority ex 
ante to operations accountability ex post.17 In hindsight one might state that the Sint 
Committee tried to start that systematic evaluation process but ended up identifying 
three motives for creating ZBOs18 rather than developing its report further into the control 
mechanisms required for the three groups of ZBOs. 
1.2.2. Focus on ZBO operations 
In this study the focus is on services provided to the public by ZBOs on behalf of national 
government. Such services may either be „pure public goods‟ or „impure public goods‟ 
(e.g. Hillman, 2003, p. 64-65; Rosen, 2005, p. 56-57). When production is realised within 
the hierarchically controlled civil service, ministerial responsibility for budgeting and 
                                                 
17 Case based political interventions on operational decisions are not done in the Dutch political setting 
(Scheltema, 1974, p. 13). 
18 The motives were: mass production, impartial judgement and co-operation with third parties. 
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monitoring are clear as there is a direct chain of command. However, when a decision is 
made to transfer production to a unit like a ZBO outside the hierarchical structure , 
responsibilities become blurred even though the transfer of production was based on a 
democratic decision. It is the political system that makes this decision, sometimes 
perhaps for reasons of efficiency; in other cases possibly to guarantee objectivity or 
because government does not have the specific knowledge (Sint Committee, 1994, p. 13; 
OECD, 2002, p. 14). After this decision, ZBO management is responsible – given the 
(program) authority attributed – for actual realisation of the program as efficiently as 
possible. This also implies that in the relationship between Parliament, minister and ZBO 
the primary focus will be on quality and efficiency of operations. As the services provided 
are still regarded as public services rather than market activities, the system of funding 
the services will not change as a result of using another organisational structure. Using a 
ZBO only means that production is transferred to an institution that is no longer fully 
controlled by Parliament and a minister. Essentially, transfer of production does not 
change the nature of the services and the accompanying system of funding the services. 
If funding is based on a budget authorisation process, the transfer of production does not 
automatically require a change in the initial budget authorisation process. Only a 
fundamental political decision on funding rather than on production may result in a 
change in the budget authorisation process. Furthermore, a decision on budget 
authorisation frequency can be made as an expression of the reduced level of political 
control that was intended when production was transferred to an arm‟s length 
organisation. 
Zijlstra (2009, p. 43) notes that a ZBO has a double legal entity status. From a public 
law perspective, the office including attributed powers can be regarded as the legal 
entity; in a civil law context, the organisation and not the office is the legal entity. The 
emphasis in this study is the control by Parliament on the organisation, not control of the 
office which has a delegated or attributed power to issue public law based decisions. It is 
possible to address the ex ante Parliamentary control of ZBOs at two different levels. 
First, there is the debate between Parliament and Minister who have to agree on the level 
of budgets and the objectives to be achieved by the ZBO. At this level the issue is 
authorisation of budgets and objectives to be achieved. Using a ZBO implies that there is 
some managerial autonomy in operating the unit. In the Dutch setting, authorisation and 
appropriation have no separate legal status as in the USA (Janse de Jonge, 1993, p. 
149). It would therefore be odd for Parliamentary (budgetary) authorisations to result in 
detailed Parliamentary appropriations which restrict managerial autonomy. Second, there 
is the relationship between the minister and the management of the ZBO. Given the 
authorised budget, the minister is allowed to appropriate money to the ZBO and monitor 
the use of funds and the resulting performance. The level of detail a minister specifies in 
commissioning the tasks and corresponding funding for the ZBO of course also has an 
impact on ZBO managerial autonomy. Given the present Dutch practice of authorising 
more aggregated budget articles in the law (Minderman, 2003, p. 66), ZBO financial 
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autonomy seems to be formally assured. Intervention by a minister in appropriating 
detailed budgets may have a negative effect on autonomy and therefore needs to be 
investigated to assess the actual autonomy of individual ZBOs. At the end of a fiscal year 
the loop is the other way around. The ZBO is accountable to the minister with respect to 
services delivered and resources used. The minister assesses performance and is held 
accountable by Parliament for his actions with respect to the ZBO‟s management given 
the authorisation framework which was set by Parliament in the legislative and budgetary 
processes. 
Some ZBOs – such as UWV – provide income transfers to people who qualify for a 
particular income transfer program. These programs are based on a law that has passed 
Parliament in a separate procedure. It is up to the ZBO to decide upon individual 
applications and then provide the income transfer. From a program perspective, the 
transfer should be in compliance with the regulations in the program law. From an 
operational perspective, management of the ZBO has to assure that compliance is 
realised and payments are made as efficiently as possible. The ZBO is funded for its 
processing activities rather than the amount of income transfers provided to applicants. 
This means that budget authorisation of the ZBO only looks at the amount of money 
Parliament is willing to spend on the execution of the program, given the requirements in 
the program (level of compliance, timeliness and the like). Therefore, I can neglect the 
budget authorisation for the actual income transfers and focus on costs of operations 
only. 
1.3. Democratic control as leading mechanism 
In this study, the theoretical notions for provision of services are indirectly relevant as 
they have an impact on the solutions that can be used for specifying and funding the 
activities of a particular ZBO. I assume that the specific service is regarded as a service 
that must be provided in the (national) public domain. The study starts with the task 
assigned to a ZBO and elaborates on economic and legal control tools available to 
Parliament and minister to ensure that services are provided as efficiently as possible. 
Therefore I will not discuss the normative choices made by the political system to perform 
a task in the public domain. To illustrate this I will use the example of Land Registry. In 
the Netherlands, the Land Registry Office „Kadaster‟ was created in the early 19th century 
as a public service. For decades no one had debated the position of the Kadaster as a 
public service at the national level subject to budget authorisation and appropriation, 
despite the fact that citizens have always paid fees for the service. However, in 1994, the 
Kadaster was given a ZBO status and very soon after that a more efficient organisation 
with reduced fees came into being (Deelen and Eertink, 2004, p. 118), while still 
performing its traditional tasks. Kadaster‟s task is still regarded as a typically public task. 
The organisation was given more organisational freedom when it was given a ZBO-status 
and it is no longer included in the budget authorisation and appropriation process. 
Despite increased organisational freedom, Kadaster is still part of the broader 
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public/democratic control system. The control tools that are still used are the key subject 
of this study, although I will use other cases than Kadaster. 
1.3.1. Authorisation and autonomy 
This study focuses on operational autonomy of ZBOs. A ZBO has to produce services in 
the public interest, based on a democratic decision that a service has to be provided 
through government intervention rather than by market forces. It is the government who 
decides on funding of the organisation, either by taxes or by fees. The specification of 
services and the type and level of funding will be relevant for actual production and are, 
from a public finance theory perspective, based on a democratic decision to allocate 
resources in order to perform a public task. Allocation of a budget is reflected in the 
authorisation of a law that specifies the level and type of resources to be granted to 
perform a public task. The other two motives for government intervention - the macro-
economic and the distributive motive – can be ignored. The macro economic motive is 
not relevant as the resources used for operations of an individual ZBO are too small to 
have a macro economic impact. Furthermore, the macro-economic motive includes fiscal 
policy of government as a whole.  NCA studies claim that the amount of money spent in 
entities at arm‟s length of government is some €120 billion, just below the level of central 
government spending (Parliament, 2006a, p. 5). Such an amount of money suggests that 
a macro-economic impact from ZBO activities can be expected. However, based on the 
data collected for this study, nearly 95% of spending within at arm‟s length entities can 
be classified as program costs. As the study focuses on control of operations by 
Parliament, the impact of operating costs are relevant and their impact on fiscal policy 
and the macro-economic dimension to budget authorisation is, given the amount spent, 
rather small. 
The distributive motive covers income transfers and is related to the programs to be 
realised. Demand for an income transfer program will determine the level of operations of 
a ZBO but not the societal impact of the redistribution which is the relevant issue for the 
distributive motive. 
 
In the classic model, service provision based on authorised budgets is executed by a 
ministry and under full responsibility of the executive, in the Dutch case a minister. 
Unspent resources will be available for re-distribution within the political system. Due to 
the hierarchical structure, direct intervention by Parliament is possible if Parliament calls 
upon the minister to act. Using a ZBO or another form of quango implies that a specific 
public task is deliberately – e.g. for organisational reasons – commissioned to an entity 
at arm‟s length of government with consequences for the remaining responsibility of the 
executive (Scheltema, 1974). Direct intervention is no longer possible. From a budget 
authorisation perspective, the money will be spent within the organisation it has been 
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appropriated to, but there is no automatic mechanism19 for re-appropriation of unspent 
money because the money has left the State to be spent within another organisation.20 
Intervention by Parliament may be based on an ex-ante basis when the organisation is 
created and tasks are assigned or at the start of a fiscal year by passing a budget law 
and/or defining service levels. Parliament can also intervene during and after the initial 
budget authorisation, when performance of the organisation is assessed, be it to decide 
upon next year‟s budget or as a result of information on the organisation‟s operations. 
Whether interventions by Parliament have an effect can depend on the attribution of the 
necessary authority to the minister in the process of creating a ZBO for actual 
interventions. Creating a new legal entity is not automatically a financial authorisation 
procedure; to some extent it is part of the budget authorisation process, not only because 
of legislative requirements (CW2001:32-36), but also because it means that Parliament 
reduces part of its budget authorisation powers and transfers it into the hands of a 
minister. The fundamental decision on the distribution of authority between minister and 
ZBO in the legislative process is the foundation of decisions to be made in annual 
budgetary decisions. 
Given the arguments above, purely discussing budget authorisation as the key 
Parliamentary control tool would deny the broader context in which a production decision 
for government services and the related decision on the organisation of production by 
using a government unit or establishing ZBOs as well as other units at arm‟s length is 
realised. To discuss this broader context, I will use „control‟ of ZBOs rather than the 
classic concept of „budget authorisation‟. 
1.3.2. Product and market characteristics 
The type of services to be delivered by any publicly funded organisation might have an 
impact on how resources are allocated. In the case of „pure public goods‟ (Cullis and 
Jones, 1998, p. 50-51; Hillman, 2003, p. 64-65) such as defence, price cannot 
determine the quantity of the services to be delivered. This is caused by the fact that a 
pure public good does not allow for exclusion and is non-competitive, which means that 
the use of the service by a single additional user does not affect quality of or access to 
the service for other users. The lack of a market requires that government produces the 
services itself or will commission delivery of the service from a third (public) party such as 
a ZBO. In that situation a budget allocation is most likely a given amount of money.  
At the other end of the spectrum, a market good allows for exclusion and has a 
competitive character. In principle, no intervention by government is needed, unless the 
                                                 
19 Of course, it is possible that funding is paid on condition that unspent money will be returned, but this 
requires an action of government.  
20 Zijlstra (2009, p. 199) implicitly addresses this issue from another perspective. He notes that from a 
constitutional perspective ZBOs are nothing more than substructures rather than democratically 
legitimised organisations. He has a point and the precise legal arrangement of a ZBO will actually 
determine whether or not an automatic mechanism for re-appropriation mechanism  exists. My point 
here is that the legislature has to consider this beforehand, whereas in the case of a ministry no specific 
arrangements have to be made. 
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government‟s objective is to create a level playing field for supply and demand. Allocation 
of production and consumption of services is in this case subject to individual free 
choice. Government intervention may exist in the form of market or price regulation. In 
many countries a form of market regulator exists (e.g. Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [NMa] - which is a ZBO; Bundeskartellamt in Germany, Conseil de 
la Concurrence in France). In general, such organisations are classified as quangos 
because they are not subordinate to ministerial control for policy independence reasons 
(OECD, 2002, p. 14). The control mechanisms applied by the market regulators influence 
the allocation decisions of both consumers and producers. They do not affect the price 
mechanism as the prime control tool in production and supply, because the market 
regulator only intervenes in cases of possible mergers or unfair competition by price 
dumping for instance. The price after regulatory intervention will be different from the 
price in a perfect market and therefore, demand will be different as well, but this does 
not change the principle that decisions are made based on the new equilibrium price of 
the services. 
In both cases, political decisions have to be made to spend resources on the authority 
that is responsible for the market regulation and on the issue of funding these activities. 
Whether or not the particular authority is a ministerial unit with some autonomy or an 
autonomous entity, the same budget appropriation questions exist. 
Between excludable and rival services, which the market can provide and the “pure 
public goods” a whole range of services exists which may be subject to the political 
decision making mechanisms. Both in the case of creating a form of market regulation or 
in the case of traditional government services, a democratic authority has to decide upon 
the need for delivering this service and thus the same authority has to have some form of 
control over the task attributed to the executive unit and the corresponding funding.  
1.3.3. Control by Parliament 
In section 1.3.1, I have argued that budget authorisation by Parliament is in practice an 
expression of a wider range of control tools available to Parliament in relation to 
achieving political objectives. From a legal perspective, these control tools are not 
defined as control tools but can be derived from the powers attributed to Parliament by 
the constitution (Grondwet; [GW]) or by unwritten law. Basically, one can argue that 
Parliament has two types of powers for controlling government. The first type of power is 
related to passing legislation, the second type relates to providing information to 
Parliament. „Tweede Kamer‟ and „Eerste Kamer‟ do not have exactly the same powers; 
the role of „Eerste Kamer‟ is limited and regarded as an institution which reviews 
(chambre de réflexion; Burkens, Kummeling, Vermeulen and Widdershoven, 2001, p. 
228) proposals passed by „Tweede Kamer‟. I will mention the key differences in the 
discussion below. 
In the legislative process, Parliament in general is constitutionally co-legislator 
(GW:81). Van der Pot et al. (2006, p. 632) note that this was done to implement a system 
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of checks and balances within the legislative power. Both „Tweede Kamer‟ and „Eerste 
Kamer‟ have to approve a proposal for a law, before the law can be signed and published. 
In the Dutch system, there is no measure made in the case of diverging opinions on 
legislation between „Tweede Kamer‟ and „Eerste Kamer‟ (Burkens et al., 2001, p. 229).21 
The legislative power of „Tweede Kamer‟ is stronger than that of „Eerste Kamer‟ because 
„Tweede Kamer‟ has not only the right to accept or reject a proposal, it can also propose 
amendments (GW:84) or submit a proposal (right of initiative) for a law from its own ranks 
(GW:82). Van der Pot et al. note (2006, p. 633-638) that only a few proposals for a law 
are actually submitted by members of Parliament. Furthermore, the role of „Tweede 
Kamer‟ as legislator is changing from debating and considering legislation to debating 
policy programs, including objectives to be met (and services to be delivered- jdk) as well 
as active monitoring of Government (Van der Pot et al., 2006, p. 653). As a result, 
legislation has become the final stage of a process rather than an initial stage and 
„Tweede Kamer‟ is relying on its (ex post) monitoring role rather than its (ex ante) 
legislative role. The above remarks concern formal legislation, including budget laws and 
tax laws (Van der Pot et al. 2006, p. 794-800; Kortmann and Bovend‟Eert, 2006, p. 91). 
With respect to lower level legislation, generally decrees, ministerial rulings and policy 
rules, the role of Parliament is an ex post based rather than ex ante based control. This 
means that Parliament can discuss the decree or ruling after it has been announced. In 
the case of conditional decrees only, Parliament can use ex ante control tools by requiring 
legislation (Van der Pot et al., 2006, p. 678). One of the examples of conditional decrees 
regards creating at arm‟s length entities and will be discussed in Part B. 
 
The second type of control tools available to Parliament regards information provision. In 
this category, the rights of the „Tweede Kamer‟ and „Eerste Kamer‟ are theoretically 
similar, only the use of particular instruments may diverge. The first tool available is that 
of submitting questions to a minister. In formal law this is referred to as the right of 
information (GW:68). Ministers will generally answer questions, unless national interest 
prevents them from providing the information requested. A second tool is interpellation, a 
particular form of questioning on a subject not yet scheduled for discussion. Third and 
related to questioning and interpellation are motions, in which a proposed opinion of 
Parliament on a subject, generally the „Tweede Kamer‟, is submitted. If a motion passes 
Parliament, it is an expression of Parliament‟s desires on the subject towards the relevant 
minister who will generally give it due attention (Van der Pot et al., 2006, p. 782).  A 
fourth form is a Parliamentary investigation in which politicians and others can be heard 
but are not required to respond to Parliament‟s invitation. The last, and scarce, form is 
using an Parliamentary inquiry (GW:70) in which a particular topic is investigated by a 
Parliamentary subcommittee that is allowed to summon both politicians and others 
                                                 
21 This means that negotiation as is usual in the budgeting processes in the US House of Representatives 
and Senate (e.g. Ott and Ott, 1982, p. 136; Janse de Jonge, 1993, p. 47; Schick, 2000, p. 108-110; 
Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001, p. 104) does not exist.  
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involved in the subject under scrutiny and question them under oath. Parliamentary 
investigations and inquiries are generally based on the initiative of the „Tweede Kamer‟ 
but are tools available to the „Eerste Kamer‟ as well although it has not yet been used.  
(Van der Pot, 2006, p. 783). 
Questioning, interpellations and motions are tools that may be used on an ex ante or 
an ex post basis. Basically they fit the observed tendency for a monitoring role for 
Parliament (Van der Pot et al., p. 2006, p. 637). As these control tools are relatively easy 
to use, it is likely that these are tools that will be used when discussing at arm‟s length 
organisations as well. Investigations and inquiries are typical ex post control tools meant 
to evaluate a particular process. Van der Pot et al. (2006, p. 784) mention eight inquiries, 
one of them on the arm‟s length organisation of Dutch social security which provided 
some of the building blocks for the present organisation of social security (Bekke and Van 
Gestel, 2004, p. 37). 
 
Ultimately, the legal control tools attributed to Parliament are used to assess whether or 
not Parliament still has confidence in a particular minister or Cabinet as a whole, given 
the responsibility attributed to a minister in a particular case (see section 2.2.2 below). 
The role of these control tools is wider than just budgetary control, although the right of 
budget authorisation still is a strong control tool, which has been used in the past to 
express a lack of confidence in the Cabinet as well (Van der Pot et al., 2006, p. 634).  
 
Contrary to the legal setting, where control is not defined as a concept, in an economic 
setting definitions do exist. I will now address control from an economic perspective and 
after doing so discuss the relations between the legal and the economic perspectives of 
control. 
Merchant (1998, p. 2) starts noting that there is no universally accepted definition. He 
distinguishes two groups of definitions, one based on „a simple cybernetic system‟ and 
the other encompassing „all devices managers use to ensure that the behaviour and 
decisions of people in the organisation are consistent with the organisation‟s objectives 
and strategies‟ (Merchant, 1998, p. 2). Examples of the cybernetic system definitions can 
be found in for example Drury (2008, p. 11) when he refers to the managerial function of 
control consisting of measurement, reporting and subsequent correction of performance. 
Similarly, Weetman (2006, p. 10) describes control as a system of information seeking 
and gathering including accountability and feedback to achieve the organisation‟s goals. 
Atrill and McLaney (2009, p. 177) define control as „compelling events to conform to 
plan‟. Early promoters of the broad definition of control are Ouchi (1977) and Hofstede 
(1981) referring to different levels of control and required control tools that match types 
of decisions in organisations. They refer to differences between routine day to day 
decisions at one end of the spectrum and strategic decisions with ambiguity which 
require political control, even in private organisations (Hofstede, 1981, p. 197-198). 
Anthony writes in his foreword to the 9th edition of his management control systems book 
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(Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998, p ix) that back in 1965 he had some clues to 
behavioural issues with respect to control but that the issue was by far not as important 
as it is nowadays (end 1990s, jdk). Anthony and Young (2003, p. 3-4) and Merchant 
(1998, p. 2-3) identify three levels of control. First strategy formulation: setting out the 
goals and the activities to be realised to achieve these objectives. Second, management 
control in which, given the defined strategies, decisions are made on how to use 
resources to meet the strategic targets including systematic assessment of the results. 
Third, task control focuses on efficient and effective daily operations, including all 
necessary procedures to achieve production. In a fully unambiguous case where 
production is based on standard routines, Hofstede‟s routine controls are a very 
important instrument for managing the organisation. On the strategic level however, 
uncertainty prevails and decisions have a political character.  
 
In this study, the focus is on control of ZBO operations at the level of the decision makers, 
in this case Parliament and ministers. Parliament will set the objectives to be achieved, 
including the appropriation of resources needed to deliver production and the 
organisational framework in which production is to be realised. Furthermore, Parliament 
may set key decision rules for delivery of services, for example a driver‟s licence may only 
be issued to a person above the age of 18. These decisions are at the strategic level. In 
terms of the legal powers attributed to Parliament they refer to passing legislation 
including setting standards in the budgeting process. The latter group of decisions by 
Parliament aims at the managerial level rather than the strategic level because the 
cyclical budgeting procedures determine each and every year, given the strategic choices, 
the actual level of production to be delivered.22 Parliament‟s role in controlling decrees 
and other lower levels of legislation can be regarded as part of the management control 
tools because lower level legislation is based on the strategic decisions made before. 
Parliament‟s second cluster of legal control tools concern information provision. In 
economic terms, these control tools primarily focus on the management control level 
because information provision focuses on what is actually going on in a ZBO‟s operations. 
The information provision process can result in reconsidering strategic decisions in 
Parliament, or in interventions in the daily operations of an organisation in case of 
unexpected outcomes. However, given the arm‟s length relation between 
Parliament/Minister and a ZBO without hierarchical control structures, in general 
Parliamentary interventions at the operations level will be rare. It is the ZBO‟s 
management which was hired to define the actual operational processes to deliver the 
services and allocate the appropriated resources. They will have to organise processes in 
line with standards set by Parliament‟s control tools. A summary of the control tools 
available to Parliament is given in Table 1.1. 
                                                 
22  For now, I ignore differences in product and market characteristics although they may influence the 
control tools available to Parliament at a managerial level.  
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Table 1.1 Parliamentary control tools at the different control levels 
Strategic control Management control Task control 
Passing law on ZBO tasks and 
organisation  
Passing budget law - 
Right of initiative Discussing decrees - 
Amendments Amendments - 
Investigations and inquiries Questions Questions 
 
Given the control tools available to Parliament, focus in the study will be on the strategic 
and managerial level rather than on the actual operational level.  
1.4. Theoretical perspectives on ZBOs. 
Using quangos to deliver government services is neither new, nor a specific Dutch issue. 
The Swedish case is well known for its long history of small central government supported 
by numerous quangos (Statskontoret, 2001). Zwart (2003, p. 5) claims that the USA was 
one of the founding fathers of the executive agency23 concept that by now has spread all 
over the world. Early forms of what would in the 21st century be labelled “quango” existed 
in The Netherlands at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1950s, many new 
autonomous organisations were established by government (Van Thiel, 2000, p. 18). It 
lasted until 1974 when the label “Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan” or “ZBO” was used in 
Scheltema‟s inaugural speech (Scheltema, 1974). A decade later, under growing 
budgetary pressure, political and academic attention was given to the issue of 
privatisation (e.g. Boorsma and Mol, 1983) and autonomisation of ministerial units. From 
around 1990 (Boxum, de Ridder and Scheltema, 1989; Parliament, 1993a, 1993b), 
more (academic) attention was gradually given to controlling quangos and more 
specifically ZBOs. At the same time, a new peak in creating ZBOs could be observed (Van 
Thiel, Leeuw, Siegers & Flap, 1999, p. 34). The subject became an issue on the political 
agenda with the 1994 annual report of the NCA (Parliament, 1995a) I have already 
mentioned in section 1.1. 
 
In the last decade, studies on quangos from an economic, legal, political and managerial 
perspective have been published. The motives for creating quangos – of which ZBOs are 
a subgroup – include delegation of public management and improving efficiency (e.g. 
Hunt, 1995 p. 19; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 6-7). The idea is that delegation of 
responsibilities gives more leeway for management to use resources in line with actual 
needs. Delegation of responsibilities is based on neo-institutional theories from both an 
economic (Thompson, 1993, Ter Bogt, 1998, Verhoest, 2002) and a sociological/political 
perspective (Dimaggio and Anheier, 1990 p. 152; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Van 
Thiel‟s conclusion (2000, p. 180) that creating quangos does not automatically or 
immediately lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness is a warning regarding the 
                                                 
23 Some authors use executive agency (e.g. Hyndman and Eden, 2001; Smullen, 2007, p. 13); others use 
Government Agency (e.g. Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield and Smullen, 2004, p. 3). I will use „executive agency‟ 
when an internally autonomised unit is meant and the more general „agency‟ if reference is made to any 
form of agency, not covering the whole range of quangos. 
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creation of quangos as a panacea for management and control issues in the public 
sector. An additional complication with respect to quangos is that the authority related to 
ownership may be dispersed over several different institutions. This is what the NCA 
reported in their general reports on two groups of Dutch quangos24 (Parliament, 2000a, 
2001c, 2002a, 2004b, 2006a). In the following sections I will address some issues 
related to quangos in general that have been covered in earlier research. I will start with 
autonomy from a legal and economic perspective and then give some attention to issues 
that are relevant as background for my study. 
1.4.1. Legal perspective 
From a legal perspective, three lines of issues related to control of ZBOs can be identified 
in earlier studies. The first issue is the matter of ministerial responsibility. The doctrine is 
that there is no ministerial responsibility without corresponding ministerial authority (e.g. 
Scheltema, 1974, Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 8; Kummeling, Duijkersloot, 
Minderman, van Schagen & Zijlstra, 1999, p. 69). Kummeling et al. conclude in their 
study that ministerial power towards ZBOs is limited compared to ministerial powers 
within the hierarchical structures of government. Authority given to a ZBO implies that a 
minister cannot be forced to reverse a decision made by the ZBO unless he has specific 
authority to do so (Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 69). In a study in the British context 
(Westminster style democracy), Stone (1995) has developed a framework on 
responsibility and accountability resulting in different sets of institutional arrangements 
for public administration. In Stone‟s model traditional Parliamentary control and the 
effects it has on ministerial responsibility is contrasted with a judicial review perspective, 
a constituency accountability perspective, a market accountability perspective and a 
managerial perspective. The judicial review and constituency accountability are issues 
that affect individual cases, whereas the other two themes have an effect on the system 
of government operations. I will not cover the issue of market accountability which is 
covered in the issue of horizontalisation as referred to in section 1.4.3. When discussing 
budgetary control of operations, the differences between traditional Parliamentary control 
and the managerial perspective are the most relevant issues. In the former, compliance 
with authorised budgets, correct application of legislation in providing services and the 
resulting strict regulations prevail. In the latter the achievement of objectives is the 
relevant issue for Parliamentary control. To rephrase Stone‟s contrast in a budget 
authorisation context: traditional Parliamentary control is associated with line item 
budgeting (Anthony and Young, 1999, p. 449; Wildavsky, 2001, p. 139-140; McCaffrey 
and Jones, 2001, p. 11-12). The management perspective is reflected in program 
budgeting models such as the „Planning Programming and Budgeting System‟ [PPBS] 
(Schick, 1966), the (US) Government Performance and Results Act [GPRA] (McCaffery 
and Jones, 2001, p. 310) or the Dutch equivalent „Van Beleidsbegroting tot 
                                                 
24 More specifically: ZBOs and „Rechtspersonen met Wettelijke Taak‟ [RWT]; see chapter 2. 
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Beleidsverantwoording25‟ [VBTB] (see e.g. Boorsma, Maessen & Schild, 1999) as it is 
incorporated in the present Dutch CW2001. The essential difference between the two is 
that in the traditional model ministerial responsibility will imply that on a day to day basis 
interventions may exist, whereas in the managerial model ministerial responsibility is at 
the strategic level of achieving goals (Stone, 1995, p 511-514). In the Dutch context, the 
strategic level responsibility is referred to as system responsibility (Parliament, 2006a, p. 
21). 
Second, there is the issue of budgeting and budget laws themselves. Why and how 
has the present central government budgetary framework developed, more specifically 
with respect to those units that operate outside the traditional hierarchical setting of the 
ministries? This means that the concept of authorisation and appropriation (e.g. Lyden 
and Miller, 1982) and the importance of ex ante authorisation (van Braband, 1986) have 
to be addressed. The work of Minderman (2000) and Janse de Jonge (1993) discusses 
Dutch budgeting procedures and requirements and the role of Parliament in budget 
authorisation. In the words of Lüder‟s contingency model, the institutional arrangements 
including the legal system have an effect on government accounting reforms (Lüder, 
1992) and must therefore also have effects on budgeting as the budgeting framework 
defines the accounting model that can be used. In Minderman‟s work, ZBO budgeting 
procedures are described given the responsibilities attributed to a minister for controlling 
ZBOs. He concludes that there are sufficient control instruments available regarding 
ZBOs although these control instruments are not always fully used (Minderman, 2000, p. 
206). Minderman refers to annual reports (informally) submitted to Parliament which are 
hardly used by Members of Parliament [MP]. Minderman neglects two issues that are 
related to each other. The control instruments available remain within the domain of the 
executive power – the minister and his staff - rather than in the domain of the legislature. 
Therefore, Parliament in its role as legislator is not able to assess how ZBOs are 
performing and using their budgets. Furthermore, Minderman does not discuss whether 
there is a need for authorisation of ZBO budgets at all. NCA and Cabinet have different 
opinions on ex post reporting: Cabinet prefers reporting by exception whereas NCA notes 
that transparent information provision requires aggregated information on operations and 
performance of ZBOs including reporting on the monitoring role by the respective minister 
(Parliament, 2007b, p. 14). MPs interviewed in the context of this study note information 
overload. Reading the full annual reports of ZBOs is time consuming, whereas a 
summarised statement by a minister is likely to draw attention of Parliament and is in line 
with NCA‟s suggestions for improving control of ZBOs. Does that mean that allocating a 
budget to a ZBO is equivalent to allocating a budget to a ministry which uses that budget 
to buy services on the private market? If that was the case, all critical reports and studies 
on ZBOs would be obsolete because in general Parliament will not discuss profits or 
governance structures of individual contractors. Whether or not authorisation and 
                                                 
25 This can be translated as „from policy budget to policy accountability‟ 
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appropriation are described in present law is only one part of the story, there have been 
substantial changes in Dutch Budgeting Laws throughout the years. Documents such as 
Antheunissen‟s (1948) description and explanation of the first „Comptabiliteitswet‟ of 
1927 [CW1927] or the Simons Committee report (1960) that drafted the 1976 
„Comptabiliteitswet‟ [CW1976] reveal different stages in attitude towards budget 
authorisation and appropriation for what are now generally labelled as at arm‟s length 
organisations. 
The third issue is the legal setting in which ZBOs operate. ZBOs should preferably 
operate within the public law framework (Zijlstra, 2009, p. 9). This notion was for example 
expressed in the recommendations of the Sint Committee on creating ZBOs (Sint 
Committee, 1994, p. 22) and confirmed in statements by the Cabinet on kZBO 
(Parliament, 2005a, p. 6). The fact is that the Dutch government often uses private sector 
entities to perform public tasks (Peters, 1997; Zijlstra, 1997; Van Wijk, Konijnenbelt and 
Van der Male, 1999; Schroten, 2000). In other cases ZBOs are part of the „State‟ legal 
entity (Van Wijk et al., 1999, p. 126), which suggests at first glance that they are 
hierarchically subordinated to the minister. Such differences in legal status may have 
effects on the authority that is or can be attributed to the minister to control ZBOs. In 
kZBO some differentiation with respect to financial monitoring by the minister exists 
between ZBOs created as public law units, public law entities and private law entities. It is 
not immediately clear how this differentiation affects the role of Parliament in authorising 
and appropriating budgets. 
What is known of the legal framework in which ZBOs operate mainly concerns 
ministerial responsibility and accountability rather than a discussion on the role of 
Parliament in controlling ZBOs. In line with the NCA recommendations on improving 
information provision to the legislature (Parliament, 2006a, p. 9) I will use the concept of 
ministerial responsibility related to the legal status of specific ZBOs to assess the effects 
on Parliamentary control of ZBOs. 
1.4.2. Economic perspective 
Secondly, I will address the economic perspective. In this section I will focus on three 
lines of economic theory: Neo Institutional Economics, providing public goods and 
financial management. I will discuss the concepts „principal‟ and „agent‟ which are 
concepts in Neo-institutional Economics, particularly „Agency Theory [AT]‟. This choice is 
driven by the fact that these concepts have different meanings when used in an 
economic or in a public administration perspective. I will follow the economic perspective 
and elaborate on the differences between this perspective and the public administration 
perspective. 
1.4.2.1. Commissioning and funding 
Berle and Means (1932) developed the agency theory from a business environment. In a 
small business, the owner and manager of the entity is one and the same person, which 
prevents the problem of information asymmetry. The owner/manager has to deal with his 
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clients to whom he has to sell his products and services on demand of the individual 
client. In larger companies, the information problem arises from the separation between 
owner and manager. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as well as Eggertson (1990, p 
40-41) defined an agency relation as a relationship in which the principal delegates some 
authority to an agent who in turn provides a service on behalf of the principal. This 
implies that the agent‟s services to the principal is to organise matters so that the 
customer, who would previously ask the owner (principal) to deliver the service directly to 
him no longer asks the owner to do so, but asks his stand-in, the agent. As a result two 
service relationships are created: one between the principal and the agent (the stand-in 
relation) and one between the agent and the customer (the purchaser relation). A key 
point in Jensen and Meckling‟s and Eggertson‟s definitions is the principle of delegation 
of rights or - to put it differently – authority/powers from one person (organisation) to 
another. These two persons are labelled principal and agent respectively. It is the 
information problem that exists between these two that is analysed under agency theory. 
The owner no longer has a relationship with the client: that is left to the manager who is 
responsible for the operations of the entity. Neelen (1993, p. 65-67) notes that the 
hierarchical relationship is not necessarily essential for defining principal-agent problems 
but that positive principal agent theory with respect to problems between or in 
organisations has led to this focus on delegation of authority. 
 
In the public sector, agency theory has been applied as well (e.g. Moe, 1984; 2006).  The 
analogy to the private sector implies that principal and agent must be regarded in terms 
of owner and manager. The manager has to make sure that the services provided are 
delivered within a framework set by the owner. In a business case, the framework will 
come down to a ROI-indicator.26 In a budgeted environment in the public sector, 
management has to meet the standards set in the budget, eventually including output 
standards.  
Agency theory in the public sector has developed beyond the original separation of 
ownership and control. Moe (2006, p. 3) and West (1997, p. 599) focus on the 
hierarchical relationship in which a task is delegated or assigned to an agent. In that 
case, information problems arise due to the differences in knowledge on the assigned 
task. In public administration theory, agency theory is broadened towards political control 
in general (e.g. Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 177; Verhoest, 2002, p. 53) and even 
further to issues of multiple principals (e.g. Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 178; Hazeu, 
2000, p 99-100). Koppel (2003, p. 22) points out that few public administration users 
adhere to the formal meaning of the concepts of principal and agent in the economic 
context. In his words, „principal-agent theory has become the metaphor of choice for 
political scientists studying bureaucratic control‟.  Others are suggesting that agency 
theory is associated with supply and demand. Waterman and Meier (1998, p. 175) state 
                                                 
26 Return on investment 
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that the economic perspective of agency theory is on „buyers and sellers‟. Similarly, Van 
Thiel and Pollitt (2007, p. 56) implicitly assume a supply and demand relationship as they 
state that „the principal charges the agent in return for a budget‟. McGuire (2003), states 
that „purchaser-provider arrangements are a variant of the principal-agent model of 
rational choice‟, which also suggests „buyer-seller‟ relations. Using agency theory to 
describe supply and demand relations may be the effect of using examples commonly 
used as „insurer-insured‟ or „doctor-patient‟ which actually address the moral hazard-
dimension of information asymmetry rather than a division of powers between two 
related institutions. In a legal context, Songer, Segal and Cameron (1994, p. 674) 
indicate that the courts in the USA „…have considered agency “a fiduciary relationship”, 
where the agent has a primary duty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal‟. They 
continue that, in their study on the relationships between different levels of courts, the 
hierarchical relationship is the most important issue. This resembles the original 
economic interpretation of principal and agent. 
Although there may be a shift in attention from the formal hierarchical structure as a 
result of adapting agency theory to the public administration field, the emphasis is in my 
opinion still on the original governance structure. This is emphasised by words like 
„control‟ (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 309; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, p. 331-332; 
West, 1997, p. 600) or „power‟ (e.g. Moran, 2008, p. 159).  
 
The different interpretations of the principal-agent concept have to do with convergence 
in the hierarchical relationship between the political system and the executive power on 
the one hand and the provision of (impure) public services by the executive on the other. 
Meier and O‟Toole (2006, p. 142) note that in NPM, there are in fact different focuses: on 
the one hand consumer sovereignty or, in the words of Boorsma and Mol (1983), 
privatisation of demand, in which choice by citizens is the main issue. On the other hand, 
there is a focus on reducing the bureaucratic hurdles that prevent management from 
being creative in delivering services. The client as user of services is not discussed in 
most public sector principal-agent cases; just as in the private sector analysis of principal 
agent relations within or between organisations.27 
The concept client gives rise to another complication in the analysis. First, Fountain 
(2001) remarked that the focus on privatisation of demand has risks with respect to 
democratic choices as well, given the focus on the individual. I will focus on the difference 
between final user and the one who is paying for the service as an analytical tool and not 
discuss the possible impact on democracy. Second, in a private sector environment, the 
client directly pays for and receives the goods or services delivered. In a public sector 
environment, there may be a difference between the one paying for a service and the one 
who actually receives the service. This difference can best be elaborated upon in the case 
of an income transfer transaction. Suppose government has decided that a form of 
                                                 
27 Classic examples of private relationships between client (principal) and agent service provider are 
patient-physician, client-lawyer (e.g. Neelen, 1993, p. 65) 
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scholarships should be available to a particular group of students. The decision making 
process is left to a private entity who, after a tendering procedure, has a monopoly on this 
decision making process and has to comply with rules set by government. Government is 
in this case not the owner of the entity, but has commissioned this task to the private 
entity. As government is not the owner of the private entity, it cannot have the status of 
the principal as meant by agency theory. Government is also not the one who receives the 
service; that would be the student who successfully applied for the scholarship. The 
services government receives are in fact intermediate: it regards the decisions made by 
the private entity on the applications of all students. Government will pay for these 
decisions and also fund the scholarships.  
The example illustrates that 'client' is an ambiguous concept, as there are in fact two 
different clients who each receive a different service based on the single application of 
the individual student. To make a clear distinction between the different roles 
government and individuals have, I will not use the concept of principal when discussing 
the role of government towards an individual ZBO. If I do refer to the role of principal as 
meant in agency theory, I will use the word 'owner' or „minister-principal‟. If government is 
the entity that assigns a task to an entity outside the hierarchical structure but only 
receives benefits in terms of intermediate outputs or in terms of general outcomes, I will 
use 'commissioner'. The concept 'client' is only used for the individual or entity that is the 
final user of the service provided; in the case of the scholarships this is the individual 
student who has applied for the scholarship. A final point to be made is that 
commissioner or client need not be the person who is actually paying for the service 
delivered. I will use 'funder' to indicate the entity that actually transfers the payment for 
the service directly to the service provider (i.e. the ZBO). Of course, both in theory and in 
practice cases exist in which government has multiple roles, but by clearly separating 
them in the analysis, the different interests involved in these different roles and the 
impact that has on the relative autonomy of ZBOs can be shown. 
1.4.2.2. Three economic dimensions. 
Autonomisation is often regarded as a result of Neo Institutional Economic theories (e.g. 
Ter Bogt, 1998; Kettl, 2002, p. 86-87; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, 175; Guthrie, 
Humprhrey, Jones & Olson, 2005, p. 2). I have already discussed AT, but another related 
issue has to do with the observation of the NCA on dispersed ownership (e.g. Parliament, 
2000a, p. 16). Property Rights Theory [PRT] can provide tools for analysing residual 
claims (Künneke, 1997): who bears the ultimate operational risk. The ideas of PRT are 
related to the legal status of a ZBO and the distribution of authority, but have to my 
knowledge not been discussed in a ZBO context.  
From Transaction Costs Theory [TCT] (e.g. Williamson, 1993) it is known that asset 
specificity – either physical or in terms of knowledge – may lead to mutual dependencies 
between commissioner and supplier. It will thus also affect Parliament‟s budget 
authorisation perspective.  
Introduction and research question   
 
24 Part A: Research problem and Dutch institutional context 
 
In the PRT literature that directly refers to ZBOs, Kuiper (1999) focuses on financial 
supervision, which is basically an element of AT. His proposals address the organisation 
of supervision and the actual arrangements to be made. Once the legislature has 
authorised the structure of supervision in the law that creates a ZBO, supervision is a tool 
that is only available once budgets have been authorised. It therefore does not 
immediately contribute to a debate on the need of budget authorisation as such.  
Plug, Timmerman and Dekker (2004, p. 28) note that supervision is only one of four 
elements in the relationship between ministry and ZBO. The policy-program is given when 
discussing ZBO operating costs and therefore, ownership and contract are the remaining 
themes which are relevant. From the authorisation perspective, the issues are the 
amount of resources Parliament would like to allocate to execute a specific task. Only 
when that is given, can negotiations and contracting be performed.  
Similarly, ownership suggests control over residual value (see PRT). The role of 
Parliament from the authorisation perspective would then be that it considers the 
possibilities to reallocate residual value, which can only be performed if there is a match 
between the institutional setting - including the distribution of authority - of a ZBO, the 
tasks attributed to it and the matter of funding.  
Finally, Verhoest (2002, p. 117) uses agency theory to develop a model in which 
controls on results and inputs on the one hand and incentives such as funding and 
competition on the other hand determine the level of control required. He ultimately 
suggests that perhaps other variables such as legitimacy are more important in 
determining the performance than the controls developed from AT (Verhoest, 2002, p. 
358). The control models Verhoest tests are meant to predict effectiveness of 
organisations, which is of course relevant in a performance budgeting environment.  
What in my opinion is still missing is the possibility to apply such a control model 
based neither on the activities of organisations nor on the choice of a specific form of 
organisation. As a result, Parliament‟s role in authorising budgets – whether traditional 
input or performance based budgets – is not sufficiently covered.  
 
A second perspective is public finance theory. This line of theory on providing public 
services aims at identifying possible solutions for funding and commissioning services 
provided by ZBOs. The characteristics of a service determine whether or not the service is 
non-rival and/or non-excludable. As a result, services can be classified as pure public 
good, impure public good or individual good (e.g. Hillman, 2003, p 64-65; Rosen, 2005; 
p. 56-57). It is obvious that in the case of a pure public good, the free rider problem 
prevents commissioning and funding solutions other than government commissioning 
and funding. Government has to fund and allocate a budget, irrespective of who is 
actually producing a service. Thus budget authorisation is expected to be a decision of 
Parliament. Pure public services may be found in case of quasi judicial ZBOs (tribunals) 
such as „Commissie Gelijke Behandeling‟ [CGB] (Equal Treatment Commission). The other 
extreme is an individual service (e.g. a licence) that allows for user payment for the 
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service as well as calculation of cost prices. Services provided by ZBOs will generally have 
a monopolistic character as they are the result of an exclusive public law based 
authoritative decision by the ZBO as an office. Hence, from the supply side of the „market‟ 
there may be a lack of efficiency incentives (e.g. IBGroep, 2006, p. 15; Linker, 2006, p. 
237). It may thus also have an effect on the (budgetary) controls and authorisation that is 
needed when Parliament decides that a specific good has to be provided. 
In the literature on ZBOs, some classifications on services or activities exist (Sint 
Committee, 1994; Parliament, 1995a, p. 12; Boxum et al, 1989, p. 48-49; Smullen & 
Van Thiel, 2002) but in none of these are the public good characteristics of ZBO-services 
included. Only in discussions on hybrids (Simon, 1989; Kickert, 1998) does the 
dichotomy between the task-market environment have a relation to the public good 
dimension. Using the public good dimension can thus contribute to understanding the 
relation between controls by Parliament and the provision of services by ZBOs.  
 
The last economic perspective to be mentioned here is based on (micro) business 
economics. From this perspective, the debate is on the continuity of the organisation or, 
in the words of Bouma (1982, p. 42), economic independence. This concept has a very 
straightforward link to autonomy as it is an indicator of the ability of an organisation to 
cover costs through revenues generated. If not, the organisation will be doomed to 
disappear. To put it simply: if Parliament is not willing to authorise a ZBO‟s budget and 
the ZBO has no other options for generating revenues, it will cease to exist as a result of 
lack of resources. A ZBO that delivers pure public good can thus never be economically 
independent, whereas a ZBO that delivers individual services, at least theoretically has 
opportunities to survive. Zijlstra (1997, p. 213) noted in his dissertation that 
independence of a ZBO is a function of funding, organisational structure and the authority 
attributed to the oversight body (i.e. minister). The business economy perspective also 
has a relation to PRT and legal authority attributed through the concept of responsibility 
accounting (e.g. Merchant, 1998, p. 305; Anthony & Young, 1999, p. 12-15). The 
concepts of economic independence and responsibility accounting have as far as I know 
not been applied to the domain of quangos in general nor for that of ZBOs. Budget 
authorisation has an effect on economic independence and responsibility accounting first 
and foremost while discussing making funds available to a specific entity. It also has an 
indirect effect by setting the (legal) standards under which the unit has to operate. The 
concept of responsibility accounting is a reflection of the degrees of freedom available to 
management of a ZBO and thus by implication a reflection of the responsibilities that 
have been left at the higher – in this case political – level of the organisation. It is an 
expression of the link to the authority attributed by Parliament to the minister from an 
economic rather than a legal perspective. 
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1.4.3. Public Administration perspective 
For the public administration perspective, three groups of studies can be identified. The 
first group addresses the issue of why and how at arm‟s length entities were created. The 
Sint Committee‟s report (1994) is a document which has tried to set standards for 
creating ZBOs in the broader context of the privatisation and autonomisation debate. The 
most important conclusions of this report were that only three motives should allow for 
creating ZBOs: efficiency in production; impartial judgement or co-operation with third 
parties outside central government. Similar motives were given in the UK (Wilson, 1995, 
p. 9). Later government reports such as the Kohnstamm Committee report (2004) 
recognised this conclusion but noted that given ministerial responsibilities, only the 
impartiality motive would allow for creating ZBOs. Van Thiel‟s (2000) study is an example 
of studies that address the issue of why and how at arm‟s length organisations were 
created by politicians. In a later study, an effort was made to find relevant factors within 
the civil service that may have led to specific choices in autonomisation (Van Thiel, 
2006). Similar studies exist for the UK setting (e.g. Ridley & Wilson, 1995; Flinders & 
Smith, 1999) and the USA (e.g. Hammond & Knott, 1996). 
Related to the first group of studies on creating entities at arm‟s length of government 
is the cluster of comparative (international) studies. The underlying perspectives vary but 
they have in common that an analysis is performed based on institutional arrangements 
in different countries. The study of Greve, Flinders and Van Thiel (1999) is an early 
example of describing units at arm‟s length of government from within three different 
jurisdictions. Another example focusing mainly on the Anglo Saxon world is Nolan (2001). 
The OECD (2002) and Zwart and Verhey (2003) comparative studies provide general 
descriptions of positions of arm‟s length organisations in several countries including 
economic and legal dimensions of control. These studies are useful as they provide 
elementary frameworks for analysis of ZBOs. Pollitt and Talbot (2004) provide a 
comparative study from a public administration, more particularly, Public Management 
Reform perspective in which they comment on the impact of the organisational changes. 
Janse de Jonge‟s (1993) work is a comparative study of (legal) budgeting procedures in 
the USA, the UK and the Netherlands. This work is useful because it provides a context to 
assess literature on at arm‟s length organisations in their national setting. Solutions that 
may have an effect on controlling at arm‟s length organisations in one jurisdiction may 
have other effects in other jurisdictions. 
The policy objective and managerial perspectives of units at arm‟s length of 
government are covered for example by the works of Pollitt (1990) and Flynn (1993) who 
study the development of management theories that allow for executing public tasks at 
arm‟s length from government. Hood, James, Peters and Scott (2004) and Pollitt, Talbot, 
Caulfield and Smullen (2004) studied specific policy domains in which at arm‟s length 
organisations have been created. 
A third group consists of studies that focus on the perspective of changing 
governance structures (e.g. Kalders, Van Erp & Peters, 2004; Schillemans & Bovens, 
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2004; Bovens, 2005; Schillemans, 2005). The core of the debate in these studies is that 
vertical accountability – the accountability from a hierarchically subordinate unit to its 
principals - can partly be transferred by accountability to other stakeholders, referred to 
as horizontal accountability. 
 
The first group of studies only explains the existence of autonomous units without 
creating a link between the characteristics of the services provided and funding of 
quangos. As a result of that, there has been no discussion whatsoever on the role of the 
legislature in the budgeting process. That is where my study can fill a gap. I will use the 
second group of comparative literature mainly to describe the Dutch setting in a broader 
international perspective when needed to make readers aware of specific institutional 
and constitutional features. The third group of studies is not interested in the ex ante 
budgeting process at all and focuses on the ex post accountability and the performance 
of units at arm‟s length of government. In my opinion it is not possible to assess the 
performance of a unit when no clear standards have been set. In the public domain the 
legislature has the role of defining what services have to be delivered and at what cost. 
From an economic perspective this is referred to as the allocation and authorisation 
function of budgeting. Before it is possible to discuss performance, one should be able to 
assess the allocation and authorisation perspective. I will therefore not address the issue 
of ex post accountability as a separate issue. 
1.4.4. Organisation and management perspective 
There is very wide literature available on the why and how of New Public 
Management/Public Management Reforms. The (economic) work of for example Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1983) and Williamson (1993) as well as Osborne and 
Gaebler‟s (1992) sociological approach may be regarded as the theoretical foundation 
behind present developments in delegated public management. Key issues in this 
literature include that delegated authority and responsibility generate more responsive 
government but at the same time create new issues on how to control delegated 
authority and responsibilities on an operational level. As in the Public Administration 
literature, authorisation of budgets by the legislature is not an issue. 
A specific theme in organisation theory is the phenomenon of hybrid organisations. 
Hybrid organisations are according to Kickert organisations that have to operate 
„businesslike… and efficiently‟ while performing their public tasks (Kickert, 1998, p. 192). 
Others describe hybrid organisations as organisations that deliver services both in a 
(budgeted) task setting as well as in a market setting (In „t Veld, 1995; Meijerink, 2005, 
p. 19; Simon, 2005, p. 39). In the USA, Koppell defines hybrid organisations as (partly) 
privately owned entities created by government to realise public policy purposes (Koppell, 
2003, p. 12). Although the definition is not the same as in the Dutch cases, Koppell also 
discusses organisations that deliver services on behalf of the public as well as the private 
sector (Koppell, 2003, p. 184).  
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A ZBO is not necessarily a hybrid organisation. In most cases when hybrids are 
discussed, the debate is on organisations that deliver services (e.g. education and health 
care) in the public domain but without the legal-authoritative character of the services 
(e.g. licensing) as is required to qualify as a ZBO. A parallel between hybrids and ZBOs 
can be found in discussions on governance of these institutions. Many debates in the 
Dutch Parliament as well as in the press are on issues such as remuneration of top 
management and the level of equity accumulated in such organisations. A Parliamentary 
committee even reported on the matter of remuneration (Dijkstal Committee, 2004, 
2007) and discussions on equity in the public domain emerge regularly (e.g. Tubbing, 
2007). 
A major issue for hybrid organisations is whether the organisation can manage to 
deliver services for both the market and the public domain without bias in favour of 
market production. In the Netherlands, two rather opposed perspectives exist. On the one 
hand, Simon (1989; 2005, p. 42) is very explicit: a mixture of task and market services in 
one organisation will ultimately result in a relative disadvantage for one of the domains. 
In „t Veld (1995) and Meijerink (2005) are more optimistic. They postulate that especially 
in the not-for-profit domain numerous organisations exist which deliver public services 
from a private setting where governance and control is different not just in the financial or 
legal dimension (Meijerink, 2005, p. 31). I do not intend to analyse hybridity of ZBOs in 
depth, but I cannot neglect it either. Some ZBOs are private legal entities, others do have 
a mixture of public and private tasks (e.g. Boxum et. al, 1989); the previously mentioned 
Kadaster generates some sales from international activities (Kadaster, 2007). It is likely 
that such differences may have an effect on the need for budget authorisation and 
appropriation in specific cases. 
Kickert concludes in his book on hybrid organisations that creating formal autonomy 
may be misleading. He found that ministerial control seems to be even stronger when an 
organisation is given formal autonomy as a result of differences in cultural and 
managerial responsibilities (Kickert, 1998, p. 189.). A few years later the NCA issued a 
report describing possible control tools for ministries to monitor ZBOs (Parliament, 
2001c). Both studies address internal management issues which are relevant for 
ensuring that information is available to a minister and thus in principle also for 
Parliament. Such instruments can be the result of responsibility and accountability 
attributed to a minister, but do not discuss whether ministerial responsibility is required 
or not. Therefore, I will not follow a similar line of research. 
 
By now, I have superficially discussed four perspectives for studying ZBOs. The economic 
dimension in particular seems to have had only limited attention despite the indications 
that this dimension, together with the legal context, does have an impact on 
Parliamentary control including budget authorisation and appropriation. Parts B and C of 
this study will provide an in depth analysis on the legal and economic dimensions related 
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to ex ante control of ZBOs. In the following section, the research questions and the 
outline of the study will be discussed. 
1.5. Research questions 
Parliament has two ex ante tools to control ZBOs. First Parliament defines the legal 
framework in which ZBOs have to operate by attributing authority to a minister and 
assigning tasks to a ZBO.  Second, the annual budget process is the key tool by which 
Parliament is periodically able to allocate resources to a ZBO and implicitly accept 
priorities and service levels (Minderman, 2002, p. 20-21). In section 1.3, I argued that „ex 
ante control‟ represents a wider set of legal and economic instruments for Parliament 
than the formal budgeting process. There has been no systematic evaluation of the 
effects of ex ante control by Parliament on the distribution of authority and the impact on 
budgeting authorisation with respect to ZBOs and, by implication, autonomy on the 
operations of ZBOs. Therefore, my research problem will focus on these effects as 
expressed in the following question: 
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
To arrive at an answer, a multidisciplinary study will be performed in which not only the 
effects of the separate legal and economic dimensions to the problem will be evaluated, 
but also the effect of arrangements of the separate dimensions on each other. Before I 
can actually assess the full impact of a set of arrangements, I will need to evaluate three 
separate descriptive research questions leading to a framework for assessing ZBO 
autonomy. The first question addresses a description of the field of ZBOs in its 
institutional context: 
How do Dutch ZBOs fit into the institutional context of Dutch central 
government? 
I will not only focus on a description of ZBOs but also provide a brief description of the 
Dutch institutional setting. By doing so, I aim to create a level playing field for 
understanding Dutch solutions in an international (comparative) context. 
The second question provides a mono-disciplinary approach to autonomy in the Dutch 
legal context and its impact on Parliamentary control: 
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from legal theory and how do 
they match control of ZBO operations? 
Similarly, a question from an economic perspective is needed: 
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from economic theory and how 
do they match control of ZBO operations? 
Given the answers to these research questions, an analysis can be performed on the 
autonomy of individual (groups of) ZBOs. I use the word relative to express that I expect 
not all ZBOs to have been attributed the same level of autonomy. This is for example 
based on Linker‟s (2006, p. 103-104) remarks on differences in control structures of 
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ZBOs. On the level of analysis of an individual ZBO, this means that a ZBO can be 
classified as an entity with high or low autonomy, both in the legal and on the economic 
dimension. Ideally, there will be a match between the economic and the legal dimension 
of autonomy, otherwise conflict in controlling a ZBO is built in by design. This is expressed 
in Figure 1.1. When legal and economic autonomy are aligned in the Parliamentary 
control systems, only problems that are mainly driven by political considerations rather 
than actual ZBO operations may remain. 
 
Figure 1.1: Matching of legal and economic autonomy of ZBOs. 
 
The empirical part of this study will address the issue of the (mis)match between 
Parliament‟s control tools and the economic and legal autonomy of a ZBO. The question 
for this part of the study is:  
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit the legal and 
economic characteristics of ZBO services? 
Given the number of ZBOs, it would be too ambitious to prepare a study that covers all 
existing cases; therefore I will use a multiple case study approach. Before I give a brief 
outline of the thesis, I will first address the research methodology in more detail. 
1.6. Research design and methodology 
1.6.1. Research plan 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate possible mismatches between formally observed 
and actual practices in Parliamentary control and autonomy of ZBOs. There has been no 
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previous research on a multidisciplinary basis of law and economics with respect to ZBOs. 
Previous mono-disciplinary studies on ZBOs, both in terms of economics and law, do exist 
(e.g. Kummeling et al. 1999; Kuiper, 1999). Such studies do allow a theoretical basis to 
be developed that goes beyond the pure exploratory research model (Babbie, 2008, p. 
326; Yin, 2009, p. 18) that would be necessary if no knowledge was available at all.  The 
research plan has an inductive rather than a deductive design (Babbie, 2008, p. 57). 
Furthermore, the research has a descriptive comparative character (Geurts, 1999, p. 
153) rather than a testing character. This allows for what Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 
2002, p. 501) refer to as theory based evaluations by disclosing expected relationships. It 
cannot have a testing character due to a lack of a theory on possible causal relationships 
that determines the autonomy of ZBOs. 28 The descriptive character of the study is also a 
result of the fact that there are no normative solutions for controlling ZBOs: as far as 
general legislation on ZBOs (even in kZBO as of 2008) exists it allows politicians to 
choose between options or to even fully diverge from these options (Parliament, 2008b).  
On a broader level, comparative research is needed due to the differences in 
institutional settings in each jurisdiction: just copying a solution that seems to be 
adequate in one jurisdiction may be totally ineffective in another one. A comparative 
study can provide the context that is needed to understand what is going on in the 
particular – in this case Dutch national level – jurisdiction. A comparative case study 
design provides the opportunity for an in depth analysis of controlling individual ZBOs.  
In addition to the two formal legal and economic dimensions, controlling a ZBO is 
based on an interaction between different participants at different levels (ZBO-ministry-
political level) who might have different opinions on the effect of autonomy on budget 
authorisation. The case study design allows data to be brought together from this variety 
of perspectives (Swanborn, 2003, p. 39-40; Yin, 2009; p.18). 
1.6.2. Methodology 
I have chosen to carry out multiple case study research. From a methodological point of 
view, a multiple case study design allows more powerful conclusions to be reached than 
a single case study design (Yin, 2009, p. 61). The choice is also driven by the indications, 
at least in the literature on the legal setting in which ZBOs operate, of a link between 
reasons for creating ZBOs and the authority attributed to a minister (e.g. Boxum et al., 
1989, p. 37-39; Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 65-67). Kuiper (1999, p. 35-39) adds that 
different control regimes exist, also based on the legal characteristics of ZBOs. A single 
case study would not reveal such differences. A full survey (Geurts, 1999, p. 152; Babbie, 
2008, p. 270) on the population (n>100) would be more appropriate for an exploratory 
research design aiming at future in depth research (Yin, 2009, p. 9) or an explanatory 
design meant for deductive research types (Babbie, 2008, p. 303) 
When executing multiple case study research, a major question is how to find relevant 
cases. Basically, two options exist: a random or a stratified sample. Swanborn (2003, p. 
                                                 
28 See e.g. the variation in autonomy of ZBOs as described in Van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2006). 
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59) notes that a random sample is not really suitable for case study designs. A stratified 
sample from the population is, given the research question for this study, possible 
because at least some characteristics that might be relevant – such as legal status and 
services provided – can be observed objectively.  
The process for arriving at the stratified sample started by collecting data from the 
Internet on all ZBOs as listed by minBZK (minBZK, 2007b). The date of data collection, 1 
July, 2007 has been used as a benchmark. By doing so, a comparison between the 
different ZBOs could be made without interference from legislative changes during the 
empirical part of the research. It does not imply that changes in later legislation were 
completely ignored; where relevant, reference is made to such changes. The empirical 
part of the study in terms of data collection and including legislative developments was 
finally closed on December 31, 2008. The data collection process currently covers what 
occurred throughout fiscal 2007 concerning oversight and control on ZBOs from all of the 
ministries. The information search was aimed at finding the ZBO 2006 annual reports 
and preparing a database of ZBO financial information as well as on the services 
provided. The data were used to design the case selection model as described in Part D 
as well as to present the data on ZBOs in general as shown in chapter 2.5.3. 
 
Once the cases were selected, the second stage of the research was started. At this 
stage, desk research based on ZBO case law and ZBO statutes as of 1 July 2007, 
documents from fiscal 2007 and 2008 as submitted to Parliament as well as a number 
of documents from ZBOs and ministries were studied. Finding the latter group of 
documents was based on a general description of these documents and on own 
experience.29 The list could only include general descriptions as there was no information 
on the jargon used on ZBOs related to ministries I was less familiar with. Appendix 2 lists 
the general description of the documents requested and Appendix 3 lists the documents 
that were actually received and studied at this stage of the study.  
 
Documents in principle only provide formal information on autonomy and authorisation. It 
is possible that underlying documents reveal something of a mismatch between formal 
and actual autonomy, particularly when an underlying document seems to have content 
that diverges from legislation or legislation based decrees. 
However, most of the information on actual autonomy can only be retrieved by 
participating in the budget authorisation and appropriation processes. Along with the 
general restrictions on participative research such as risk of bias and the effort needed 
(Yin, 2009, p. 102), in this case it would require more observers to cover both sides – 
ministry and ZBO - of the process. I chose for another complementary research strategy 
that can reveal actual processes, I decided to interview key officials at both the selected 
                                                 
29 I had the advantage that I am also an employee of a large ZBO, UWV. Although I am not working work in 
UWV‟s process of controlling operating costs, I do have knowledge of the outlines of the process of 
controlling operating costs and the documents that are used in that process. 
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ZBOs and the ministries that can be regarded as their owners. These key officials are 
considered to be the major players in the debates between Parliament and minister. It is 
possible that this approach also results in some bias, particularly in those cases where 
the parent ministry30 is not the only ministry involved in commissioning services towards a 
single ZBO. I will mention this issue in cases where it appeared to be relevant. 
In preparation for the interviews a semi-structured or focused (Yin, 2009, p. 107) 
questionnaire was designed. This questionnaire aims at identifying both legal and 
financial arrangements between parent ministry and ZBO based on 9 topics, ranging from 
attributed authority to planning and control. The questionnaire was used as a tool for the 
interviews and was not literally followed, partially because some information could be 
found in documents, partially because a thematic semi-structured interview rather than a 
strictly structured interview provides opportunities to find information that would not have 
been revealed if the questionnaire had been followed strictly (Yin, 2009, p. 107). The 
questionnaire was discussed with the research supervisors and is included in Appendix 4. 
I did use structured questions on the questionnaire form, but these were meant as a 
reminder for the interviewer. The interviewee did not see the questionnaire but was 
informed about the general topics to be addressed in the interview in the letter in which 
the interview was confirmed.  
At the time of most of the interviews in the 2nd quarter 2008, 2007 was the most 
recently completed fiscal year that could be discussed. Especially with respect to the 
interviews this choice prevented bias from respondents having to rely on their memory 
(„poor recall bias‟; Yin, 2009, p. 108-109) for issues that had occurred too long ago, since 
preparation of the 2007 budget may start early in 2006. It also reduced the risk of 
holding interviews with respondents who had only been recently been assigned to the job 
and did not know (enough) about what had happened in the past. Of course, the method 
used also has some disadvantages, because fiscal 2007 was covered fully and fiscal 
2008 was only partially covered in the evaluation process. In my opinion, the risk of bias 
due to an incomplete overview of a fiscal year is relatively low because as long as there 
are no significant changes in tasks or activities involved as well as no substantial 
changes in law or statutes, there will be no change in the basic lines of autonomy. 
Furthermore, budget processes do have an overlap: at the end of fiscal 2007, the 
budgeting process for 2008 has already been started (Minderman, 2000, p. 88), which 
allows for inclusion of information on the budgeting process for the next fiscal year. It is 
unlikely that the interviewees would not mention essential changes in the process if that 
was the case. By including remarks on particularly recent legal developments (i.e. after 1 
July, 2007) based on documents, another provision is made to include the most recent 
information. 
The interviews were held with controllers and/or secretaries of the executive board of 
the ZBO. These people are supposed to have the most direct relationship with the parent 
                                                 
30 Parent ministry refers to the ministry that is politically managed by the minister responsible for a 
particular ZBO. 
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ministry and should have an overview of the relationship between ministry and ZBO. To 
prevent a ZBO-bias in the research, account managers and/or controllers within the 
parent ministry, mostly staff that are directly involved in controlling and monitoring the 
ZBO, were interviewed as well. In some cases a separation existed between policymakers 
responsible for the ZBO and controllers. In such cases, a separate interview was held with 
the policy makers. All interviews were recorded and an interview protocol was presented 
to the interviewees. The interview protocols were authorised and these authorised 
protocols have served as input for the empirical section. Theoretically, interviews with civil 
servants may be biased by politically driven answers. This cannot be fully excluded, but is 
mitigated by the interviews with ZBO staff and the use of document analysis. 
In addition to officials from ZBOs and parent ministries, some other people were 
interviewed. The reason for this is that in the end, this research project is focused on the 
issue of democratic control of ZBOs as a group of organisations at arm‟s length of central 
government. Finding out what civil servants and ZBO staff think of the governance 
structure and budgetary control procedures gives insight as to what is going on, but it 
does not cover the opinions of those who are actually supposed to pass laws and hold 
ministers to account. That is why I decided to ask (former) Members of Parliament about 
their opinions on controlling ZBOs. An additional incentive to do so is given by remarks by 
the NCA (Parliament, 2006a, p 9) concerning the information provided by ministers on at 
arm‟s length entities to ensure that Parliament is able to hold a minister accountable for 
controlling these entities. The questions to Members of Parliament are at a higher level of 
abstraction, but also aimed to cover the full scope of the research. Similar procedures 
were used as for the interviews with officials. The questions to Members of Parliament 
are included in Appendix 5. I have also prepared a set of questions for staff involved in 
preparing the report that is at the basis of the proposals for implementing a kZBO 
(Parliament, 2007c). In this interview, emphasis was on exceptions to full implementation 
of kZBO and the general motivation that is the basis of these exceptions. These questions 
are included in Appendix 6. Finally, a full list of all interviewees (at a functional level) is 
included in Appendix 7. 
 
The data generated from documentary analysis as well as from the interviews were 
supplemented with Parliamentary documents regarding budgetary and intermediate 
financial information. In the three stages of the budget process: 
authorisation/appropriation, execution and reporting, Parliament has a direct opportunity 
to discuss ZBO operations. I searched these documents for fiscal 2007 and 2008 to find 
references to the ZBOs in the case studies with respect to operations as an additional 
tool for indications of autonomy. When the interviews revealed that a discussion on a 
specific ZBO had been held in Parliament on another occasion, these documents were 
also included in the desk research. A list of key documents used can be found in 
Appendix 11. 
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A final note should be given on data analysis and validity. In general, using both 
documents and interviews provides a form of data triangulation (Geurts, 1999, p. 98; Yin, 
2009, p. 116) that addresses the ZBO autonomy issue from different perspectives, which 
is in this case supported by interviewing respondents. Triangulation is also applied on the 
methodological level by using document analysis along with interviews and in 
operationalisation (Van Thiel, 2007, p. 118; Yin, 2009, p. 116) by using more than one 
indicator for the autonomy concept, both from a legal and economic perspective. 
Although using these different forms of triangulation contributes to the reliability of the 
results, some bias cannot be fully excluded. Civil servants may have provided politically 
motivated answers as a result of their position in the process. The guarantee of 
anonymity for individual respondents is an important tool to reduce the risk of politically 
driven answers. On the other hand, recording the interviews and preparing an interview 
protocol might have had the opposite effect. In general my impression was that 
respondents were willing to share their views with an open mind. Details on data analysis 
and actual operationalisation will be discussed in section D.  
External validity of this research has been ensured by concentrating most of the 
interviews within a short period of three months in spring 2008 at the final stage of the 
reporting process on fiscal 2007. This has contributed to preventing poor recall bias but 
also to a similar political setting. During this period there was no change in the political 
climate or political priorities. The ministry of the interior (minBZK)31 had just published its 
letter on the implementation of kZBO (Parliament, 2008b) but there had not yet been a 
debate in Parliament on this subject.  
To some extent the results of this study can be generalised to a larger group of ZBOs: 
first, if a ZBO in the study is actually part of a cluster, it is very likely that other ZBOs in the 
cluster will have similar levels of autonomy including mismatches. Second, the stratified 
sample used allows for an autonomy indication for ZBOs delivering similar tasks. It does 
not allow for conclusions with respect to ZBOs that provide essentially different types of 
services. Third, the interviews and documents provided by the ministries reveal some 
information on the attitude of a ministry towards the ZBOs „owned‟ by that ministry. 
Similar cases are likely to be treated similarly. I should note that this aspect of external 
validity only holds from the perspective of a ministry, it cannot be concluded that all ZBOs 
„owned‟ by a ministry hold similar attitudes towards that ministry.  
 
1.7. Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is split up in four parts, each addressing one of the research questions. Part A 
covers the introduction, research questions and research plan (chapter 1) as well as the 
descriptive research question on the field of ZBOs (chapter 2).  
                                                 
31  I use the name of the ministry as provided on its website. minBZK has tasks similar to the UK Home 
Office. 
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Part B covers the legal dimension of ZBO autonomy. In three chapters, the descriptive 
research question on autonomy from a legal perspective will be discussed. Each chapter 
covers a particular domain of legislation. I will start by discussing the legal budgeting 
framework as this subject is at the heart of the constitutional position of Parliament in 
authorising budgets. Secondly, I will address issues regarding public law in relation to 
ZBOs. This will cover general legislation on ZBOs. Thirdly, private law will be reviewed. 
This is driven by the fact that some ZBOs have a private law based status and thus by 
definition a different governance structure to those ZBOs that have a public law status. 
Part C covers the economic dimension of ZBO autonomy. In three chapters the 
descriptive research question on autonomy from the economic perspective will be 
discussed. This will be done along the lines of Neo-institutional economy, the market as 
well as product and production characteristics. The last issue regards the actual control 
tools that follow from service characteristics.  
In Part D, the empirical research question is addressed. Here, I will start with a more 
detailed description of the ZBO field to arrive at a case selection for empirical research. In 
the actual empirical research chapters, I will describe the individual cases selected and 
then address autonomy as it has been formally described and materially observed. The 
last chapters of this part will end with a summary, conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
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2. ZBOs within the framework of Dutch central government 
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 briefly discussed research on quangos and more specifically, ZBOs. I made my 
case as to why I would specifically like to focus on Parliamentary control in relation to ZBO 
(relative) autonomy. Before I can address theoretical notions on that issue it is necessary 
to describe the context of Dutch ZBOs within the framework of Dutch central government. 
The question that will be addressed in this chapter is:  
How do Dutch ZBOs fit into the institutional context of Dutch central 
government? 
I will start with the last part of the question. Every national jurisdiction has its own 
characteristics, traditions and regulations. In section 2.2 I will describe in a nutshell how 
the Dutch government is organised and what roles are given to legislative and executive 
powers to provide a context for the institutional setting. After the introduction on the 
Dutch government, more can be said on ZBOs as a tool in implementing government 
tasks. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss definitions, motives for creating ZBOs and the 
relationship to the core of central government. In section 2.5.1, internal and external 
autonomisation of government entities are discussed. 
The last part of this chapter will be used to describe ZBOs in more detail. The number 
of ZBOs that exist at a national level in the Netherlands is an issue that causes confusion. 
In the literature the number of ZBOs varies between 144 (Parliament, 2008b, p. 1), 17032 
(Kohnstamm Committee, 2004, p 19); 430 (Kraan, 2006, p 226), 431 (Van Thiel and 
Van Buuren, 2001) to 54533 (Parliament, 1995a, p. 10) and 600+ (Van Thiel, 2009). 
Without elaborating here, it is fair to claim that a definitive answer as to what is to be 
regarded as a ZBO cannot be given as it is still subject to substantial changes. Section 
2.6 addresses the ZBO population and different classifications that may be used to 
create a more structured view on the population. In the last section (2.7) I will draw some 
conclusions and define the population studied in the following chapters. 
2.2. The organisation of Dutch central government 
The Netherlands is formally a constitutional democracy which can be classified as a 
decentralised unitary state (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, p. 12 and p. 161). Three levels of 
territorial government exist: central government, provinces on a regional level and local 
government. Within the framework of central law, regional and local governments have 
some autonomy to make policy decisions, but the degrees of freedom are limited. In 
many cases a form of joint government (co-governance; Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, p. 
                                                 
32 In some cases, a ZBO is in fact a group of separate ZBOs each performing the same task within a 
specified jurisdiction. These groups are counted only once. Example: there are 22 Chambers of 
Commerce, each with a separate ZBO-status. 
33 162 when corrected for groups of ZBOs 
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166) between the central and local level exists in which local government is in fact 
executing central legislation and receives the necessary funds from central government. 
Degrees of freedom for local (and regional) government are also restricted by the 
relatively small opportunities for raising taxes and the amounts of general income 
transfers from central government (Allers and Elhorst, 2005; p. 499). 
ZBOs are a form of functional rather than territorial government (Zijlstra, 2009, p. 
199) and are in most cases only affiliated to central government. In the following sub-
sections I will first address the political setting at the national level. After that some notes 
on legal as well as on government budgeting and accounting traditions will be made. The 
section will end with some remarks on the reasons for creating forms of functional 
government at the national level as an introduction to the concept of ZBOs. 
 
Focusing on the national level 
Autonomisation and privatisation are phenomena that can be found at all levels of 
government. At the sub-national level, at arm‟s length entities may have been created 
based on a general law or statute. Examples of these are local public bodies delivering 
services for a group of municipalities. Statute based arm‟s length entities exist in 
different forms as well. Zijlstra (1997, p. 309-386) discussed the possibility of the 
existence of ZBOs at a local level. His conclusion is that some units of local government 
may have a status similar to a national ZBO but that the local government act 
„Gemeentewet‟ [GemW] does not allow attributing ZBO status to separate legal entities 
(Zijlstra, 1997, p. 385). In this study I will only focus on national level ZBOs, which include 
both separate legal entities as well as units operating within the State legal entity. 
2.2.1. The political setting 
In the Dutch constitutional monarchy, the legislature can be regarded as a joint effort 
between Parliament, Cabinet and the Monarch, in which the latter‟s role is limited to 
giving the final formal consent to laws that have passed through Parliament. This is 
expressed by the formal definition of Government in the constitution which stipulates that 
Government consists of the King and the Ministers, followed by the statement that the 
ministers must be held accountable for acts of government (GW:42). Both „Tweede 
Kamer‟ and Cabinet can propose laws, which have to pass both chambers of Parliament, 
the „Tweede Kamer‟ and „Eerste Kamer‟. In practice, the majority of proposals for 
legislation are initiated by Cabinet (Van der Pot, Elzinga, De Lange and Hoogers, 2006, p. 
632; Kortmann and Bovend‟Eert, 2006, p.73).  
The political system is based on a representative democracy in which citizens choose 
the „Tweede Kamer‟ and the members of the provincial parliaments elect the „Eerste 
Kamer‟ indirectly. Members of Parliament do not represent a specific constituency, but 
represent the people as a whole (Van der Pot et al., 2006, p. 537-538; Kortmann and 
Bovend‟Eert, 2006, p.74). The system of representative democracy without electoral 
thresholds implies that it is extremely unlikely that any party will win an absolute majority. 
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Since universal suffrage was introduced in 1918, every Cabinet has been a coalition 
government, in most cases with Christian Democrat parties as part of the coalition34 
(Stuurman, 1983, p. 281; Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, p. 110). For decades the political 
system in the Netherlands has been based on „accommodation‟ (Lijphart, 1975, p. 103) 
and „pillarisation‟ (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, p. 21) in which consensus in the political 
elite was based on the minimal agreement of fundamentals in the political system 
(Lijphart, 1975, p. 103). In this system, co-operation between the elites resulted in power 
sharing (Andeweg & Irwin, 2002, p. 111). The electorate however, was organised along 
strictly separate religious and class lines. One can state that since 1980, most Cabinets 
only had small majorities which is an indication that the idea of power sharing is losing 
some of its relevance. After the 2002 elections, the idea of power sharing has been 
heavily discussed and within five years, four different government coalitions have 
governed, indicating some political instability. Thomassen (2010, p. 39-40) notes that the 
coalition governments did not face a structured opposition ready to take over 
government, which resulted in voting for anti-establishment parties and increased 
instability during the last decade. Despite this instability and change in attitude towards 
creating coalition governments, the traces of the tradition of organising political influence 
along religious and class lines is still visible, especially in education and health care, 
where private organisations that originate from this tradition dominate the provision of 
public services.  
The strong religious and class based influence on politics has of course had an effect 
on the position of the state in society. Esping Andersen (1990) has developed a model in 
which he describes three35 welfare state regimes. In the liberal model, government 
intervention is at a minimal level. This model applies for countries such as the USA. The 
social democratic model on the other hand, is aimed at high level equality, leading to 
widespread intervention in society by government. This model applies to the 
Scandinavian countries. In the corporatist/conservative model, state intervention does 
exist but is aimed at maintaining basic differences between social classes. The model is 
according to Esping Andersen (1990, p. 27) „typically shaped by the Church‟. In his 
studies he classifies The Netherlands under corporatist countries with substantial 
influence from social democrat institutions (Esping Andersen (1990, p. 53).36 Although 
the fundamentals still exist, under the influence of new public management [NPM] 
theories, the Dutch model is changing to a more market based liberal model. Examples of 
this can be found in competition policy (Parliament, 1997a) which ultimately has resulted 
in sale of the postal services and power production companies. 
 
                                                 
34 The only exceptions are the two liberal/social democrat coalitions between 1994 and 2002. 
35 In his revision of the study (Esping Andersen, 1999) he introduces a fourth – Mediterranean - regime, 
which can be disregarded here. 
36 In the last two decades changes in opinion on the role of government in society can be observed, 
influenced by neo-liberalism and NPM-programs. Kickert notes that these changes however have not 
really affected government decision making (Kickert, 2008, p. 135). 
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The Cabinet (i.e. the ministers) constitutes the executive power. The coalition that is 
formed after elections builds on a coalition agreement document „Regeerakkoord‟, which 
is more or less a political contract which morally binds coalition parties in the Coalition 
Majority in the Tweede Kamer to the agreements laid down in the document. Officially the 
Cabinet is not a partner in the „Regeerakkoord‟, but in practice members of the Cabinet 
are involved in drawing up the agreement (Vis, 1986 p. 8-9). Minderman (2000, p. 144) 
notes that the „Regeerakkoord‟ has become an important document for fiscal policy in 
the last two decades. It defines the financial targets the Cabinet has to achieve and thus 
also has an impact on the budget authorisation process. 
Ministers are not necessarily recruited from the political system and cannot be both 
Member of Parliament and minister. This has led to selecting ministers based on 
experience in the policy domain they will be operating in (Andeweg & Irwin, 2002, p. 116). 
Once appointed, a minister can hold his office until the next elections or as long as 
Parliament does not explicitly state that it has lost confidence in the minister. This rule of 
confidence is one of the most important soft law rules in the Dutch Government. The 
Scheltema committee notes that the rule of confidence has a separate function to 
ministerial responsibility and accountability. When Parliament expresses its loss of 
confidence in a minister, he is supposed to resign, even in cases where he has explained 
his actions or if he cannot be held responsible for a certain matter (Scheltema 
Committee, 1993, p. 12). With respect to the issue of ministerial responsibility, the 
Scheltema Committee distinguishes between four elements: responsibility for his own 
acts, responsibility as a member of the Cabinet, responsibility for the King and members 
of the Royal family and responsibility for the civil service (Scheltema Committee, 1993, p 
10). When applied to ZBOs, especially the responsibility for his own acts and that of the 
civil service are relevant. In short, a minister is responsible for ZBOs given the authority 
attributed to him in relation to the specific ZBO and his actions towards the ZBO under 
scrutiny. I will elaborate on these issues in Part B. 
The organisation of the civil service is in principle politically neutral. The minister is 
supported by his personal staff.  Senior civil servant staff is not replaced when a new 
government comes into office.37 This is in line with the traditional concept of bureaucracy 
as meant by Weber, which includes rules bound officials subject to hierarchical structures 
but independent from the individual who holds office (Weber, 1947, p. 330). The 
ministries are highly specialised and horizontal coordination between ministries with 
respect to shared or adjacent policy fields is difficult. The ministries do however have 
many relationships with outside specialist interest groups which were originally also 
related to the pillarised movements (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, p. 208). In relation to 
ZBOs, the ministry of agriculture has strong affiliations to specialist groups; many ZBOs 
affiliated to the ministry of agriculture are industry based quality control and certifying 
                                                 
37 At the appointment of heads of ministries and the level immediately below, political affiliation is taken 
into consideration. This ensures that all major political parties are represented in the civil service. 
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institutions. Relationships with external specialist groups are used to coordinate within a 
policy domain and negotiate a specific result.  
The main forum where policy coordination beyond the boundaries of a policy domain 
can be realised is in the Cabinet and its subcommittees, but even there coordination is 
the result of negotiation and non-intervention (Van den Berg, 1981, p. 234; Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2002, p. 117) rather than from using authority to decide. A result of this method of 
organising politics is that consensus is an important mechanism for implementing 
policies. Once consensus is agreed upon, then there is a high level of legitimacy for the 
results achieved, even when the results themselves are regarded as unpopular (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2002, p. 209). A disadvantage of the system is that when no consensus can be 
agreed upon, no changes will be realised and the status quo will be continued. The 
minister has in such cases insufficient power to enforce a change, because there is 
always the possibility that he will lose a vote of confidence when he proposes changes 
that are not sufficiently coordinated and prepared with members of the majority parties or 
agreed upon in the „Regeerakkoord‟. Once a particular policy has been developed 
including the organisational setting in which it is to be implemented, it is very difficult to 
change this setting: (re)nationalisation of tasks in the public domain is practically 
impossible in the Netherlands.38 This can be illustrated by critical comments of the „Raad 
voor het Openbaar Bestuur‟39, which stated that managerial and efficiency motives only 
are no longer sufficient to set up a ZBO (Rob, 2004, p. 11). However, many ZBOs have 
existed for many years and altering their status as an autonomous entity with ministerial 
responsibility as the single argument to do so is questionable. Furthermore, there are 
limits to rational decision making in politics: I refer to Simon‟s concept of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1978, p. 10). Within the Dutch political context with its traditions of 
coalition agreements and negotiations, the outcome of a debate is often more 
determined by finding a majority than by the strictly rational arguments that can be found 
to realise changes in policy or organisation. The ups and downs in the appreciation of the 
use of ZBOs both in the Netherlands and abroad40 indicate that popularity of ZBOs may 
sometimes be discussed but that the phenomenon as such is likely to persist. 
A rare example of a case where an unexpected shift in opinion on hiving off or hiving 
in (In „t Veld, 1995, p. 10; Van Thiel, 2000, p. 9) occurred, is the case of creating UWV. 
Bekke and Van Gestel (2004, p. 88-93) describe how the political elites became 
convinced that the proposed privatisation of UWV‟s predecessors was undesirable. 
However, making the creation of a public sector based UWV acceptable for one of the 
majority parties required that „Arbeidsvoorziening‟ – the public office operating as an 
intermediate on the labour market – had to be privatised. Ultimately this plan was 
implemented and resulted in a mixture of hiving in social security programs to be 
                                                 
38 In particular, nationalisation by fully integrating a separate organisation into departmental structures is 
unlikely; a softer form – hiving in (In „t Veld, 1995, p. 10) is sometimes carried out. 
39 The Rob is an advisory body to central government on governance issues. 
40 See Van Thiel‟s analysis on the creation of Dutch Quangos (Van Thiel, 2000, p 18-20) or Flinders (1999b, 
p 34) description of ups and downs of quangos in the UK. 
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implemented by UWV and privatising of re-integration services formerly delivered by 
Arbeidsvoorziening, both at the expense of corporatist control by employers and labour 
unions which had controlled the industry before. 
2.2.2. Ministerial responsibility for organisations 
In this section I will discuss the (political) responsibility attributed to a minister for the 
organisations he uses to achieve his policy objectives. Three articles of the Dutch 
Constitution are relevant, regarding government in general, the responsibility of ministers 
and the creation of legal entities.  
 
First, article 44 of the Dutch Constitution governs the creation of ministries. A Decree is 
required to create a ministry and it is also stated that a ministry is led by a minister. The 
internal organisation and tasks attributed to a ministry are also laid down in Decrees. The 
minister is fully responsible and accountable for all acts and decisions made within the 
ministerial structure, unless otherwise stated. All ministerial units including executive 
agencies belong to the internal structure of the ministry. They are fully included under 
ministerial responsibility. The fact that executive agencies use a separate accounting 
framework does not alter the ministerial responsibility and hierarchical subordination of 
an executive agency (e.g. Parliament, 1995c, p 3; Van Oosteroom, 2002, p. 113; Wall & 
West, 2002, p 211; Plug et al., 2003, p. 24-25; Minderman, 2003, p. 68-69, Pollitt et al., 
2004, p.71).  
 
Second, the full hierarchical subordination of a ministry implies that a minister has full 
responsibility for both operations as well as policy development in programs and policy 
effectiveness. Although the minister has full responsibility for operations, the impact of 
errors by civil servants on the position of a minister is in most cases low. In many cases 
the minister may not know about errors or cannot prevent errors from occurring. Although 
he is still fully responsible, the political debate – if any – will then focus on the question 
of whether the minister is still supported by Parliament on a basis of trust (Scheltema 
Committee, 1993, p. 11-13). Bovens (2000, p. 12-13) showed that no minister has 
resigned since 1945 only because of errors committed by civil servants. 
This is different for those entities that are not hierarchically subordinated to the 
minister. The study of the Scheltema Committee stressed that other control instruments 
are required to ensure that a minister can assess the operations of the at arm‟s length 
entity (Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 72-73). Kummeling et al. (1999, p. 19-20) 
summarised ministerial accountability into three criteria. First, the minister is 
accountable as far as authority is attributed to him. Second he can be held accountable 
for his acts with respect to the at arm‟s length entity – either public or private - and third, 
he is responsible and thus accountable for the framework in which the at arm‟s length 
entity is operating. The general rules on responsibility and accountability hold for all forms 
of legal entities executing a task on behalf of the State. 
  ZBOs within the framework of Dutch central government 
 
Part A: Research problem and Dutch institutional context 43 
 
 
Third, public legal entities other than ministries must, according to article 134 of the 
Dutch Constitution, be created by or under the law. When a body is given a separate legal 
status, this implies that the minister in charge cannot have the same authority that he 
has with respect to the ministry he is leading.  Minderman (2000, p. 182) states that 
such a reduction of responsibility can only be authorised by law. The inclusion of article 
134 of the Dutch Constitution is the formal institutionalisation of this proposition. The 
wording in the Dutch Constitution is however ambiguous. Holterman (2000, p. 596-597) 
shows that this section of the Dutch Constitution governs the creation of the Dutch 
concept of public bodies – „Openbare lichamen‟- in general. He also indicates that the 
Government intended to change article 134 because it might lead to confusion when a 
constitutional arrangement on ZBOs was made because „Openbare Lichamen‟ covers 
more than just ZBOs. This change of GW:134 has never been  implemented in favour of 
the development of the formal kZBO-law.41 The principle of creating an entity by law 
however stands: „Openbare Lichamen‟ have to be established by law according to the 
Dutch Constitution (Grondwet; [GW]) and the creation of civil law legal entities by 
government is governed in CW for the authorisation procedure and the civil code 
„Burgerlijk Wetboek‟ [BW] for the governance structure of the civil law legal entity. The 
group of public law ZBOs which is somewhere in between these two groups then also has 
to be established by law. The tasks, organisation and governance structure (composition 
of the executive and/or non-executive board, the authorities attributed to the board and 
the system of monitoring) of public entities must be defined by law. This wording 
indicates that for every specific public legal entity a law has to pass Parliament. 
Passing a law requires that Parliament must be involved in the procedure. According 
to the Dutch Constitution, the Tweede Kamer can make amendments to a proposal and 
thus modify the level of control attributed to a minister. The Eerste Kamer can only reject 
or accept the proposal as it is submitted to them after adoption by the Tweede Kamer. In 
political terms it is therefore Parliament that ultimately decides to what extent a 
minister‟s responsibilities are to be reduced and where Parliament can hold a minister 
accountable.  
One should note here that responsibility, accountability and provision of information 
are related but not identical. External autonomisation – creating a new (public) legal 
entity is one form of that concept - and the corresponding reduction in ministerial 
responsibility does not reduce the obligation of a minister to inform Parliament on 
request. The minister has to provide information when requested, but at the same time 
he may state that he does not have the proper instruments (authority) to change any 
undesired results arising from the actions of a public legal entity. Zijlstra (1997, p. 104) 
noted that the distinction between accountability and information provision is deliberately 
                                                 
41 See also Zijlstra (2009, p. 208) who refers to a proposal of the „Raad voor Openbaar Bestuur‟ [Rob] to 
include the concept of ZBOs in the constitution in relation to ministerial responsibility rather than under 
separately legitimised public bodies meant in GW:134. 
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included in the Dutch Constitution. He illustrates the difference with a theoretical case in 
which information reveals undesired policy outcomes for which a minister can be held 
accountable if he did not use his authority to change the system that  led to the 
undesired result. This example is in line with the conclusion by Kummeling et al. (1999, 
p. 19-20) of ministerial responsibility as described above, in particular the minister‟s 
responsibility for the framework an entity is operating in. 
 
When creating an at arm‟s length entity, the Dutch Constitution requires a law on creating 
public legal entities and CW specifies requirements for creating a civil law legal entity by 
government. The contents of the law or statute formally divide the responsibility between 
the minister and the (non-) executive board of the entity. The more responsibilities are 
attributed to the board, the greater the relative autonomy from a minister will be. 
However, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility also includes the concept of system 
responsibility for a minister. If the system of which the at arm‟s length entity is a part 
does not operate correctly, he is supposed to intervene. In the end that may change the 
relative autonomy of the entity involved. 
2.2.3. Legal traditions 
The present Dutch legal system is based on the civil law tradition that was adapted from 
the French system in the early 19th century (Glendon, Gordon & Osakwe, 1985, p. 54). 
The core of the civil law tradition is that it is based on written law, whereas the – 
generally Anglo Saxon - common law system is based on case law and legal procedures 
(Glendon et al., 1985, p. 281). The Dutch legal framework is based on a written 
constitution and a set of formal and material laws. As for all Member States of the 
European Union [EU], EU-law is superior to national legislation and rulings from the 
European Courts can overrule national legislation (Seerden and Stroink, 2002a, p. 347). 
Dutch law is based on the Constitution and consists of a criminal section - which is not 
considered here - a civil section, as expressed in the „Burgerlijk Wetboek’ [BW] (Civil 
Code) and a public section, consisting of general public law, as well as administrative law. 
Based on the Dutch Constitution, the general public law includes issues such as basic 
(human) rights, the parliamentary system, the judiciary system and decentralisation 
(Seerden & Stroink, 2002b, p. 145). The group of administrative laws can be divided into 
a more general part which includes for example legal protection of citizens and a more 
specialised part. The „Algemene wet bestuursrecht‟ [Awb] (General Administrative Law) 
and the „Comptabiliteitswet‟ [CW] are important laws in this group. The second group is a 
more specific part which includes for example the relations between citizens and the 
state in several policy domains. In this group not only are specific policy domains 
addressed, but organisational matters concerning the attribution of tasks to entities such 
as ZBOs are also included. 
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An important issue in Dutch public law is that it depends on the matter at hand whether 
or not a public entity is allowed to use private law. In pure business transactions, such as 
purchasing goods, civil law prevails. In transactions that are meant to achieve 
government objectives, private law may be used, unless a public law provides better legal 
protection and can be used to achieve the same objective (Nicolaï, 1997, p. 320-321; 
Seerden & Stroink, 2002b, p. 162-164). The „Hoge Raad‟ (Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands, [HR]) ruled in the Windmill case42 that a local government is not allowed to 
levy private law based fees in a case where public law based fees are possible. Whenever 
government uses private law, it is not allowed to abuse its powers and must comply with 
the general principles of proper administration as developed by the Courts and which are 
by now included in the Awb (Seerden & Stroink, 2002b, p. 151). When it comes to 
individual authoritative decisions of a government unit, these are governed by general 
rules of the Awb and subject to testing by an administrative court.  
In cases where (central) government uses units outside the ministerial structure, such 
as ZBOs, in principle the same administrative rules apply to these units. Central 
government will in those cases either have attributed powers to the unit directly by law 
(functional decentralisation; Parliament, 1989) or has delegated existing powers of 
central government to the unit. The difference is rather formal; intervention in decision 
making based on the powers that were transferred by central government is in both 
cases restricted to the powers that remain in the hands of the relevant minister. In the 
case of delegation, it is comparatively easier to withdraw the transfer of power because 
the formal law does not have to be changed by Parliament. 
 
Examples of delegating and attributing authority 
In the case of ZBOs which provide certification services, the law states that a minister can 
delegate the certifying task to one or more ZBOs (e.g. 6 organisations are allowed to 
certify radio equipment, based on article 10.3 of the „Telecommunicatiewet‟). 
In the case of RDW, the law has attributed specific tasks to the ZBO (see article 4b 
„Wegenverkeerswet‟) such as issuing motor vehicle registrations and general motor 
vehicle approvals. 
 
The „Grondwet‟ and „Comptabilititeitswet‟ (Budgeting and accounting act, [CW]) are the 
basic laws that govern central government organisation. The „Grondwet‟ stipulates in 
article 44 how ministries have to be created. In article 105 of the „Grondwet‟, it is 
stipulated that a general law covers financial management of central government. This is 
the basis for the „Comptabiliteitswet‟. In the latter, the use and creation of public and 
private law units operating at the level of central government is defined. To put it shortly 
here, it is Parliament which has the ultimate voice on the creation of units other than 
ministries. The Constitution (GW:120) explicitly states that the judiciary is not allowed to 
                                                 
42 HR 260-01-1990; NJ 1991, 393; AB 1990, 408) 
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evaluate whether or not a law is contrary to the constitution or international treaties. This 
implies that no-one can claim before a court that using a ZBO or any other at arm‟s length 
entity for providing government services is illegal. 
From a legal perspective, the main issue in this study will be the relationship between 
Parliament, Minister and the ZBO involved. This means that the relationship between 
citizens and ZBO, which is governed by the powers available to ZBOs and legal protection 
as included in the Awb will not be considered. What remains is the division of powers 
between the Minister and the ZBO as they are described in both the formal law in which 
powers are attributed to Minister and ZBO and the powers that are delegated from the 
minister to the ZBO. I will elaborate on this in Part B. 
2.2.4. The budgeting process in Dutch central government 
The present CW2001 covers the budgeting procedures of the ministries and is based on 
cash and encumbrance (or obligation) accounting in a program oriented setting. It is 
intended that in budget documents a connection is made between objectives and central 
government activities and the costs of these activities. Based on CW2001, the Minister of 
Finance can set rules on the information provided in budget documents by ZBOs, but no 
direct reference is made to the accounting framework of ZBOs.  
Budget proposals for central government are presented on an annual basis by mid 
September before the start of the fiscal year.43 The Budget proposal consists of a review 
of the general financial position of the State (national level only) in the so called 
„Miljoenennota‟ (Budget memorandum). This document does not include budget laws; it 
provides context and indicates the more general ideas of the Cabinet on the financial 
position of the State. In addition to the „Miljoenennota‟, 26 budget laws are proposed for 
fiscal 2007 by the Cabinet to Parliament. There are budget laws for each separate 
ministry (13), High Authorities of State (Royal Household, Parliament and the like), 
Overseas Territories, Treasury and Special Purpose Funds44 (8; e.g. grants towards local 
government). The budgets can include expenditure from ministries to ZBOs. As of 2005, a 
list of ZBOs is included as an appendix to the budget document. Ministerial budgets for 
fiscal 2007 amount to some 75+% (€ 121 billion) of total proposed spending. This is 
some 20% of GDP. Because ministry responsibilities do not change very often, budgets 
are fairly comparable over a number of years, even after new elections.45,46 Parliament, 
more specifically the „Tweede Kamer‟ discusses and passes the budget laws before the 
start of the new fiscal year on 1 January. The role of the „Eerste Kamer‟ is rather formal 
because the „Eerste Kamer‟ cannot amend budget proposals (GW:84-85). In case budget 
                                                 
43 In the Dutch context, fiscal year = calendar year 
44 These funds are not Sovereign Wealth Funds meant for investment but are earmarked program 
resources on behalf of e.g. local government or infrastructure. 
45 Van den Bent‟s (1989, p. 62) book on budgeting in central government also lists budgets for 13 
ministries with more or less the same names as those that exist in 2007. 
46 The Balkenende IV government (February 2007-February 2010) made an exception to this rule. Two new 
budget chapters are presented for fiscal 2008, reflecting political priorities of coalition members. 
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laws do not pass the „Eerste Kamer‟ before the start of the fiscal year, provisions exist 
that allow spending to a certain level. 
 
The budgetary process for Parliament formally starts when the Minister of Finance 
presents the government‟s budget proposals for the next fiscal year on the third Tuesday 
of September t-/-1. This date is mentioned in CW2001:12. In the following few days, 
Tweede Kamer has the opportunity to discuss the budgets in general. After that, 
discussions start on each separate budget. In recent years47, this has generally lasted 
until December before all discussions are completed and all budgets have passed the 
Tweede Kamer. Although, constitutionally, Eerste Kamer has to pass all budgets as well, 
this is in most cases only a formality due to the lack of right of amendment by Eerste 
Kamer. Therefore, Eerste Kamer will be neglected in this study (see also Minderman, 
2000, p. 19).  
CW2001 includes regulations for modifying  budgets throughout the fiscal year. 
Ultimately on June 1, fiscal year „t‟, the „Voorjaarsnota‟ [VJN] (1st supplement to the 
budget) and accompanying proposals for adapting budgets are presented. The proposed 
modifications may be policy driven, whereas under the „Najaarsnota‟ [NJN] (2nd 
supplement to the budget) – which is to be presented before December 1, „t‟ - only 
changes due to accounting differences or errors are allowed. On the 3rd Wednesday in 
May t +/+ 1, budgets are formally closed under the „Slotwet‟ proposals – covering the 
difference between actual results and budgets as authorised under „Najaarsnota‟ - which 
are submitted together with the Annual Report of the Dutch State. All intermediate budget 
laws have to pass Parliament as well, finally discharging the ministers for their budgetary 
responsibilities over fiscal year „t‟. The time line in Figure 2.1 shows all politically relevant 
moments in the planning and control process of Dutch central government. 
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Figure 2.1 Time line of the budget process in Dutch central government. 
 
2.2.5. Budgeting and accounting traditions 
The Dutch central government traditionally uses a cash accounting system. Outside 
central government, accrual accounting systems are commonly used, not only in the 
private sector, but also at the level of local government and many arm‟s length 
                                                 
47 Further back in history it was not unusual for budget laws to be passed after the start of the fiscal year 
(Van den Bent, 1989, p. 40; Janse de Jonge, 1993, p. 372 and 471; Warmelink, 1993, p. 164) 
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organisations such as ZBOs. In this section, I will provide a context for the application and 
interpretation of accruals based accounting in line with commercial practices of BW2 in 
the Netherlands and its possible implications for ZBOs.  
Accounting regulations in the Netherlands have a long history in using accruals 
accounting for enterprises. Sutton (2004, p 164-168) classifies Dutch accounting 
practices as falling within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of accounting principles, which is 
different to the Continental European tradition. The Anglo-Saxon tradition is driven by 
diffuse ownership, separation between tax and book income and common law. The 
Continental European tradition is more government and tax driven and has relatively little 
emphasis on equity. With the exception of common law (see 2.2.3), the Dutch BW2 
accounting principles comply with the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Nobes and Parker (2004, p 
66-69) note that Dutch accounting practices are commercially driven; equity oriented and 
have room for professional judgement. The difference with UK and US practices is found 
in the autonomy of professionals. Whereas in UK and US practice professional regulation 
is preferred, in the Netherlands regulation could be overruled by professional judgement 
from the accounting profession. Due to globalisation and the efforts of the International 
Accounting Standards Board [IASB], accounting in the 21st century is regulated by the 
international financial reporting standards [IFRS] which are applied in the Netherlands as 
well, reducing the significance of professional judgement.  
The context of commercial accounting has had its influence on ideas about 
government accounting as well. As early as 1916, proposals were made by the Minister 
of Finance Van Gijn for a „Comptabiliteitswet‟ in which accruals budgeting and accounting 
was included (Goedhart, 1958, p. 249-254; Van der Bij, 1993, p 184).48  It lasted until 
1985 before accruals accounting was introduced, but at that stage it was only applied in 
local and regional government. In 1991, the Ministry of Finance proposed creating 
executive agencies which would have to use accruals budgeting and accounting 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991, p. 58). The first executive agencies were created in 
1994 and used accruals budgeting and accounting from the start. In the case of ZBOs 
there is no uniform accounting framework, the general rule is that those ZBOs with a 
separate legal status use accruals accounting as far as possible in line with the BW2-
framework (Staatscourant, 1995, instruction 124p; as of now, I will use the word 
„Aanwijzingen‟ [AW1996], when I refer to this decree). Where transition from cash to 
accruals based budgeting and accounting for existing ZBOs was regarded as necessary, it 
was implemented in the 1990s, in most cases related to other changes in the formal law 
on the ZBO.  
 
Despite the long history of application of accruals accounting in The Netherlands, the 
country is not in the frontline of government accounting reform. Lüder and Jones (2003, 
p. 47-48) explain this by the relatively weak position of the Minister of Finance due to the 
                                                 
48 The Netherlands was not the first country in which accruals accounting for government was discussed. 
Goedhart mentions that Italy introduced accruals in 1886 (Goedhart, 1958, p. 288). 
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process of decision making as described in section 2.2.1 and the lack of a central 
accounting agency that supports a  transition to accruals accounting.  
Lüder and Jones‟s analysis is partially correct. Te Velde (2007, p. 16-17) notes that 
the role of the minister of Finance has changed in the last two decades. Te Velde points 
at the role of the Minister of Finance in the domain of fiscal policy. When it comes to a 
matter such as changing an accounting system, this does have elements of fiscal policy 
(Van Schaik, 2007) but the bottom line is an organisational matter in which many hurdles 
can be created (see e.g. Robinson, 2002; Hepworth, 2003; Mol & De Kruijf, 2004). 
Introduction of accrual based budgeting and accounting for national government was 
considered around 2000 (Parliament, 2000b, p. 83 – 88) but was quietly deleted from 
the political agenda. In 2003, the NCA made a new effort to put the issue on the political 
agenda (Parliament, 2003a). Despite critical comments from Parliament, the Cabinet was 
not convinced to continue the 2000 initiatives to use accruals accounting (Dees, 
Neelissen and Steenhoek, 2004).  
By 2007, a pilot project by the Ministry of Agriculture [minLNV] was agreed upon as a 
result of pressure from both Parliament as well as from the accounting industry (Van 
Schaik, 2007, p. 8). Cabinet reconfirmed its position on government accruals accounting 
at the end of the pilot project. The main argument provided was that the introduction of 
another accounting system would not resolve problems with providing policy – outcome – 
information (Parliament, 2008c, p. 12). For this study it is particularly relevant that 
consolidation49 of ZBOs in the financial statement of minLNV – as would be required 
under IPSAS 650 - was not realised due to the additional complexity it would generate for 
the pilot project (Parliament, 2008c, p. 4). 
2.3. Definition of quangos and ZBOs 
This study is on a specific Dutch group of units at arm‟s length of government, ZBOs. In 
the literature, quasi non-governmental organisation – quango (Barker, 1982, p. 4) 51 – is 
often used to describe the whole group of at arm‟s length entities. I have already noted 
that in the political context of the Netherlands, tasks in the public domain were 
performed by private entities, organised along the lines of the various social groups. In 
the Swedish case, using at arm‟s length entities to achieve public goals has a more than 
200 year history (Larsson, 2002, p. 181). In more recent years, under the influence of 
demand for more efficiency in the public domain, the concept of using entities at arm‟s 
length of government has spread over many countries (e.g. OECD, 2005, p. 110-112; 
Pollitt, 2007).  
The quango concept is a catch all concept for all kinds of organisations somewhere in 
between private entities and government units (Forward, 1976, p. 50; Ridley & Wilson, 
                                                 
49 In short: consolidation means that the separate financial statements of individual legal entities are 
integrated into one financial statement for the holding company. See Part C for further elaboration. 
50 International Public Sector Accounting Standard no 6 on Consolidation 
51 Historically, Quango is based on a classification on a scale of public to private service provision in which 
quasi government and quasi non-government units were separated in an effort to separate public from 
private organisations (Barker, 1982, p. 13). 
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1995; Koppell, 2003, p. 16; Smith, 2004). Barker has emphasised that the negative 
aspect „non‟ in the acronym is actually inadequate, as the organisations are more 
affiliated to government than to the public sector as a whole, despite their independent 
legal status (Barker, 1982, p. 4).  In definitions of the quango concept, factors on 
spending public money (Flinders, 1999a, p. 4) and (hierarchical) independence (from 
bureaucracy) (Flinders, 1999a, p. 4; Van Thiel, 2000, p. 5; Koppell, 2003, p. 16-17, 
Talbot, 2004, p. 5) are shared issues. Some (Ridley & Wilson, 1995, p. 4-5; Greve et al. 
1999, p. 142) include entities at the sub-national level in the quango definition, but this 
only holds for the general concept.  
 
 QUANGOS  
 not subject to ministerial hierarchy subject to ministerial hierarchy 
private 
companies 
state 
enterprises 
voluntaries and 
charities 
public body executive 
agency 
unit of ministry 
Figure 2.2: Different types of organisations for delivering government services. Adapted 
from Van Thiel (2000, p. 8) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the group of quangos which is divided into four subgroups: state 
enterprises, voluntaries/charities, public bodies and government agencies (Flinders, 
1999a; Greve et al., 1999, van Thiel, 2000). Flinders (1999b, p. 29-30) notes that 
creating quangos has to do with reducing the span of control of central government‟s 
bureaucracy and the limitations of government to execute tasks independent of political 
control. This argument is more or less in line with the Dutch debate on separation of core 
and non-core activities of departments as mentioned in the Kadaster example before. 
I will now focus on the specific subgroup of Public Bodies from Figure 2.2 as an 
introduction to the definition of the Dutch variety, ZBOs. Barker (1982, p. 4) noted that 
organisations under the UK label Non-Departmental Public Body [NDPB], although it 
suggests independence in fact are a form of arm‟s length controlled government 
institutions providing services to the public. Similarly, Talbot (2004, p. 6) emphasises the 
non-departmental (italics jdk) rather than non-governmental aspect of the NDPB concept.  
In the UK, the government uses the concept of Non Departmental Public Bodies, 
which is according to Hogwood (1995, p. 30) a „pragmatic labelling focusing mainly on a 
set of bodies to which government makes appointments and is inconsistently applied‟. In 
France, the „etablissements publics administratifs‟ are identified as organisations under 
public law and subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Together with 
autonomous administrative authorities, which are part of the State entity but operate 
independently from government, they form a group of entities performing public tasks at 
arm‟s length of government (Rochet, Cabane & Formery, 2002, p. 74-77). Their legal 
status does not allow them to be included under either government enterprises or 
voluntary organisations. They cannot be included under the concept of executive 
agencies as they are not subject to ministerial hierarchy. 
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In an OECD-report (2002, p. 11), Public Bodies are negatively defined as not being 
part of the vertically integrated ministries, but still part of government. Therefore all 
definitions in fact emphasise a government rather than private affiliation. The OECD 
document specifically excludes state enterprises from their definition, which is an 
indication that the quango definition is broader than the usual Public Body definitions. 
Another important distinction to be made here is the „hybrid concept‟, as used in the USA 
(Moe, 2002, p. 250-254). In a US context hybridity only refers to private organisations 
that may have some relation to federal government, whereas in a Dutch context, hybridity 
suggests a mixture of tasks and market activities within one organisation, irrespective of 
legal status (In „t Veld, 1995; Kickert, 1998; Hazeu, 2004, Meijerink, 2005). These 
authors basically accept the existence of hybrid organisations. Despite that they do see 
some risks related to for instance prioritising private tasks over public tasks and 
distortion of competition (e.g. Meijerink, 2005, p. 19-20). The opinion of these authors is 
strongly debated by Simon (1989, 2005). In his opinion a combination of market oriented 
production and task (budget) driven activities within one organisation should be avoided. 
He claims that in cases where government is commissioning services within the 
framework of a quasi market rather than a competitive market, traditional budgetary 
controls must be maintained. If not, there is substantial risk of losing control of both the 
entity that is delivering the services as well as the quality and quantity of the services 
themselves. I will avoid the normative discussion raised by Simon, but the fact that all 
authors see some issues in the relation between government and hybrid entity implies 
that I will have to take that into account in this study. 
 
In the Dutch literature, there also is no unambiguous definition of the ZBO concept. 
Scheltema (1974, p. 4) identifies them as entities executing central government tasks 
with some discretion. He did not mention the lack of hierarchical subordination as was 
done later by the Sint Committee (1994, p. 24) and the NCA (Parliament, 1995a, p. 7-8). 
Academic literature also recognised the lack of hierarchical subordination (Boxum et al., 
1989, p. 16; Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 24; Kraan, 2006, p. 28). As a result of the non-
hierarchical relationship, ministerial responsibility is also limited (Scheltema Committee, 
1993; Sint Committee; 1994). The services provided by ZBOs are regarded as executive 
(Sint Committee, 1994) or administrative (Boxum et al., 1989) public tasks, which implies 
that some authority has been attributed to the ZBO (e.g. Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 24). 
Kraan (2006, p. 228) noted that ZBOs can be distinguished from executive agencies 
not only by the difference in hierarchical subordination of the latter, but also by the lack 
of  ministerial authority to give instructions in individual cases processed by ZBOs and the 
option for ZBOs to use civil law when the minister intends to claim (part of) the ZBO‟s 
equity. These differences are according to Kraan of only minor importance, in the case of 
both executive agencies and ZBOs there is no residual claimant or competition, and as a 
result of that, economic incentives are relatively low. Kraan‟s implicit assumption seems 
to be that all ZBOs whether based on public or private law, have similar public controls. I 
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disagree with this point of view. He is right when referring to the large public law based 
ZBOs and those private law based ZBOs that were created by government. However, a 
number of ZBOs – notably certifying institutions – only have a ZBO status for a specific 
task and operate in a competitive market. They do perform authoritative public tasks, but 
ministerial control is generally on quality control rather than on budgetary controls. This 
latter group of ZBOs is often neglected in debates on ZBOs.  
Dutch administrative law allows both public law and private law units to execute 
administrative public tasks. This has been the case historically and is still continued 
practice under kZBO. It should be noted that there is a strong emphasis on using a public 
law based legal status if a new ZBO is to be created (AW2008). In some cases, a ZBO 
does not have a separate legal status but is still part of the legal entity State. This 
primarily concerns small  ZBOs which operate at arm‟s length of government mostly for 
reasons of what is labelled as policy independence (OECD, 2002, p. 14) or impartial 
judgement (Sint Committee, 1994, p. 13).  
A formal definition of a ZBO was given in AW1996 and by now under kZBO. The 
essential difference between the two definitions is „attribution of public authority‟ as it is 
included in the kZBO definition. It is precisely this change in definition that is contested 
from a constitutional perspective, because it also implies that without public authority a 
public law entity is not subject to kZBO, leaving an open end in the legal framework of 
public law entities (Zijlstra, 2009, p. 196-197). The full definition (kZBO:1) is as follows: „a 
public body at the level of central government that has been attributed public authority by 
or under the law and which is not hierarchically subordinated to a minister‟. I will follow 
that definition in general, but will mainly discuss the concept of ZBO based on two 
characteristics: „authority to decide unilaterally‟ („bestuursbesluit‟) and „not hierarchically 
subordinated‟. This choice is driven by the fact that the formal definition of kZBO had not 
yet been implemented in 2007 and the register of minBZK followed the old AW1996 
definition. The two characteristics position ZBOs on the quango scale. If there is no 
authority for unilateral decisions the unit is, in the words of Greve et al. (1999, p. 142), a 
voluntary/charity organisation or a (semi) privatised organisation. If the organisation can 
be classified as hierarchically subordinate to a minister, it is either an executive agency or 
a unit within a ministry.  
2.4. Positioning of Dutch ZBOs in relation to other Dutch quangos 
2.4.1. Use of ZBOs for policy realisation 
Before the issue of efficiency was on the political agenda, the role of non governmental 
actors in decision making and policy execution was already an issue in Dutch 
government, due to the traditions of pillarisation. Van Thiel mentions that one of the 
reasons for creating quangos – which includes ZBOs - could be that it gives the 
opportunity to let interest groups participate in policy execution, e.g. by giving them 
positions in the quango boards (Van Thiel, 2000, p 169). In more than a quarter of the 
cases (Van Thiel, 2000, p. 8) where politicians gave a motive for creating a quango, the 
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motive of self-regulation is mentioned. The Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on social 
security concluded in 1993 that organised employers and labour were able to influence 
the cost of social security programs and there was insufficient supervision to prevent this 
(Bannink, 2004, p. 153). Ultimately the conclusions of the Parliamentary Inquiry 
Committee have led to reforms in the social security domain resulting in the exclusion of 
organised employers and labour from policy execution. The participation motive based on 
traditional corporatist structures loses relevance. The Gerritsen Committee (2008, p. 20) 
explicitly suggested that board members in a participation type ZBO must be able to act 
independently from their stakeholders. If not, transfer of activities to the particular 
organisation must be considered according to the Gerritsen Committee. 
As of the 1980s, the issue of financial distress and as a result, reconsideration of the 
position of government in society was put on the political agenda. In a report on 
privatisation of government units, the suggestion was made to either outsource activities 
performed by Kadaster or to restructure units of ministries into a state enterprise 
(Parliament, 1982, p. 91). It lasted another 12 years before Kadaster was actually 
autonomised, but now under a ZBO-label. The outsourcing argument was the intended 
separation between core activities and non-core activities of ministries (Parliament, 
1993a, p. 3). By autonomising, efficiency improvement was expected. The motivation to 
create a new public legal entity was the typical public character of the services provided 
by Kadaster. 
The example of Kadaster is illustrative but only one in a sequence of reconsideration 
of the organisation of the civil service at the national level. This process had started with 
forms of delegated operational control „zelfbeheer‟ and the creation of executive 
agencies (e.g. Kuiper, 1999, p. 20-21). This process continued for another decade in 
which some 200 (Van Thiel and Van Buuren, 2001) new ZBOs were created and some 
300 were dissolved. After the year 2000, there have been some changes, but the 
discussion on kZBO between 2002 and 2006 resulted in a political reluctance to create 
ZBOs. If ZBOs were created, the main motive was no longer the participation motive; 
emphasis is on impartial judgement and to a lesser extent rule driven provision of 
services, often referred to as the efficiency motive (Gerritsen Committee, 2008, p. 17-
18). The latter option is only used if other solutions are inadequate (see AW2008:124a). 
2.4.2. Privatisation and autonomisation 
The ideas from New Public Management have led to a vast array of organisations, each 
with different names, status and authorities. Like other governments, Dutch government 
has used several forms of autonomisation, originally labelled privatisation (Boorsma and 
Mol, 1983; Kuiper, 1999, p. 8). Later on, a distinction was made between „pure‟ 
privatisation indicating a full transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the private sector52 
and autonomisation. The concept of autonomisation implies that there is some remaining 
                                                 
52 Of course when government commissions services from such a privatised organisation, the 
commissioning would be part of the ministerial responsibility.  
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ministerial responsibility. In the debate on autonomisation a distinction is made between 
„internal autonomisation‟ on the one hand and „external autonomisation‟ on the other. 
The concept of internal autonomisation is used when entities are given more degrees of 
management freedom but the entity still remains within the hierarchical structure of 
central government (Mol, 1998, p.  67; Kickert, 1998, p. 35; Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 
22). Internal autonomisation started with degrees of freedom on specific budgets within 
the framework of the cash accounting system in the early 1980s (Verbaan, 1983), and 
evolved – based on a government report in 1991 (Mininisterie van Financiën, 1991) to 
the creation of what is now known as executive agencies „Agentschappen‟53 with 
substantial degrees of freedom to operate and to use an accruals budgeting and 
accounting system. External autonomisation refers to those cases where there is some 
remaining ministerial responsibility, but the organisation involved is no longer part of the 
hierarchical structure of a ministry as is the case with ZBOs. 
 
Greve et al. (1999) prepared a continuum in which different groups of quangos were 
included. In an adapted form, this table was also used by Van Thiel (2000, p. 7-8). I will 
use the idea of this table as well but again with some modifications. One of the problems 
with the original tables was that public authority was not included. Furthermore, legal 
status and funding are mentioned only marginally, whereas these issues are major topics 
in this study. I have modified the table in a way that so that the basic (sub)groups of 
quangos can be identified. The classification is mainly adapted by using the „hybrid‟ 
concept (In „t Veld, 1995); the separation of public law and private law based ZBOs as 
used by the OECD (OECD, 2002) and the typical Dutch concept of „Rechtspersoon met 
Wettelijke Taak‟ [RWT] (Legal entity with statutory task; Kummeling & Duijkersloot, 2003, 
p. 82).  
No hierarchical subordination Hierarchical 
  PUBLIC BODY   
STATE 
OWNED 
ENTERPRISE 
VOLUNTARY / 
CHARITY 
ORGANISTION 
Non-ZBO 
RWTs 
PLB 
Non 
Hybrid 
Other public bodies 
(GW:133-134) 
EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY 
MINISTRY 
PLA-legal entity 
Non Hybrid 
PLB 
Hybrid 
PLA-State 
PLA-legal entity 
Hybrid 
 
Legend: ALL ZBOs Other Quangos NO QUANGO 
 PLA: Public LAW Administration; PLB: Private Law Body 
Figure 2.3: Different types of ZBOs within the quango spectrum Adapted from Van Thiel 
(2000, p. 8).  
                                                 
53 The formal name is „Baten-lastendiensten‟ (accruals accounting units) to emphasize that the only 
relevant distinction from other units of ministries is the accounting system 
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Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the different groups of ZBOs that can be identified 
both within the spectrum of Public Bodies as well as in the broader quango spectrum. I 
will elaborate on each of these different subgroups in the following subsections. 
2.4.3. State owned enterprises 
The first group of quangos is „state owned enterprises‟. Originally, this concept covered 
three groups of organisations, each with a separate status (Van den Bent, 1989, p. 152-
154). The most important ones were companies „Staatsbedrijven‟ that were operated like 
private companies, including an accrual budgeting and accounting system but regarded 
as companies performing a specific public task. The former Postal and Telecom Company 
is an example of this group, which is now fully privatised. In the Netherlands, the last 
„Staatsbedrijf‟ at the national level, Royal Dutch Mint, was transferred into a private 
company in 1994. The second group consisted of organisational units within central 
government that were allowed to operate like a company but remained subject to most of 
the rules of the cash accounting system of the CW. With the introduction of executive 
agencies, this form of managing government units was obsolete. The third group consists 
of private companies („Staatsdeelnemingen‟) in which the Dutch state owns a majority or 
all shares and thus has full control over the company. This is the group which Van Thiel 
(2000, p. 6) refers to in her study. This group of some 30 companies (Parliament, 2006c, 
p. 55-56) includes „NV Nederlandsche Spoorwegen‟ [NS] (National Railways), NV 
Nederlandse Gasunie‟ - the national gas transport infrastructure company - and most of 
the airports. The Dutch State holds a minority interest in some 25 other private 
companies, implying that it does not fully control these companies. 
Government involvement in state owned enterprises is related to legal and economic 
ownership of the organisation rather than the involvement in the production process. 
State enterprises are governed by the principles of supply and demand in their 
operational activities; the government may have influence through voting rights or having 
appointed members on the board of the organisation.  
There is a thin line between a state enterprise and privatisation. One can argue that at 
the moment when a ministerial entity is reorganised into a private company, this change 
would qualify as privatisation. From a legal point of view this can be justified as the 
organisation is no longer subject to public law. From an economic point of view this can 
be debated because as long as government holds the majority of shares (and thus voting 
rights) actual control is not in private hands. If the Dutch State were to follow IPSAS 
accounting standards, this would be expressed by the consolidation of the financial data 
of state enterprises in the financial statements of the State (Van Schaik, 2008; De Kruijf, 
2009). 
In some cases, using a state owned enterprise may be regarded as a step in the 
process of transition of a unit from a government controlled unit to a market controlled 
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entity (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 97).54 In other cases, such as for example DNB, it is 
however hard to imagine that government will ever sell its shares to third parties. 
2.4.4. Voluntary or Charity organisations 
„Private law voluntary or charity organisations‟ may perform a public task and are 
generally funded by donations and sometimes subsidies from (national) government. 
Their main relation to government is that they may perform a task that is in the general 
public interest and therefore sponsored or funded by government. Examples given by Van 
Thiel are the Salvation Army and the Red Cross, which operate in several countries.55 The 
initiative for establishment of private law voluntary or charity organisations will generally 
be found in the private sector. The entities that have now merged into the previously 
mentioned UWV have roots that fit into the characteristics of voluntary and charity 
organisations (Bannink, 2004, p. 19). 
It is possible that Dutch central government has a role in establishing these 
organisations. Examples can be found in some New Zealand trusts (OECD, 2002, p. 137) 
and Canadian foundations (OECD, 2002, p. 66). In the Dutch case, Dalhuisen (2004; see 
also Parliament, 2005b) has shown that CW2001 allows ministerial involvement in 
establishing such organisations – sometimes referred to as „public„ foundations (Van der 
Burg, 1986; Schroten, 2000) - ranging from granting financial facilities to direct 
involvement by taking the initiative to establish such an organisation. 
As is the case with state owned enterprises, in several cases Dutch central 
government has attributed authoritative tasks to organisations that at a first glance seem 
to be voluntary organisations. Examples are the funds supporting art, affiliated to the 
ministry of education, culture, science [minOCW] and the mortgage guarantee fund 
affiliated to the ministry of housing, spatial planning and environment [minVROM]. The 
organisations mentioned are classified as ZBOs. Although it is recognised that using 
voluntary organisations is undesirable from a governance point of view (Parliament, 
2005a, p. 6), the fact is that some seemingly voluntary organisations do act as ZBOs and 
that there are no indications that government is intending to reposition these 
organisations in the near future.  
2.4.5. Public Bodies 
In the Dutch case ZBOs are regarded as the „public body‟ type of quango. In section 2.3 
on the definition of ZBOs, I have already mentioned that two criteria are relevant for 
identifying ZBOs. These criteria are authoritative power and not being hierarchically 
subordinated to a minister. In the description Van Thiel (2000, p. 5-6) uses in her study, 
water boards are included as public bodies. However, water boards are a group of entities 
that have a specific constitutional position (GW:133) in the Dutch public sector. They are 
                                                 
54 I will neglect the stake the State has taken in banks as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. 
55 Although partially sponsored by government, these examples are not the best examples to be found as 
they operate independently from government. Better examples are social housing associations and 
hospitals, both private organisations which are at least in the Netherlands still strongly regulated by 
government. 
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functionally decentralised bodies like ZBOs, but their board is democratically elected 
rather than appointed by the minister. A second problem with using „Public Bodies‟ in the 
Dutch context is that, literally translated, a public body is an „Openbaar Lichaam‟, an 
entity that is mentioned in the Dutch Constitution (GW:134). Examples of „Openbare 
Lichamen‟ are the former „Openbaar Lichaam Zuidelijke IJsselmeerpolders‟, now part of 
the province of Flevoland and „NIVRA‟, the organisation of chartered accountants. In 
Dutch studies on ZBOs both „water boards‟ as well as „Openbare Lichamen are generally 
excluded (see e.g. Boxum et al., 1989, p. 16) although they would qualify under the 
public body type of quango. From a legal perspective, GW:134 generates confusion even 
in the courts, but according to Zijlstra, the constitutionally relevant distinction between 
Public Bodies as meant in GW:134 and a ZBO is found in the direct democratic 
legitimisation of Public Bodies. Legitimisation of a ZBO is indirect and based on authority 
delegated by Parliament (Zijlstra, 2009, p. 63). 
ZBOs do not have a standard legal format. I will mention some highlights in legal 
structure here; details will be elaborated on in Part B. There is a group of ZBOs that is at 
first glance not hierarchically independent from a minister because they are units within 
the legal entity State and use ministerial facilities. A well known example is the 
„Kiesraad‟, which operates from within minBZK. A second remark is that both public and 
private law based ZBOs exist. I have mentioned above that some private organisations 
are regarded as ZBOs, but the main rule is that a ZBO has a public legal status (kZBO:4). 
The OECD (2002, p. 19) makes a distinction  between private and public law based 
public bodies. Public law based bodies, both units of the entity State as well as separate 
legal entities, are referred to as „Public Law Administrations‟ [PLA], whereas private law 
based bodies are referred to as „Private Law Bodies‟ [PLB]. I will follow this distinction 
whenever necessary because it is clear cut and in the Dutch kZBO-law, a similar 
distinction is made with respect to ministerial authority towards the two groups. 
In principle, ZBOs operate exclusively in the public domain, given their authoritative 
tasks and irrespective of their legal status (e.g. the PLB „Autoriteit Financiële Markten‟ 
[AFM] (Netherlands Authority for the financial markets). In some cases however the 
activities performed can be used for market purposes as well and when political consent 
is given, market operations are allowed. 
A last remark to be made here is that ZBOs do not have to operate exclusively on 
behalf of government. The hybridity concept has been discussed in more detail in section 
2.3. A classification of ZBOs along the lines of „hybrid‟ – „non-hybrid‟ can complete the 
overview of different groups of ZBOs. 
 
To summarise, the quango group of public bodies seems to be larger than the group of 
Dutch ZBOs. For this reason I will avoid using the concept „Public Body‟. ZBOs can be a 
unit within the legal entity State or they have a separate legal status, either public [PLA] 
or private law [PLB] based. Finally, some ZBOs may have hybrid characteristics implying 
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that only part of their activities have an authoritative public character. I will refer to ZBO 
when studying the whole group or use PLA and PLB when referring to a specific subgroup. 
2.4.6. Executive Agencies 
After discussing Public Bodies, all subgroups of quangos are in fact discussed. The 
acronym quango includes the words „non-governmental‟. As Barker (1982, p. 4) put it, 
„non-governmental‟ actually suggests „non-ministerial‟. Lack of hierarchical relationships 
is what binds the three types of entities described above. It also distinguishes them from 
the executive agency type of quango which is still subject to hierarchy within the ministry.  
An executive agency is an internally autonomised unit within a central government 
ministry. The minister who is responsible has the opportunity to give operational 
instructions to any unit within the ministry, including the executive agencies. Although this 
is the formal position of executive agencies, Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield and Smullen (2004, 
p.9) state that executive agencies „have a greater autonomy than the normal [emphasis 
in original] divisions and directorates in the core of a ministry‟. The Dutch form of 
executive agencies -  „agentschappen‟ -were introduced in the mid 1990s after a 
government report (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991) was issued on improving public 
management (see e.g. Van Oosteroom & Soons, 2002, p. 19 and Van Oosteroom, 2002). 
Unlike ZBOs, „agentschappen‟ are a well defined group which is easily identifiable in 
budget documents of central government. In fiscal 2007, 39 „agentschappen‟ are listed 
with total costs of operations of some €9.2 billion (Parliament, 2006d, p. 83-84).  
Although executive agencies differ in their hierarchical relationship from other 
quangos, there is some justification to include them within the quango concept. In many 
cases, quangos were created to reduce ministerial overload (Flinders, 1999b, p. 30), give 
management more responsibilities and to focus on results rather than on money spent 
(Statskontoret, 2001). These motives hold for executive agencies in general and the 
Dutch „agentschappen‟ as well. 
Executive agencies are not an explicit object of this study. In principle, their budgets 
are authorised by Parliament and included in government budgets. In the Netherlands, 
executive agencies are a relatively new way of implementing public tasks, and are in 
some cases very close to what some ZBOs do. The Dutch government notes that in 
situations where large numbers of executive administrative decisions are made, an 
executive agency may very well be an alternative to ZBOs (Parliament, 2005a, p. 5).56 In 
effect, a letter from minOCW announces the merger of an executive agency and a ZBO as 
of 1 January, 2010. One of the motives given for this merger is that „...ministerial 
responsibility requires that operations of the ZBO should be under closer scrutiny of the 
minister…‟ (Parliament, 2007d, p. 1)  In the literature (e.g. Berenschot, 2002, p. 40; Mol 
and de Kruijf, 2003 p. 561; Mol and de Kruijf, 2004), indications are given that 
performance and control of executive agencies is not always as was expected. Because 
                                                 
56 The Gerritsen Committee suggested that creating new rule driven ZBOs was no longer necessary given 
the opportunity to create an executive agency (Gerritsen Committee, 2008, p. 19) 
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of the supposed similarity and remarks in the literature on executive agencies, I will use 
what is known about executive agency management in the assessment of ZBOs 
whenever that may be relevant.  
2.4.7. Quangos and the Netherlands Court of Audit 
When the NCA published its first report on ZBOs in 1995, discussions were restricted to 
those entities that did have an authoritative task at central government level. In 2000, a 
first report in a series on quangos was delivered by the NCA (Parliament, 2000a). The 
report discussed not only ZBOs but also other entities that deliver services „funded by 
central government contributions or fees that are charged by or under the law‟ 
(Parliament, 2000a, p. 16). In the Dutch jargon, the groups of entities that are included 
under this definition of the NCA are labelled „Rechtspersonen met wettelijke taken’ [RWT] 
(Legal entities with statutory tasks; Kummeling and Duijkersloot, 2003, p. 82). RWTs 
perform tasks on behalf of central government, either at central level or at a local level, 
but these tasks need not have an authoritative status as is the case with ZBOs. The 
largest groups of RWTs are primary and secondary schools. This group comprises some 
1,600 school boards out of 1,900 RWTs (Parliament, 2006e, p. 15), down from some 
2,700 school boards some 6 years earlier (Parliament, 2000a). School boards can also 
be classified as voluntary organisations receiving public funds to perform their tasks. 
The concept of quango might be applied to describe the group of RWTs, but is not fully 
correct either, especially as the NCA includes some public utilities (postal services and 
power supply) which are regarded as entities outside government control by the relevant 
ministries (Parliament, 2004c, p. 167). In their 5th study on RWTs (Parliament, 2007b, p. 
12), the discussion seems to be closed. The majority of organisations discussed in 2004 
are no longer regarded as RWTs. 
The RWT concept creates greater confusion compared to international discussions as 
there are other organisations which can qualify as quangos from an international 
perspective. For example, social housing associations57 (SHAs) which operate nearly 40% 
of Dutch housing (Hazeu; 2004, p. 188) are not included in the definition of an RWT, but 
they could also be classified as quangos as their assets are still subject to indirect control 
by the Minister of Housing.58 Following the same line of reasoning of the NCA for public 
utilities, one could also argue that SHAs are entities that have a statutory task as price 
regulation still exists for homes with below market rate rents.  Similarly, hospitals are not 
included in the RWT definition, although they are tightly controlled by government 
regulated fees and budgets. Van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2006) have done a survey on 
governance of Dutch quangos. In that study, it can be observed that for comparative 
reasons it was necessary to include organisations which in the Netherlands are regarded 
as entities that have their own democratic governance structure and are regarded as 
                                                 
57 In this case „association‟ does not refer to a specific legal status, SHAs are in most cases actually 
foundations rather than associations. 
58 Equity in excess of the actual SHA needs can only be used within the sector, a topic which is still heavily 
debated in Parliament (Vrom-raad, 2003; Parliament, 2007e, p. 46) 
ZBOs within the framework of Dutch central government   
 
60 Part A: Research problem and Dutch institutional context 
 
neither RWT nor ZBO. However in the political debates governance discussions are in 
general mostly limited to the RWT or ZBO concept only. 
 
In 1999 Kummeling et al. presented a diagram showing the main groups of entities in the 
Dutch public sector that could be identified. This diagram was used to draw a distinction 
between RWTs and ZBOs. I have modified this diagram to give an overview of the 
complexity of the whole   quango field at the Dutch national level. Figure 2.4 shows that it 
is hard to identify the individual status of an organisation which performs tasks in the 
public domain.  
 
Figure 2.4: National level quangos in the Netherlands. Adapted from Kummeling et al. 
(1999, p. 26) 
 
As discussed in the subsections on the different types of quangos, the diagram also 
shows that ZBOs do not need to be public law entities. Some may have private law entity 
status with an authoritative task, possibly along with fully privately operated tasks. The 
example of the Kiesraad (Dutch Electoral Council) also indicates that ZBO-status does not 
require separate legal entity status.  
 
In this section, the different forms of quangos that exist in the Dutch context were briefly 
discussed. I pointed out that from an organisational point of view executive agencies 
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(„Agentschappen‟) are clearly separated from the three other forms of quangos – state 
owned enterprises, voluntary/charity organisations and public bodies. 
 
Studying Dutch units at arm‟s length of government is a complex matter. There are 
numerous organisations in the field with very different characteristics. One can take a 
snapshot right now, but be assured that a new one a year later will show different results.  
Using the internationally widely used concept of the quango seems to be helpful for 
creating analytical structures. Readers should however be aware of the complications 
that arise in the Dutch case as a result of the introduction of the RWT concept by the 
NCA. Furthermore, ZBOs are only a – although substantial – subgroup of the public body 
concept within the quango debate. 
2.5. ZBO as a tool of government 
Up to this point, the ZBO concept has been described. The last step in this chapter is to 
provide a framework that can be used for classifications within the group of ZBOs as a 
whole, to be used in empirical section D. I will discuss four elements: motives for creating 
ZBOs, the emphasis on ZBO operations (section 2.5.1), and the complexity of the role of a 
minister in relation to ZBO operations (section 2.5.2). Finally, some remarks are made on 
services delivered by ZBOs (section 2.5.3), which is related to the discussion on the 
economic characteristics of services and the possibilities for funding as was generally 
discussed in section 1.4.2. 
The first motive is impartial judgement, which was a motive for creating ZBOs before 
cost-efficiency in government really became an issue on the political agenda. This motive 
refers to two different types of decision making. Government may not be able to make an 
impartial decision because of the lack of specific knowledge and expertise in the relevant 
policy domain. By using a ZBO, it is possible to organise the required knowledge and to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the decision making processes (Scheltema, 1974, p. 10; 
Boxum et al., 1989, p. 21; OECD, 2002, p. 14). Examples of this kind of ZBO are the 
Dutch Statistical Office „Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek‟ [CBS] and the Medicines 
Evaluation Board „College Beoordeling Geneesmiddelen‟[CGB-MEB]. Impartial judgement 
is also needed in those cases where government itself may be a party in the decision 
making process (Boxum et al., 1989, p. 28; OECD, 2002, p. 14; Gerritsen Committee, 
2008). Often, this motive is related to quasi-judicial themes as is the case with the 
„Kiesraad‟ (Electoral Council) and the „College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens’ [CBP] 
(Dutch Data Protection Authority). 
The second motive for creating ZBOs is the result of New Public Management/Public 
Management Reform theory and its preceding discussions on privatisation of government 
activities. Traditional government entities are subject to full bureaucratic control 
mechanisms that may not provide sufficient flexibility (see e.g. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, 
p. 11-12; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 61-63). The idea is that administrative tasks 
might be performed more efficiently and effectively outside the hierarchically controlled 
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bureaucracy. An additional argument for this motive is found in ministerial responsibility: 
a minister cannot be held accountable for any error in operations deep down in an 
organisation. This argument is more generalised in the problem of „span of control‟ 
(Scheltema, 1974, p.11; Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 45-47; Flinders, 1999, p. 29). 
Under the new kZBO framework, support for this motive is diminishing (Gerritsen 
Committee, 2008, p. 19). 
The third motive for creating Dutch ZBOs is strongly related to the political history of 
the Netherlands. The Sint Committee states that ZBOs may be used in „specific policy 
domains in which it is thought to be desirable that groups in society have direct (co-) 
responsibility for governance and administration (Sint Committee, 1994, p. 13). Van Thiel 
notes that this motive was particularly important in the growth of ZBOs in the 1950s (Van 
Thiel, 2000, p. 9). Flinders (1999b, p. 29) and the OECD (2002, p. 14-15) also refer to 
this motive as a tool for citizen involvement or other levels of government in decision 
making processes. Examples of ZBOs that were created based on this motive are the 
Kamers van Koophandel [KvK] (Chambers of Commerce) and the former social security 
benefit organisations that have been merged into the present UWV. In this latter case, 
one can also observe another development with respect to Dutch ZBOs, which is „hiving 
in‟ (In „t Veld, 1995, p. 10; Kohnstamm Committee, 2004, p. 17), meaning that central 
government is formalising former private tasks into the domain of public law.  
 
Given these three motives, some indications on the services provided by a ZBO can be 
derived. In all cases there is some form of unilateral decision to be made; however, the 
nature of that decision is different. When impartial judgement is needed, the decision has 
a relatively high „knowledge‟ character which is to some extent close to the ruling of a 
judge. In the efficiency case, decisions are rule driven and relatively straightforward; only 
the public nature of the decision results in the political choice not to privatise the service. 
The participation motive results in decisions which are the most difficult to describe. A 
key issue is that some peer group is apparently required to be involved in the decision 
making process as part of legitimising the decision. These differences have an impact on 
ex ante budgetary control because it allows for  differentiation in funding. This will be 
developed in Part C. 
2.5.1. Policy Objectives, Commissioning and Ownership 
A decision to create a ZBO implies that the task assigned to the entity requires some form 
of control by Minister and Parliament. In this section I will address the distinction 
between the commissioning and ownership roles of ministers because these different 
roles imply different control tools. To do so, I will elaborate on the policy objectives to be 
achieved through the operations performed by a ZBO. 
Analytically, the creation of a ZBO can be split up into two different decisions. First, 
there is the public task that has to be performed. Second, an organisation(al) unit is set 
up to perform this specific program task. These two decisions imply different governance 
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issues in the relationship between Parliament and Minister. Decision making on 
delivering a public task assumes that Parliament and Minister set the framework under 
which the entity may come to decisions. This framework requires a precise specification 
of the kind of decisions a unit is allowed to make as well as a choice on how the activities 
resulting in decisions are to be funded. It is Parliament – in collaboration with the 
Minister – which sets these specifications, may assess the outcomes59 and possibly alter 
the original specifications. In some cases, there may be a financial link to the desired 
outcomes when Parliament and the Government agree to use income transfer to achieve 
the outcomes. In such a case Parliament and Government have two strings to pull: one 
through the policy program requirements in the law and one through the level of income 
transfers that are made available to achieve the outcomes. Changing the level of income 
transfers may have an effect on the level and kind of activities of the unit that actually 
executes the task as attributed to it by law. What is stated here with respect to ZBOs 
generally holds for fully hierarchically subordinated units of government as well. The 
major difference is found in the organisational setting in which service is realised. 
The second issue is the decision to use a unit that operates within the hierarchical 
structure of central government, at arm‟s length of central government or perhaps further 
decentralised to local government or even privatised. Whatever form is chosen, to some 
extent the unit will be held accountable for the performance of the program task 
attributed to it or the services it provides. Without doubt, accountability demands will be 
stronger when a unit is closer to central government. Zijlstra (1997, p. 6) noted that in 
Dutch public law there is relatively little attention paid to the organisational structure 
under which public tasks are performed. That is why he tried to develop a normative 
framework on the organisation of ZBO public task execution. Whether Zijlstra‟s or another 
framework is used, the governance structure of a specific ZBO can deviate from that 
framework. Differences can be the result of either formal divergence from a framework or 
as a result of historic developments and arrangements that already existed before the 
framework became a standard. For example, in the Kadaster case, the organisation was 
able to create a new separate legal entity, which was not in line with the political opinions 
on the services to be provided by Kadaster, Kadata BV, (Deelen & Eertink, 2004, p. 119). 
As a result, Kadata was dissolved and its activities were again continued by the ZBO 
Kadaster. Furthermore, formal governance structures as reflected in the legal status of 
an entity can be overruled by actual controls imposed by the political system on a specific 
ZBO. 
 
As discussed in section 1.4.2.1, service delivery and thus ZBO operations are determined 
by commissioning and funding once the program has been defined. The political question 
regarding operations of a ZBO is not one of the outcomes of the program to be executed, 
but one of outputs and continuity of the organisation. Outputs are related to the 
                                                 
59 I use outcomes in terms of effects as the result of outputs or production (See e.g. Hoogerwerf, 1982, 
p.53; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 118-119; Kettl, 2008, p. 378) 
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production delivered to government in its role as commissioner of services on behalf of 
the general interest. Continuity of the organisation regards the ownership relationship 
between government and the ZBO as well as the authority on operations attributed to 
ZBO management. If financial resources are insufficient, theoretically the ZBO will face 
illiquidity and insolvency. When looking at the issue of output, Government – and through 
Government, Parliament - is acting as a commissioner in a quasi market who desires best 
value for the services to be delivered. In this role, the minister who represents 
Government as a contract party will have to monitor whether the output as requested in 
an implicit or explicit Service Level Agreement (SLA)60 is actually delivered according to 
the specifications. In case of under performance, reassessment of the SLA is needed, 
leading to questions as to how and whether or not to continue the use of this specific 
ZBO to achieve the desired output. Second, and related to the desired level of output, 
there is the matter of funding the output. At arm‟s length entities – especially those which 
have legal entity status – have to ensure that their financial continuity61 is guaranteed. 
The financial continuity issue is the link to the debate on authority to control ZBOs. One 
question is whether the costs of the entities‟ operations are in line with the financial 
resources available. A second question in this respect is whether the performance of the 
entity is on such a level that the SLA is met. If not, the commissioner theoretically has the 
option to find another service provider or will impose incentives/controls (e.g. fines) that 
will stimulate the service provider to deliver in accordance with the SLA specifications. 
Both these questions determine whether the financial position of the ZBO will enable the 
organisation to perform its tasks without additional financial support from the bodies 
controlling the entity. 
When studying ZBO autonomy from a legal structure and governance perspective, it is 
the issue of continuity that is the most important one. If Government and Parliament 
intend to continue to classify the task executed by the ZBO as a public task under the 
same conditions, the remaining issue is that of assessing the performance of the entity 
from both the commissioner and the owner perspective. From the commissioner 
perspective, the ultimate question is whether you get what you have paid for and the 
price is not too high. From the owner perspective, the question is whether revenues 
generated by the entity are sufficient so that there is no need – either in the short or long 
term – to allocate additional resources to the entity to prevent it from financial collapse. 
2.5.2. Multiple roles of a minister 
A problem with ZBOs is that program objectives, commissioning and ownership are in 
many cases interwoven and get mixed up. By using the analytical tool of separation 
between programs to be realised and operations to be managed, it is possible to focus 
entirely on the organisational structure of ZBOs and assess the formal and actual 
autonomy attributed by or under the law to a ZBO. Managing operations has a direct 
                                                 
60 In Dutch sometimes indicated as Service Niveau Overeenkomst (SNO) 
61 As opposed to program continuity, which is ultimately under the discretionary power of Parliament 
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relation to the continuity and ownership perspective as it aims at the delivery of agreed 
upon services as efficiently as possible. The analytical tool of separating program 
objectives and managing operations was implicitly used in the Sint Committee report 
where it stated that the creation of ZBOs would only be possible in an environment in 
which policy objectives appear to be relatively stable (Sint Committee, 1994, p. 14). Van 
Leerdam (1999, p. 185-186) arrived at a similar conclusion from a transaction cost 
approach. He stated that unambiguous policy goals lead to more balanced provision of 
services in the course of time. According to Leerdam lack of ambiguity leads to improved 
(ex-post) accountability and as a result creates a balanced basis for delegation of 
authority. 
The NCA (Parliament 2006a, p. 9) notes in its 5th report on (ex post) accountability of 
at arm‟s length entities that there is insufficient information provided to Parliament to 
assess „the full cash flows and equities of RWTs”62 which includes program costs as well. 
This remark by the NCA seems to be a mix of the owner and commissioner perspective. It 
is based on a statement regarding a budget for all RWTs of over €100 billion63 and is 
related to performance information including „outcomes‟ (Parliament, 2006a, p. 13). 
Having noticed this, my second comment would be that I do not fully agree with the NCA 
comment as it ignores the essential difference between decisions on program costs and 
costs of operations when assessing ZBO performance. Under my assumption of executing 
a program under steady conditions, a discussion on program costs is irrelevant in 
assessing ZBO autonomy. In fact, this remark holds for government units which process 
program costs as well. The essential difference is that in a ZBO case, operations are in 
fact outside the full hierarchical control of Parliament and Minister. 
In those cases where programs are an element in the public debate based on the 
inclusion of that program in a ministerial budget document, the debate on effectiveness 
of the program as well as its costs should be held in a policy debate setting rather than in 
the setting of  assessing the performance of the ZBO from the customer and ownership 
perspective. This is also in line with the remarks of the Scheltema committee (1993, p. 
62) which states: „By reducing the full authority of a minister to the core ministry, the 
responsibility for policy tasks is emphasised and incrementalism is prevented‟. The 
responsibility for policy tasks will also be reflected in monitoring ZBOs which consists of 
„assessing the quality of operations‟ and second „the feedback from operations to policy 
making‟ (Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 63). The minister is, in his role as (quasi) owner 
of the ZBO, responsible for the continuity of the organisation and the issue of customer 
satisfaction. His role is comparable to that of a shareholder64 who is interested in the 
                                                 
62  Note that the NCA report is on RWTs, which is a broader population than ZBOs alone, see Figure 2.4. 
63 Some € 20 bln program costs refers to cure budgets which are only regarded as part of RWT not ZBO 
budgets. 
64 Actually, one can argue that the minister is only the shareholder spokesman. It is the legislature 
Parliament and Cabinet which decide to create a ZBO, so the legislature should formally be regarded as 
shareholder of an entity. For matters of convenience in writing, I regard the minister as shareholder. 
Reallocation of residual claims is however a matter for the legislature. 
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financial targets set for the entity. From this comparison it also follows that the 
governance structure in the relationship between minister as (quasi) owner and ZBO is 
basically ex post. The minister and the entity do not have a formal hierarchical relation, 
which prevents the minister from giving direct instructions.  
In the ex post assessment of entity performance, the owner can require strategic or 
tactical changes in entity operations. Measuring the formal and actual distance between 
government and ZBO can from the ownership perspective be realised by assessing to 
what extent the minister has been given more authority than the authority available to a 
regular shareholder. Full autonomy would exist when the minister (and Parliament) has 
similar influence on the operations of a ZBO to a shareholder in a company where nobody 
has a controlling share in the organisation. On the ownership dimension only, Figure 2.5 
shows a decreasing level of autonomy. Note that this is an analytical tool only; I am not 
suggesting that non-controlling interests are a normative model for the ownership 
relationship between Government and ZBO, only that it can be used to assess the arm‟s 
length position of ZBOs amongst each other. The tool cannot be used as precisely as it 
can be in a BW2 context where the controlling number of shares can be assessed 
objectively. The legal measures laid down in ZBO case law are likely to disclose the scope 
of control by a minister, ranging from no control to full control. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Autonomy from a BW2-shareholder perspective 
 
The Scheltema Committee‟s statement on „assessing quality of operations‟ (1993, p. 63) 
is also an indicator for the commissioner perspective. The question would then be 
whether the specifications set beforehand in a SLA or similar contract document, which 
are part of the budget authorisation and appropriation process and the use of the 
appropriated budgets was in line with the standards set. As indicated above, it is difficult 
enough to distinguish between assessing the role of a minister as (quasi) owner or as 
commissioner acting on behalf of Parliament. Matters are even more complicated 
because the structure of ministerial budgets under CW2001, often makes it difficult to 
draw a distinction between programs and operations. Budgets are allocated based on 
policy programs as expressed in the ministerial budget documents that are submitted to 
Parliament. Unlike practices in the UK, where management of a Non Departmental Public 
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Body may be called to account by Parliament (OECD, 2002, p. 237)65, budgeting and 
accounting procedures for Dutch ZBOs are the responsibility of the minister. In the 
Netherlands, only annual reports from ZBOs have to be sent to Parliament (kZBO:18.2). 
Hence, budget authorisation can only be based on the ministerial budget documents 
submitted to Parliament.  
 
To summarise, a policy program may be executed by several forms of organisational 
structures, from a ministerial unit or an entity at arm‟s length such as a ZBO or perhaps 
even further decentralised to local institutions. The assessment of the program must be – 
at least analytically - separated from the assessment of the entity that is executing the 
program. Altering the program of course affects the operations of the entity involved, but 
the aim is primarily effectiveness rather than efficiency of the program. In this study, the 
programs to be realised are not discussed. The emphasis is on operations that are a 
result of the program specifications. Given the program specifications, a quasi contract 
relation emerges on service delivery (commissioning) and the continuity of the 
organisation (ownership) providing the services. 
When assessing an organisation that is responsible for operating a program, the focus 
is on how the organisation is run and how continuity of the entity is affected as a result of 
operations. This is the ownership perspective of control. Appropriating resources to a unit 
implies that some kind of service is to be delivered by that unit. The roles of Parliament 
and Minister in this case are based on the perspective of commissioning a task and 
expecting a certain level of quality to be delivered. The ownership and commissioning 
perspective can be used to find indicators for autonomy in operations. This analysis of 
the multiple roles of Minister and Parliament will be used in the theoretical discussion on 
ZBO autonomy from both a legal and economic perspective. 
2.5.3. Classification of ZBO services 
Bouckaert and Peters (2004, p. 38-43) provide a classification of services to be delivered 
by autonomous organisations. Bouckaert and Peters identify 7 groups of activities 
ranging from implementation of policies through direct services or income transfers to 
quasi judicial services and policy advice. In a paper on executive agencies, Pollitt, 
Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen & Talbot (2001, p. 282) note that an international 
comparison is difficult due to differences in size and functions of agencies. A draft paper 
by Van Thiel and CRIPO-team (2009) shows based on a survey of 21 countries that the 
organisation of 25 different public services is widely spread over different types of legal 
entities ranging from traditional government units to private organisations. A very general 
classification as provided by Bouckaert and Peters may therefore also be helpful for a 
general impression of ZBO functions, but it will improve understanding of the specific 
national context to stay as close to national classifications as possible.  
                                                 
65 This UK practice allows to separate accountability regarding operations (managerial responsibility) and 
programs (political responsibility) 
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In the Dutch context, the NCA classified 11 types of services in its first report on ZBOs 
in 1995 (Parliament, 1995a, p. 12). In the context of a classification of executive 
agencies the NCA classification was reduced to 6 types of services by Smullen and Van 
Thiel (2002, p. 40-41). Smullen and Van Thiel made an association with diversification of 
governance and control of executive agencies, suggesting that different types of activities 
require different control tools. Although less diversified, the classification is in fact an 
aggregation of the previous items defined by the NCA and can therefore also be applied 
to ZBOs. This is generally confirmed by the Cobra research findings (Van Thiel & 
Yesilkagit, 2006, p. 12-13) in which distributing and collecting money, auditing and 
information provision are the top three tasks mentioned by ZBOs. In Table 2.1, the 
classifications by Bouckaert and Peters, the NCA and Smullen and Van Thiel are 
presented. 
Table 2.1: Classification of activities of autonomous entities 
Bouckaert  and Peters 
(2004) 
NCA (1995) Smullen and Van Thiel (2002) This study 
Implementation: 
Direct service delivery 
Licensing 
Other unilateral decisions 
Registration 
Stewardship (assets and data) 
Licensing. 
1. Stewardship 
(assets and data) 
5. Licensing 
Implementation: 
Transfer of funds 
Income transfers 
Collecting fees/taxes 
Income transfers 
+ collecting fees/taxes 
2. Income transfers 
(inward and 
outward) 
Regulation Monitor 
Quality control 
Issuing decrees 
Monitor/control 3. Monitor + Quality 
control 
 
Advice and policy 
development 
xx Not applicable on ZBOs xx 
Information:  
Collection and  
dissemination 
xx xx xx 
Research Research 
 
Research/Education/Informat
ion 
4. Research + 
education 
(examination) + 
information 
(dissemination) + 
impartial judgement 
(tribunals) 
Tribunals and public 
enquiries 
Not mentioned, included 
under policy advice 
Not mentioned included in 4 
Research 
Representation Not applicable on ZBOs Not applicable on ZBOs  
 Policy advice, educate, 
stewardship 
(assets/data) 
Others  
 
I will use the Smullen and Van Thiel classification as a key classification in this study. The 
classification is comprehensive and more up to date than the NCA-classification. In the 
latter, the policy advice option existed, which was later excluded from the ZBO-definition. 
In the NCA classification, no distinction is made between decisions that can be regarded 
as impartial decisions and rule driven decisions as is the case in the Bouckaert and 
Peters classification. In Smullen and Van Thiel‟s classification, tribunal activities are not 
mentioned because such activities are not assigned to executive agencies. Given the 
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relevance of tribunals for ZBOs, I have included tribunal-activities under the „Research‟ 
label as it is, like research, an activity that is supposed to be realised in a value free 
setting allowing for impartial conclusions. My classification allows segregation between 
rule driven decisions (Stewardship, Income Transfers and Licensing) on the one hand and 
tasks based on impartial decision making (Monitoring and Research) on the other.  
2.6. The ZBO population 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the number of ZBOs varies, depending on when they 
are counted as well as on the definitions used. In 2005, minBZK created an Internet 
register of all units that are regarded as a ZBO (Parliament, 2005a, p.1). This register is 
regularly updated. An earlier paper list was presented by the Ministry of Finance in 2002 
(Ministerie van Financiën [minFin], 2002) and the NCA included a list of what were at that 
time regarded as ZBOs in their 1995 report on ZBOs (Parliament, 1995a). In this study I 
will use the list of ZBOs as it was available on July 1, 2007 from the Ministry of the 
Interior‟s website (MinBZK, 2007b). The July 2007-register included 145 entries, which 
include some entries that indicate a group of similar entities and other entities listed 
separately. Examples are the separately listed „art funds‟ whereas the territorially 
devolved separate legal entities KvK (Chamber of Commerce) are mentioned as 1 item. 
After rearranging all items that can be regarded as a group, 128 items remain. Details of 
this rearrangement are disclosed in Appendix 1. 
Compared to the previous lists that were available, the most remarkable change in 
the July 2007 list is the omission of the regional police forces. Apparently police forces 
are not regarded as units that are part of central government although the Minister of the 
Interior still has an arm‟s length role in controlling them. As a result, police forces are not 
subject to the framework law on public bodies (kZBO) that passed through Parliament by 
the end of 2006. I will follow the most recent classification of ZBOs for practical reasons. 
This study is not intended to discuss whether an entity should or should not be included 
within a specific definition of ZBOs. The study addresses the characteristics of 
organisations and the implications they have on the authorisation and control framework 
for an individual ZBO. The characteristics described in this study might however, be 
useful for other entities that operate at arm‟s length of government; whatever label they 
may have.  
Table 2.2: ZBOs subject to kZBO based on data minBZK 
 under kZBO not kZBO not listed January 
2008 
included in 
groups 
totals 
July 2007 list 56 51 21 - 128 
January 2008 list 59 66 - 19 144 
 
In January 2008, minBZK sent a letter to Parliament (Parliament, 2008b) in which she 
summarised the effects on individual ZBOs of the implementation of kZBO. Again, the list 
of ZBOs was different from the July 2007 list. Because the July 2007 list is no longer 
publicly available and the 2008 minBZK list is an officially published document, I have 
disclosed the aggregated data of both lists in Table 2.2. The letter of minBZK splits ZBOs 
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in two clusters: a cluster subject to kZBO and a cluster that will not be subject to kZBO, 
but governed differently. In the following paragraphs, I will provide some data on the 
clusters of ZBOs in which a link is made between the July 2007 list used in this study and 
the list provided by minBZK. 
The three newly listed ZBOs that are subject to kZBO appear to be very small 
entities66; I will not cover them in the remainder of the study. Which ZBOs are classified 
as subject to kZBO can be derived from Appendix 1. Most ZBOs that do not fully comply 
are regarded as „part-time ZBOs by minBZK (Parliament, 2008b), indicating a hybrid role 
with a relatively small ZBO function. Another reason that is given is reconsideration of the 
role of the ZBO in the near future. 
At this stage of the study, data on the number of ZBOs that are listed by government 
is basically sufficient. I will only give the numbers of ZBOs classified as to their legal 
status in Table 2.3. All other details on the population needed for the empirical part of 
this study will be given in Part D. 
 
Table 2.3 below shows the variety of ZBOs by the different types of legal status that 
exists. Even those ZBOs that are subject to kZBO show a variety in legal status. The 
variety in legal status is accepted by minBZK, otherwise the reconsideration argument 
mentioned above would have been used as well. Thus in the budget authorisation 
process, one has to take into account the different forms of legal entities that exist. 
 
Table 2.3: Number of ZBOs by legal entity and subject to kZBO 
 Part of legal entity 
State 
Public legal entity Private legal entity Totals 
ZBOs under kZBO 12 26 18 56 
ZBOs not under 
kZBO 
26 9 37 72 
Totals 38 35 55 128 
 
In Figure 2.4, the complexity of the use of quangos at the national level in the 
Netherlands has been illustrated. In absolute numbers, RWTs outnumber all other 
quangos, due to the fact that the RWT concept includes some 1,600 school boards 
operating at local or regional levels. However, when the different groups of Quangos67 are 
presented at a similar level in which entities performing the same task in separate 
jurisdictions are treated as being part of a group, ZBOs become a more prominent group 
of quangos, both in numbers as well as financially.  
                                                 
66 These three entities are: Stichting VAMEX (minVW); a committee on exam standards for accountants and 
a group of registration committees for medical professionals. 
67 Quangos meant here are State participations, ZBOs, executive agencies and RWTs which do not qualify 
as ZBOs. 
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Table 2.4: Relevance of types of quangos 2007 
 State 
participation* 
RWT, not 
ZBOs** 
ZBOs Executive 
agencies 
Number of items 21 22 128 39 
Estimated operating budget 2007 n.a. €8 B €7 B €9 B 
* Excluding 3 State participations that either have the status of RWT or ZBO 
** excluding the education sector 
 
The RWT group includes an estimated operating budget of some €21 billion for 
educational institutions from primary education to university education. Of the remaining 
€8 billion, some € 3.5 billion is spent by police forces; another € 1.5 billion by the railway 
infrastructure company and some €0.75 billion by public broadcasting organisations. This 
implies that after excluding the education sector, some 70% of RWT-resources are spent 
within the three largest entities.  
Estimated operating budgets of ZBOs add up to some €7 B (own calculations). The 
three largest budgets are those of UWV (€1.8 B); TNO (research institute; €0.6 B) and 
academic hospitals (€0.5 B for ZBO activities). The latter two are in fact only partial ZBOs.  
Runners up and full ZBOs are COA (housing asylum seekers; €0.5 B) and CWI 
(employment front office; in 2009 merged with UWV: €0.4 B). With respect to the 
executive agencies, the three largest units are DJI (prison service; €2.1 B); 
„Rijkswaterstaat‟ (infrastructure management; €1.9 B) and RGD (real estate management 
€1.3 B). 
2.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have discussed the environment in which Dutch ZBOs operate. The 
question in this chapter was:   
How do Dutch ZBOs fit into the institutional context of Dutch central 
government? 
The Netherlands is a decentralised unitary Monarchy in which political majorities are 
based on participation of several political parties in government. Ministers must act in 
line with the authority attributed to them, both with respect to ministries which are fully 
controlled by the minister, as well as for ministerial responsibility with respect to ZBOs 
(and quangos in general). The history of coalition building and accommodation and 
pillarisation has had a substantial role in the development of central government. One of 
the results, dating from at least the 1950s, but even prior to that, was that public tasks 
were executed by entities that are now labelled ZBOs. 
ZBOs are a Dutch form of organising production in the public domain at national level. 
They are the result of private initiatives that were „hived in‟ later on, or – mainly after 
1980 – the result of new ideas on managing the public sector and using entities at arm‟s 
length of government. In the literature, four groups of entities at arm‟s length of 
government are identified: state owned enterprises, charity/voluntary organisations, 
public bodies and executive agencies. ZBOs can be classified as a form of the public body 
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concept: not within the hierarchical structure of central government but executing 
authoritative public tasks on behalf of central government. 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess ZBO autonomy from a legal and economic 
perspective in relation to Parliament‟s ex ante control tools. From that perspective, ZBOs 
can be split into two groups: those that do have a separate legal status and those that do 
not. The latter group is part of the legal entity State and from a budgetary perspective 
subject to the same rules as ministries. Their autonomy is mainly based on political non 
intervention rather than on efficiency driven reasons. The group that does have a 
separate legal status is subject to other rules, which are basically case specific. In 
addition to the legal status of a ZBO, the type of services to be provided has an impact on 
the alignment of legal and economic dimensions of autonomy. Five types of services 
emerge from the literature: stewardship, income transfer, monitoring, research and finally 
licensing services provided by individual ZBOs. In the following chapter I will start 
elaborating on the relevant legal dimensions. 
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3. Introduction to Part B 
3.1 Research question 
In the previous chapters, the research problem for this study was given. The research 
problem is as follows: 
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
I have also given some indications of the institutional context in which ZBOs operate at 
Dutch central government level. Furthermore some remarks were made on the literature 
regarding entities at arm‟s length from government. ZBOs are a form of quango outside 
the hierarchical structure of government but still relatively close to government, given the 
authoritative nature of the task attributed to a ZBO. As a result Parliamentary involvement 
with ZBOs is likely to be stronger than for the voluntary/charity sector or state 
participation group of quangos.  
 
The research question focuses on two dimensions of autonomy that affect Parliamentary 
control of ZBOs: the legal and the economic dimension. In Part B of this study, I will 
address the legal autonomy dimension for ZBO operation. The research question 
addressed in Part B is:  
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from legal theory and how do 
they match control of ZBO operations? 
In Dutch law, the concept of autonomy itself does not exist. Autonomy is reflected in the 
concept of delegation (Awb:10.13) which refers to full transfer of authority to another 
entity under the responsibility of that entity. Delegation does not allow transfer of 
responsibilities to a subordinate body or person (Awb:10.14).68,69  Although full 
responsibility suggests autonomy, the extent to which autonomy is actually given will 
depend on the type of authority and the aggregated areas of responsibility issued. 
Therefore, I have to construct a set of indicators that allow me to determine to what 
extent a ZBO can be regarded as having formal and actual autonomy from the classic 
hierarchical structures of government. The attribution of delegated authority by 
Parliament and the corresponding budget authorisation process are the most important 
control tools for Parliament to allocate resources.  This basically holds true for all 
government funded activities. For national government activities which are not 
government funded, other forms of authorisation – passing relevant laws – have to be 
used.  Depending on the level of autonomy that is actually given to ZBOs, the 
                                                 
68 By July 2009, arrangements on attribution of authority were included in Awb10:22-23, which also refers 
to transfer of decision making. 
69 A mandate, as meant in Awb10:1 refers to a transfer of a decision on behalf of a public office, which 
means that there is no separate decision making autonomy. 
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authorisation principle results in a set of control tools which a minister needs to be able 
to use to fulfil his responsibilities towards Parliament.  
 
The remainder of the introduction consists of a short introduction on the legal dimensions 
to be assessed in order to answer the research question (section 3.2 ). I note that when I 
use examples to illustrate an issue being discussed, I will refer to ZBOs that are not 
included in the cases studies in Part D. 
3.2 Structure of Part B 
The analysis on the autonomy of ZBOs attributed or derived from the law can be 
performed along two thematic lines.  These are responsibility and authority on the one 
hand and budget authorisation on the other. These two thematic lines are spread over 
several parts of the Dutch legislative framework. The budget authorisation issue is 
covered in the legal financial framework for the public sector; in the case of ZBOs, the 
part that covers the national level. The authority and responsibility issue with respect to 
ZBOs is influenced by the comments of the NCA in 1995 and the political pressure that 
resulted from it. This part is covered in three groups of legislation: general public law, 
ZBO-case law and civil law. In the end, the NCA comments resulted in a general law on 
distribution of responsibility for ZBOs, the framework law on ZBOs [kZBO]. 
 
The research question for this part of the study focuses on autonomy indicators from a 
legal perspective. This is the basis for finding autonomy indicators. The Dutch legal 
framework consists of International Law, Civil Law, Public Law and Criminal Law. I can 
ignore Criminal Law and International Law as not being relevant to the organisational 
issue of using ZBOs for provision of government services. Civil Law is relevant, because at 
least some ZBOs are created under Private Law rather than Public Law.  
The underlying research sub-questions in Part B address the autonomy indicators to 
be derived from the legal financial framework, general public law and the civil law 
framework respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Most important legislation influencing autonomy of ZBOs 
 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the most relevant parts of legislation that affect the 
relationship between government and ZBO. Civil law defines all legal entities that exist in 
the Netherlands. At first glance it would be sensible to start my analysis from the Civil Law 
perspective. However, the emphasis in the study as a whole is on the relationship 
between Parliament, Minister and the ZBO executing a public task. Therefore, I will start 
with a discussion on Public Law. Without attribution or delegation of authority and the 
subsequent spending authorisation, government cannot execute its tasks, unless the 
activities are funded otherwise. In that case, Parliament has authorised the attribution of 
responsibilities to the minister and the (non) executive board of a ZBO. The restrictions in 
budget law and possibly any exceptions made to these restrictions in ZBO laws, 
determine the (relative) autonomy of ZBO management towards Parliament and minister. 
In principle, the legal framework including budget authorisation should result in a 
(matching) set of control tools which a minister requires to be able to fulfil his 
responsibilities to Parliament. 
 
I will not consider the issue of case specific judicial supervision by administrative courts. 
Although relevant to citizens appealing against decisions, a judgement in an individual 
case does not in principle affect the governance relationship between ZBO and 
Parliament or minister. Therefore, the organisation of judicial supervision can be ignored 
although the outcome of that supervision may be an element in the assessment of the 
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performance of the ZBO by the minister, or an element in the discussion between 
Parliament and minister on ministerial responsibility.  
 
In this theoretical part of the study, the emphasis is on the factors included in the legal 
context. Each element of the law will have an emphasis which either leans towards 
autonomy or towards government control. By assessing all elements it is possible to state 
a theoretical position of (legal) autonomy for ZBOs at a general level. Actual autonomy 
can only be assessed when case law is included in the evaluation, but that will be 
discussed in Part D. The results of this assessment can then be compared with elements 
which determine the autonomy of individual ZBOs from an economic perspective (Part C), 
which is the basis for an answer to the match in design of ZBOs. A final statement on the 
(relative) autonomy of ZBOs requires that not only does a match in design exist, but also 
the material position of the ZBO is in line with the design. The material position can be 
assessed by the question of whether parties behave according to the design or whether 
the actual governing structure is tighter or looser than was intended in the design. The 
match of design at an individual ZBO level to its material position is covered in the 
empirical Part D. 
 
The structure of Part B is as follows. Chapter 4 addresses the relevant budget 
authorisation legislation. In Chapter 5 the emphasis is on specific public laws that govern 
general measures on ZBOs, including the framework on attribution of responsibility. In 
Part B I will not discuss individual laws under which ZBOs were created: that issue is to be 
discussed in the empirical part D of the study. Chapter 6 focuses on autonomy indicators 
from a Civil law perspective. Finally chapter 7 provides an answer to the research 
question and summarises the elements which determine autonomy from a legal 
perspective.
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4. Budget authorisation: The budgeting and accounting act 
4.1 The principles of budgeting 
Production of services is in general controlled by the market mechanism. Supply and 
demand ultimately determine the level of actual production. However, in the case of a 
deficiency in the market-mechanism, another control system has to be used to determine 
the desired level of production. The classic example is policing.  Since nobody is prepared 
to pay voluntarily for the service, it will only be performed when at some level an 
authoritative power imposes a tax on all citizens to pay for police services. Such a tax will 
ideally be imposed by a democratically legitimised body. On the one hand, that body will 
impose the tax; on the other hand it will use a budgetary control tool – authorisation – to 
match expenditure on policing with the aggregate level of taxes. In the authorisation 
process, rules and regulations can be set which have impact on the degrees of freedom 
available to top and middle management of at arm‟s length entities. This section explores 
the general impact of budget authorisation on the operations of these entities. 
Theory mentions a variety of budgeting functions, which I will reduce here to three 
main public budgeting functions: „allocation‟, „authorisation‟ and „stabilisation or macro-
economic‟ functions (Musgrave, 1959, p. 7-9; Musgrave & Musgrave, 1973, p. 10; 
Boorsma, 1982, p. 323-325; Dolman, 1987, p. 147; Van den Bent, 1989, p. 25; Heun, 
1989, p. 272-282; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2001, p. 1-5;  Minderman, 2003, p. 13-14).70 
The choices made by the political system with respect to allocation and stabilisation are 
finally expressed in the authorisation procedures through the legislature. Allocation of 
budgets indicates Parliamentary preferences on the direction of spending. Gray, Jenkins 
and Segsworth (1993, p. 6) have stated that at its most basic level, the budgetary 
process acts as a mechanism for integrating different interests into the regular 
procedures of the political process and by doing so realising political efficiency.  
 
Authorisation in relation to budgeting should be regarded as the formal decision by the 
legislature to spend government resources.  Appropriation is the related consent to incur 
obligations and to make payments (Lyden & Miller, 1982, p. 408). In the US context, 
authorisation focuses on passing program laws, but not the funding of these programs. 
The funds related to the program are passed in separate appropriations, after the 
program law has been passed. Both authorisation and appropriation are the prerogative 
of Congress (Ott & Ott, 1982, p. 79-83). This difference between authorisation and 
                                                 
70 This study focuses on operations of ZBOs. This means that I am studying the activities of ZBOs which are 
directed to generate a certain output and outcome. From the perspective of ministerial responsibility for 
ZBOs the stabilisation function can be neglected as this function aims at using programs to actively or 
passively redistribute income within the economy. When a ZBO is involved in redistribution, this is a 
matter of production, not one of stabilising the economy which is politically determined. From a legal 
perspective the stabilisation function is subordinate to the other budgeting functions. In the Netherlands 
the EMU requirement is the only legal framework that influences budgetary decisions from a 
stabilisation perspective. 
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appropriation (Janse de Jonge, 1993, p. 149) is a typical issue in the American budgeting 
system.71 In the Netherlands, the distinction does not exist as clearly as in the American 
system. This is due to the fact that the program laws that have been passed by 
Parliament do not require annual adoption as is the case in the USA (see also Heun, 
1989, p. 89). Parliament has the right to change a program law and by doing so affects 
the budget required to execute that specific law. The result is that once the budget has 
been adopted, the role of the legislature ends and the executive – i.e. the minister – 
takes over.  
 
In the Netherlands and also in other European countries, budget authorisation has no 
external effect on citizens or legal entities (Heun, 1989, p. 165-171; Van der Bij, 1993, p. 
13-15; Mulder, 1995, p. 26; Minderman, 2003, p. 20). No one can claim a right based on 
an available budget but government cannot claim that budgetary limits do not allow for 
payment if an applicant for a government contribution has fulfilled the legal requirements 
to receive the grant. In the USA the authorised budget is a strict spending limit and no 
spending is allowed above the authorised budget. A government shut down as may occur 
in the USA (Schick, 2000, p. 4; Joyce & Meyers, 2001, p. 6) cannot happen in the 
Netherlands.  
Once the budget laws have passed through Parliament, the minister has the formal 
right to distribute the appropriated funds to the entities that actually execute a specific 
program. The distribution of money will be realised by the ministry under full ministerial 
responsibility. The actual entity that executes the program can be the ministry, a ZBO or 
any other organisation outside the ministry. Of course, the budget law may have 
restrictions by specifying an organisation that should receive the resources.   
 
The Dutch budgeting and accounting act (CW) is the main document in which budgeting 
procedures are described. I will start by describing CW and its relevance for ZBOs (section 
4.2). After that, I will focus on authorisation procedures, accounting details and the 
effects of CW on budgeting for ZBOs. 
Depending on the level of detail in the budget laws, the minister is free to distribute 
the monies appropriated. This distribution of funds is a ministerial responsibility for which 
he is accountable to Parliament. The authorisation issue in budgeting is dominated by 
two themes. First, what is to be authorised: a level of spending or a level of costs? In 
other words: is there an authorisation in terms of cash or in terms of resources/accruals 
(section 4.3). The second theme is the subject of authorisation and the level of detail of 
authorisation. What are the degrees of freedom for management and what has been 
controlled ex ante by the legislature? This will be discussed in sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.5 
respectively. The chapter ends with a summary of findings. 
                                                 
71 I use the comparison with the American budgeting system as much of the general budgeting literature in 
English refers to the US system. By doing so, I stress some of the differences that exist in budgeting 
systems. 
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4.2 The ZBO budgeting framework explored 
Before the 1994 NCA annual report (Parliament, 1995a), relatively little attention was 
paid to ZBO governance issues. The NCA noted that as a result of this low political 
attention, a wide variety of ZBO governance measures existed and furthermore that 
ministers did not have the appropriate tools to control ZBOs. The immediate effect of the 
NCA report was a motion passed by Parliament (Parliament, 1995c) to prepare a legal 
framework in which ZBO governance had to be arranged. At that time, CW did not include 
any explicit regulations on ZBOs. In the following sub-sections, I will address the 
measures in CW for creating arm‟s length organisations, including ZBOs, the planning and 
control measures that are relevant for Parliamentary decision making and finally, the 
issue of funding ZBOs by resources other than government budgets.  
4.2.1 Comptabiliteitswet and creating arm’s length organisations 
The budgeting process is generally defined in the Constitution (GW:105.1-105.3). by 
stating that the government submits annual budgets to Parliament and that the income 
and expenditure statement has to be approved by the NCA before they are presented to 
Parliament. In GW:105.4 the requirement that a law must be passed to govern central 
government operational and financial management. This law is the „Comptabiliteitswet‟ 
[CW]. The general features of CW are that it describes the format of the budgets including 
the cash-commitments accounting system to be used by the ministries. Second, CW 
describes requirements on administration and daily financial operations and third, the 
authority and competences of the NCA are described.  
CW includes some articles on the relationship with arm‟s length organisations. These 
articles focus on executive agencies as well as private law based entities, which include 
PLB type ZBOs. I will not consider executive agencies and focus on creating legal entities 
under CW. Many ZBOs are however public law based entities (PLAs). Public law entities 
are not separately discussed in CW. In BW2:1a72, it is stipulated that a public law entity is 
created by law. This is a reference to case law in which the organisation and – in the case 
of ZBOs – offices of the public law entity are described. Ten Berge & Zijlstra (2000, p. 10) 
emphasise that from a constitutional perspective, a PLA is part of the public body State 
even though it has the right to use assets and is accountable for its civil law acts from a 
civil law perspective73. Formal measures on creating a law as well as on creating a PLA 
are laid down in the Constitution (GW:81-89) and in “Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving”, a 
decree which includes general instructions for legislation. Particularly with respect to 
ZBOs, as of 2008 the legislation creation framework is supplemented by kZBO on the 
organisational arrangements for ZBOs. I will discuss the decree in more detail in Chapter 
5. 
                                                 
72  References to BW will have this style „BWX:y.z, to be read as BW, book X, article y, sub article z. 
73 See also Ten Berge & Zijlstra (2000, p. 21) in which reference is made to the full legal private law 
capacity of a PLA based on BW2:5 and BW3:32. 
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CW has changed several times in the course of time. For the purpose of this study 
four CW phases are relevant. First, I will discuss CW1927 as effective from about 1950. 
This law oversees the creation of private law entities in the 1950s, according to Van Thiel 
(2000, p.18-19) a period during which many decisions on ZBOs were made. Article 89a of 
CW1927 was introduced to define the exact position of government regarding third party 
liabilities of legal entities in which government participated. Antheunissen (1948, p. 167) 
shows that this CW 1927 article was of only very limited scope since it was aimed at 
those entities for which no general third party liability rules existed. In modern phrasing, 
the clause is directed at civil law ZBOs or state owned companies which are materially 
governed by a minister. In 1956, the Simons Committee was asked to investigate the 
need to revise CW1927. With respect to creating legal entities by government, the 
committee acknowledged that the civil code74 already made a provision for creating 
public law legal entities by law. The Committee advised including an explicit requirement 
for creating civil law entities by or under the law (Simons Committee, 1960, p. 192). In 
their draft of the new CW, they referred directly to article 89a of CW 1927. In the debates 
on the proposed new CW, the requirement was made more restrictive; a civil law entity 
could only be established by law. The option to use an instrument - such as a Decree – 
that is available to a minister without prior authorisation by Parliament was removed 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 2003, p. 166; CW1976-I:40.1).75 This restriction was motivated 
by the desire to give Parliament the explicit power to consider prior to the establishment 
of the entity whether the political role of Parliament was secured. Parliament also 
considered whether sufficient control instruments were available to monitor the activities 
of the civil law entity. The period governed by the CW1976 version can be divided into two 
parts. From 1976 till 1995 (CW1976-I) regulations on creating private legal entities were 
stricter than from 1995 until and including fiscal 2001 (CW1976-II).76 Before the 6th 
revision of CW1976 in 1995, as already mentioned, a law was required if a minister 
wanted to create a private legal entity (CW1976-I:40). As of 1995 the procedure changed 
from explicit authorisation to restricted implicit consent. A minister has to notify both 
Houses of Parliament that he intends to participate in establishing a private legal entity. 
This procedure is called „voorhang-procedure‟. In the debate regarding the change of the 
procedure, both the Raad van State [RvS]; (Council of State)77 and members of 
Parliament commented that the change would be constitutionally inappropriate because 
prior approval on creating a private entity would be required in those cases where 
government was acting on behalf of the general interest. Furthermore an a priori test of 
the effects of establishing a private entity on the political function of Parliament would be 
required (Parliament, 1994a, p. 7). The government replied that the procedure to create 
                                                 
74 The civil code was under revision in 1956. The Simons committee referred to the proposed version of the 
Civil code. In 2006 this requirement was codified under BW2:1.2 
75 After 4th modification of CW1976: article 29 
76 CW1976-I refers to versions before the 6th revision in 1995, CW1976-II refers to the later versions 
77 A High Authority of State that has to be consulted on every proposal for a law (Dutch Constitution, article 
73) 
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civil law entities based on a law, led in some cases to the use of puppets that formally 
created the legal entity on behalf of a minister. The proposal to change the procedure 
implies according to the minister that such evasion of legal requirements can be 
prevented (Parliament, 1994b). Furthermore, the Minister of Finance claimed that 
deregulation and a need to speed up processes make the change in the law necessary 
(Parliament, 1994c, p. 15). Parliament still has the option to require that a law is 
submitted in which the proposal for establishing a private legal entity is included. The 
difference between CW1976-I and CW1976-II may be relevant in those cases were 
private legal entities were established, initially without the status of a ZBO but which are 
regarded as being ZBOs by the administrative court (Kloosterman, Winter, Noordam & De 
Ridder, 2002, p. 60) or when a ZBO is created without proposing a law as in the case of 
the Jewish Humanitarian Fund (Parliament, 2000c). Parliament ultimately agreed with 
the government‟s proposal with only a minor change. In the original proposal implicit 
consent was given after 14 days. This was changed to 30 days to bring the proposal in 
line with a similar procedure for the creation of executive agencies (Parliament, 1995d) 
 
The fourth and last version of CW is the present CW2001, which regarding the creation of 
private legal entities is equivalent to the preceding version CW1976–II.78  The present 
measures in CW2001 cover notification when a private law entity is created, whereas 
creating a public law entity is covered in the constitutional procedures and from a civil law 
perspective described in BW2:1a.  To summarise, Table 4.1 provides an overview of the 
different stages of CW for creating legal entities and ZBOs. 
 
Table 4.1: Requirements on creating private entities and ZBOs in CW. 
 CW 1927 
(As of 1934) 
CW 1976-I CW 1976-II 
(as of 1995) 
CW 2001 
On private entities 
includes PLBs 
Art 89a:  
3rd party liability 
Art 40.1:  
Explicit 
parliamentary 
consent. 
Law on private 
entity required 
Art 29: 
Notification 
required; option to 
use a law. Law 
required if 
Parliament 
demands it 
Art 34 
Notification 
required; option to 
use a law. Law 
required if 
Parliament 
demands it 
On PLAs No requirements No requirements No requirements No requirements 
 
Before notifying Parliament, the minister has to consult the NCA and obtain the consent 
of the entire Cabinet (CW2001:34.1 and 34.2). This implies that any plan to create a 
private legal entity has to have the consent of the Minister of Finance before it can be 
implemented. I do not consider the role of the other members of the Cabinet as they will 
generally have a policy of non-intervention in cases which do not immediately affect their 
policy field (e.g. Van den Berg, 1981, p. 234). If Parliament does not require additional 
information within 30 days after notification, the minister can create the entity. If 
Parliament does require additional information two possible outcomes may occur. First, 
                                                 
78 See article 34, CW2001 
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the information provided is sufficient for Parliament. In that case the minister can create 
the entity. Second, Parliament expresses the opinion that authorisation by law is required 
for a specific proposal. In that case, the minister has to comply with the procedures of a 
proposal for a law, which results in a considerable delay. To my knowledge, there are no 
cases between 1995 and 2009 where Parliament required a law for creating a private 
legal entity, neither a PLB, nor any other form of private legal entity. Of course that does 
not mean that no private law entities were created at all, but this was carried out on the 
basis of the notification procedure only. 
4.2.2 Planning & Control under CW 
In Part A, I have briefly indicated that between September „t -/- 1‟ and December „t -/- 1‟, 
Parliament (i.e. Tweede Kamer) discusses and passes the budget laws of the ministries 
including government funding of ZBOs.  Actually the procedure starts with a document 
presented to the ministers in December „t -/- 2‟ in which the regulations for preparing the 
budget for fiscal year „t‟ are included. The Minister of Finance has the power to issue a 
set of standards for preparing budgets under article 18 CW 2001. These standards 
include only one instruction on ZBOs, which is the authority to set rules on the 
information with respect to ZBOs (and RWTs) to be included in the ministries‟ budget 
documents. In practice, this has resulted in the requirement to submit an appendix which 
presents proposed (realised) spending from a ministerial budget. It is up to the minister 
who is responsible for the ZBO organisation how to include relevant budget information 
for specific ZBOs into the ministries budget proposals. There are no general regulations 
on changing ZBO budgets, unless the ZBO is funded from a ministerial budget. In that 
case, the implicit policy is that budget overruns can be included in the relevant budget 
article. In fact, that results in authorisation for the minister to use the additional 
resources, not a direct authorisation towards a ZBO. Only at the end of the fiscal year, in 
the annual reports, is information on all ZBOs and the level of government funding they 
received further disclosed. The internal procedures of individual ZBOs are governed by 
the regulations in ZBO-case law, which can include regulations on (the timing of) approval 
of ZBO budget documents and annual reports by the minister. 
 
If a ZBO‟s budget is included in the budgets of a ministry, Parliament has the same rights 
as for other parts of the ministry budget. In my opinion, given studies on reallocated 
budgets on the initiative of Parliament (e.g. Warmelink, 1993, p. 171-185), it is very 
unlikely that Parliament will change a ZBO budget proposal. If Parliament does decide to 
do so, the change is likely to refer to the program to be carried out by the ZBO rather than 
strictly based on decisions on its operations, given Minderman‟s explanation of budget 
reallocation by Parliament.  
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Parliament‟s influence on proposed budgets. 
Minderman (2000, p. 44) emphasises that the role of Parliament in the Dutch system is 
to legitimise the plans to be implemented by the government by – amongst other issues – 
passing the budgetary laws. However the actual influence of Parliament on budget levels 
or the direction of spending is low. Many authors have shown that the actual changes in 
proposed budgets as a result of amendments submitted in Parliament are only very 
minor, both in number as well as in the amount of money reallocated (e.g. Warmelink, 
1993, p. 171-185; Van der Bij, 1993, p. 87-89). Warmelink shows data for five ministries 
whose budgets were amended on average between 0.0% and 0.34% in the 1980s. 
Warmelink claims that the small impact is due to the fact that budgets are prepared by 
the ministries and that Parliament neither has time nor knowledge to develop 
alternatives to the proposals submitted. Another part of the explanation is shared by 
Warmelink (1993, p. 187) and Minderman (2000, p. 103) by stating that in practice the 
coalition agreement as concluded after an election is the basic document for allocating 
resources to policy objectives. The coalition majority in Parliament is politically committed 
to this agreement and only in the event of urgent political issues may reallocation of 
resources be needed.  
 
4.2.3 CW regulations relevant for ZBOs 
In this section, I will discuss the regulations in CW that are relevant for ZBOs and the 
impact of these regulations on autonomy in operations. I will start with the general 
budgeting procedures, then discuss information provision and finally discuss other 
relevant parts of the CW regulations. I will use CW 1976-II as a benchmark in this section. 
The CW1976-II regulations on ZBOs are essentially transferred to CW2001 (Minderman, 
2002; Van der Dussen, 2002), whereas older regulation were more stringent, particularly 
for creating legal entities. Minderman (2000, p. 180-183) indicates that (ex ante) 
financial control of ZBOs is based on CW1976-II:17 on the one hand and articles 
CW1976-II:57, 59, 66 and 79 on the other hand, which cover ex post controls based on 
the authority attributed to the NCA. The latter articles are beyond the scope of this study. 
Ex ante control of ZBOs is not explicitly covered in the CW. CW1976-II:1779 refers to 
ministerial responsibility for compliance, efficiency and effectiveness with respect to the 
budgets attributed to him. CW1976-II:17 holds for ZBOs with legal entity status. 
Budgetary control of ZBOs without legal status is covered under the standard regulations 
for ministries in CW2001:1 and CW 2001:4. Minderman (2000, p. 183-184) notes that 
CW1976-II:17 implies that the minister is at least responsible for control and distribution 
of government budgets and the conditions for efficient and effective organisation of 
independent entities – amongst them ZBOs (jdk). In those cases where specified 
government budgets for ZBOs are authorised and appropriated in budget legislation, 
                                                 
79 CW1976-I: basically article 25, but in other words. 
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Parliament has had an active role in the decision appropriating a specific level of budget 
to a minister with the intention that it is to be distributed to that specific ZBO.  
In the formal setting, the budget law is not regarded as externally binding legislation. 
When a ZBO is not part of the State legal entity, the Parliamentary decision has no 
immediate effect on the ZBO. The minister has two formal options so that the ZBO 
complies with the budget that was appropriated by Parliament. The first option would be 
to pass a law governing the financial relationship between minister and ZBO. This option 
would be rather inefficient, as it will only transpose what has already been decided for the 
relationship between Parliament and minister. Furthermore, such a law has to be 
adopted every year. The second option is to agree upon a budget document or a civil law 
contract/SLA which specifies exactly what services are to be delivered by the ZBO. 
Verhoest (2002, p. 60) shows that such an option is possible but generates additional –
sometimes hidden (jdk) – costs in terms of monitoring or bonding costs. 
Besides these two formal options, the minister has the material option to use 
incentives such as informal pressure or postponing and prioritising delivery of services to 
make the ZBO comply with the desired level of spending. Whatever option the minister 
uses, Parliament has no option other than to accept the actual level of use of resources 
by a ZBO since as a result of this reduced authority the minister is not in the hierarchical 
position to instruct the ZBO to comply with the budget level that was appropriated. The 
lack of a hierarchical relationship might be overruled in those cases where other legal 
instruments exist, e.g. if laid down in the legislation regarding a specific ZBO. This will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
The minister can be held accountable by Parliament for the efforts made to have the 
ZBO comply with Parliament‟s intentions. This is part of his responsibility for his own acts 
towards the ZBO in question (Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 19). The legal status of the SLA 
will be discussed in chapter 6. From a budgeting perspective, the SLA is only an 
explanatory note when it is included in the budget documents. In other cases it has no 
direct impact on the relationship between authorisation in Parliament and actual budget 
appropriation for the ZBO. If Parliament is dissatisfied with the performance of a ZBO 
related to the SLA or other performance documents, then Parliament has to hold the 
minister accountable for his efforts to encourage the ZBO to comply with the performance 
document. 
In the present CW2001, the contents of CW1976-II:17 are split up into four new 
articles (CW2001:19-22), in which a clear distinction is made between efficiency, 
effectiveness and compliance. The purpose of the new articles is similar to the old ones. 
According to Minderman (2000, p. 184) it is generally accepted that ministerial 
responsibility also refers to monitoring the operations of independent entities.  
Two other, more general remarks on budgetary control should be made here. First, 
the rules of fiscal discipline – an appendix to the Coalition agreement, covering 
procedures in case of budget overruns – require that budgetary overspending in a 
ministry budget is generally compensated for by other items in the ministry‟s budget. If a 
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minister has an excess expenditure problem, he may choose to apply general budget cuts 
throughout the whole of the ministry‟s budget. Such a budget cut may also affect ZBOs 
that are directly or indirectly funded from within the budget of a ministry. The impact on 
ZBO  operations will depend on the specifications in the SLA. Second, and more recently, 
a general report on the future structure of central government particularly focuses on the 
staff levels in ministries and ZBOs. In this report, a claim on staff reduction in ZBOs is 
mentioned (Parliament, 2007f, p 33-34). This claim has impact on 35 ZBOs.80 Although 
comments are made that ZBO operations cannot be directly influenced by a minister, he 
is urged to prepare implementation plans for staff reduction that also cover the ZBOs 
listed in the document. These 35 ZBOs are thus in effect less autonomous than those 
which were not listed in the document. 
 
The second issue to be addressed is information provision. Minderman‟s comment that 
ministerial responsibility includes monitoring the operations of arm‟s length entities 
implies that relevant information has to be available to allow monitoring. In the present 
CW2001 a provision for this has explicitly been included. Article CW2001:44a81 requires 
that information on (non-financial) performance of all ZBOs and other legal entities that 
are funded by fees (RWTs) is submitted to the minister who is responsible for the specific 
entity and not Parliament (jdk). Such performance information may include information 
as required in the specific law on an entity as well as information that is agreed upon 
between minister and ZBO in whatever format (Parliament, 2002c). The fact that 
information is provided to the minister implies that Parliament has deprived itself of the 
direct opportunity to use such information in budget and accounting documents.  
Another new issue in CW2001 is described in article 18.4. In this article it is explicitly 
stated that the Minister of Finance can set standards regarding the information on ZBOs 
and RWTs to be included in a ministry‟s budget proposal. The origin of this article lies in 
an amendment proposed in the debate on kZBO (Parliament, 2002d) that was meant to 
obtain financial information on all ZBOs. The Minister of Finance accepted the proposal 
but included it in CW2001 because he thought this amendment would fit better in 
CW2001 (Parliament, 2002e, p. 4-5). The Minister of Finance listed the information that 
should be included in the budget documents and annual reports of the ministries in the 
explanatory notes to CW2001:18.4. Table 4.2 shows the information required as of fiscal 
2004 according to these explanatory notes: 
                                                 
80 The number of 35 ZBOs is based on a selection by minBZK of all ZBOs with staff over 50 FTE and „full-
time‟ ZBOs. For other ZBOs, no targets are set under this specific program (Parliament, 2007f, p. 43) 
81 The wording of article 44a is not completely clear. It only states „our minister‟ where all other articles 
within CW2001 use either „our minister of finance‟ or „our minister in question‟ when a specific minister 
is meant. From the explanatory memorandum (Parliament, 2002c, p. 2) it can be concluded that „our 
minister in question‟ is meant  
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Table 4.2: Information on all ZBOs to be included in budgets of ministries and annual 
reports (Source: Parliament, 2002e, p. 4-5) 
 Budget document Annual report 
List of all ZBOs and RWTs Yes Yes 
Related policy article For each entity separately For each entity separately 
(Estimate) of government contribution For each entity separately -- 
Actual government contribution -- For each entity separately 
When applicable:  
Explanation of use of authority by the 
minister on: 
 
Approval of fees -- Yes 
Approval of budget document -- Yes 
Approval of annual report -- Yes 
Report on structure of assets and 
liabilities 
-- For each entity separately 
 
From the control perspective the explanation on the use of authority is especially 
relevant. This information is supposed to disclose how a minister has used his authority 
and thus how the relative autonomy of a ZBO can be assessed on this specific item. 
However provision of non-financial information on ZBOs in budget documents or annual 
reports is not mentioned. When Parliament requires that information, there are two 
options: one is voluntary disclosure by either the entity or the minister or by using the 
right of information as stated in article 68 of the Dutch Constitution. This is an indication 
of the level of autonomy of a specific ZBO. Article CW2001:18.4 requires information on 
ZBOs to be provided by the minister; it does not state rules on actual control of ZBOs. 
 
Finally, at a more detailed control level, CW2001 introduces some regulations with 
respect to liquidity and debt management. These regulations are related to the allowed 
level of EMU-debt. Their origin lies in an NCA-report on the desired level of general equity 
in RWTs (Parliament, 2000e and Parliament, 2001d). These regulations may be relevant 
for ZBOs as long as they have a separate legal status. Article CW2001:44 stipulates that 
the Minister of Finance can set rules for providing information by those entities that 
according to the European System of Accounts are included in the General Government 
sector. Article CW2001:45 gives the Minister of Finance the power to require that specific 
legal entities deposit their cash in an account at the Treasury. A Decree on this was 
issued in 200482 and affects a number of ZBOs. Article 46 prohibits obtaining cash with 
the single purpose of reinvesting it to obtain additional resources. Articles 48, 49 and 
49a provide opportunities for the group of legal entities defined in article 45 to borrow 
money from the Treasury. With respect to the assessment of ZBO autonomy, those ZBOs 
who are not subject to one or more of articles 44 to 4983 have relatively more autonomy 
than those who are subject to those articles. Table 4.3 summarises the effects of CW 
regulations on the autonomy of ZBOs. 
                                                 
82 Aanwijzingsbesluit rechtspersonen met beperkte kasbeheerfunctie 
83 With exception of article 44a, which regulates non-financial information provision. 
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Table 4.3: CW2001 and effect on autonomy of operations of ZBOs 
Regulation Contents Effect on ZBO autonomy  
CW2001:1 and 4 Describes details of ministry‟s budgets Holds for ZBOs part of the legal entity 
State; financial autonomy equals 
autonomy of units of ministries 
CW2001:44 Authority minFin on setting rules related 
to EMU-debt 
Reduces autonomy, but holds for all 
„full-time‟ ZBOs 
CW2001:18d Information provision in budgetary 
documents of ministries 
No effect 
CW2001:44a Information provision non-financial 
information to the minister 
No effect 
CW2001 :45.1 Requirement treasury management by 
the State 
Reduces autonomy 
CW2001:45.2 Treasury management with restrictions 
on using financial instruments 
Reduces autonomy (less than under 
45.1) 
CW2001:46 Restrictions on borrowing  Reduces autonomy except for 
competitive ZBOs 
CW2001:48 -49a Options to borrow at minFin No effect 
CW2001:91 NCA auditing required Auditing level equals that of 
ministries, 
Reduces autonomy compared to a 
„standard‟ legal entity. 
Rules on fiscal 
discipline 
Overspending by a ministry is to be 
internally compensated 
Pressure on not overspending 
authorised level of resources on the 
government funded part of ZBO 
activities; reduces autonomy. 
 
As of fiscal 2002, CW2001 is applicable for all units within the State as well as the legal 
entities – including ZBOs – to which reference is made in the law. This implies that a 
uniform presentation should be available in the ministry‟s budget documents. However, 
in those cases where under earlier laws ZBOs or other legal entities were established, 
there may be some exceptions to the CW2001 rules. Whether that is the case will be 
studied in empirical Part D. 
4.2.4 Price control by Parliament? 
The discussion in the previous section is relevant for ZBOs which are funded directly by 
government. This means that the ZBO budget is included in the budget proposal sent to 
Parliament. A number of ZBOs are not (fully) funded from contributions by ministries but 
by some form of (compulsory) fee. I will elaborate on different fees in Part C, but in this 
section I will address the legal dimension of funding activities through fees. In short, a 
distinction can be made between authority biased fees which resemble taxes and market 
biased fees – not market based as there is no real market for ZBO services - that 
resemble prices. For example Goedhart (1958, p. 77), mentions retributions as an 
example of fees for authoritative services and public prices for non-authoritative services 
delivered directly to individuals. 
The Dutch Constitution states in article 104 that taxes must be levied by law and that 
non-tax charges by the Dutch State („het Rijk‟) have to be based on the law. According to 
Janse de Jonge (2000, p. 500), in both cases the level of the fee or the tax rate has to be 
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included in the law, but according to him this is not always the case. The result is that the 
influence of Parliament on charges levied by ZBOs is reduced in favour of the minister 
who is allowed to issue a Decree on fees. 
Janse de Jonge (2000, p 499-500) also indicates that the wording chosen in article 
104 of the Constitution is based on an amendment in Parliament, which intended to 
minimise delegation in fiscal matters by requiring a formal law and implicitly allows some 
delegation for other charges. The wording „het Rijk‟ is in the constitution the opposite to 
local and regional governments and public bodies. This suggests that at arm‟s length 
entities should also be considered under the concept of the Dutch State and therefore 
that charges imposed by ZBOs should also be defined by law.  
 
Taxes in the law and charges based on the law  
To illustrate the difference in legislative treatment of taxes and charges, I refer to income 
tax on the one hand and premiums levied for unemployment benefits (WW) on the other. 
In article 2.10 of the law on income tax, the tax brackets are directly included. The 
premiums levied for WW is based on the law funding social security insurance (Wet 
financiering Sociale Verzekeringen; WFSV). Article 27 of this law stipulates that the 
premium is set in a ministerial Decree rather than in the law. 
 
If the fee charged by the ZBO qualifies as authority biased, their strong resemblance to 
taxes would suggest that delegation is not desirable. In the case of a market biased 
charge, some form of delegation might exist, although according to Janse de Jonge the 
level of charges should also be formally included in the law. 
Wattel (1995, p. 193-194) notes that it is odd that  delegation is formally minimised 
with respect to taxation, whereas in the case of other sources of government income, 
which are according to Wattel similar to taxes as far as citizens are concerned, delegation 
is allowed. Wattel suggests that a formal law on taxation should at least include a 
description of what is subject to taxation, the fundamentals and yardsticks for levying 
them as well as the structure of the tax brackets imposed. According to Wattel, GW:104 
should be reconsidered to allow a form of delegation (Wattel, 1995, p. 221). In terms of 
autonomy, I would argue that the less the criteria mentioned by Wattel are included in a 
formal ZBO(case) law, the more ex-ante autonomy is given to the ZBO for calculating the 
fee. Secondly, the standards proposed by Wattel reduce the arguments a minister can 
formally use in disapproving a fees proposal. That effectively also results in more 
autonomy for the ZBO. 
Wattel‟s proposal seems to be interesting, but at the local level, regulations on 
imposing taxes seem to be stricter and more in line with the Constitution than central 
government practice. In the Gemeentewet (Law on local government [GemW]), a 
provision is made for local taxes. Local taxes have to be separately authorised in a local 
decree along with the local government budget authorisation. Such a local decree has to 
be explicitly approved by the City Council rather than issued by the executive (alderman) 
  Budget authorisation: The budgeting and accounting act 
 
Part B: Autonomy and control of ZBOs from a legal perspective  91 
 
and then possibly discussed by the City Council. Gemeentewet specifies that the decree 
must include the subject as well as object of taxation, the fundamentals, tax brackets, 
date of effectiveness as well as other relevant information regarding levying (GemW:217). 
This strongly resembles the criteria used by Wattel. In the local government decrees not 
only do those resources that traditionally qualify as taxes need to be included but also the 
levies charged for services provided by local government (GemW:220 and GemW:229). 
 
Regulations on ZBO fees: an example. 
RDW-fees are imposed for example for the motor-vehicle registration issued when 
someone buys a new car. This is comparable to issuing of passports by local authorities. 
 
Article 48 of Wegenverkeerswet 1994 [WVW1994] (Law on traffic regulation) covers 
issuance of a registration document. In Article 4q WVW1994, the requirements for 
determining the fees for issuing a registration document are given. These requirements 
specify the costs of the activities which are to be included in the fee imposed. The fee 
needs to be related to the costs of the activities performed. The fee will be announced in 
a ministerial decree but determined by RDW according to article 4b.1n. In Wattel‟s terms, 
anyone who asks for registration of a vehicle would be subject to this (article 48); 
fundamentals are covered by “a relation to costs of tasks”. There is neither an indication 
for a yardstick nor for tax brackets in the law. I think it might be claimed that even the 
fundamentals are not solid, because a relation to costs of tasks leaves degrees of 
freedom compared to an imperative that „estimated revenue does not exceed estimated 
expenses‟ as is stated in GemW229b on determining fees for services. 
 
Regulations on ZBO fees are included in or based on ZBO-case laws rather than in 
general laws as each case will have to be assessed separately. In kZBO, there is a 
reference to specifying revenues in ZBO budgets, but there is no all encompassing 
reference made to fees similar to taxes and the way they should be decided upon. Given 
the remarks of Wattel and local government legislation, that seems to be an omission. An 
exception could be made in cases where the charge is based on market competition such 
as is the case for a number of monitoring ZBOs. Such a procedure would also match with 
the authority the NCA has for assessing the operations of all entities that are funded by 
some form of fees (CW2001:91). 
4.2.5 Summary 
In this section, the ZBO budgeting framework has been explored. First, I have elaborated 
on the creation of legal entities, including ZBOs and concluded that the constitution 
oversees creating public law entities, supplemented by full civil law capacity under BW2.  
CW oversees creation of private law entities, which means that Parliament has the 
authority to require legislation if the government wants to set up a private law entity. 
Secondly, planning & control under CW was discussed. Formal budgeting rules only bind 
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government, not a separate legal entity. This means that a minister can use contract 
based agreements or informal control tools to manage ZBO budget levels and not the 
formal legislative procedure in Parliament. The information arrangement included in CW 
allows for monitoring by a minister and therefore for him to fulfil his responsibility towards 
Parliament. Furthermore, some operational arrangements on treasury management exist 
which reduce ZBO autonomy when applicable. The third point made is that not all ZBOs 
are fully government funded. Although the constitution seems to require that all fees 
levied have to be included in the law, there are indications that this does not hold. This 
practice raises questions to say the least, since at the local level regulations require that 
any fees charged by local government are explicitly authorised by the City Council. As 
many of the activities performed by ZBOs that are funded by direct contributions from 
citizens are similar to services local governments provide, I would plead for a similar form 
of decision making for the fees charged by ZBOs. 
4.3 Impact of accounting systems 
In this section I will address the relevance of the use of the two main accounting systems 
(cash and accruals) from the constitutional perspective of budget authorisation. I will 
start with a general assessment of these two accounting systems (subsection 4.3.1). 
After that, I will focus on the position of ZBOs when using a particular accounting system 
(subsection 4.3.2). The section continues with a discussion on accountability and the 
supposed need for aggregated information on ZBOs (subsection 4.3.3). The section is 
concluded by a summary on the use of accounting systems (subsection 4.3.4).  
4.3.1 Authorisation: cash or accruals? 
Originally, all government activities were organised into entities hierarchically 
subordinated to a minister, implying that both the legislature and the minister had full 
control on budgets.  Authorisation of budgets was based on expenditures. The 
background for this accounting method is the economic argument that government only 
consumes income, whereas a private company aims at generating income (Mol, 1998, p. 
24). Government income is primarily derived from taxes, which are generally budgeted 
and accounted for in terms of cash receipts. The origins of taxation go back to the system 
for funding the expenditure of the Monarch and ensuring a balance between his 
estimated expenditure for both government services and the Monarch‟s household and 
the taxation level required to cover that expenditure (Grapperhaus, 1989, p. 43-46; Van 
der Bij, 1993, p. 1-2). This principle of budgeting and tax accounting on a cash basis 
holds for those entities that in theory have unlimited opportunities for raising revenue. On 
the central government level in the Netherlands, this traditional relationship between 
expenditure and tax income still holds (Mol & De Kruijf, 2003, p. 547-548).84 
Measurement and regulations on expenditure are rather straightforward; the actual date 
                                                 
84 In the western world, mainly countries such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand have introduced forms 
of accruals accounting for central government (e.g. Guthrie, 1998; Robinson, 1998). 
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of a cash flow determines whether or not certain expenditure is subject to fiscal year A or 
B.  
In the last few decades, several countries have started to convert their budgeting 
procedures into forms of accruals budgeting (e.g. Guthrie, 1998, Carnegie and West, 
2003, Likierman, 2003). International accounting organisations and also the OECD and 
IMF recommend introducing accrual based budgeting and accounting for government 
entities in many other countries. As of 2000, the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board [IPSASB] has been working on a set of international public sector 
accounting standards [IPSASes]. These standards are also based on accruals budgeting 
and accounting principles, derived from the commercial International Accounting 
Standards [IAS]. Some standards only exist under IPSAS because issues such as non-
exchange revenues85 are not covered in commercial accounting (Christiaens, Reyniers 
and Rollé, 2010, p. 540). Accrual standards are more complex than cash standards and 
are not relevant for the core of Dutch central government. They can be relevant for arm‟s 
length entities such as ZBOs because these entities do not have an unlimited opportunity 
to raise taxes.  
To my knowledge the economic literature gives no reasons to favour accruals 
budgeting from an authorisation perspective. In the IPSASB handbook, the objective is 
described as serving the public interest by developing high quality public sector financial 
reporting (italics JdK) standards (IPSASB, 2007, p. 16). This wording indicates that 
emphasis is on ex post reporting, which is also expressed by the fact that budgeting is 
one of the last IPSASes in the structure of the IPSASB-project.  
 
In the legislative discussions on spending resources by government, it is not the ex post 
accountability issue that is most important, but the ex ante control of the proposed levels 
of spending. Schick (2002, p. 18) mentioned that the appropriations process is the 
expression of the original fiscal power of legislation above the executive. In his view 
budgeting emerged as a result of insufficient fiscal control over the executive. Schick‟s 
argument is independent from the accounting framework and implies that budgetary 
reform has no effect on the distribution of power between legislature and executive. 
Another comment in this respect was made by Perrin (1998, p. 10) who stated that in 
public budgeting ex ante disclosure remains more relevant than the ex post disclosure. 
For purposes of ex ante disclosure, Perrin states that cash disclosures are better suited. 
Traditional budgets are, according to Perrin, often rather detailed to express the primacy 
of the legislature for control of spending. The shift in focus towards output and outcome 
together with delegating responsibility to operational managers has led to more global 
budgets, giving management leeway at a micro level to achieve the goals desired by the 
legislature. Delegation of responsibility in the public sector is relatively independent of 
budgeting and accounting frameworks, as most production in government entities is 
                                                 
85 This refers to revenues for which no direct service is delivered such as social security premiums. 
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strongly related to the use of staff and not on the use of any kind of assets (investments), 
resulting in accounting statements where expenditure nearly equals expenses. In the 
Dutch case, it is estimated that 97% of expenditure equals expenses (Mol & De Kruijf, 
2003, p. 552; Parliament, 2008c, p. 5), which is an empirical confirmation of Perrin‟s 
analysis. 
According to Likierman (2003, p. 45) accruals imply that a shift can be made from an 
input to output focus. This suggests that accrual budgeting may be helpful in assessing 
the allocation function of budgeting. Likierman refers to the British model of Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), which should provide better information for 
management and reduce the „perverse effects of annuality‟, which is associated with 
traditional budgeting methods. A well known example of this is the training budget, which 
is often spent at the end of the fiscal year to prevent budget cuts the following year. The 
Australian model of Accrual Output Budgeting (AOB) (Robinson, 2002, p. 18) goes even 
further; the basic idea is that government purchases from agencies in an environment 
that attempts to simulate a competitive market. This model has parallels to the Dutch 
case because government budgets are not externally binding. Therefore, ex ante control 
of arm‟s length entities‟ budgets resembles contract relations rather than full budgetary 
control relations. In the private sector, the direct link between expenses, revenues and 
outputs makes the use of accrual accounting logical. For budgeting however, financial 
targets need not to be set in terms of accruals, investments will be presented as a level 
of expenditure and in a company a budget may be set in terms of return on investment 
[ROI] instead of expenditure levels as I already mentioned. 
4.3.2 ZBOs and accounting systems 
ZBOs, unlike central government, do not have unlimited scope to raise taxes. Their 
income is derived from contributions from central government or other parties, which 
have to be matched to expenses in order to ensure the continuity of the activities of the 
entity. This implies that in accounting terms it is necessary to match ZBO revenues and 
expenses within a fiscal year. However it does not immediately imply that ZBO budgeting 
also has to be defined in terms of accruals. Accruals budgeting and accounting is 
required for PLB-type ZBOs, given the fact that they follow the civil law accounting regime. 
However the accounting regime for a PLA-type ZBO is determined by the relevant ZBO 
case law. 
4.3.2.1 Accruals accounting used by ZBOs 
The case-laws on most ZBOs as well as kZBO (kZBO:35) include the requirement that 
ZBOs have to use an accruals accounting system for financial reporting purposes.86 There 
is one exception to this rule and that regards PLA type ZBOs which are part of the State 
and therefore use the cash accounting system as required for ministries under CW2001. 
Whether or not accruals accounting is effectively used by ZBOs is discussed in Part D of 
                                                 
86 Article 35 kZBO states: as far as possible in line with BW2, section 9 (accounting regulations for 
companies, jdk), implying that accruals accounting is not fully in line with commercial accounting. 
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this study. For now it is sufficient to state that overall a form of accruals accounting is 
applied. In the explanatory memorandum to kZBO (Parliament, 2000d), no reference is 
made as to why ZBOs should use an accruals accounting system or the impact that may 
have on funding relationships and ministerial control of ZBOs. There is some logic behind 
the choice to require use of accruals accounting systems, since legal entity ZBOs are 
separate entities that do not have unlimited access to taxation or other resources. As a 
result a continuous flow of financial resources to a ZBO cannot be guaranteed. ZBOs 
must therefore be regarded as organisations that are required just as private companies 
are to match revenues and expenses as well as account for changes in the value of 
assets (Mol & de Kruijf, 2004). Some authors claim that such a matching process can 
also be fulfilled in a cash accounting system (e.g. Berens, Bücker & Finken, 1998; 
Günther & Schill, 2000; Monsen, 2001), but the public sector accounting mainstream is 
convinced that accruals accounting is preferable as can be concluded from the effort 
devoted to the IPSAS-project. 
 
In general, a distinction can be made between authorisations of a budget without 
connection to production – a traditional line item fixed budget – or a budget which has a 
connection to production and is at least theoretically flexible (Wildavsky, 2001; p. 139-
141). This distinction was one of the arguments for introducing an accruals system of 
accounting for executive agencies (Van Oosteroom & Soons, 2002, p. 23), with a 
separate operations budget and investment budget (CW2001:11.3).  
The same arguments can be applied to ZBO budgets. If the ZBO budget has no 
connection with production and can be regarded as a fixed budget, authorisation is 
straightforward: the budget is approved by Parliament and will result in a cash flow to the 
ZBO irrespective of the accounting system used. The second possibility is that a ZBO‟s 
budget is based on a flexible, production oriented allocation. Here, two options can be 
identified: budget authorisation and funding on completed products or authorisation and 
funding based on activities. In the first case, authorisation will imply payment for a 
completed product regardless of the budget period in which a service was started. This is 
similar to the matching principle in accruals accounting. The result for the ZBO is 
authorised and funded on expenses rather than on expenditure. When products are paid 
for, the ZBO‟s budget could be in terms of resources/accruals but if a ministry‟s budget is 
authorised and funds the ZBO, the result might be that expenditure control in the ministry 
will be disrupted if there are divergences in the ZBO‟s actual production. When activities 
are funded, each separate step in a process is paid for and in most cases this will lead to 
the same result in terms of expenses and expenditures. This means that ZBO budget 
authorisation can be on expenditure basis when activities are funded.  
 
The fact that no procedure exists is not only remarkable, it might even result in a risk of 
uncontrollable budgets. The rationale for a separate authorisation for investments is 
based on the fact that Parliamentary decision making is based on avoidable costs rather 
Budget authorisation: The budgeting and accounting act   
 
96 Part B: Autonomy and control of ZBOs from a legal perspective 
 
than on full cost calculations. Once an investment is decided upon and expenditure is 
made, there is no possibility to change the level of expenses related to the investment 
until a decision to discontinue is made (Mol & De Kruijf, 2003, p. 551). Controlling the 
level of investment expenditure for executive agencies as well as for ZBOs prevents 
undesired increases in the level of future expenses for the services delivered. This also 
implies that Parliament has to authorise investment budgets in expenditure terms. It 
does not necessarily mean that individual assets have to be authorised. By using an 
investment budget it will be possible to give management freedom to invest based on 
what the organisation actually requires. This solution parallels the trend to authorise 
more general budgets and simultaneously delegate responsibility. 
 
The impact of authorisation of a ministry‟s cash budgets for operations of a ZBO that 
uses accruals budgeting and accounting. 
 
The example given below uses fictional data, but is based on problems described in an 
earlier study (Mol & de Kruijf, 2002, p. 100). A ZBO „X‟ provides income transfers which 
are based on an initial decision using estimates and a final decision more than a year 
later when the applicant‟s fiscal data is definitively available. The decision is then made 
in two stages: one in year „t‟ and one in year „t +1‟. Suppose the initial decision has 
operational costs of €1,000 and the final decision has operational costs of €500. In both 
stages, €100 is included as depreciation costs for an IT system.  
In an activities funded context, the ZBO charges €1,000 in year „t‟ and €500 in year 
„t+1‟. The ZBO receives these amounts from the commissioning ministry. In a completed 
product funded setting, the completed product will be charged, i.e. at the final stage in 
„t+1‟. On the ZBO „X‟ balance sheet, at the end of year „t‟ under current assets the 
amount of €1,000 will be included as unfinished product. Payment of €1,500 in „t+1‟for 
the finished product will complete the transaction, including a reduction in „unfinished 
product‟ on the balance sheet by €1,000. 
In the cash based budget authorisation processes in Parliament, both the „t‟ as well 
as the „t +1‟ budget will be approved. In the activities funded setting, budgets will be 
€1,000 and €500 respectively. In the product funded context, budgets will be €0 and 
€1,500.  
 
Now suppose that Parliament imposes a budget cut for year „t+1‟ of 20%, without 
reducing the production level required from the ZBO in the activities funded setting. As a 
result, the ministry will pay only €400 for the second stage of the activity. The ZBO 
however has €100 of unavoidable costs – depreciation – which means that only €300 
remains to cover the costs of staff and materials rather than the original €400. In effect a 
budget cut is required of 25%.  
The ZBO management is able to reduce staff and materials costs in „t+1‟ to €350. 
Because all original requests that were submitted in year „t‟ have to be processed in 
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„t+1‟, the effect will be that at the end of fiscal „t+1‟ Parliament has to approve the 
additional costs of €50 (€350-/- €300) for each decision. If they do not approve, the 
additional €50 will be transferred to the ZBO‟s balance sheet as receivables and will 
affect the remaining budget available in „t+2‟. In that case the ZBO will have spent the 
money and needs to borrow the additional cash from the bank, because the 
commissioning ministry is not allowed to pay. If ZBO „X‟ is not allowed to borrow money, 
the effect will be that production has to match cash available and that means that 1 in 9 
cases cannot be handled in „t+1‟. The unlucky applicant has to wait till „t+2‟ until a final 
decision is made. 
 
The budget cut has an even more severe effect on available resources in the completed 
product funding context. The budget cut results in a cash flow in „t+1‟ of €1,200 (80% of 
€1,500). The first €1,000 is needed to cover expenses made in „t‟, leaving €200 in „t+1‟. 
That amount must be used to cover both depreciation and other expenses in „t+1‟. 
Effectively that means that instead of the original €400, only €100 remains for expenses 
other than depreciation. 
 
A last point to be made regards the claims by accruals accounting supporters that 
balance sheet information is relevant to the budgeting process. Wildavsky‟s (1992) and 
Chan‟s (2003) analysis with respect to output and outcome control that budgeting morals 
also have to change applies here. Behn (2002, p. 107) arrives at a similar conclusion 
from the public administration perspective. He notes that vagueness in objectives is 
politically rational. Thus a focus on performance can only be ex post but without having a 
yardstick based on set standards. As a result, an emphasis on financial performance will 
continue to exist. Ex post – balance sheet - information will only be useful when the 
information is applied in the ex ante budgeting procedure for the next budget cycle. This 
is relevant because investment finance is raised directly or indirectly from the financial 
markets. In general, Dutch ZBOs do not enter the financial markets, making the motive of 
informing investors (italics jdk) about the financial position of the ZBO obsolete. This 
remark typically holds in the Dutch context. Under IPSAS 6, consolidation of financial ZBO 
statements might be required, but as financing is – due to CW 2001:45-46 - already 
included in the State‟s financial statements, such an action would not have additional 
value. This might be different in other jurisdictions. Only when financing is the 
responsibility of the ZBO itself, in combination with a demand driven form of funding, 
could the (financial) risk profile of the ZBO be an issue for investors.  
The idea that a ZBO balance sheet is not relevant for investors does not make the 
balance sheet obsolete at all. When a ZBO is funded by government, a relatively weak 
financial position may lead to additional future claims on the government budget 
because the level of reserves might not be adequate to cover losses on operations. This 
argument indicates that Wildavky‟s and Chan‟s arguments also hold for information on 
ZBOs. Furthermore profit from operations can result in amounts of equity higher than 
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politically desired or statutory levels. Drawing a parallel to the right shareholders have to 
determine what a company is allowed to do with surplus equity, the Government has, 
from an allocation perspective, the duty to assess how surpluses may be used in an 
economically efficient way. Therefore, Parliament as budgetary legislator should have the 
right to reallocate surplus equity. Finally, depending on the way production is funded, it 
can be relevant to have an overview of receivables to prevent the problems illustrated in 
the text box on page 96 on the differences in accounting systems. At the local level, the 
most recent version of the „Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording‟ [Local Government 
Accounting Regulations] (BBV:27) explicitly requires that allocating surpluses is 
separated from determining the financial results of operations. The surplus equity of a 
ZBO is not presently subject to Parliamentary control. CW2001 does not provide any 
rules; ZBO-case laws may do so. In kZBO:33 a provision is made which allows ZBOs to 
create an equalisation reserve. However the level of this reserve is not specified. Where 
no political control of surplus equity exists, the ZBO can be regarded as relatively more 
autonomous than a ZBO that does have rules on surplus equity. 
4.3.2.2 The mismatch between government and ZBO accounting systems. 
I have mentioned that there are no rules for creating a ZBO except for passing a law in 
the case of PLAs or reporting it to Parliament in the case of PLBs. As ZBOs and executive 
agencies are close to each other on the scale of autonomisation, it is interesting to 
compare the requirements for internal autonomisation with those for the closest form of 
external autonomisation. One of the rules for creating an executive agency is that before 
a proposal is submitted to Parliament, a number of financial processes have to be tested. 
This includes preparing a cost price model as a basis for funding the executive agency; be 
it on a mere billable hours basis rather than a cost price basis for services delivered 
(Ridderbos, Zweers, Biemold, Jonker & Van Veen, 2005, p. 44-45). Regulations also 
require that efficiency incentives are included in the system and that an opening balance 
sheet is prepared (MinFin, 2007a). The whole procedure is rather formal, strict and tests 
whether a government unit is prepared for internal autonomisation.87 It is to say the least 
remarkable that in the case of creating a ZBO, none of these requirements are stated in 
law, neither in CW2001, nor in kZBO nor in ministerial decrees. In one of the most recent 
case laws (Zorgverzekeringswet [ZVW]; law on health insurance) in which the ZBO CVZ is 
(re)established, reference is only made to past experience and a statement that 
„budgeting is an appropriate tool to control the level of operating costs for the tasks to be 
executed and the output/outcome to be delivered‟ (Parliament, 2004d, p. 165).  
In short, it is remarkable that there are no regulations on testing whether a ZBO is 
ready to use accruals accounting when needed. 
4.3.3 Financial accountability and accounting standards 
The developments in international public sector accounting and the growing use of 
accruals budgeting and accounting do of course also affect the position of Dutch public 
                                                 
87 As of 2008, the procedures have been changed and are less severe (Mookhoek, 2008). 
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sector entities. The Dutch State does not intend to fully adhere to IPSAS standards 
(Parliament, 2008c, p. 9). However, it is recognised that financial information on ZBOs 
should be improved (Parliament, 2004e, p. 2). The NCA emphasises the relevance of 
information on the aggregated financial position of RWTs, which includes most ZBOs 
(Parliament, 2007b, p. 15).  
In the private sector, financial information on companies is provided at the level of the 
holding company rather than at the level of the individual companies that have a 
separate legal status but are part of a larger group of companies within the holding 
company. These so called „consolidated financial statements‟ presented by the holding 
company provide all relevant (ex post) information on the holding company and its 
subsidiaries. Consolidation in the private sector is regulated by the IFRS and is also 
covered in the Dutch BW2. Some Anglo Saxon countries such as New Zealand, Australia 
and the United Kingdom are working on the introduction of what is called „Whole of 
Government Accounts‟ [WGA] (Chow, Humphrey & Moll, 2007). This WGA concept is a 
form of consolidation in which all units of government (at all levels) are regarded as part 
of one holding company. The claim for aggregated information as proposed by the Dutch 
NCA resembles the ideas of consolidated information. Therefore it is interesting to study 
the relevance of consolidation with respect to ZBOs. As no Dutch public sector 
consolidation regulations exist, the issue can only be studied from standards that exist 
elsewhere. Because an international standard has been developed under IPSAS, I will 
follow the requirements laid down in that standard. The IPSAS 6 standard on 
consolidation is supported by some Dutch authors. For example Van Schaik (2008) 
claims that as a result of the creation of executive agencies and ZBOs, the scope of the 
ministry‟s financial statements has been reduced.  
In the evaluation of the application of accruals accounting at minLNV, it was 
concluded that consolidation of ZBOs in the ministry‟s documents would result in 
„significantly more complexity‟ than in the case of only consolidating executive agencies 
(Parliament, 2008c, p. 4).  The reason for this seems to be found in the consolidation 
technique and accounting policies rather than in the question of whether or not to 
consolidate one or another entity as the Finance Minister does not discuss the principle 
of applying consolidation on ZBOs in his letter to Parliament.  In this section, I will argue 
that consolidation of ZBOs is not useful at all for the most important ZBO stakeholders. 
4.3.3.1 The concept of consolidation 
When summarising issues on consolidation and segmentation one can discuss two 
issues: (a) what is to be consolidated or segmented and (b) which accounting policies and 
procedures should be used when a consolidated financial statement including relevant 
segmentation is to be presented. I will focus mainly on the first issue: whether or not 
consolidation and segmentation can contribute to improving provision of information on 
ZBOs to Parliament. I will not discuss consolidation within the financial statements of a 
ZBO, which might be required under BW2 if the ZBO is a holding entity in which several 
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legal entities exist. The second issue on accounting policies is a matter of technique 
which is not immediately relevant for stakeholders.  
In IPSAS 6 and 18 consolidation and segmentation of Government Business 
Enterprises [GBE] that would qualify as controlling entities are excluded. In general this 
means that „State enterprises‟ as discussed in Part A are excluded. It implicitly indicates 
that ZBOs in general might be included under the IPSAS standards. 
 
The basic consolidation rule in IPSAS 6 is that a controlling entity using accruals 
accounting has to present a consolidated statement unless, to put it simply, the entity 
itself is controlled by another entity or there are no financial instruments of the entity 
being traded on a public market (IPSAS 6:15-16). The second basic rule is that all 
controlled entities except those which are only temporarily controlled need to be 
consolidated (IPSAS 6:20-21). In both rules, the key word is „control‟ which is defined as 
„the power to govern the financial and operating policies of another entity so as to benefit 
from its activities‟ (IPSAS 6:7). This power to govern has to be „presently exercisable‟ 
although the controlling entity may choose not to exercise its power (IPSAS 6:30-32). The 
concept of „power to govern‟ is operationalised in (potential) voting power over operations 
and financial decisions and implies that the controlling entity is able to benefit from this 
voting power on the other entity. In IPSAS 6:39-40 criteria are given under which power to 
govern is presumed or likely to exist. Table 4.4 gives a brief overview: 
Table 4.4: Summary of control indicators under IPSAS 6 
 Presumed control* Indicators of control 
Power Majority voting rights 
Appointment majority of board 
 
Ability to veto budgets 
Ability to veto/modify decisions 
Ability to approve hiring of senior staff 
Holding „golden share‟ 
Benefit Dissolve entity and claim residual value 
Extract distributions of assets 
(In)direct title to net assets with ongoing 
right to access net assets 
Right to significant level of net assets in 
case of liquidation/distribution 
Direct to co-operate 
Exposed to residual liabilities 
* Control by „holding‟ entity, in the case of ZBOs to be read as the Dutch State when applicable. 
 
The remainder of IPSAS 6 is dedicated to the consolidation technique as well as to what 
items are to be disclosed. In short this comes down to using the same reporting dates, 
uniform accounting policies and using equity method, at cost or as financial instruments 
(IPSAS6:58).  
 
Applied to the Dutch context, the simple answer on consolidation would be that the Dutch 
State does not have to consolidate controlled entities because it does not qualify under 
the accrual accounting criterion. The Dutch State does qualify under the „financial 
instruments‟ criterion because it issues bonds on the public market. The financial 
statements of the Dutch State include the „Staatsbalans‟; the balance sheet of the State. 
It includes information on State participations in share issuing companies as well as 
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some information on current ZBO and executive agency assets and debts. The document 
is confusing, because only partial information is given: not all assets or liabilities are 
included (Van Schaik, 2007) which also holds for information on ZBOs. For example, 
infrastructure assets are not included and the same holds for the liabilities of the State‟s 
old age pension plan AOW (1st pillar old age pension plan, see Boot, 2008). It can thus 
not be regarded as a consolidated statement, but does include some forms of 
information on legal entities other than the State. 
The fact that the Dutch State does provide some information on other legal entities in 
its financial statements is also an indication that providing such information is regarded 
as relevant. Therefore, it is reasonable not to consider the formal answer to the 
consolidation question and assess the possibility and impact of consolidation as if the 
Dutch State is using an accruals system of accounting. A more pragmatic approach is to 
assess the impact of a single consolidated statement for all State controlled entities that 
do use accruals accounting along with the ministry‟s cash based financial statement. By 
doing this, it is possible to assess whether applying IPSAS 6 on consolidation would result 
in improved information for stakeholders.  
 
If an assessment of the relationship between two or more legal entities concludes that 
consolidation is required the issue of segmentation also becomes automatically relevant 
(Van Offeren, 2002, p. 6). The core function of segmentation is to provide information on 
the activities of the consolidated entities in different (program) lines or geographical 
regions. Without consolidation, there is often no need for segmentation unless the 
individual company is operating in different markets, for example two countries with 
different economic fundamentals. According to IPSAS 18, a segment is a „distinguishable 
activity or group of activities of an entity‟ for which separate financial information is useful 
to evaluate past performance or to have a basis for making future resource allocation 
decisions (IPSAS 18:9). Where the issue of the need for consolidation can be discussed 
based on more or less objective criteria, segmentation is more a matter of judgement 
according to IPSAS 18:15. This gives management more degrees of freedom to choose 
their segmentation basis, as long as it is consistent over time. Segmented information 
must cover segment revenues and expenses as well as assets and liabilities which can 
either directly or reasonably be attributed to the specific segment. Segment information 
does not include interest and dividends, results from sales of assets, taxes and head 
office expenses (IPSAS 18:27). Under segment-revenues external revenues have to be 
separated from transactions between segments as well as from revenues generated by 
budget appropriation.  
4.3.3.2 State as controlling entity over ZBOs 
The question of actual control by the State of ZBOs is to be answered from the criteria 
laid down in IPSAS 6. Under the assumption that Parliament needs to have information 
on all ZBOs rather than on only a part of the population, consolidation of financial data is 
only useful if all ZBOs were required to be consolidated. In the case of at least two 
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subgroups of ZBOs, there is doubt whether the requirements are met. First, for PLB type 
ZBOs, the group of „part-time‟ ZBOs (Parliament, 2008b) will not pass the IPSAS criteria 
because they are basically commercial entities with only a small ZBO task. The State (in 
fact the minister) has no control on any of the indicators stated in Table 4.4. The second 
group for which the IPSAS criteria can be discussed are the PLB type ZBOs that have 
foundation legal status.  Here, the power criterion is met, based on kZBO:24 which allows 
the minister to intervene in cases of negligence. Foundations that only provide unilateral 
authoritative services (kZBO:37) are subject to the same criteria as PLA type ZBOs having 
a separate legal status, including having an equalisation reserve that allows 
compensating for differences between budgeted and actual results over a number of 
years. This means that the minister at least has indirect access to the assets of the entity 
because he is not obliged to compensate for operational losses in a particular year. In the 
case of hybrid (foundation type) ZBOs88, these rules do not apply. 
Therefore, I can conclude that in the case of PLB type ZBOs, it is not always certain 
that consolidation is required. Furthermore, ZBOs that are not subject to kZBO are likely 
to have more degrees of freedom; otherwise they would have been included.89 Thus, 
consolidation requirements applied to ZBOs would result in partial consolidation rather 
than full consolidation. This might generate confusion rather than transparency in 
information provision on ZBOs. 
A second point to be made is based on problems regarding authorisation and the 
twin-brother of consolidation, which is segmentation. When searching for possible 
improvements to the information provided in Dutch State budget documents and annual 
reports, two information levels have to be distinguished. First, from an investor 
perspective, the Dutch State as a whole is relevant. This would ideally be achieved by 
consolidated statements in the Budget Memorandum as well as the financial statements 
of the Dutch State. From a political authorisation perspective however, it is not the 
Budget Memorandum or the financial statements of the Dutch State that are relevant, 
but the individual budget proposals of ministries for which an individual minister can be 
held accountable.  
 
The most relevant information for investors, EMU debt and EMU deficit are discussed 
extensively in the Budget Memorandum. This information is based on the projected 
consolidated information based on ESA95 (the accounting system used for statistical 
purposes within the EU) which includes what could be labelled as „Whole of Government‟, 
thus including the financial position of ZBOs. The EMU-deficit and EMU-debt aggregation 
level is based on three main budgetary themes: State, Local governments and Social 
Security funds. From a political control perspective such a classification is a prime 
concern. This implies that the most relevant information for investors – aggregate State 
                                                 
88   Foundation ZBOs that provide both authoritative and non-authoritative services. 
89 Some ZBOs are in fact only temporary excluded from kZBO due to „reconsidering their position‟ 
(Parliament, 2008d). 
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debt - already covers debt of ZBOs because given CW2001:45-46 ZBOs are generally 
financed by the Dutch State. 
The second perspective, based on authorisation in Parliament cannot be solved by a 
consolidated statement alone, because it violates what Goedhart labels as the „specificity 
principle in budgeting‟ (Goedhart, 1958, p. 304). Under this principle, authorisation of a 
consolidated statement would imply that in fact all ZBO budgets and investments would 
be authorised in one large budget article. As a result, government would have all formal 
flexibility to reallocate budgets at will, which conflicts with the allocation principle in 
budgeting. The result would be that in fact segmentation along the lines of the individual 
ZBOs is needed to reveal the really relevant policy decision making information and then 
disclosure of information for individual ZBOs would be a starting point again. Given the 
remarks of the NCA on organisational information provision with respect to RWTs and 
ZBOs (Parliament, 2006a, p. 53), an organisational (sub)classification along the lines of 
Ministries, Government Agencies and RWT/ZBOs might be a suggestion. To prevent 
information overload, the information to be directly submitted to Parliament in budget 
documents and annual ministry statements should be on a relatively high level of 
aggregation. This can be done realistically, because kZBO:18.2 already requires that ZBO  
annual reports of ZBOs to be submitted to Parliament.90 I note that in general annual 
reports will include financial statements, but the wording of kZBO:18.2 and kZBO:34 
allow financial statements not to be submitted to Parliament. This is in my opinion an 
omission in the kZBO legislation because it would directly give feedback on resources 
used by the ZBO based on Parliament‟s decision to attribute authority and resources to 
the ZBO. One of the prime motives for consolidation in the private sector is that the 
financial statements of individual subsidiaries need not to be publicly disclosed, a 
problem that with respect to ZBOs is thus covered in kZBO and makes consolidation at 
least less necessary if not obsolete.  
 
Consolidation of ZBO information in the State‟s financial documents is thus problematic. 
First, only some of the ZBOs would be included. Second, consolidation would violate the 
budget authorisation principle, which can only be solved by providing segmented (in fact 
individual) information on ZBOs. Third, from an investor perspective, the key issue – ZBO 
debt – is included in the State debt which means that the key information on trading 
financial instruments on a public market (IPSAS6:IN8) is already available in the data on 
EMU debt provided by the Dutch State. Therefore, consolidation of ZBO-information at the 
level of the State as a whole does not contribute to the providing relevant information to 
stakeholders including Parliament.  
Because ZBO annual reports are sent to Parliament directly under kZBO, it is possible 
that a form of aggregated information with respect to ZBOs is provided in ministry budget 
                                                 
90 In chapter 5, I will discuss the requirement to submit annual reports to Parliament. 
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documents. This might contribute to solving the remarks made by the NCA on the lack of 
financial information on ZBOs provided to Parliament. 
4.3.4 Conclusion on accounting systems 
Most ZBOs are separate legal entities which unlike central government do not have 
unlimited scope to raise revenues. Therefore, the use of an accruals accounting system is 
more or less required from a perspective of matching revenues and expenses. Two main 
remarks can be made. First accruals accounting systems are not the best solution for ex 
ante control. This leads to problems in aligning budgets appropriated by a minister on 
behalf of Parliament and the actual operations of a ZBO. Second, it is remarkable that no 
procedure exists to assess whether or not a (potential) ZBO is ready to use an accruals 
accounting system as is performed for executive agencies. Related to this issue is the 
fact that the ex ante control of investments – which has also been implemented for 
executive agencies – does not apply to ZBOs. This might have an impact on the total 
costs of ZBOs in the future. 
Along with these two general remarks, I have addressed the issue of financial 
accountability. The NCA has indicated that insufficient financial information on ZBOs is 
provided to Parliament. Under international public sector (accruals) accounting rules, a 
consolidation regulation exists which might allow ex post information provision to be 
improved. I have shown that consolidation does not contribute to transparency for two 
reasons. First: in general financing of ZBOs is provided by central government and 
included in the State‟s financial position, more particularly the EMU-debt. Second, a full 
consolidated statement of all ZBOs would result in a level of information aggregation 
which does not support information transparency to Parliament. Consolidation would 
automatically call for its twin-brother, segmentation, and is likely to result in the individual 
financial statement of each ZBO as the „market‟ in which each ZBO operates is entirely 
different. As kZBO requires individual ZBO annual reports to be submitted to Parliament, 
consolidation would be a solution to a non-existing problem. However, the wording of 
kZBO can be improved to ensure that full financial statements including statements of 
accounts and balance sheet information are submitted to Parliament. 
4.4 Controllability of ZBO budgets 
Budgetary reforms over the last three decades suggest that Parliament focuses on output 
and outcome rather than just on the level of expenditure (e.g. Wildavsky, 1992, p. 597; 
Potter, 2001, p. 84). As indicated in Part A, one of the reasons for creating ZBOs was to 
create flexible administrative units at arm‟s length of government. In these organisations, 
output can at least be measured, which means that some form of price and volume 
numbers can be used to prepare a budget. If in these situations Parliament adhered to 
the traditional lump sum based authorisation process, it would ignore the intended 
flexibility of the ZBO budget. In this section, I will address the impact of using a 
combination of ex ante control tools by Parliament on the controllability of ZBO budgets.  
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In general, Parliament has three control tools available that determine the budget of a 
ZBO both in the short term and in the long term. In section 4.3, I have discussed why 
Parliament has to consider controlling ZBO investment budgets. In short, if investments 
are not controlled, in the long run prices cannot be controlled under an accruals 
accounting system as applied by ZBOs. The other two control mechanisms available to 
Parliament are price and volume control.  
If the ZBO‟s budget is funded by government and Parliament is able to determine the 
maximum level of services to be delivered by a ZBO, a form of volume control exists. Such 
a volume control can however only exist if the services provided by the ZBO are not open 
for any application, because a basic budgetary rule is that government budgets are not 
externally binding. Furthermore Parliament can authorise the cost price of the service to 
be provided by the ZBO. This type of control is relatively strong as a cost price as such 
does have an impact on the total budget to be authorised. If Parliament is able to control 
both volume and price of the ZBO services, one can argue that this results in a case of 
full budgetary control. If Parliament has neither the opportunity to control price or volume, 
the ZBO budget is beyond Parliamentary control.  
The price control issue is of particular relevance if a ZBO is not funded by government 
but by citizens. The services provided by a ZBO have an authoritative character, which 
generally implies that a market mechanism to determine prices is not available. Price 
control (i.e. authorisation) by Parliament is then the substitute mechanism to determine 
allocation of resources, just as is the case when taxes are charged. Price control on ZBOs 
would also be in line with the constitutional idea that charges (i.e. prices) levied by 
government institutions have to be based on the law. 
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Discretionary 
(lump sum) 
budget 
Expenditure Yes Not 
appli-
cable 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Activity/ 
product 
based budget 
Level of 
production 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Cost price Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
Investment 
budget 
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
  High  Controllability  Low 
Figure 4.1: Effect of authorisation of different types of budgets on controllability of the 
ZBO budget 
 
One can summarise the effects of authorisation of different forms of budgets as follows. 
The basic classic form of authorisation is a discretionary line-item or lump sum budget. It 
only sets an expenditure level and focuses on compliance. No other criteria are set. 
Under modern budgeting models, in which output has a role in the level of budgeting, the 
level of control depends on what has been authorised by Parliament. When production is 
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maximised, cost-prices are determined by Parliament (or minister on behalf of 
Parliament) and an investment budget is given, the control level is similar to that of the 
classic budgeting process. However, when one or more of the three control items are not 
authorised, degrees of freedom for management will result, depending on what is actually 
authorised by Parliament. Figure 4.1 summarises the options that exist. The classification 
of these different options is mine. 
4.5 Details of authorisation 
Traditional authorisation of budgets is based on line item expenditure based budgets. 
Applied to ZBOs, Parliament would authorise a budget for individual ZBOs – or even more 
detailed into cost categories - as these would be separately listed in the budget proposals 
(Anthony & Young, 2003, p. 492). Although it is recognised that (annual) line-item 
budgeting may lead to inefficiencies (e.g. Jones & McCaffery, 2005, p. 338), it is still used 
to some extent. From an autonomy perspective, the more detailed a budget is, the fewer 
the degrees of freedom available to management. I will now address the level of detail 
found in the budgets of Dutch ministries and analyse the effects on autonomy and 
transparency of that level of detail for ZBO budgets. 
4.5.1 Development of line item budgeting 
The budget of a Dutch ministry consists of a number of articles; each of them can be 
regarded as a form of a line item. In Table 4.5, an example is given of the development of 
the level of aggregation in these line items over the last 30 years. 
Table 4.5: Line items in the budget law of minVROM in nominal amounts (own 
calculations) 
 Fiscal Year Operating 
expenditure 
Program 
expenditure 
Accruals Expenses Investment 
expenditure* 
Number of items 
1976 29 45 X 5** 
1986 21 91 X X 
1996 11 29 10*** X 
2006 X 15 2 1 
Average amount 
in €‟000s 
1976 7,555 30,731 X 93,279 
1986 14,300 51,705 X X 
1996 23,181 101,135 64,185 X 
2006 X 227,765 618,697 726,941 
Minimum amount 
in €‟000s 
1976 3 15 X 9,484 
1986 95 45 X X 
1996 28 11 2,168 X 
2006 X 1,818 4,333 726,941 
* 1976 was the last fiscal year in which a separate capital budget was used. With the introduction of 
government agencies, investments by those agencies are again authorised separately. 
** Lending for housing was discontinued in the early 1990s-and would give large distortions in this 
comparison. Therefore it is excluded for all budgets. 
*** In 1996 preparations were made to establish an executive agency. This was done by separating the 
budget for the future executive agency from the main budget of minVROM, however still on an expenditure 
basis. 
 
Compared to some 30 years ago, the level of aggregation of line item budgets in the 
Netherlands has shifted to a more abstract and general level as is shown by the example 
in Table 4.5. One aspect of this aggregation is that program and operations costs are no 
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longer legally separate budgets. Particularly in the case of budgets to be authorised for 
and distributed to ZBOs this may have negative effects for Parliament, as it may no longer 
recognise what budgets are intended for a program and what parts are intended for ZBO 
operations related to the program or the remaining monitoring functions within the 
ministry. In some cases, it is not even possible to recognise the budgets of individual 
ZBOs at all. In those cases Parliament may require information from the minister on the 
ZBO‟s budget. When the minister informs Parliament of the actual distribution of funds by 
means of a letter, Parliament will not be able to change the choices of the minister by 
changing the budget law because there was no law proposed. In those cases where 
Parliament disagrees with the minister on the distribution of funds, there are only two 
possibilities. Parliament – more specifically Tweede Kamer – can use its right of initiative 
and propose a budget law themselves. Janse de Jonge (1993, p. 5) indicated that 
Parliament has not used this instrument.91 The other option is for Parliament to use 
political pressure with the ultimate sanction of dismissing the minister in order to 
distribute funds in accordance with the will of Parliament (Janse de Jonge, 1993, p. 5). 
Such political pressure may result in a change of the budget law on the initiative of the 
minister in the regular intermediate budget procedures in spring and autumn. However, 
that would be an odd procedure, given the fact that executive agency budgets are not 
amended throughout a fiscal year. Effectively, it would imply that a ZBO has less 
autonomy relative to an executive agency, despite the fact that only the latter has a 
hierarchical relationship to the minister. 
4.5.2 Content of authorisation 
From a constitutional point of view, Minderman (2003, p. 21) claims that only what is 
directly described in the budget law is authorised. All other information is explanatory 
notes which cannot be amended. This implies that the content of a SLA is a matter 
between the minister and the ZBO which cannot be included in a law. At present four 
possibilities in authorising and distributing operating budgets for ZBOs may occur as a 
result of the change in the level of aggregation of budgets. First, the ZBO only has an 
operating budget and is separately visible in the proposed budget law for a ministry (e.g. 
CBS, Budget 2006, minEZ, article 9). In this case, Parliament can theoretically authorise 
and amend the budget of the ZBO directly. Second, the ZBO is funded from ministry 
budgets, but performs activities within several policy programs. The budgeting system will 
then present the costs of the operational activities over several line items, resulting in a 
lack of overview on the grand total available for the specific ZBO (e.g. IBGroep, 
minOCW)92, in most cases as part of a larger budget. There is no separate authorisation 
by Parliament for the ZBO‟s budget either in total or for parts of the ZBO‟s budget. An 
amendment in the budget law can in such a case only affect the total of the line item and 
the minister can distribute funds at will, including an option not to distribute funds. The 
                                                 
91 To my knowledge Tweede Kamer had not done so between 1993 and 2008 
92 As of 2005, a compulsory appendix to the budget law has to be provided in which total government 
payments to ZBOs and RWTs have to be listed for each entity. 
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explanatory notes provide Parliament with some information on the costs of the 
operations of the ZBO with respect to a certain program. Third, the operating budget of a 
ZBO is aggregated within a larger group of operating budgets. Then the difference 
between budget authorisation and distribution is most noticeable as it is the minister who 
actually decides what level of budgets are to be distributed to each individual ZBO and 
the explanatory notes do not reveal the separate budgets for individual ZBOs (e.g. CBP 
and CGB, Budget 2006, minBZK, article 1). When Parliament wants to influence the 
budget of a specific ZBO in the second or third case, it may use the right to amend the 
budget but simultaneously has to specify the budget to be authorised for the specific 
ZBO. The last option is that only a part of or even no budget is included in the ministry‟s 
budget law. In that case no overview is available with respect to the level of spending of 
the ZBO and no budget law is passed for that specific ZBO. This implies that there has to 
be another source of income for the ZBO in order to cover the costs of operations. An 
example of this is RDW (minVW), which is funded by direct charges on citizens for 
services delivered. In cases where no formal budget authorisation exists, laws other than 
the budget law may however regulate the level of charges to be imposed upon users of 
the ZBO service. Such case law has, to be authorised by Parliament in the same way as 
all other laws. Generally, such a regulation will be included in the law creating the entity, 
which means that the influence of Parliament is minimised after the entity has been 
created. Table 4.6 summarises the effects of the different ways of including ZBO budgets 
on the roles of Parliament and minister in the budgetary process. 
Table 4.6: Influence of Parliament on ZBO budgets as stated by law. 
Effect 
Inclusion 
Of ZBO budget 
in Budget law 
Influence of 
Parliament 
Transparency Ministerial role 
Separate article Full authorisation Fully disclosed Appropriation according 
to law 
Split up over several 
articles 
Fragmented 
authorisation 
Needs consolidation Appropriation at will 
within framework of 
separate budget articles 
In larger budget Indirect, outside 
budgetary 
procedures 
Disclosure at best in 
explanatory notes 
Appropriation at will 
within framework of 
larger budget 
Not included No budgetary role No disclosure Ministerial 
consent/approval of 
fees 
 
Due to the lack of external impact towards third parties, authorisation of budgets which 
are intended to be used by ZBOs may have different results with respect to set spending 
limits. First, ZBOs that are part of the legal Entity State are not formally external parties 
and therefore the spending limit is a critical issue in the relationship between the 
minister and the ZBO. In these cases, the minister in fact has the hierarchical power to 
force the ZBO to comply with budget limits. This conflicts with the ZBO‟s intended status 
of an autonomous entity. Second, for those ZBOs which have a separate legal status, it is 
possible to ignore the spending limits as authorised by Parliament and appropriated by 
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the minister. A minister has to ensure that a ZBO with a separate legal status controls its 
budget and respects the spending limits. An instrument to do so may be found by using 
specific reserves which allow overspending to be compensated for with previous years‟ 
savings. Such an instrument has to be included in the law, because it is a breach of the 
fundamentals of Parliamentary control over allocation of (unspent) budgets. Third, there 
is a group of ZBOs that is not directly funded through budgets as authorised by 
Parliament, but through separate direct charges on citizens. In those cases, some form of 
control on either the full budget or the level of charges must be included in a law when 
the charges levied strongly resemble a compulsory contribution for government activities. 
If not, this would mean a breach of the legitimising role of Parliament in requiring 
compulsory contributions from citizens. From the autonomy perspective, one can claim 
that for cases where ZBO budgets are not included in the budget authorisation processes 
in Parliament these ZBOs have more relative autonomy than those ZBOs whose budgets 
are specifically authorised.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the legislation on Dutch Central Government budgeting process is 
discussed. Parliament passes budget laws which has no external effect outside the legal 
entity State. This means that Parliament can never directly control the level of budgets in 
a ZBO that has a separate legal status. However, the concept of ministerial responsibility 
and accountability mean that Parliament can hold the minister accountable for his 
decisions with respect to appropriation of budgets to entities – such as ZBOs – outside 
the State. The constitution and budgeting legislation do include some regulations that 
can be used as indicators for ZBO autonomy.  
First, I have discussed the CW regulations with respect to ZBOs: essentially the only 
requirement to disclose information is in budget documents and ministry annual reports 
as well arrangements on treasury management. An important omission seems to be 
authorisation of fees charged by ZBOs. Following the lines of the Dutch constitution and 
practice at the local government level, a case can be made that Parliament should 
approve ZBO fees.  
Second, accruals budgeting and accounting was discussed. In principle accruals 
budgeting and accounting does not contribute to ex ante control of ZBO budgets, except 
in some cases of demand driven production as well as for investment authorisation. The 
issue of demand driven production is based on control of (cost) prices, production 
volumes and investments. If these three variables are ex ante controlled by Parliament, 
the result is a traditional fixed budget to be complied with. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a full open ended budget exists when Parliament authorises none of the 
variables. In between a variety of control levels exist in which differentiation between 
short term and long term control can be made.  
The last point discussed looks at the level of detail in control. Dutch practice in the 
last three decades shows an increase in aggregation of budgets, resulting in less 
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Parliamentary control on parts of budgets. As a result, only when a ZBO budget is 
explicitly and fully disclosed in a ministry‟s budget does Parliament have the possibility of 
direct control. Partially disclosed budgets, budgets of ZBOs split up over several budget 
articles as well as ZBO budgets not included in ministry budgets reduce transparency and 
as a result the power of Parliament to influence these budgets. 
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5. General Public law and autonomy of ZBOs 
In this chapter I will address general public legislation on ZBOs and the impact this 
legislation has on the (relative) autonomy of ZBOs. Public law legislation on ZBOs is 
divided into three groups. The general level of legislation comprises framework legislation 
on structuring ZBOs and legislation on general principles of public administration. The 
latter holds for any government entity – at arm‟s length or within a ministry‟s hierarchy - 
executing an authoritative task (Goorden, 1997, p. 73-74). Within the law on general 
principles of public administration (Awb), two issues are relevant for ZBOs from an 
operations perspective. First, the already mentioned issue of delegation in section 10.1.2 
Awb (see chapter 3) and second, Awb includes regulations on subsidies in section 4.2 
Awb. The second group of legislation is ZBO case law. These laws generally cover the 
organisational structure, distribution of authority between ZBO and minister, as well as 
the tasks assigned to or the program to be executed by an individual ZBO. The last group 
of legislation covers ZBO-programs. ZBO case law may include a specification of activities 
to be performed on a general level, operationalised in other legislation or in decrees (see 
text box on page 111). In other cases, a full program law is defined which includes a 
separate chapter on the organisation of the ZBO. If so, I will only focus on the 
organisational arrangements of the ZBO and not consider the program contents of that 
law. A similar law can exist for a unit within the hierarchical structure of a ministry or for 
an executive agency. This chapter focuses on the ZBO framework law and addresses the 
Awb delegation and subsidising regulations. 
 
ZBO case law and program law. 
Public law ZBOs are created by or in the law. When a separate law is used, this law is 
referred to in this study as a ZBO case law. When a law is used in which the activities 
performed by the ZBO are the main contents, such a law is referred to as a program law. 
Private law ZBOs are created by statutes and their ZBO-task is defined by a program law. 
 
An example of a ZBO case law is on IBGroep. This ZBO93 provides several forms of income 
transfer in the education field and has registration and examination responsibilities. The 
ZBO case law in this case is the „Wet verzelfstandiging informatiseringsbank‟ (Law on 
autonomisation of IB-Group). The title of the law in this case even indicates that it is a 
ZBO case law rather than a program law. Relevant program laws are mentioned in the 
ZBO case law (article 3): e.g. Wet op de studiefinanciering (Law on Student benefits) and 
„Algemene wet erkenning EG-hoger onderwijsdiplomas‟ (Law on accepting EU-higher 
education degrees). The ZBO case law also includes the system for funding IBGroep: 
article 11 deals with operating costs, article 13 covers program costs. 
                                                 
93 As of 1-1-2010, IBGroep has merged with an executive agency and lost its ZBO status. 
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An example of a program law which creates a ZBO is the „Kieswet‟ (Law on elections). 
In this law the existence of the „Kiesraad‟ (Electoral Council) is mentioned (article A1). Its 
role in the election process is defined in articles F and G under which the „Kiesraad‟ is 
attributed the authority to decide upon the admittance of political parties to general 
elections, given the rules laid down in the law. 
An example of a program law under which a private law ZBO is authorised to decide 
upon a particular issue is the „Wet houdende vaststelling regeling ten aanzien van de 
Stichting tot verzorging en afwikkeling van pensioensaangelegenheden gewezen 
overheidspersoneel van Indonesië‟ (Pensions law for former government staff in 
Indonesia), in which the ZBO „Stichting Administratie Indische Pensioenen‟94 is authorised 
to provide income transfers for widows of former Dutch government and military staff in 
the Dutch East Indies. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will start with a short introduction on the 
history of public law in relation to ZBOs. Secondly, a short discussion on authority and 
responsibility is given from the perspective of the authority to be attributed to either the 
minister or ZBO. Then I will address the key features of the two frameworks that are 
relevant for ZBOs. These frameworks are „Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving 1996‟ and, 
as of 2008 the framework law on ZBOs „Kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen‟. Then, I 
will address delegation and subsidising concepts in Awb. Finally, I will compare the 
frameworks and assess the impact they have on ZBO autonomy, either individually or as 
a group. 
5.1 History of general legislation on ZBOs 
In 1992, Cabinet presented a fully revised framework on general legislation with the 
objective of standardising the structure of legislation and decrees. These „Aanwijzingen 
voor de regelgeving‟ (General Instructions on Legislation) [Aanwijzingen; AW] are 
internally binding instructions on the preparation of legislation, without direct effect on - 
amongst other things – ZBOs (AW1996:4). They cover the basic rules for all new 
legislation (Borman, 1993, p. XVI). Eijlander and Voermans (2000, p. 374-375) note that 
Aanwijzingen have the characteristics of an order to civil servants but have the impact of 
an evaluation framework for assessing legislation proposals by the Council of State and 
sometimes even in Parliament. Furthermore a motivated exception to AW can be claimed 
on the basis of AW1996:5. 
The comments on control of ZBOs in the NCA 1994 fiscal report led to a motion in 
Parliament in which the Cabinet was asked to develop a dedicated framework law for 
ZBOs, to be effective as of 1997 (Parliament, 1995c). The Cabinet first solved the 
problem of a more structured legislative process on ZBOs by introducing a new section in 
„Aanwijzingen‟ as of January 1, 1996. Although the new section in „Aanwijzingen‟ 
structures the creation of ZBOs, this only applies to new ZBOs. However many ZBOs were 
                                                 
94 Note that this foundation was created on the basis of CW1927:89a. 
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already in existence before 1995. These older ZBOs were, according to the Dutch 
Constitution and CW, established by law but the authority and responsibilities available to 
the minister may not be the same as those stated in „Aanwijzingen‟. Many older ZBOs 
have been merged or reorganised in recent years (Van Thiel en Yesilkagit, 2006, p. 10). 
These new entities have also had to apply „Aanwijzingen‟ rules. The precise requirements 
can differ from case to case and it is here that „Aanwijzingen‟ has most of its added 
value. Aanwijzingen 1996 was used as the framework to assess all known ZBOs based 
on the 1995 NCA report. This initiated reconsideration of the role of ZBOs in the structure 
of national government (Parliament, 1995b; Parliament, 1997a) in what was labelled as 
„re-introducing primacy of political authority‟ (herstel van het primaat van de politiek). The 
instructions lay down the procedure for establishing a ZBO as well as the specific controls 
that may be applicable in a specific situation. Depending on what controls are ultimately 
included in the law or statute that establishes the ZBO, one can analyse the degrees of 
freedom and the remaining ministerial responsibility with respect to that specific ZBO. 
 
In September 2000 a proposal for the new ZBO framework law [kZBO] as meant in the 
1995 motion of Parliament was submitted to Parliament. The Tweede Kamer passed the 
bill in March 2002. After the May 2002 general elections, the new Cabinet stated in 
August 2002 that it would review its opinion on the proposal of kZBO and as a result, 
debates in the Eerste Kamer were suspended (Parliament, 2005c). In 2005, discussions 
were reopened and the law was adopted by the Eerste Kamer on October 31, 2006. 
kZBO consists of both compulsory measures as well as optional measures which 
theoretically still allow for differentiation and tailor made measures. As with 
„Aanwijzingen‟, kZBO can only be applied to new ZBOs. To include as many existing ZBOs 
as possible under the new law, article (kZBO:42) states that within a year of kZBO coming 
into effect, a list of ZBOs to which kZBO will be applied must be made available. This 
indicates the start of a process to change legislation for those ZBOs that are on the list 
and for which kZBO rules are not fully met. A weakness in the transition process with 
respect to PLB ZBOs under kZBO is that changing a private law statute cannot simply be 
enforced by Parliament and a minister. This problem may particularly arise when a 
minister does not have a final word in changing statutes – an optional issue under 
AW1996. Dalhuisen (2004, p. 145) indicated that in only 60% of all ZBO foundations 
does the minister have the final say on changing the statute, implying that in the other 
cases either there is no possibility of changing the statute or that the minister needs co-
operation of the board of the foundation to change the statute. 
Based on the data set used in this study (see Part A) it appears that only some 20% of 
ZBOs will have to fully comply with kZBO and some 25% have to partially comply with 
kZBO. All other ZBOs are either to be reconsidered or discontinued (34) are no longer 
mentioned by minBZK (21) or are not relevant under the kZBO framework. Table 5.1 
shows the distribution of compliance with kZBO as proposed by government (Parliament, 
2008b). 
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Table 5.1: ZBOs by legal status listed in this study to be included under kZBO (source: 
Parliament, 2008b) 
 State Public Private Total 
kZBO 12 26 18 56 
Not kZBO 16 8 27 51 
Not mentioned 10 1 10 21 
Total 38 35 55 128 
 
Based on cabinet‟s decision, 56 ZBOs will be subject to the new framework. The other 72 
ZBOs will be subject to older standards if they were created after 1995 or had their 
statutes revised after 1996. If no changes in statute were made after 1995, there has 
been no standardisation of regulations. Absence of standardisation does not imply 
absence of control mechanisms for Parliament and minister: the only way to find the 
control mechanisms is to fully assess the individual statutes.  
5.2 Attribution of authority to a ZBO. 
From a political point of view, establishment of a ZBO by law implies that both Houses of 
Parliament have to give their consent. This implies that Parliament also agrees to the 
reduction of ministerial responsibility. The differences between the authority and 
responsibilities attributed to and/or executed by ministers with respect to ZBOs create 
confusion and different degrees of real autonomy for ZBOs. After the conclusions of the 
NCA in 1995 several studies were performed on these authority and responsibility 
differences (Zijlstra, 1997; Boxum, 1997, Leerdam, 1999; Kuiper, 1999; Kummeling et 
al., 1999; Minderman, 2000; Dalhuisen, 2004; Van Thiel, 2006). Zijlstra notes that 
autonomy of an entity is determined by the lack of another entity to direct operations of 
that authority. Autonomy is a relative concept, but if a hierarchical relationship, a 
mandate relationship or the power to give instructions in individual cases exists, an 
organisation is subordinate to the other organisation (Zijlstra, 1997, p. 76-77). A 
hierarchical relationship with a minister is by definition excluded for ZBOs. The other two 
elements could be included by law but are unlikely given the intentions to create an arm‟s 
length organisation. As a result, variations in autonomy for different ZBOs are based on 
the actual authority attributed to the entity. Some of these authors (Kummeling et al., 
1999; Minderman, 2000; Dalhuisen, 2004) tried to classify authority into different 
categories, others tried to explain why this authority was given (Van Thiel, 2006). The 
categorisation of authority as identified by Kummeling et al. (1999, p. 39) includes four 
groups: cyclical powers, information based powers, other (governance) powers and 
normative powers. In this study normative authority is relatively unimportant. Normative 
measures aim to standardise programs rather than ZBO operations. I regard such 
measures as part of the specifications of services to be delivered. As long as the ZBO can 
deliver according to these specifications, the actual operational processes can remain a 
black box for the commissioning ministry. The other three categories of authoritative 
power have a more immediate effect on operations: they all have to do with transparency 
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in operations, with interventions on available resources or managerial decisions. When 
assessing relative autonomy of ZBOs, these three categories will be emphasised. 
 
Kummeling et al. (1999, p. 53-59) emphasise the differences in the authority attributed 
to a minister from the wording the legislature uses to do this. Full authority and 
responsibility is expressed by attributing decisive power or determining power 
(„vaststellen‟) to the minister. In that case the minister can accept a proposal but is also 
able to change the proposal or even to reject it. Authority is relatively restricted when the 
minister only has power to approve („goedkeuren‟) a proposal. In that case, the minister 
can only accept or reject the proposal. Approval can be used before a proposal becomes 
effective or afterwards. In the latter case, it will lead to annulling a decision made by the 
entity that had to obtain approval for its decision from the minister. In the context of local 
government oversight Bolkestein and Van der Wel (1959, p. 28) noted that approval is a 
necessary condition before a local government decision can become effective. 
Kummeling et al. note (1999, p. 55) that disapproval of an annual report does not have a 
direct legal effect, but might lead to resignation of the board that submitted the annual 
report. Often, the power to (dis)approve is restricted in law by stating under what 
conditions a minister is allowed to reject a proposal. In that case the legislature uses the 
following wording: „approval can only be withheld when the decision is contrary to the law 
or the general interest‟ (e.g. GemW:85.3; kZBO:29.2). A third expression used in the 
context of attributing power is consent („instemmen‟). In this case, the power of the 
minister is even more formally restricted.  
In the literature I did not find any definition of the consent concept. In general the 
discussion is on „to approve‟ or „to decide‟. Visser (1986) gave an example of consent in 
the contemporary version of GemW: the provincial authorities could send a message of 
consent on receiving a local government decree in which sanctions were included. This 
suggests that rejection of the decree by the provincial authorities was not possible. 
Similarly, a minister can give a negative opinion on a decision or proposal but lacks the 
authority to disapprove and thus annul the decision. In the explanatory memorandum to 
the third part of the Awb-legislation, reference is made to the concept of consent.  Based 
on comments on an earlier draft of the proposed legislation Cabinet argues that consent 
suggests that the monitoring public body would consent to a proposal only if it accepts 
full accountability as if the decision was made by the monitoring public body itself. 
Furthermore, according to the explanatory memorandum approval is related to 
relationships between public bodies that do not operate under the hierarchical 
responsibility of the monitoring public body. In terms of ZBOs, this is the case as 
ministerial responsibility is reduced and not hierarchical (Parliament, 1994d, p. 185).  I 
note that the consent option still exists, but that the legislature has indicated in his 
legislative instructions on attributing authoritative powers that using a word such as 
consent should be avoided (Borman, 1993, p. 112).  
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In the following two sections I will discuss standardisation under „Aanwijzingen‟ and kZBO 
respectively. The discussion on AW1996 is needed because the empirical part of the 
study was performed during the intermediate period when the legislation had not yet 
been aligned with kZBO. 
5.3 ZBO control under „Aanwijzingen‟ 
The „Aanwijzingen‟ decree starts with a definition of a ZBO. This states that a ZBO is „an 
authoritative body at the level of central government, which is not hierarchically 
subordinated to a minister and which is not an advisory board…‟(AW1996:124a). In the 
following two articles, the organisational form and the reasons for creating a ZBO are 
determined. The leading principle is that a ZBO is to be created under public law and 
based on one of the three listed motives: „impartial judgement‟, „rule based decision 
making‟ or „participation with third parties‟. Although the principle that a ZBO has status 
under public law is not politically discussed, the organisational form is open. The fact is 
that many ZBOs have civil law status and that even after 1995 new civil law ZBOs were 
created.95 A ZBO can either be a unit within a larger structure or a separate legal entity. 
This follows from the words „organisational form‟ in AW1996:124b.1 which is different 
from the word „organisation‟ that is used in AW1996:124b.2 for civil law ZBOs. Moreover, 
in AW1996:124h it is explicitly stated that „when attributing legal status is desired‟, which 
clearly shows that a ZBO may have a separate legal status but does not need to have 
one. The Dutch Electoral Council is an example of an entity that has no separate legal 
status but does have the status of a ZBO. In general, only small units that require the 
status of ZBO will not have a separate public legal entity status. 
In general, all other arrangements being equal, not having separate legal status 
implies having relatively less autonomy in operations compared to other ZBOs. This is 
because operational processes and operational control have to fit in to the system of the 
larger entity under which the ZBO unit is operating. In specific cases, autonomy actually 
depends on the authority attributed and the control procedures applied. „Aanwijzingen‟ 
continues with a list of legislative instructions which includes areas of authority that can 
or must be attributed to the minister responsible for the ZBO. The list of authority areas to 
be attributed to the minister is more restricted for PLBs than for PLAs. This implies that a 
PLA has less autonomy than a PLB. Again, case law and actual control practices 
ultimately determine ZBO autonomy. In Appendix 10 a full specification of the regulations 
in „Aanwijzingen‟ is given, including an indication of whether or not the regulation affects 
operations of the ZBO and thus possibly its autonomy. Table 5.2 below, only shows the 
items in „Aanwijzingen‟ which affect autonomy of operations of ZBOs.  
The table shows that about half of the instructions in „Aanwijzingen‟ are optional. This 
means that Minister and Parliament may or may not include the issue in the ZBO case 
law. The other half is compulsory, but the instructions only require a measure to be 
included in the ZBO case law. In theory, Parliament and minister can agree not to include 
                                                 
95 e.g. Stichting Nidos, established in 2005 
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a measure in the ZBO case law. Formal autonomy of a ZBO can therefore only be 
assessed by studying the individual ZBO case-laws.  
Table 5.2: Authority issues having impact on autonomy as mentioned in 'Aanwijzingen' as 
of 1996 
Issue Article x 
AW1996 
Applicability Option (O) or 
compulsory (C) 
Cyclical issues    
Approval of fees by minister 124l.3 All C 
Including funding method in the law  124n.1/ 
124l.2 
PLA C 
ZBO Board decides upon the budget 124o.1 PLA C 
Consent with budget and multiyear forecast by minister 124l.4 PLA C 
Minister can set rules on structure of budget,  124p.2 PLA O 
Information issues    
ZBO submits annual report to minister  124s.1 All C 
General right of inquiry for minister 124t All C 
Requirements on statement of accounts 124p.1 PLA C 
Requirement that ZBO-case law determines financial 
oversight 
124o.2 PLA C 
Specifications of annual report included in ZBO-case law 124s.2 PLA O 
Minister can set rules on structure statement of accounts 
and auditing 
124p.2 PLA O 
Other (governance) issues    
Law must include relation and authority attributed to minister 
and board 
124l.1/ 
124l.2 
All C 
Appointment in governance structures other than Board 124i.4 PLA C 
(Re)appointment and dismissal of board 124i.1 PLA C 
Structure of board 124i.1 PLA C 
Defining relationship between different bodies in governance 
structure 
124j PLA C 
Approval of internal governance statute by minister 124l.4 PLA C 
Appointment of members of interest groups 124i.3 All O 
Approval, suspension or reversal of ZBO-decisions 124l.5c All O 
Intervention by minister in case of negligence 124m All O 
Requirement that ZBO  case law determines ministerial 
consent to private law based decisions (e.g. statutes, lease, 
borrowing) 
124o.3 PLA O 
Normative issues    
Task description 124g All C 
Prohibition to appoint civil servants in board 124i.2 All C 
Change of legislation when insufficient authority appears to 
be attributed to minister 
124l.7 All C 
Conditions for issuing operational instructions by ZBO 124f All O 
Approval by minister of other authoritative decisions by ZBO 124l.5 All O 
Minister decides on general instructions on tasks and other 
listed issues 
124l.5a/
124l.5b 
All O 
Measures on appointing staff 124u PLA O 
Measures on transfer of legal disputes 124w PLA O 
Measures on transfer of liabilities to new legal entity 124v PLA O 
 
The table also indicates that the compulsory normative issues with impact on the 
autonomy of ZBOs hold for all ZBOs. As a result, relative autonomy of ZBOs is hardly 
affected; only the optional normative issues may result in differences. In the three other 
categories, the emphasis is on PLA‟s: relatively few issues hold for all ZBOs. Furthermore, 
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authority issues aimed at PLAs are mainly compulsory requirements. Thus, PLA case laws 
drawn up under AW1996 are likely to have stronger control tools thanthose for other 
ZBOs.  
Some remarks can be made on specific articles in AW1996. Article AW1996:124o.3 
leads to some confusion. The article only applies to PLAs (according to AW1996:124b.3). 
In the explanatory notes, changing of statutes is mentioned as an example of a private 
law based action that might be subject to ex ante permission by the minister. However, a 
statute is only relevant in a PLB setting; a PLA is based on a law, not a statute. 
Furthermore, the article is not restricted to types of private law actions, which 
theoretically means that any action might need ex ante permission from the minister.  
 
The introduction of kZBO did not make the ZBO section in „Aanwijzingen‟ obsolete. As of 
August 2008, the section has been reduced to a set of instructions that standardise the 
phrasing in individual ZBO laws and the procedures on changing ZBO-legislation. Such 
instructions had been included in „Aanwijzingen‟ in 1996, but were surrounded by 
instructions that aimed at the contents of ZBO legislation. One instruction that does 
affect autonomy and is still included in AW2008 has changed. This instruction 
(AW1996:124j; AW2008:124f) allows PLA authority to be distributed amongst different 
bodies. The text of the instruction has been changed to emphasise that it only holds for 
PLAs. In AW1996:124b, it had been arranged that only a limited number of instructions 
were applicable for PLBs. As the differentiation between public law based and private law 
based ZBOs has been transferred to kZBO, the wording of AW2008:124f had to be 
adapted as well. More relevant however is that three different cases are mentioned in the 
explanatory notes to AW2008:124f: an executive board and a non-executive board, a 
non-executive board and an executive director and an executive board and a user / client 
panel. These cases are not restrictive: the wording is „one can think of…‟ („gedacht kan 
worden aan…‟). Compared to the AW1996:124j instruction, the AW2008 instruction is 
extended by the latter two options. This means that solutions other than the three 
mentioned are also possible.  
 
A final remark can be made on ministerial responsibility, more particularly on system 
responsibility as described by Kummeling et al. (1999, p. 19-20). In the case of ZBOs, 
this element of responsibility is institutionalised; „Aanwijzingen‟ requires that in the event 
of insufficient authority a minister has to change the legal framework in order to acquire 
the authority he needs (Aanwijzingen:124l.7). The adapted „Aanwijzingen 2008‟ does not 
include the contents of the former AW1996:124l.7. As a result, the system responsibility 
for monitoring ZBOs is now implicitly assumed rather than explicitly given in the legislative 
frameworks on ZBOs. 
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5.4 ZBO control under kZBO 
The remarks on lack of ministerial control made by the NCA and the Sint Committee in 
1995 initially led to a fast and practical solution through the adoption of „Aanwijzingen‟. 
This lasted till the end of 2006 before the Framework law (kZBO) had passed through 
Parliament.  
Goorden (1997, p. 110-111) mentioned a list of minimum requirements that should 
be included in the new framework law. These five requirements were: general right of 
inquiry, cognisance of the annual report and financial statements; approval or decision 
making on budgets and fees, ability to give general instructions and the appointment and 
dismissal of the board. According to Goorden another 6 issues had to be considered 
when developing the new framework law. These were: funding, arrangements for 
secondary or commercial activities, incompatibility in the functions of board members, 
annulling and negligence provisions, evaluation and finally remuneration of the (non) 
executive board. Goorden‟s requirements can be used to assess the differences between 
AW1996 and kZBO measures. 
5.4.1 Legal status of kZBO 
The legal impact of kZBO and „Aanwijzingen‟ is different. As mentioned, AW1996 
generally only has an internal effect on ministers and civil servants and sometimes 
serves as an assessment framework for new legislation. The framework law kZBO has an 
external effect as a law generally addresses anyone whom it may affect. Ten Berge & 
Zijlstra (2000, p. 83-84) note that the general legislative rule is that „lex specialis‟ (i.e. 
case law), overrules general legislation. In this case kZBO can be overruled by other rules 
in case law. If deviations from the general law are deliberately meant, the standard 
wording „..in afwijking van..‟ (contrary to) is to be used. This holds for legislation in 
general.  
Applied to the kZBO-framework, two cases exist. First, a new ZBO is created after 
kZBO came into effect. The kZBO generally holds for all compulsorily worded kZBO 
articles and those optional articles which are explicitly mentioned in ZBO case law. 
Provisions that run contrary to kZBO also have to be mentioned explicitly. Secondly, in the 
case of an existing ZBO, kZBO must be explicitly made effective first in the case law, 
possibly by excluding some compulsorily worded kZBO measures. What has been covered 
in kZBO does not need to be repeated in the case law once kZBO has been made 
effective. The optional measures do not hold; here the old wording in the case law can be 
used unless another measure has been implemented.  
In both cases, new (adopted) legislation has to pass through Parliament before 
legislation actually becomes effective and Parliament can therefore discuss possible 
measures which run contrary to kZBO. 
5.4.2 Contents of kZBO 
A key concept under kZBO is that the law requires a ZBO to be based on public law, 
unless „it is particularly relevant for the public interest‟ to use a private law solution. 
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There have to be „sufficient‟ safeguards included in the statutes of a PLB to ensure that 
the public ZBO tasks can be separated from the other tasks of the private entity (kZBO:4). 
In the initial proposal, this article as well as article kZBO:3 on the motives for creating a 
ZBO (impartial judgement, rule driven task execution and participation of third parties), 
were not included. Both articles were included in kZBO only after amendments from 
Tweede Kamer were accepted. Article kZBO:4 was motivated by standardising the legal 
status of ZBOs, which was in line with the general idea of kZBO (Parliament, 2002f). An 
amendment that proposed to extend this rule to a priori approval by minBZK was 
included in modified form in article kZBO:6 (Parliament, 2002g). Article kZBO:3 was 
included (Parliament, 2002d) as an assurance that only these three categories of 
reasons were sufficient to create a ZBO. The article is identical to the text used in 
AW1996:124c. In kZBO, a requirement is included that ZBO annual reports must be 
submitted to Parliament. Again, it was Tweede Kamer which managed to include an 
amendment to kZBO with this requirement, which is stronger than the previous measure 
in which these documents were submitted to Parliament on request or on a voluntary 
basis directly from a ZBO (Parliament, 2002h). It should be noted that the wording of the 
article does not cover the intentions of MPs. In the debate on kZBO, several MPs made a 
link between annual reports and financial statements (Parliament, 2002i, p. 3533-3535). 
The text of kZBO:18 only refers to an annual report, not financial statements. The latter 
have to be approved by the „parent‟ minister based on kZBO:34 in which a clear 
distinction between the annual report and annual accounts/financial statements is 
made. 
Another amendment (Parliament, 2002j) that was included in kZBO is in kZBO:21.  
This allows a minister to issue general instructions. The measure included in kZBO is 
restricted to policy rules on the task of a ZBO only, whereas AW1996:124l.5 also includes 
rules on a limited list of issues in the ZBO-case law. At present a similar measure is 
included in AWb:10.16. 
 
The content of kZBO has similarities with the original „Aanwijzingen‟. Some new issues on 
authority are also included. Table 5.3 gives an overview of the issues which impact ZBO 
operations that are included in the new law. 
 
Compared to AW1996, it appears that many of the issues included in ZBO laws are now 
compulsory and hold for all ZBOs that are subject to the new law. Only a few issues are 
particularly relevant for a specific group of ZBOs. At first glance, kZBO suggests much 
stronger control tools than those used before. Compared to Goorden‟s (1997, p. 110-
111) proposals, three issues have been solved differently. First, a minister has to approve 
annual reports rather than having knowledge of the contents but formally restricted to the 
annual report and not annual accounts. This is a stronger measure compared to 
Goorden‟s proposal. Two issues are less strict than Goorden‟s proposal: the minister only 
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approves budgets and fees; the executive board decides. The other one is the lack of an 
explicit rule on secondary or commercial activities.  
Table 5.3: Authority issues impacting autonomy as mentioned in kZBO 
 Art x kZBO Applicability Option (O) 
or 
compulsory 
(C) 
Cyclical issues    
Approval of fees by minister 17 All C 
Consent with budget and multiyear forecast by minister 29: approval 
except 
multiyear 
forecast 
All C 
Report on substantial differences between budgeted and 
actual expenditure 
30 All C 
Creating equalisation reserve 33 All C 
ZBO board decides upon the budget 26, by 
implication 29 
All C 
Minister can set rules on budget structure  27 [C];  
28 [C] 
All O 
Information issues    
ZBO submits annual report to minister and Parliament 18 All C 
General right of inquiry for minister 20 All C 
Requirement for approval of statement of accounts 34 All C 
Minister can set rules on structure of statement of 
accounts and auditing 
35 [C] All O 
Requirement to separate accounts for ZBO activities and 
non-ZBO activities 
38 PLB C 
Other (governance) issues    
Defining relationship between different bodies in 
governance structure 
7 All C 
Ex ante approval by minister for mandates to the ZBO 8 All C 
Requirement that ZBO-case law determines ministerial 
consent to private law based decisions (e.g. statutes, 
lease, borrowing) 
32, limitative 
list  
All O 
Intervention by minister in case of negligence 23 All + inform 
Parliament 
Yes, directly 
based on 
kZBO 
Approval, suspension or reversal of ZBO-decisions 22 All, only 
annulment 
O 
Approval of internal governance statute by minister 11 PLA C 
(Re)appointment and dismissal of board 12 PLA C 
Rules on Board member secondary jobs 13 PLA C 
Minister decides on Board member remuneration  14 PLA C 
Normative issues    
Prohibition on appointing civil servants to board 9 All C 
Decide upon ZBOs to be subject to kZBO 42 All C 
ZBO staff are subordinated to board, not minister 16 PLA C 
Applicability of rules for PLBs 36; 37 PLB C 
Data protection requirement 41 All O 
Rules on appointing staff 15 PLA O 
Minister decides on general instructions on tasks  21 All O 
 
In a letter on hybrid status in the public sector, Cabinet announced an assessment of 
whether or not rules on secondary activities had to be included in kZBO as well as 
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assessing the need for changes in individual ZBO case laws (Parliament, 1997b, p. 7). 
Since no rules have been included in kZBO, the issue is left to the ZBO case law, implying 
that minister and Parliament are „free‟ to decide on this topic. 
In AW1996:124o.3, a provision is made which suggests that private law transactions 
by PLBs – at least changes in statutes – should be approved by the minister. Under kZBO, 
a similar article is included in the law (kZBO:32) but this article applies to all ZBOs and 
restricts ex ante permission to a limited list of actions. In effect, this means that 
theoretical autonomy under kZBO on private law actions is greater than under AW1996.  
Another relevant difference between AW1996 and kZBO is found in an instruction to the 
minister to acquire relevant authority if an omission in the system of responsibilities is 
discovered. This requirement is not explicitly included in kZBO. Basically, kZBO is meant 
to specify what is to be regulated in the laws or statutes of individual ZBOs. From that 
perspective, it is logical that this element of „Aanwijzingen‟ is not included in kZBO.  
Before I discuss implementation of kZBO, one issue that has no immediate impact on 
autonomy from a legal perspective must be discussed. In kZBO:14, it is stated that the 
minister decides the remuneration of the ZBO Executive Board members. In the 
explanatory memorandum to kZBO (Parliament, 2000d, p. 24) the text suggests that 
remuneration is based on a standard system, because no performance related 
remuneration is mentioned. This is however not explicitly excluded. Furthermore, it is 
expected that ZBOs will publish the total amount of remuneration of the board in line with 
civil law (Parliament, 2000d, p. 13). In 2006, a specific law was introduced – Wet 
Openbaarheid uit publieke middelen gefinancierde topinkomens (law on publication of 
high level remuneration for publicly funded activities [WOPT]) - which required any public 
sector remuneration which exceeds that of a minister to be disclosed in the institution‟s 
annual report. This law holds for ZBOs as well. The issue is relevant given the political 
debates on remuneration (Dijkstal Committee, 2004; 2007) and because the 
remuneration structure may affect autonomy from an economic perspective.96 Given the 
political attention to this issue and its relevance from an economic perspective, I will 
include an assessment of remuneration decisions and compliance with WOPT in the 
empirical part of the study. 
5.4.3 kZBO implementation 
The reader is reminded that kZBO only applies to ZBOs created after the law was 
implemented in February 2007. A transition arrangement for existing ZBOs is included in 
the law. In order to accommodate the transition process, a committee of ministry 
representatives (Parliament, 2007c; Gerritsen committee, 2008) assessed proposals to 
modify present ZBO case laws to comply with kZBO. The committee took the position that 
basically each ministry had to comply or explain itself when a deviation from kZBO was 
desired. In its report, the committee discussed five groups of issues that required special 
                                                 
96 Incentives as performance related remuneration are mentioned in neo-institutional economics as a 
control tool (Moe, 1984, p. 756. See also Part C.) 
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attention by cabinet. Three of them need some attention here, because they have 
particular relevance for the relative autonomy of ZBOs. A fourth – appointment of staff – 
also has an impact. The committee advises continuing the existing arrangements on this 
point to avoid transition costs (Gerritsen Committee, 2008, p. 33). As a result, the relative 
autonomy of individual ZBOs is not affected by the issue of appointing staff. I now will 
discuss the relevant issues.  
The first item is the appointment of a „non-executive board‟ or an „advisory board‟. 
Under AW1996:124i.4, PLAs may have a governance structure consisting of an executive 
board as well as a non-executive board. Goorden noticed in 1997 that there is a strong 
resemblance between private sector arrangements on two tier boards and the public 
sector arrangements (Goorden, 1997, p. 209). He notes that the essential difference is 
that along with the responsibilities of the (two tier) board, there is a process of 
accountability towards the minister. Dalhuisen (2004, p. 62) indicates that issues on 
appointing and dismissing the executive board of a foundation are deliberately not 
included in the proposed kZBO. The Cabinet argued that the Dutch civil code gives 
sufficient scope to deal with appointments and dismissals and additional measures in 
kZBO might conflict with the civil code (Parliament, 2000d, p.7; Dalhuisen, 2004, p. 62). 
In the kZBO-proposal as it was finally concluded by the Dutch Senate (Parliament, 2000f; 
Parliament, 2002b), no explicit reference is made to appointments to the non-executive 
boards of foundations. However in the explanatory remarks to the original kZBO proposal, 
the minister leaves the option open to include a rule on appointments in a specific law or 
in the civil law ZBO statutes (Parliament, 2000d, p. 23). By August 2007, the Minister of 
Justice published a proposal on a „Maatschappelijke Ondernemingen‟ law for 
consultation with relevant organisations, based on a policy advise by the Wijffels 
Committee (2006).97 This idea is similar to that of Community Interest Companies in the 
UK [CIC] (Masson, 2005) or Public Interest Company (Birchall, 2002; Maltby, 2003). The 
Dutch variety of a CIC is a private legal entity aimed at achieving a goal on behalf of 
society and parallel to the general interest, where profits are not distributed but used to 
achieve the goal of the entity. However a CIC is not the same as a ZBO, because 
qualifying as a CIC does not require an authoritative task.98 In the minJus proposal, a 
regulation (proposed BW2:307i) is included that the board of a CIC is appointed by the 
non-executive board; in specific cases based on a binding nomination by relevant interest 
groups. Such a solution could overcome the comments made on not including 
appointment regulations for PLBs in kZBO. Some authors (De Ru, Burggraaf & Spaans, 
2005; Baarsma & Theeuwes, 2008; Wolfson, 2008, Jongsma, 2008) have expressed 
their doubts whether a CIC in Dutch law really has additional value. Without the CIC-
proposal, appointments to boards of foundation-ZBOs are not structurally governed by 
general law. Another point is that at the political level, there seems to be doubt on the 
usefulness of creating a non-executive board in the ZBO governance structure. In its 
                                                 
97 See also Pijls (2006). 
98 The idea of the Dutch CIC is based on governance issues in health, education and social housing. 
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report on the assessment of the proposals by ministries, the Gerritsen Committee 
observes a tendency to attribute authority to non-executive boards (articles kZBO11-14, 
kZBO:20) rather than to the minister. The committee proposed that cabinet should not 
attribute authority that ought to be attributed to minister or executive board to a non-
executive board (Gerritsen Committee, 2008, p. 24). The opinion of the Gerritsen 
Committee reflects the shift in (political) opinions on the use of non-executive boards. 
Although the Committee prepared this proposal, the subsequent new AW2008:124f does 
allow degrees of freedom to create a non-executive board. 
Second, the exemption from the authority of a minister to reverse decisions of a ZBO 
was discussed. This exemption (kZBO:22) is the most frequently claimed exemption (18 
cases). In most cases, it regards quasi-judicial entities, where a ministerial intervention 
would be undesirable. However, in the case of the Art-funds, Parliament explicitly states 
that it should not intervene with funding for art. This is expressed in the letter of minOCW 
(Parliament, 2008d, p. 3) by stating that the exemption only holds for „decisions that are 
based on the activities performed by the funds‟, implying that the exemption from the 
authority to reverse a decision only refers to program decisions. Operational decisions of 
the Art funds are supposed to be part of the ministerial authority attributed to him under 
kZBO:22. However, having said this, by mid 2008 discussions emerged in the media (e.g. 
NRC, 2008) and in Parliament (Parliament, 2008e) on the distribution of funds towards 
individual organisations. This is an indication that, despite restricted responsibility for the 
minister on this topic, the Parliamentary right of inquiry and political pressure may affect 
the formal position of the minister towards a ZBO.  
The last item discussed by the Gerritsen Committee was on creating an equalisation 
reserve. In four cases, an exception is made to the standard that a ZBO has an 
equalisation reserve (kZBO:33). The idea of an equalisation reserve is that differences 
between actual expenditure and budgeted expenditure can be compensated for over a 
number of years. By not allowing an equalisation reserve, the ZBO is actually fully 
controlled as a budgetary entity, which has affects absolute and relative autonomy. The 
discussion is remarkable given the fact that a similar equalisation reserve arrangement 
also exists for executive agencies which are formally fully subject to ministerial control. 
5.5 Awb and kZBO 
As stated before, Awb governs general administrative issues with respect to all 
government bodies. In most cases, it regards the relationship between citizen and public 
body, including appeal procedures. I will not consider that as it does not affect general 
control of ZBO operations. 
Two issues are relevant from an operations perspective. First, Awb, chapter 10 
governs the relationship between public bodies including issues such as attribution and 
delegation of authority. These can be classified under Kummeling et al.‟s (1999, p. 39) 
normative measures. The main issues are transfer of responsibility, issuing policy rules as 
well as approval, suspension and annulling of decisions by a public body. Most of these 
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issues are also made explicit in kZBO. Second, the section on providing subsidies to legal 
entities should be mentioned (Awb4:58-80). In AW1996:n.2 it is suggested that reference 
be made to Awb to allow monitoring ZBO use of resources. The specific measures on 
structurally subsidising legal entities include the procedures to apply for a subsidy and 
the subsection on applicant obligations include measures on asset control similar to 
kZBO:32 (Awb4:71) and measures on equalisation reserves (Awb4:72; kZBO:33). The 
difference in the measures is that under kZBO:33, a compulsory measure is laid down 
whereas Awb4:72 is only optional. Furthermore, both optional asset control measures are 
not exactly the same. Awb4:71h covers an measure on conjunction of fees and subsidies 
and Awb4:71i covers dissolution of a legal entity. As under kZBO, the parent minister 
needs to approve fees, so the impact of Awb4:71h is low. Not including Awb4:71i in the 
kZBO-framework seems to be an omission; the explanatory notes to kZBO (Parliament, 
2000d, p. 31) only refer to the previous measures in AW1996. 
5.6 Summary 
A direct comparison between the authority issues which impact ZBO operations between 
AW1996 and kZBO regulations shows that kZBO is in theory a more restrictive model. 
Many more requirements have to be included in ZBO case laws or ZBO-statutes. This 
means that more authority is attributed to the minister and thus ZBO executive board 
autonomy is reduced. 
Both kZBO and AW1996 have left degrees of freedom in attributing authority to 
minister and ZBO. By the end of 2008, the legislative process on adapting ZBO case laws 
to the kZBO framework had not yet been completed. Formal testing of autonomy based 
on kZBO is not yet possible. However, all ministers have indicated the proposed 
deviations to kZBO for individual ZBOs under their responsibility and these were assessed 
by the Gerritsen Committee. The exceptions to kZBO in individual cases are therefore 
likely to be accepted, unless Parliament intervenes. This does allow formal ZBO autonomy 
to be assessed under the new regime. In my opinion, such an assessment provides a 
better view on the position of a ZBO than a retrospective assessment only. 
Along with the kZBO and AW measures, a third set of measures has to be kept in 
mind. Awb governs a number of normative measures which are mostly also covered in 
kZBO. The measures on subsidising legal entities (chapter 4.2 Awb) may have an impact 
on ZBOs as at least in AW1996 reference was made to these measures. 
 
In the following chapter, attention shifts from the public law dimension to the private law 
dimension. Up to this point, ministerial authority and responsibility have been discussed. 
Secondly, the general legislative processes with respect to budgeting as well as 
developments in the history of ZBOs have been described. Third, the chapter on 
framework legislation showed the theoretical options for distributing authority between 
the minister and the board of a ZBO.  
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The private law dimension will address in more detail the different legal entities and 
the impact of private law issues such as contracting on ZBO operations. 
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6. Autonomy and ministerial control: a civil law perspective 
6.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters discussed (relative) autonomy indicators and their impact on 
Parliamentary control from a public law perspective. Relevant indicators found were the 
level of detail in budgeting and the distribution of authority as actually laid down in the 
individual ZBO case laws. This chapter will address the indicators that can be derived 
from a private law perspective. Again, a general analysis will be performed which at this 
stage does not assess the actual rules in the ZBO case laws or statutes. Statements and 
conclusions therefore only reflect on general civil law rules. Creating a ZBO under a 
private law based organisational structure is not excluded although public law states that 
ZBOs are preferably created under public law. Whatever form of legal entity is used all 
forms are, unless stated otherwise, regulated under civil law. This follows from article 1, 
book 2 of the Dutch civil code (BW2:1). Of course, as most ZBOs have public law based 
case law; this overrules the civil code with respect to the contents of that public case law 
under the principle that lex specialis overrides lex generalis. What is not included in the 
public case law is governed by the civil code as far as it concerns the acts of a ZBO as a 
legal entity rather than a public body (Ten Berge & Zijlstra, 2000, p.21), although even 
then the principles of good public governance have to be met (Nicolaï et al., 1997, p. 
247). Therefore, this chapter discusses ZBOs from a civil law perspective.  
 
The attribution and distribution of authority towards a single ZBO is given in the 
requirements of public law but has to fit in with statutes that are also governed by private 
law for PLBs. For PLAs, the same holds as far as financial controls allow autonomous 
operation (Ten Berge & Zijlstra, 2000, p. 39) and authority to participate in private law 
transactions is given (ibid., p. 46). When discussing organisations and the governance 
structure of organisations, two main themes emerge. First, there is an ownership-control 
discussion because creating a separate legal entity outside central government implies 
that some of the hierarchical controls used within central government cannot be used. 
Ownership of ZBOs may sometimes be similar to that in the private sector (shares held by 
government), but in other cases there are no shares and only a form of quasi-ownership 
exists, based on rules set in the formal statute (Law)99 of the ZBO. In a private company, 
ownership implies access to residual value and determining the strategy of the 
organisation. In a public law setting one can distinguish between controls on tasks 
assigned to an organisation including system-responsibility (Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 
19-20). The other part refers to responsibility for the organisation as an entity or unit, 
which is in a civil law context referred to as the continuity issue. It should be noted that 
continuity of a PLA is guaranteed as long as it is not dissolved by law (Ten Berge & 
                                                 
99 Public ZBOs are created by ZBO-case Law, Private Law ZBOs are created by a statute; the attribution of a 
ZBO task to a PLB is either done by or under the law. 
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Zijlstra, 2000, p. 57 and p. 95-96). If net equity of a PLA is negative, the organisation is 
technically bankrupt, generating a problem for the Minister-Principal responsible for the 
organisation.  
In the case of ZBOs which have public legal entity status (PLA), different individual 
governance structures may exist as a result of historical developments. As a result, ZBO 
case laws have to be studied individually to arrive at a conclusion on (relative) autonomy 
for PLAs. In the case of PLBs, Civil law (BW2:3) gives three (relevant) different formats for 
private law entities, each having different characteristics when studied from an 
ownership-control perspective. These forms are (limited liability) corporations, 
foundations and associations. Within these formats, statutes can vary as well, implying 
that classifying private law entities along the lines of formats alone is not sufficient to 
arrive at a conclusion of (relative) autonomy for private law ZBOs. In theory, it might very 
well be that the statute of a private law ZBO includes restrictions that result in a position 
in which that specific ZBO is less autonomous from an operations perspective than a 
public law ZBO. It is therefore necessary to study separately both the legal format and the 
owner controls for each type of entity. 
The second problem to be discussed is related to the tasks assigned to the ZBO. The 
lack of hierarchical relationship between ZBO and the minister results in a relationship 
between two separate legal entities.100 This relationship is expressed in a form of „quasi 
contracting‟ to define the production for the new fiscal year. Both parties depend on each 
other for delivering services as most ZBOs have been assigned a unique task. A 
discussion on the specifications of the task to be commissioned will resemble a contract 
relationship between two fully independent organisations. Therefore, I will study the 
commissioning process from a civil law perspective to find indicators that may result in 
differences in (relative) autonomy (Lane, 2000, p. 149-155; Greve, 2008, p. 167-168). 
The commissioning issue is not fully equal to pure private law contract relationships since 
the minister can have authoritative powers that may overrule such negotiations. Goorden 
(1997, p. 79) suggested that ZBOs should be subject to the section on subsidies in Awb 
as well as in AW1996 (see section 5.4) to describe the relation between the entity and 
the minister. In my opinion, this is an incorrect proposition as ZBO operations are 
activities delivered on behalf of central government which are similar to the provision of 
services to government. The ZBO produces the service at government request, given the 
specifications that are set in the program laws. As a result, the financial relationship 
between ZBO and government has more resemblance to a contract relationship in terms 
of funding in exchange for services rendered rather than an income transfer (grant) 
relationship in which there is no need for direct service delivery. In more economic terms, 
the relationship between minister and ZBO is basically one on commissioning and 
funding (see section 6.3 for more details). Ensuring proper decision making on grants as 
laid down in Awb is therefore not relevant. The fact that an authorised budget is the basis 
                                                 
100 Except in case of ZBOs without separate legal status. 
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of this contract relationship is irrelevant because a budget does not formally have an 
external effect outside the hierarchical structure of the State (e.g. Van der Bij, 1993, p. 
13-15).  The statutory power to (dis)approve budgets is one of the most powerful tools 
available, but Van Wijk (1998, p. 15) mentions for example that a concession – in this 
case to be interpreted as the quasi contract - or grant terms can be used by a minister to 
influence entity behaviour. While commissioning of public services ultimately aims at 
outcomes delivered, the main objective with respect to ownership-control is the 
operational output and financial results in terms of residual income realised by the 
organisation on behalf of its owners. I recall that this operational relationship is at the 
heart of this study. 
 
I will start this chapter by describing the variety of legal structures that exist under civil 
law in section 6.2. This includes a discussion on the two possible formats for PLAs as well 
as the three major different formats101 for PLBs that can be derived from BW2:3. Given 
the formats, including rules that are described in the public law frameworks 
„Aanwijzingen‟ and kZBO, a ZBO case law or a private law statute ultimately determines 
the actual autonomy of an individual ZBO. Section 6.3 focuses on service provision by 
ZBOs and the „contract relationship‟ that will emerge when someone submits a request to 
a ZBO to provide the service that may only be provided by the ZBO. In section 6.4, I will 
address controlling property rights in ZBOs which have separate legal status as well as 
the relevance of the internal governance structure of a ZBO with a separate legal status 
on the relative autonomy towards minister and Parliament. The chapter concludes with a 
short summary of findings in section 6.5. After these conclusions, a short intermediate 
chapter will focus on the overall results on the legal perspective of ZBO control and the 
implications for empirical research. 
6.2 Governance structure of the types of legal entities 
Civil law states that „a body, to which a public task is assigned, only has the status of a 
separate legal entity when that status has explicitly been attributed by or under the law‟ 
(BW2.1.2). This legal status is generally confirmed by the phrase: „Entity X is a legal 
entity‟.102 There is no definition of ZBOs in civil law; they are described in public law. This 
implies that all ZBOs must fit into the framework of civil law as defined by BW2:1 and 
BW2:3. There are basically two options. First, the ZBO is part of the legal Entity State. 
Second, the entity has a separate legal status as defined in BW2:1 (public law entity) or 
BW2:3 (civil law entity). 
When a ZBO is part of the legal entity State, autonomy as a result of legal status 
under the civil code does not exist. In that case, autonomy can only be enlarged by 
making special provisions in ZBO case law. Creating a separate public law based legal 
                                                 
101 Formally BW2:3 describes 6 forms but two of them – co-operation and mutual assurance company – are 
not relevant at all and one – limited company – is basically a variety of a share-issuing company. 
102 For example, article 2, section 2 of „Wet verzelfstandiging informatiseringsbank‟ explicitly attributes the 
status of legal entity to IBGroep. 
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entity also implies a form of enlarged autonomy from the State. If not, there would be no 
argument for creating a separate legal entity at all. Enlarged autonomy implies that the 
legislature deliberately loosens its control systems which may affect the budget 
authorisation process. In the case of a ZBO with separate legal status under civil law, the 
opposite occurs. The initial autonomy of the entity due to its separate legal status can 
only be reduced as a result of the provisions in the law or statute. 
 
The discussion in this chapter is on autonomy of legal entities from a civil law perspective 
and starts with some general remarks. The discussion on autonomy seems odd, as 
BW2:5 explicitly states that a legal entity has, under civil law, the same rights as a natural 
person, unless otherwise stated. Without restrictions as meant by “unless otherwise 
stated”, the entity is entitled to full control as well as full benefits from the assets 
available to the entity. This means that in principle, a legal entity is autonomous. The 
autonomy of the entity can be reduced as a result of legal or statutory measures. In a 
pure civil law context between companies, the most common form of reduction of 
autonomy is found in a corporate holding structure in which the autonomy of a subsidiary 
company is reduced by the control systems – at least a majority voting right -  available to 
the holding company.  
In the context of a ZBO, the impact is more complex. In the case of a PLA, autonomy is 
described in the distribution of authority between Minister-Principal and the (executive) 
board of the entity on managerial issues103 as well as on the authority attributed or 
delegated to management on civil law transactions under the general condition that the 
use of the attributed or delegated authority does not conflict with public law (BW3:14). 
The fact that the measures to carry out private law transactions are based on attribution 
or delegation of authority to the (executive) board of a PLA implies that whether or not the 
transaction scope is restricted depends on the characteristics of that authority. I refer to 
the options of Awb4:71.1 and kZBO:32 on ex ante control of particular civil law 
transactions by the Minister-Principal (see also Ten Berge & Zijlstra, 2000, p. 48). With 
respect to a PLB, a standard framework on authority is provided in BW2. These measures 
are reflected in the minimum set of controls from a governance perspective. Parliament 
and Minister-Principal can reduce the operational authority of the (executive) board by 
requiring additional controls in the statutes, setting standards on authority in the relevant 
program law or by including conditions for qualification as a PLB service provider in a 
program law. In all cases, this means an increase of public controls and decreased 
autonomy for a PLB. To what extent autonomy is actually diminished depends on the 
individual provisions. 
 
Autonomy indicators will be analysed along the lines of the control tools available to 
(quasi) owners of the legal entity. The idea is that control tools not attributed to the 
                                                 
103 Even then, public law may be relevant, for example with respect to the legal status of staff under public 
law. 
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(quasi) owner of the organisation are available to the (management of the) legal entity. As 
will be shown, it is not possible to refer to ownership of entities in all cases. In fact, only 
for those entities where shares are (publicly) issued is it possible to refer to ownership in 
the basic sense of BW5:1, where ownership is described as „the most encompassing 
right‟ a (legal) person may have on an asset. 
When an entity has issued shares, the shareholders are the residual claimants to all 
assets of the entity in the event of liquidation. Shareholders, or at least the majority of 
shareholders, can alter the legal position of the entity when appropriate (BW2:107a). In 
the case of the legal entity State there are no residual claimants. Neither Cabinet nor 
Parliament is able to alter the legal position of the State without consent of the other 
party due to the constitutional requirement104 that they are jointly responsible for 
legislation. More or less the same holds for all other entities that are established by law. 
In associations there is no explicit ownership relation either, the majority of members has 
the right to alter the legal position of the entity (BW2:42.1). In foundations, where there 
are no members, the statutes determine how control is organised, and specify how 
remaining assets will be distributed in the event of liquidation. As the original founders of 
the entity cannot distribute the remaining assets amongst themselves (BW2:285.3), they 
are not equivalent to the residual claimants of enterprises that issue shares.  
In the following subsections, I will discuss the different forms of legal entities that 
exist. For each type of entity, I will describe the effect of using that form of legal entity on 
ministerial responsibility and ex ante control including budget authorisation. I will start by 
describing the legal entities that typically have a public sector character (PLA). These are 
the State on the one hand and ZBOs with the status of public legal entity on the other. 
The description of the other forms of legal entities which includes PLBs is then continued 
along the lines of the relative share in the number of ZBOs that have private legal entity 
status. The description given here has to be read from the perspective of control of 
operations of the entity, assuming that the legal entity is only operating in a public sector 
environment.105 Program control of ZBOs is by definition a public law rule and does not 
generally affect the position the minister has as (quasi) owner of the entity and the 
budgets that are made available for operations of the entity. 
6.2.1 Public legal entities 
In this section the two forms of public legal entities that exist at national level will be 
discussed. Zijlstra (1997, p. 6) noted that in general little attention is given to the 
organisational structure of ZBOs. I will start with the legal entity Dutch State (6.2.1.1). 
After that other public legal entities at the national level will be discussed (section 
6.2.1.2). 
                                                 
104  Article 81 Dutch Constitution 
105 Hybrids as meant by Meijerink (2005), operating public as well as private tasks are neglected here 
because hybridity does not affect the status of a legal entity. 
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6.2.1.1 Legal entity ‘State’ 
The formal definition in the Dutch Constitution of the legal entity State is that the State 
consists of Government – i.e. King and Ministers – and High Authorities of State. From an 
operational perspective, ministers are - given the budget authorisation by Parliament - 
responsible for controlling ZBOs that are part of the legal entity State. The Dutch 
Constitution also defines that a Minister is the head of a ministry. The organisational 
entity ministry however is based on hierarchical structures and ministerial accountability 
holds „for all activities within the civil service‟ (Scheltema, 1993). Therefore, ministries 
are administrative structures within the framework of the State. The fact that a ministry 
does not have a separate legal status implies that all civil legal acts are based on 
mandates from the holding legal entity – i.e. the State – and that the State can be held 
fully accountable for any transaction or behaviour that is based on bipartisan consent or 
on civil law. Several „Hoge Raad‟ decisions have led to this present opinion on the relation 
between public entities and private parties (e.g. Landsmeer-rulings106). Figure 6.1shows 
the general structure of the Dutch State. 
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Figure 6.1: Organisation of the Dutch State 
 
                                                 
106 HR, 4 January 1963, NJ 1964, 202, 203, 204 
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A ministry consists of a set of hierarchical units and may also include two specific forms 
of units: a) the executive agency [„Agentschap‟] and b) dedicated units that operate 
independently on a particular policy issue (for example ZBOs or Advisory Boards). 
Executive agencies are a sub-structure within a ministry with a separate system of 
administration. Article 10, section 1 of CW2001 explicitly states that executive agencies 
are „a unit of a ministry‟. The creation of an executive agency does not require a specific 
law but only a Cabinet decision. If Parliament does not object, the executive agency will 
be created. This means that the requirement BW2:1.2 – the establishment by formal law 
- is not met and therefore executive agencies do not have a separate legal status. In civil 
law, executive agencies have a position equal to that of a ministry. 
 
Matters become more complex because there are ZBOs that do not have a separate legal 
status. The tasks of such units are attributed under public law, but they operate within 
the framework of another entity - either public or private - depending on the task 
attributed. ZBOs without a separate legal status are in most cases relatively small 
organisational units for which it is not efficient to create separate legal status. They often 
qualify as „quasi judicial‟ – impartial - autonomous units such as the Dutch Electoral 
Council or the Dutch Data Protection Authority (CBP).107 When such a ZBO is operating 
within the framework of the Dutch State, legal provisions exist that guarantee the 
necessary autonomy from full ministerial control, particularly safeguarding the impartial 
role of the unit. Minderman (2000, p.76) stated that a minister is fully accountable to 
Parliament if no restrictions on a minister‟s authority are given and, given authority 
attributed to a minister, he cannot be held accountable outside the scope of his authority. 
If specific responsibility is attributed to a minister, then accountability ends outside the 
borders of the given responsibility. From a formal civil law point of view however, it is the 
legal entity under whose framework the ZBO operates that can be held accountable for 
civil transactions or behaviour.  In a civil dispute regarding a ZBO without legal status, 
operating within a ministry, such an entity would be represented by the State. In that case 
it would follow that the minister can still be held accountable for decisions or behaviour of 
an entity which was deliberately set at arm‟s length. With some imagination one might 
state that ZBOs without legal status can find shelter within the ministry led by the 
Minister who has portfolio responsibility for the specific ZBO. In these cases public law 
will specify to what extent the minister can be held accountable for the acts of such 
„Shelter‟ ZBOs. Without specific restrictions on decisions based on civil law for the 
management of the „Shelter ZBO‟ a minister does not have an ex ante opportunity to 
intervene. Operations of Shelter ZBOs as well as budget authorisation fully comply with 
CW regulations. In theory, this also means that Parliament has full (budgetary) control on 
these Shelter ZBOs. The decision making autonomy of a Shelter ZBO might generate 
some risk in the budget appropriation process as the minister‟s scope to intervene in 
                                                 
107 The Dutch Electoral Council consists of 7 members and has a staff of 10 people (Kiesraad, 2006); CBP 
has 3 members and a staff of some 80 people. 
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decisions is limited. He might not be able to prevent a decision that can ultimately lead to 
a civil law claim affecting the appropriated budget. This may also hold for operational 
decisions made by the Shelter ZBO unless the minister has arranged for some form of ex 
ante control on the Shelter ZBO‟s operational decisions. An ex post opportunity to 
intervene would not prevent a legal ruling and the consequences thereof; it might 
however give the minister the opportunity to dismiss management of the „Shelter ZBO‟ for 
reasons of mismanagement108. 
Another complication in the relation between a Shelter ZBO and the minister is the 
appointment of staff. When staff for the Shelter ZBO are recruited from the civil servants 
of the parent ministry and perhaps assigned on a secondment basis, staff formally has a 
legal status equal to that of all other staff in the ministry. This implies that a minister has 
the power to control staff and thus overrule decisions made by the board of the Shelter 
ZBO. To prevent such interventions, the law under which the Shelter ZBO is created 
should have an article on the relationship between appointed staff of the Shelter ZBO in 
relation to other staff in the ministry. 
6.2.1.2 Public legal entity other than State 
The second group of public legal entities does have a separate legal status. As mentioned 
before, the Dutch civil code recognises public legal entities as equal to a natural person 
(BW2:5) with respect to property law, under the condition that proper authority is 
attributed to the PLA. All other legal requirements and restrictions with respect to 
creation, operational behaviour and dissolving a public legal entity can only be laid down 
in public law. This follows from article BW2:1.3 which stipulates that of all general 
regulations on creation and dissolution of legal entities, public legal entities are equal to 
other legal entities and natural persons with respect to property issues unless stated 
otherwise in the case law. If a PLA is unable to comply with its civil law based liabilities 
due to inefficient production or highly risky operations, it would technically be classified 
as bankrupt. Formally, bankruptcy is not possible, not only given BW2:1.3, but also 
because a PLA can only cease to exist if its legal entity status is withdrawn by law under 
BW2:1.1 (Ten Berge & Zijlstra, 2000, p. 57). If the law under which the entity was created 
is withdrawn or changed, the consequences might be that the public legal entity ceases 
to exist. Such changes do occur from time to time; in 2002, the ZBO „CTSV‟109 was 
merged with a unit within minSZW into a new executive agency. Although a public legal 
entity ZBO has autonomous legal status under civil law, the restricted application of civil 
law to property issues only means that autonomy can only be studied by comparing the 
law on the specific ZBO with general public law instructions and the degrees of autonomy 
that are attributed to private legal entities in civil law. This has been discussed in the 
previous two chapters. 
 
                                                 
108  Of course the minister must have the authority to do so, see AW1996:124c:1. 
109 CTSV [Dutch: College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen] had a compliance and policy monitoring role 
in social security. 
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To describe a public legal entity ZBO more generally, I would like to draw an analogy with 
strictly private legal entities. For fiscal and financial accounting purposes the concepts of 
parent companies, subsidiaries and group companies110 exist. These concepts have to do 
with control of entities and are used to show the financial interest or prevent double 
taxation in the private sector. Although exact definitions in national and international law 
may differ, the essential issue is that a subsidiary is controlled by a parent entity when 
either by voting rights (shares) or another instrument of influence the parent entity 
ultimately decides what will happen to the subsidiary. The IPSASB project to standardise 
international public sector accounting rules has adapted the private sector control 
concept for public sector purposes by introducing „benefit‟ and „control‟ criteria in 
IPSAS6:38-42. A strict interpretation of IPSAS6 is likely to include ZBOs under entities to 
be consolidated at the national level (Van Schaik, 2008; De Kruijf, 2009)111 and from this 
perspective would be similar to a subsidiary company.  
In daily operations, both a subsidiary company and a public legal entity ZBO can 
decide for themselves how to manage the entity, implying a substantial level of 
autonomy. They both have their own identity, unlike franchise or branch entities which 
adopt the identity of the parent company, as for example observed with McDonalds, 
where the level of autonomy is far more restricted.112 However, when it comes to strategic 
decisions with respect to the subsidiary, final consent from the parent company will be 
needed. This final consent is governed by the general rules of civil law113 and internal 
implicit or explicit rules issued by the parent company. In public law this final consent on 
strategic discussions is supposed to be formalised in the law by which the „public legal 
entity ZBO‟ was created as BW2 does not regulate anything more than the status of the 
legal entity for the ZBO. Whether the specific public law actually has regulated final 
approval remains to be seen. Public law („Aanwijzingen‟ and kZBO) only stipulates that 
the specific law regulates and ministerial consent is required for these civil legal acts.114 
Based on this parallel to parent and subsidiary companies in the private sector, I would 
like to label public legal entity ZBOs as „Subsidiary ZBOs‟. This shorthand phrase 
distinguishes them from the „Shelter ZBOs‟ which have no separate legal status on the 
one hand and the civil law ZBOs on the other, which I will discuss in the following 
sections. 
 
Just as in the case of Shelter ZBOs, ministerial authority determines responsibility and 
accountability with respect to Subsidiary ZBOs. From an operations perspective the 
minister may in most cases have ex ante and / or ex post authority on budgets or other 
                                                 
110 BW2:24a and BW2:24b, BW2:405-406; EC Directive of 23 July 1990 90/435/EEC, and IPSAS 6; the 
word division would not be appropriate as it is not mentioned in relevant civil law. 
111 I ignore the discussion on decision making relevance for consolidation of ZBOs in ministerial annual 
reports (De Kruijf, 2009) 
112 The introduction of a corporate identity style for Dutch national government as of 2007 affects 
ministries and executive agencies but not ZBOs. 
113 In the Netherlands Title 1 of Book 2 BW 
114 AW1996:124o.3; kZBO:32 
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(financial) decisions, based on the responsibilities attributed to him by Parliament. When 
ex ante authority exists that goes beyond a general consent on the budget towards 
interventions in operational decisions with budgetary effects, one might come to the 
conclusion that the ZBO is in operational terms actually run as a hierarchical subordinate 
unit. If a minister does not have the power to intervene in operational decisions that have 
financial effects, the principle of budget authorisation and appropriation loses some of its 
power as the minister can be confronted with ex post financial claims. The position of 
Subsidiary ZBOs in civil law implies that the civil behaviour of the subsidiary ZBO will 
reflect on the assets of the entity. Lawsuits and damages will have to be funded from the 
assets of the entity rather than from the assets of the State as is the case with Shelter 
ZBOs. Lawsuits based on a decision as a public office are covered in Awb:8.73.1 and 
Awb:8.75.3. The latter article states that the court decides which entity is liable for 
compensation. However the ultimate effect of a lawsuit and the resulting damages to be 
paid may be similar to that of a Shelter ZBO.  
BW2:19 specifies the cases in which a legal entity can be dissolved, including 
dissolution as a result of bankruptcy. This article is not applicable to public law legal 
entities (BW2:5). If a Shelter ZBO is technically bankrupt, the fact that the entity can only 
be dissolved by law also implies that an institution of last resort must exist which 
guarantees all liabilities of the Subsidiary ZBO. Due to the (national) public character of 
the Subsidiary ZBO, there can only be one institution that can act as the institution of last 
resort. Of course, that is the State as represented by the Minister-Principal who can be 
held accountable for the operations115 of that specific Subsidiary ZBO. This is another 
parallel to the parent-subsidiary construction in civil law, in which it is stipulated that a 
company „A‟ that is fully accountable for the liabilities of another company „B‟ is regarded 
as the parent company of „B‟ (BW2:24a.2). Under kZBO:32g, an optional provision is 
made that requires ministerial consent before the Subsidiary ZBO can file for bankruptcy 
or postponement of payments. Given the remarks made before, one can discuss whether 
kZBO:32g is relevant at all for PLAs; the sub-article is in my opinion only relevant in 
relation to kZBO:37 which stipulates that the provisions of kZBO:26-35 also apply to 
PLBs.  
 
In some cases, Subsidiary ZBOs are allowed to execute tasks in a market setting (In „t 
Veld, 1995; Kickert, 1998; Meijerink, 2005). Like civil law entities that are basically 
operating for the market and are granted the privilege to execute a ZBO task, Subsidiary 
ZBOs can use a part of their skills and knowledge for market purposes as well. However, 
before they are allowed to exploit their skills in the free market, explicit consent by their 
political „owner‟ might be required. An example of this form of hybridity is found at 
Kadaster where in 1996 a separate private legal entity Kadata was established to 
                                                 
115 One might argue that liabilities which are the result of issues in a particular program not part of the 
responsibility of the Minister-Principal, the claim might be politically transferred to the relevant minister 
responsible, given the specific responsibility for the program budget. 
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perform commercial activities with respect to information provision (Deelen & Eertink, 
2004, p. 118-119).  This was later discontinued. 
 
The intermediate conclusion of the two previous sections is that there are two forms of 
public ZBOs. The essential difference between the Shelter ZBO and the Subsidiary ZBO 
from a civil law perspective is that the Shelter ZBO has no legal status and all 
consequences of civil acts immediately affect the State, whereas in the case of a 
Subsidiary ZBO the effect is primarily on the assets of the ZBO itself. Ministerial 
accountability for both types strongly depends on what is regulated in public law rather 
than in civil law. Creating a ZBO under public law implies increasing autonomy compared 
to the classic hierarchical structure of government. The financial impact of ex post claims 
on the two different types of PLAs is different. As a result, public legal status may be 
regarded as a separate autonomy indicator. 
6.2.2  Civil law entities 
Civil legal entities exist in three categories: a first group which is based on membership 
control (associations), a second group which is based on shareholder control (PLC and 
Ltd) and a third group in which control is attributed to specified people or entities by 
statutory agreements (foundations). The most commonly used form of civil law ZBO is the 
foundation, governed by statutory agreements. The remaining civil law ZBOs are in most 
cases shareholder governed and only very rarely is a membership governed ZBO used. 
Given the frequency of using foundations as ZBOs, I will start the analysis with this group 
rather than following the contents of the civil code. 
 
Legal entities. 
In the Netherlands, some 200,000 private law legal entities existed on January 1, 2006 
(CBS, 2008; own calculations). Some 16% of these legal entities were operating activities 
that are regarded as being public domain (government, health, education, culture). The 
majority of these entities use the foundation form (9%); the rest are mainly organised as 
limited liability companies.  
The foundation legal entity is widely used, both in the public domain and in the private 
domain. In the public domain organisations such as hospitals, housing „associations‟ and 
school boards generally have the legal status of a foundation. In the private domain, 
charities and lobby groups use this form of organisation. Because there are no financial 
or membership requirements, there is hardly any threshold to establish a foundation. In 
the ZBO domain, 55 (clusters of) entities (total ZBO population 128 (clusters of) entities) 
are regarded as private law based entities. Of these 55, 32 (58%) have the legal form of a 
foundation. 
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6.2.2.1 Foundations 
The first group of private entities is the group where control is attributed to specific 
people without issuing shares. In this group one form of legal entity exists, the foundation 
(Stichting).116 According to the civil code a foundation is „an entity that is created by a 
legal act without members and aims to achieve its statutory goals with a dedicated 
capital‟. A foundation is not allowed to distribute income amongst board or founders, nor 
to anyone else unless these transfers have an idealistic or social purpose (BW2:285.3). 
The civil code does not specify the governance structure of a foundation; the only 
requirement is that procedures for appointing and dismissing members of the board are 
included in the statutes of the entity (BW2:286.4c). Ownership of foundations is not 
explicitly regulated as no shares exist and there are no members that may control the 
board. The main governance document of a foundation is the statute, in which 
regulations on the board are specified. The basic rule is that the board or trustees 
represent the foundation. However it is possible that a person who is not a trustee is a 
legal representative of the foundation (BW2:292.4), when this is included in the statute. 
In general this regulation aims at creating a non executive board whose members may be 
able to represent the entity to third parties (Schreuder, 1994, p. 215). The person(s) or 
entities – which can include government - that created the foundation also determined 
the statute and can therefore indirectly legally or economically influence board decisions. 
Therefore, the constituting parties of a foundation may be regarded as the “owners” of 
the foundation.117 As a result of BW2:285.3, there are no residual claimants on the equity 
of a foundation. In other words, there are no real owners of the entity either bearing the 
ultimate risk of bankruptcy of a foundation, nor for surpluses that may be accumulated by 
the foundation. Technically speaking, this means that a minister as representative of the 
State bears no financial risks when a foundation executing a ZBO task and established 
under some sort of government support fails. However, as in the case of a public legal 
entity in financial difficulties, a minister will consider, ideally after consulting Parliament, 
whether or not to continue supporting the foundation. The options will be similar to the 
case of a public legal entity ZBO, implying that he can either transfer tasks to another 
ZBO or financially support the foundation in difficulties. 
The statute must include a goal or a procedure to distribute remaining assets in case 
of dissolution of the foundation. The lack of performance or efficiency incentives that are 
associated with residual claimants however may result in managerial behaviour that is 
similar to that of a regular ministerial unit (Kraan, 2006, p. 228) due to the absence of 
cost efficiency incentives and a tendency to improve labour conditions. In principle, once 
a foundation has been created, all powers are attributed to the board. Unless provisions 
have been made for external independent monitoring nobody can influence or dismiss a 
                                                 
116 The minister of Justice has developed a proposal for a change in BW2 to create a new form of legal 
entity „maatschappelijke onderneming‟ which is very similar to foundations (Ministerie van Justitie, 
2007, Parliament, 2009a). A similar form: Public interest company exists in the UK (Maltby, 2003) 
117 This holds particularly when changes of statutes are to be approved by the founding fathers; if not, the 
foundation‟s board can be regarded as the „owner‟. 
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board. This results on the one hand in an attractive form for a single purpose legal entity. 
On the other hand, it creates a governance gap when public objectives are to be achieved 
by a foundation. 
 
Dalhuisen (2004, p. 25) has analysed foundations based on questions asked by 
Parliament (Parliament, 2003a) on either directly or indirectly creating foundations by 
ministers and their position in the public domain (ZBO or not). At the heart of this analysis 
is the way a foundation is established. Three forms are identified. First, the minister is the 
only party involved in establishing a foundation. This seems to be equivalent to Dijk and 
Van der Ploeg‟s (1997, p. 39) requirement for a government entity to establish it but it is 
not. Dijk and Van der Ploeg‟s definition also allows local governments to establish 
foundations and in theory an entity at arm‟s length of central government can also 
establish a foundation. When the minister is the only party involved in establishing a 
foundation, he has full control of the contents of the foundation‟s statutes. This form of 
establishing a foundation will be classified as „government establishment‟. The second 
option is that a minister, together with other public or private parties is involved in 
establishing the foundation. Such an option may be used for forms of co-operation 
between the minister and other parties. This form will be classified as „participatory 
establishment‟. In both these cases the minister can at least partly be regarded as the 
owner of the foundation. In the third case, the minister will not be regarded as the owner 
of a foundation. When a minister takes action to have a foundation established, other 
legal entities are the actual founders of the specific entity and the minister is only 
facilitating the initiative of those other legal entities. Therefore, this form of establishment 
of a foundation will be classified as „facilitating establishment‟. Depending on the role a 
minister has had in establishing the foundation (government establishment, participatory 
establishment or facilitating establishment), the influence of a minister in controlling the 
foundation is expected to decline as his involvement in the contents of the statutes will 
decline. Thus a „government established‟ foundation is expected to have less autonomy 
than a „facilitating establishment‟ foundation. Of course, actual attribution or delegation 
of authority in individual cases is leading; but if Parliamentary and ministerial control are 
required, creating a government established foundation seems to be preferable over a 
form of facilitated establishment of a foundation. The model Dalhuisen uses is a more 
detailed version of Schreuder‟s criterion and was used by minFin in a report on 
foundations to Parliament (Parliament, 2005b). Because the key objective of this study is 
to focus on the control of operations and the risk associated with operations, I prefer to 
follow Dalhuisen‟s line of classifying foundations as a general indicator for autonomy.  
 
Government entities often use the legal concept of the foundation to organise a specific 
public but not necessarily authoritative task. Literature suggests that in such cases, at 
least some provisions for political control are made. Political control can be realised 
either at the foundation creation stage or at the stage of foundation operations. Van der 
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Burg (1986) introduced the concept of „government foundation‟ to indicate the relevance 
of the concept in the public sector. There is no legal entity „government foundation‟; the 
concept refers to the influence government has on the legal entity foundation. Schroten 
(2000, p. 34-35) operationalises the definition of a government foundation by relating 
influence to the authority of a minister to appoint the majority of the (non) executive 
board, which is a more formal approach to influence. Given the legal requirement that 
appointment procedures must be included in the statute of the foundation and the fact 
that the constituting parties determine the contents of the statutes, this implies that the 
minister was involved in creating the foundation. The only other option would be that the 
statute of the foundation has been changed, but the civil code only allows a change in the 
statutes when this is explicitly included in the original statute (BW2:293). When the 
option of changing the statute of a foundation is included in the original statute, this may 
be a risk for a minister. Once the foundation has been created, it is up to the executive 
board to propose changes. Without forms of influence – actually some right of approval - 
by a minister on these changes, the minister may lose control of the foundation. 
Foundations whose statutes do not include ex ante control tools for a minister thus have 
more autonomy than foundations for which control measures have been implemented. 
Dijk and Van der Ploeg (1997, p. 39) choose a government foundation definition that 
overlaps with the Schroten‟s. Their definition consists of two parts: a government entity 
has established the foundation or the foundation has a role in performing a public task. 
The first part of the definition is close to Schroten‟s as one may assume that when a 
government entity establishes a foundation, it is likely – but not required – to include a 
role for the minister in the appointment of the board of the foundation. This part of Dijk 
and Van der Ploeg‟s definition is rather objective; the civil code requires that the 
foundation‟s constituting entities are registered (BW2:289). The second part of the 
definition is however ambiguous. One can disagree as to what exactly constitutes a public 
task. This is also a reason why Schroten did not choose this criterion (Schroten, 2000, p. 
34). Schreuder (1994, p. 216) prefers a definition of government influence as „controlling 
operations‟ rather than influence through creating the foundation or controlling the 
structure of the organisation. Influence can then be measured by including approval 
rights118 in the statute with respect to information, general instructions, budgets and 
annual reports (Schreuder, 1994, p. 243-245). 
 
The use of foundations – as of now Foundation ZBOs - as a legal structure to which an 
authoritative public task has been assigned is an exception to the basic rule of 
establishing ZBOs within the framework of public law. It will for example be used when 
specific knowledge that is available in the private domain must be used (AW1996:124b; 
kZBO:3.2). Dalhuisen‟s study showed that of the 336 foundations he identified, 176 had 
a „facilitating establishment‟ status, of which 18 also have ZBO status (Dalhuisen, 2004, 
                                                 
118 Determining rights are more far reaching than approval rights; determining includes changing of a 
proposal (Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 53). 
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p. 119-129). There might have been historical reasons to use a foundation rather than a 
public law entity. For example, ZBOs operating in the domain of quality assurance in the 
agricultural industry were established as foundations without any government 
involvement long before the idea of ZBOs existed and will be subject to all aspects of 
kZBO (Parliament, 2008b). In more general terms, motives for creating private law legal 
entities include increased autonomy, creating a private law entity is faster than passing 
legislation and allows more co-operation with private parties (Ten Berge & Zijlstra, 2000, 
p. 250). Each of these arguments can be contested, but the fact is that the instrument for 
creating private law entities such as foundations is still used. 
Given the different forms of involvement in establishing foundations, it is likely that in 
a case where „government creation‟ of the foundation occurs, it will be more likely that a 
minister will be actively involved in finding a solution if the foundation ZBO is in financial 
difficulties. As a result of that involvement, it will also be likely that the minister will 
monitor the operations of a „government created‟ foundation more closely than a 
„facilitated creation‟ of a foundation. This closer monitoring will in the end affect the 
autonomy of a foundation to which a ZBO task has been attributed. 
6.2.2.2 Corporations 
The second group of private entities is the group of corporations based on shareholder 
control. This group consists of two types of entities. The Naamloze Vennootschap (NV) is 
the Dutch equivalent of a PLC company. Shares in a NV are transferable without 
restriction and shareholders can neither be held accountable for the acts of the NV nor 
can they be required to compensate for losses of the NV (BW2:64.1). The Besloten 
Vennootschap (BV) is the Dutch equivalent of a limited (Ltd) company. Shares in a BV 
cannot be transferred freely and no stock certificates are issued (BW2:175.2).119  From a 
governance perspective, NVs and BVs are treated similarly. In both cases, the general 
assembly of shareholders has control with respect to appointment, remuneration and 
dismissal of the board of directors or executive board, unless this power is (partly) 
attributed to a non-executive board. The general shareholder assembly also appoints, 
remunerates and dismisses the non-executive board (BW2:142 and BW2:144). As a 
result of the role of the general assembly, strategy and control of a corporation are in the 
hands of the executive board as managerial unit. The owners – i.e. the shareholders – 
can only express their views on an ex post basis by discharging or dismissing the board, 
based on the policies realised. 
A minister has three options to attribute ZBO tasks to companies. First he can create 
a company on his own initiative. The classic form of this option is to use companies in 
which the State holds all shares – mostly former State Enterprises - to execute a specific 
ZBO task. A second option is to create a new company or to buy an existing company to 
which a ZBO task is attributed. Such a company may be fully government owned, as is the 
                                                 
119 I will only make references to relevant articles of the Civil Code with respect to the NV, unless 
substantial differences exist between NV and BV. 
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case with TenneT, which was created by electricity producing companies as the electricity 
network manager. TenneT was sold to the State in 2001 (Parliament, 2006c, p. 35) and 
was attributed a part-time ZBO task.120 It may also be that the State jointly creates a new 
company with third parties and attributes ZBO-tasks to such a new company. An example 
of this was the former NV SCG121, which as of January 2005 has been merged with an 
executive agency. The last option is that government attributes a ZBO-task to a fully 
private company. This option may be used when the ZBO-task is related to other 
operations in a commercial branch such as is the case with certification institutions. This 
holds for CAK (Centraal Administratiekantoor B.V.), a limited liability company which is 
ultimately owned by health insurance companies. CAK is responsible for collecting user 
contributions for some care arrangements.  I will label the shareholder controlled ZBOs as 
„Enterprise ZBOs‟. 
 
The influence of the minister on the operations of a company which has been attributed 
ZBO tasks depends primarily on his influence on the entity‟s governance structure. The 
civil code specifies the scope for influence by those who own shares. In principle each 
share is attributed the same value and ownership rights. There are a number of options 
for changing the ownership rights based on the possession of shares. First, corporation 
statutes may include specific regulations on voting rights that may alter the balance of 
power between shareholders (BW2:92.1). Second, special rights attributed to specific 
forms of shares (BW2:92.3) may for example exist as “golden shares”, which give veto 
power to the owner of that share (Sołtysiński, 2005, Parliament, 2006c). Third, registered 
shares may be issued which may not be sold without prior consent (BW2:86).  
Another option for changing the relative position of shareholders is when the statute 
specifies specific requirements for executive board or non-executive board appointments. 
The most important instruments for changing the balance of power amongst members of 
a (non) executive board who are equal in principle are the attribution of additional voting 
rights to a specific member (BW2:140.4) and the possibility to specify requirements for 
appointing members (BW2:142.1). 
In those cases where the minister has (jointly) created the company he has had the 
opportunity to influence governance structures by defining his position in the statute 
through one of the options mentioned above. In other cases he can buy influence by 
participating in a privately created company. However the official policy of the Minister of 
Finance until December 2007 was that the State will secure public interest by public 
policy instruments or concessions and contracts rather than private ownership by the 
State (Parliament, 2006c, p. 36). In December 2007, there was a slight change in policy, 
in which it is acknowledged that private ownership by the State might be complementary 
to concessions and regulations (Parliament, 2007g, p. 3). In both cases however, the 
                                                 
120 Income transfers and environmental quality assurance with respect to electricity production. 
121 NV SCG [Dutch: Service Centrum Grond] was operating on funding and coordinating soil 
decontamination. 
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option of buying influence is hence a rather theoretical one. When it is not possible or 
desirable to use civil law control instruments on companies, the State has the power to 
use public law instruments. The State can only attribute ZBO tasks to entities by issuing a 
(public) law. This law can not only specify the tasks attributed to the private entity but 
may also be used to specify the supervision and accountability requirements that may 
safeguard the appropriate use of public powers by a private entity.  
An Enterprise ZBO is likely to incorporate public and market oriented tasks within one 
organisation. I use the term „likely‟ to mean that the whole idea of using a shareholder 
company to perform a task suggests that the main operations of the entity are market 
oriented. An example of an Enterprise ZBO providing public tasks without any competition 
is the Dutch Central Bank DNB; the ZBO-status of notaries or health insurance companies 
includes competition on services, some of which have an authoritative character. Another 
clear example is the TenneT case where the ZBO task is only a relative small „income 
transfer and quality assurance‟ activity related to TenneT‟s network management tasks. 
According to Zijlstra (1997, p. 232),  only the fact that specialised knowledge is available 
in the entity allows a company to be used to execute a ZBO task. When a company is 
used to perform a public task, this requires additional assurances that the minister can 
be held accountable for the operations of the ZBO. Such assurances will be found in 
public law rather than in the statute of the entity. 
6.2.2.3 Membership based entities 
The most common membership private entities are associations (Vereniging). This form is 
defined as a legal entity with members and a specific objective (BW2:26). An association 
is not allowed to distribute profits amongst its members; hence the entity is a not-for-
profit institution. The objective of an association can be material or immaterial, such as a 
sports association or an association of a specific group of professionals. Members of the 
association elect and dismiss the board. The exact governance rules are at the discretion 
of the members of the entity; the only requirement is that a general assembly is 
consulted and formal control is ultimately in the hands of the members of the entity.  Two 
special forms of associations exist: one is the cooperative society, which aims at 
distributing material goods amongst its members; the other is the mutual insurance 
company that aims to organise a form of insurance (e.g. health, funeral etc.) for its 
members. As both the cooperative society and the mutual insurance company are 
association sub-groups, they are also not allowed to generate profits.  
If a minister wants to use an association as the entity for attributing ZBO status, he 
has to consider carefully how he would like to influence the association operations. 
Without specific statutory measures, the minister has equal voting rights like any other 
member of the association. In order to obtain special rights under civil law, the minister 
has to convince the other members of the association that a special position is 
appropriate and can be granted. Such agreements are in theory most likely to be 
established when the minister is one of the founders of the association. 
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The complexity resulting from the influence of the general assembly makes it unlikely 
that a minister will deliberately establish an association to which the status of ZBO is 
attributed. It is possible that a minister will use an association122 to perform a ZBO task in 
the context of a larger set of private tasks that are operated by the association. In that 
case, governance and control become more complex because the entity under scrutiny is 
a hybrid entity operating both market and public domain activities.123 I will label these 
ZBOs as Association ZBOs. 
 
By now, I have discussed all forms of legal entities that exist under Dutch civil law. Table 
6.1 gives a summary of these forms and the degree of autonomy that can be derived 
from their basic legal status. Three indicators are used to arrive at a conclusion on the 
autonomy of a ZBO under different types of legal entities. First, the degree of influence a 
minister (and Parliament) has on the statutes of a specific type of unit under the 
assumption that Parliament is willing to assign a ZBO task to a unit. Second, the 
influence the minister has ex ante on the level of operating costs the unit will charge for 
realising the assigned ZBO task. The third indicator refers to the effect overspending or a 
negative equity has on budget authorisation. The arguments only hold with respect to the 
general characteristics of the type of legal entity discussed. Actual influence and 
autonomy must be derived from the relevant case laws or statutes of the respective 
entity. It might very well be that in a particular case a private law entity has autonomy 
similar to that of a public law entity given for example budgetary controls on operations. 
 
Table 6.1: Expected government influence and impact of financial risk for different types 
of legal entities 
 Influence on 
Statutes/ZBO-
case laws 
Ex ante budgetary 
control on ZBO-
task 
Likeliness of budgetary claim in 
case of overspending or negative 
equity 
Ministry ++/++ *) ++/++ ++/++ 
Executive Agency ++/++ ++/++ ++/++ 
Shelter ZBO ++/++ ++/++ ++/++ 
Subsidiary ZBO ++/++ ++/++ +/+ 
Foundation ZBO     
Government established +/+ +/+ +/ - 
Participatory establishment +/+ +/- -/- 
Facilitating Establishment +/- +/- - - /- - 
Fully Private Establishment - -/- - - /- - -/- - 
Enterprise ZBO - /- - /- - - /- - 
Association ZBO - -/- - - -/- - - -/- - 
*) ++/++: very high; +/+ high; +/- moderate; -/- low;   - -/- - very low (influence) 
 
Up to now, I have discussed the formal aspects of organisational forms within Dutch civil 
law. The different types of organisational forms have different impacts on the autonomy 
of the entity towards the minister. Therefore, the legal status as such is only a general 
                                                 
122 An example is ANWB whose ZBO task is to issue navigation licences for recreational purposes. 
123 I refer to Simon (1989, 2005) who concluded that using hybrids lead to underperformance in both 
public or private tasks. 
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autonomy indicator . One can summarise that a Shelter ZBO has limited autonomy, 
whereas a Foundation ZBO has substantial autonomy, particularly when the statutes of 
the latter attribute only limited authority to the Minister-Principal.  
6.3 Commissioning of services 
Assigning a public task by law only provides the authority to deliver public services by an 
individual ZBO. The ZBO case law or statute cannot provide the specifications for annual 
production to be delivered because that would imply that the law has to be changed every 
year to determine the budget and the level of services to be provided. Thus other 
arrangements on commissioning services (see Part A for a discussion on the use of 
commissioning) must exist to allow production by a ZBO, particularly when the minister is 
funding the services provided by the ZBO. When two separate legal entities are involved 
in commissioning and providing services, civil law governs the relationship between these 
two entities. The basic rule in civil law is that an agreement between two parties governs 
the commissioning and supply of goods and services. The supplying entity has the 
obligation to deliver the service, whereas the commissioner has the obligation to pay for 
the service. If one of the parties fails to deliver, the other party is entitled to claim 
compensation (BW6:58 and BW6:74). These general principles hold regardless of the 
type of goods or services to be delivered. In the case of providing services, the contract 
may have the form of what is called a Service Level Agreement [SLA]. Essentially a SLA is 
also a bilateral agreement between two parties, that can exist in a market setting (e.g. 
computer services; Jander (1999)) as well as in a public setting. From a civil law 
perspective, the legal position of a contract specifying the delivery of x goods at y price 
per unit is not different from a Service Level Agreement which stipulates what activities 
will be performed at what quality by the delivering entity. The specification in a SLA on 
prices charged and performance delivered can be negotiated similarly to a contract in 
which physical goods are to be supplied. The difference is that in the case of service 
provision, there will probably be more disputes on the compliance with the SLA. Problems 
with SLA compliance have a different character than traditional contracts, which is due to 
the problem of measurability and not because of the mere existence of the agreement.  
The idea of SLAs has been copied by the public sector (e.g. Domberger, 1998, p. 13; 
Linker, 2006, p. 113) and is based on earlier ideas in economic theory such as contract 
management (e.g. Van Leerdam, 1999, p. 20; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 84). These 
ideas can also be used for creating an internal market within the hierarchical structure of 
government (Van Oosteroom, 2002, p. 116) or to let the internal service provider 
compete with the market (Domberger, 1998, p. 13; Sclar, 2000, p. 65-66). In these 
cases, the economic measures for contracting prevail over the legal measures. 
Linker illustrated (2006, p. 100) that contract management is also used in relations 
with ZBOs. As ZBOs are in general hierarchically independent, the contract relationship 
between minister and ZBO is at first glance similar to a regular civil law contract. The 
mutual authority based relationship between minister and ZBO reduces the contract 
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relationship to a relationship that has elements of the idea of contract management in a 
hierarchical structure as well. To distinguish the contract relationship between minister 
and ZBO from conventional civil law contracts, I will refer to them as „quasi contracts‟.  
Another relevant issue is that a minister can have two roles with respect to the ZBO. 
He can be the owner which means he has ownership-control responsibility towards the 
specific ZBO in his portfolio, including the authority to decide which services are to be 
delivered. Furthermore, he will be commissioner as far as he requires services under the 
quasi contract with the ZBO. A minister who has both roles is labelled here as a Minister-
Principal, whereas a minister who merely has the commissioner role is indicated as 
„minister‟. Due to the authoritative powers attributed to a minister, it might be that the 
balance of power in the SLA is biased in favour of the commissioning entity. Should that 
be the case, one can argue that again the relative autonomy of the ZBO compared to 
other ZBOs with the same civil law legal status will be reduced. 
 
When studying quasi contract ZBO relationships, three issues have to be addressed. First, 
who is commissioning. Second, how can the quasi contracts be characterised. Third, what 
are the consequences of a failure by one of the parties to comply with his obligations? 
Under civil law, commissioning is in principle a matter between two equivalent parties, 
voluntarily agreeing upon the delivery of services. The commissioning party requires some 
service and is willing to pay a certain amount of money. The contractor is at the same 
time obliged to deliver the service to the commissioner at the specified price. In a public 
sector setting, the voluntary character of the agreement may be discussed. Furthermore, 
commissioning and receiving the service to be delivered may not be in the same hands 
as the activities of a public sector unit and may be aimed at parties others than those 
who are commissioning and funding the activity.  
The analysis presented here is mainly from a theoretical civil law perspective on the 
relationship between State and ZBO under the assumption of a bilateral contract. The 
relation between the two is however primarily based on public law and that is the 
environment in which most disputes will be settled. Specifically in those cases where the 
„quasi contract‟ can be regarded as a unilaterally imposed set of performance 
specifications, one can study that relationship more conveniently from a principal-agent 
perspective than from a civil law perspective. I will discuss the (economic) principal-agent 
theory in detail in Part C. However an analysis from a civil law perspective assuming two 
equal parties is still useful as it shows that the roles of commissioning and supply of 
services may have different effects on parties involved in the commissioning relationship. 
Furthermore, the concept of „principal‟ may not be applicable to the role of the State, 
particularly when a citizen is applying and paying for the service delivered by a ZBO. 
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A ZBO has been assigned a task by law.124 This suggests that supply must be realised by 
the ZBO under the framework of the law. The commissioner of a specific service to be 
delivered by a ZBO cannot be identified immediately. One can argue that the State is 
commissioning for specific services as there is a relation between the law as defined by 
the legislature and the service that has to be delivered by the ZBO. In this section I 
assume that the executive – i.e. the minister – is the proper authority to commission a 
task. 
Analytically it is possible to identify three different relationships regarding 
commissioning and supply of ZBO services. The first relationship to be identified is that 
the State commissions and is the final user of the service. Such a position exists for 
example in those cases where monitoring activities are performed by a ZBO on behalf of 
the State. In this case, there is a single relation between commissioner and supplier as 
only two parties are involved in the production and delivery of the service which 
completes the quasi contract. There will be a financial transaction between the State and 
the ZBO related to the delivery of the services. The second possible relationship is that 
the State commissions a task from a ZBO, funds the task but actual demand is exercised 
by a third party: a citizen or a legal entity. From a civil law perspective, there will still be a 
quasi contractual relation between State and ZBO. This quasi contractual relation is 
however similar to the conditional contract of BW6:21 and has the character of a 
suspending condition. Delivery of the service is suspended until a specific condition is 
met. In most cases the condition will be that someone applies for the ZBO service. The 
financial transaction will remain within the State-ZBO relationship. If an applicant for a 
service does not qualify for that service, there is no civil law obligation for the 
commissioner to require the service to be delivered. Depending on the quasi contract 
specifications, there might be a quasi contractual obligation for the commissioner to pay 
for the activities that have led to the refusal to deliver the service that was applied for. 
The third relation is the one in which the State has authorised the ZBO to deliver a 
specific service but funding originates from the individual that requests the service. In 
this case two different quasi contract relationships exist. The first one regards the 
demand from an individual who is paying for the service. This relationship resembles a 
traditional civil law contract relation.  The second - „quasi contract‟ - relationship is the 
one in which the State specifies the quality of the service to be delivered given the 
authority attributed to the ZBO. This relationship has quasi contract characteristic 
because it only determines the services that can be delivered by the ZBO. In Figure 6.2, 
an overview is given of the forms of commissioning relationships that may exist in public 
service delivery. The case of the „free market‟ contracting model is illustrated for the sake 
of completeness. It should also be noted here, that although the model uses the concept 
„citizen‟ this should be interpreted as both individual citizens and private legal entities 
                                                 
124 In exceptional cases like CAK, the ZBO-task seems to be based on a mandate given by other ZBOs, only 
recently formalised by law (Parliament, 2008f, p. 14). 
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that apply for a certain service from a ZBO. An example of this is a real estate broker 
asking for information from Kadaster on a specific real estate object. 
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Figure 6.2: Contracting models and distribution of prime responsibility. 
 
In addition to the analysis of the parties involved in the quasi contract relationship, it is 
also possible to study what the consequences of a breach of the “contractual 
relationship” between different parties may be. The analysis discussed below is 
theoretical; I did not find any ZBO cases which have led to an actual intervention from the 
judicial system.125 A breach of contract in terms of civil law requires that two legal entities 
(persons) must be involved. This means that in the quasi contract relationship between a 
Shelter ZBO and the State no civil law violation can exist, due to the fact that a Shelter 
ZBO is part of the legal entity State; hence there is only one legal entity involved. If claims 
or sanctions of whatever kind have to be applied, this must be based on public law as 
civil law has no instruments available. In all other cases, a different conclusion will result. 
The remaining types of ZBOs can be divided into public law based Subsidiary ZBOs and 
civil law types - Enterprise, Foundation and Association ZBOs. Despite its separate legal 
status the category of Subsidiary ZBOs has a direct relationship to the State. In such 
cases, a breach of quasi contract may occur, but it is very likely – given the specific 
relationship between the two entities – that a dispute will be settled without intervention 
from the judicial system. Civil law ZBOs may settle disputes in court. However, whether 
this will happen or not will depend on the contents of the specific statute of the entity and 
the actual governing influence of the State upon the entity. Given the characteristics of 
the three groups of civil law ZBOs it seems that it is more likely that civil law claims may 
result in the event of a breach of quasi contract between State and Enterprise ZBO than 
with a government established Foundation ZBO. The case of civil law ZBOs also includes 
the possibility that a real breach of contract may occur. That would occur if government 
                                                 
125 In the USZO case, discussion on quality of services was related to possible annulment of contracts 
(Parliament, 1997c, p. 1723). 
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decided that a specific civil law ZBO was to lose its contract to perform the authoritative 
task assigned to it (Parliament, 1997c). Possible intervention by the judicial system is 
therefore also an indication of the relative autonomy of a specific ZBO. 
Whatever the reason for a breach of contract, there may be an effect – due to the 
compensation to be paid - on the budgets that have to be made available to (dis)continue 
a task assigned to a ZBO.126 From this perspective the Parliamentary control functions of 
the legislature are at stake and the Minister-principal can be held accountable for his 
acts with respect to the ZBO. This section has argued that the effects of a breach of 
contract may differ. In some cases citizens may be involved, in others there is only an 
internal government dispute and in a third category a dispute on performance and 
contracts may lead to explicit financial claims. 
 
The differences between commissioning and final user are an indicator of the degree of 
Parliamentary (budgetary) control (and as a result the relative autonomy of an entity) 
which government has in the contract relationship with a specific ZBO. One may assume 
that if a citizen is the final user and direct funder127 of the service delivered by the ZBO, 
the degree of (budgetary) control for minister and thus Parliament is different from the 
case in which government is both commissioner and final user. It is thus relevant to 
assess who is actually commissioning the service to be delivered. The analysis given 
above also reveals who is in what case entitled to claim compliance with a „contractual 
relationship‟. 
6.4 Some special issues on governance 
At the end of the discussion on the civil law legal setting in which ZBOs operate, some 
attention is given to three special issues that can affect relative autonomy of ZBOs and 
the process of Parliamentary controls on ZBOs. These three items are property rights, 
(financial) claims for compensation as a result of a ZBO„s activities and governance 
structures other than traditional hierarchical relationships.  
6.4.1 Property rights and effect on control 
Ownership is described as the most encompassing right a (legal) person may have 
(BW5:1.1). The owner has full control over a specific property item to the exclusion of 
anyone else, at least as long as this control does not conflict with the law. 
Private and public legal entities share one important characteristic: they are regarded 
as equal to a natural person with respect to property legislation issues unless a specific 
law states otherwise (BW2:5). This means that a legal entity controls all assets of the 
entity and can use, sale, mortgage or pawn them whenever and however the entity likes if 
no restrictions are set in case law or statutes. Controlling the assets of an entity implies 
that one can decide to transfer assets to another entity but also that assets are being 
                                                 
126 As of 2010, a law on paying penalties in case of untimely decision making may affect a ZBO‟s financial 
position. 
127 Because the citizens directly pays fees for the service delivered. 
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sold and thus effectively reducing the production capacity of the organisation. Sale of 
assets by a public legal entity would have the same effect and as a result, the public task 
that was assigned to the entity can no longer be (fully) realised. Without additional 
specific regulations, this would mean that a minister is not able to control a public legal 
entity. The restrictions imposed upon a (public) legal entity on controlling assets will 
determine the remaining degrees of management freedom on operational and strategic 
decisions. Conversely, purchasing new assets may affect the full cost price of a service 
and thus indirectly affect the required budget level. This means that ex ante control of 
investments is in line with Parliament‟s right of budget authorisation.  
 
The property right rule seems to be unambiguous, but it is not, as there are options to 
attribute partial rights to property which may change the position of the original owner in 
relation to those who own the partial rights to a specific item of property. 
Huijgen (1995) has written on the distinction between legal ownership and economic 
ownership. While in the case of legal ownership, full control on property exists as it is 
meant in BW5:1.1, economic ownership implies a division of a property right amongst 
more than one owner. In his definition (Huijgen, 1995, p. 12), economic ownership exists 
when a separation between control and interest with respect to specific goods occurs, 
based on a binding legal contract and where all positive and negative benefits with 
respect to the interest in the good will have an impact on the assets of the economic 
owner. Economic ownership was originally a concept used for fiscal motives, but it can 
also be used to conceal actual control of goods (Huijgen, 1995, p. 72-73). When 
economic and legal ownership are to be separated, a contract based on civil law has to 
describe the exact relationship of the economic and legal owner towards each other to 
prevent future disputes on the control of the specific asset attributed to each party.  A 
separation of ownership may be realised for tangible assets such as real estate – for 
example a partial sale of the user right for an office block - but it may also be used to 
attribute specific rights to shares in an entity. A model often used in the Netherlands was 
that of creating an entity that has the legal ownership of shares as part of a take-over 
protection scheme. This entity may issue certificates of shares to the free market, which 
bear all economic benefits and risks. The legal owner however still has the voting rights 
attached to the original shares and has control on the entity. Selling the voting rights 
would lead to a transfer of control of the entity. An example of this was found at Grolsch 
NV – a listed brewery – before it was sold to SAB-Miller in 2008. 
From the perspective of ministerial responsibility and accountability, allowing entities 
to have full control of their assets may lead to opportunities to transfer control (partially) 
– such as voting rights or financing assets by a mortgage - to other entities, leaving a 
minister with political or financial risks without appropriate tools to at least reduce 
operational risks. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate that a minister has to give final 
consent for major decisions which affect control based on civil law within organisations. 
In public law, particularly in „Aanwijzingen‟, some regulations are included that can affect 
  Autonomy and ministerial control: a civil law perspective 
 
Part B: Autonomy and control of ZBOs from a legal perspective  151 
 
the autonomy of legal entities on property decisions. These regulations are: a) the 
requirement to approve fees (AW1996:124.l.3), b) consent on the budget 
(AW1996:124.l.4) and c) the option to give ex ante consent to private law based 
decisions (AW1996:124.o3). 128  
The topic is also covered in kZBO:32, and is here explicitly extended to all ZBOs with a 
separate legal status. The provision in kZBO is also optional; the minister has the right to 
include the rule in ZBO case law, but is not required to do so. For private law based ZBOs, 
the option only holds when the ZBO exclusively performs public tasks and is not a hybrid 
entity (kZBO:37). Finally, I note here that in the economic literature the issue of property 
control is referred to as „property rights theory‟. The economic perspective will be 
discussed in Part C. 
 
The conclusion of this subsection is that a separate legal entity holds all rights on the 
assets of the entity. From a budgetary perspective, ex ante control on investments can 
prevent unexpected rises in fees in the future. Ex ante control on transfer of (partial) 
property rights prevents financial losses or risks arising for the minister controlling the 
ZBO. Both AW1996 and kZBO include some measures for ex ante control on property, 
although some of these control tools are merely optional. 
6.4.2 Third party liabilities and effect on control 
If an act of government results in damages for individuals, the individual has a possibility 
to claim compensation from government (Schueler, 1997, p. 710-720). Because ZBOs 
are not part of core central government and some of them are even private law entities, it 
is useful to elaborate on the possibility and impact of claims for compensation as a result 
of an act of a ZBO. 
The general rule in the event of unlawful behaviour by an entity is that the entity will 
be required to pay third party damages that are the result of the unlawful act (BW6:162). 
In a strictly civil setting, third party liability will be imposed upon the legal owner. If legal 
and economic ownership are separated, the legal owner can claim upon the economic 
owner when third party liability is caused by an act of the economic owner. In a holding 
company and fully owned subsidiary structure, third party liability may be transferred to 
the holding company in those cases where it is clear that the holding company gave an 
instruction for the behaviour that has led to the third party liability (De Kluiver, 1998, p. 
91). Although for foundations no formal ownership relationship exists, De Kluiver states 
that based on BW 2:291 – „the board governs except in case of restrictions included in 
the statute‟ - an entity or person that has given instructions to the foundation can be held 
liable for damages towards third parties. De Kluiver concludes that the civil code 
regulations on unlawful acts and third party liability may be also applied to all entities that 
are controlled by government (De Kluiver, 1998, p. 99). 
                                                 
128 And in Awb with respect to subsidising organisations. 
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For those entities controlled by government that have public authority, there is also a 
public law regulation which implies that whatever the legal form an entity has, unlawful 
acts may lead to payment of damages. Peters as well as Maeijer state that private law 
entities providing a government service must in general - due to BW3:14 - comply with the 
principles of good government as stated in Awb:3.1 (Peters, 1992, p. 981; Maeijer, 1997, 
p. 10).129 Article 8:73 AWb states that the administrative court can name the entity that 
will have to pay for third party liability. De Kluiver (1998, p. 88-89) indicates that this 
section of AWb primarily aims at those cases where administrative decisions are made in 
units that do not have separate legal status. However, according to him, it may also be 
applied to units that do have separate legal status, especially in those cases where 
budgets or net assets are insufficient to pay the damages. In that case the legal entity 
that controls or funds the entity in question might very well be ordered to pay the 
compensation.  
Maeijer reviews the history of CW which until CW1976 included an article 
(CW1927:89a) which if a private law entity was created, required a provision on 
government liability to be included in the law constituting the new private law legal entity 
(Maeijer, 1997, p. 21). This article was deleted in the new CW1976, as it would only be 
relevant if government accepted liability (Parliament, 1963, p. 37). According to Maeijer, 
this argument is incorrect; as far as government controls a private law entity, liability will 
ultimately be transferred to government (Maeijer, 1997, p. 22). Based on Maeijer‟s 
arguments on liability for private law entities which are controlled by a public office, it 
seems likely that the relevant public office – the minister – will be held liable. The case of 
a private law entity controlled by a public office is in my opinion different from the case of 
a relationship between two public offices at different independent levels of government 
as mentioned by Ten Berge & Zijlstra (2000, p.51). They refer to a case between national 
government and local government in which it was ruled that the State has no liability for 
the acts of local government, even in the case of co-government.130 The essential 
difference is that co-government does not include a control relation as is the case in a 
private law entity providing services ultimately controlled by the State. 
Applied to ZBOs this means that along the lines of civil law, third party liabilities may 
influence the position of a minister when it is clear that ministerial instructions have led 
to the unlawful behaviour. Along the lines of public law, the administrative court may 
order the minister to pay compensation. In the end such a compensation payment affects 
the financial position of the State and thus has an effect on the right of budget 
appropriation by Parliament. Although the minister is not responsible for the unlawful act, 
he can be held accountable. Depending on the remaining authority of the minister 
                                                 
129 Maeijer refers to Stichting Silicose Oud-Mijnwerkers, a private law entity in which despite direct control 
by a minister on operations, the approval of the program plan by the minister implied that a public task 
was realised. 
130 Co-government is a form of cooperation between central and local government: central government sets 
the legal framework and generally funds activities, local government has some delegated authority and 
is responsible for actual implementation of a program. 
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(Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 11), he may directly intervene to mitigate the effects of 
the claim or intervene indirectly to prevent claims in the future. In either case, 
accountability will then refer to the actions the minister has initiated and not the claim 
itself. Although this conclusion is an indication of relative autonomy, it will not be included 
in the assessment of relative autonomy of ZBOs. There are two reasons not to consider 
this issue. First, when a ZBO is government funded, it is very likely that in the end the 
budget appropriated by the minister will be affected by claims. This means that the 
indication „government funding‟ also covers risks of third party liabilities. Secondly, the 
powers attributed to a minister to intervene are included in the ZBO case law or ZBO 
statute. The unlawful behaviour can thus be reduced to the authority attributed to the 
minister and thus to his (lack of) responsibility (Heuvelhof, Ringeling, Van Sluis & Van 
Thiel, 2001, p. 51-53).  That again is also an indicator of relative autonomy that has been 
recognised as relevant for assessing relative autonomy before. As a result, there are two 
indicators available that cover the problem of third party compensation in relation to 
relative ZBO autonomy.  
6.4.3 Horizontal and diagonal governance structures. 
So far, the relevant factors in the governance structure between minister and ZBO have 
been discussed. Although the minister and Parliament are important stakeholders when 
studying the governance structure of ZBOs, other parties may also be stakeholders. 
Ultimately establishment of ZBOs is nothing more than an organisational form to provide 
government services to third parties. When other stakeholders are particularly relevant, 
the legislature has two solutions to include these stakeholders in the ZBO decision 
making or monitoring processes. First, there is the possibility of incorporating these other 
stakeholders into the board of the ZBO. This has been formalised in AW1996:124b.2 and 
kZBO:3.1. In that case they actively participate in governing the ZBO. I will focus here on 
the other solution which may be regarded as a substitute for formal democratic control: 
creating a participatory structure in which no authority on operations is given to 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are attributed a right to actively monitor and comment on the 
(quality of) operations of the ZBO. Minderman (2000:173) refers to Meijerink, who claims 
that it is possible that citizens claim more influence on the use of resources by 
autonomised entities. In a more general context, several authors suggest that forms of 
horizontal or diagonal governance structures may replace or be additional to the 
traditional vertical governance structures (e.g. Newman, 2003, p. 210, Schillemans & 
Bovens, 2004, p. 29; Goddard & Manion, 2004; Blomgren Bingham, Nabatchi & O‟Leary, 
2005; OECD, 2005, p. 85). When a minister or Parliament wants such other forms of 
governance structures to be used, this implies that arrangements must be made. Like all 
other measures with respect to governance structure, such measures are to be included 
in the law. For the purpose of this study, this means that commonly used horizontal or 
diagonal governance structures must be listed as far as they are not already listed as 
options in the laws and instructions mentioned above.  
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Schillemans and Bovens (2004, p. 29) identify horizontal accountability relationships 
by which they mean those relationships where entities negotiate on the basis of equality 
rather than from a traditional hierarchical structure between the entities. Schillemans 
and Bovens also indicate that along with a vertical and horizontal accountability 
relationship, there may be a diagonal accountability relationship. In a diagonal 
accountability relationship, the entity under scrutiny is not monitored by either the 
minister as principal or the parties that have an interest in the entity, but by a third 
impartial party who reports to the stakeholders. From the perspective of this study, in 
which the minister must be able to be held accountable by Parliament, it is not the 
contents of these horizontal and diagonal accountability relationships that are relevant. 
The minister has to allow or even stimulate or formalise the existence of such horizontal 
and diagonal accountability structures and can be held accountable by Parliament with 
respect to his responses on the findings of parties involved in horizontal or diagonal 
accountability. When the minister responsible for a ZBO includes forms of horizontal or 
diagonal accountability structures within the statute or law establishing the ZBO, this is 
an indication that the minister intends to give the entity more autonomy than an entity 
that ceteris paribus does not have horizontal or diagonal accountability structures. In this 
context, Trappenburg, Schillemans and Van de Bovenkamp (2009, p. 195) note that with 
respect to ZBOs, board members indicate that forms of horizontal accountability can 
contribute to legitimising the organisation as well as to possibly improving the 
organisation. 
In their study on horizontal accountability of ZBO‟s, Schillemans and Bovens (2004) 
list four groups of institutionalised structures that may be used to improve horizontal 
accountability. Forms of institutionalisation can be a non-executive board, customer-
panels and the like, structured reviews and assessments and an Ombudsman function 
(Schillemans, 2005, p. 29). Besides these formalised structures, ZBO‟s may have set up 
several other forms of dialogue with stakeholders, which are classified as unstructured by 
Schillemans. Amongst these unstructured forms are actively publishing information such 
as annual reports, benchmark reports and the like and internally organised stakeholder 
dialogue in advisory boards of any kind. I have mentioned before that kZBO does not refer 
to the use of non-executive boards. In AW2008, the explanatory notes do mention the 
possibility of using a non-executive board (AW2008:124f). The Gerritsen Committee 
(2008, p. 24) stated that it does not actively support the use of non-executive boards 
because they may interfere with ministerial or managerial responsibilities. AW2008:124f 
stipulates that if the ZBO governance structure consists of more elements than just an 
executive board this structure should be included in the ZBO case law. If so, the 
responsibilities of the different governance structure elements have to be specified. 
When not included in the law consulting or advisory boards may be created on the 
initiative of ZBOs themselves. If so, they have no formal legal status. 
Bouckaert and Van Dooren (2003, p. 134) use another typology to indicate 
accountability relations, specifically with respect to performance indicators. This typology 
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aims more at all accountability relationships from within the organisation upward to the 
ultimate political accountability towards citizens. Bouckaert and Van Dooren note that the 
accountability relationship from government to citizens has been unilateral in most 
cases. According to them an accountability relationship may be more effective when 
citizens are involved in defining for example performance indicators. At this point they 
implicitly make a link between the horizontal forms of accountability without further 
elaboration. 
For the purpose of this study in which the accountability relationship between minister 
and Parliament based on budget authorisation is the core issue, horizontal forms of 
accountability may be relevant when they are institutionalised. Parliament may transfer 
part of its accountability relationship to third (delegated) parties under the assumption 
that operations and operational monitoring and control may be better served at a lower 
institutional level. If so, the remaining political responsibility will be the minimal system 
responsibility for the framework in which a ZBO operates. The question remains whether 
a horizontal accountability relationship can replace the traditional vertical relation, 
especially when central government is commissioning tasks from ZBOs where demand 
actually originates from within the ministry‟s structure rather than directly from citizens. 
In other words: horizontal accountability might be a (partial) substitute for vertical 
accountability relationships in those cases where citizens can actually influence 
production from the ZBO involved. This will generally be the case when the ZBO performs 
a task that can be qualified as an individual service to an individual citizen who has to 
pay for that service. In many cases, such a relationship will not exist and then horizontal 
accountability may be useful as an instrument to report on the quality of ZBO operations 
to the minister. The minister will then have to take responsibility and act upon the 
findings. By then there is again a vertical accountability relationship between ZBO, 
minister and Parliament. In its review on their RWT-project, the NCA stresses that vertical 
accountability remains an important issue. The NCA emphasises the relevance of 
ministerial system responsibility which is not fully accounted for. Furthermore, the level of 
information provided to Parliament based on management by exception reports can still 
be improved and there is insufficient information to Parliament on fee funded RWTs 
(Parliament, 2009b, p. 8-9). 
The NCA emphasised the relevance of vertical accountability. In his thesis, 
Schillemans concluded that the impact of horizontal accountability is rather limited 
(Schillemans, 2007, p. 268-269) and that his findings are in line with other studies. He 
notes that as a relatively light form of accountability horizontal accountability can be 
executed at low cost. It can provide useful information for other stakeholders (ibid., p. 
270). In this respect, he explicitly refers to the visitation procedures of „Handvestgroep‟; a 
group of ZBOs and executive agencies which assess each other‟s performance and 
disclose results publicly. 
The conclusion of this section on vertical and horizontal accountability relationships is 
that horizontal accountability relationships can only work on condition that individually 
Autonomy and ministerial control: a civil law perspective   
 
156 Part B: Autonomy and control of ZBOs from a legal perspective 
 
paid services are delivered.  Then they can replace vertical relations from a budget 
authorisation perspective. In other cases, it will at best be an additional tool generating 
input for a minister to act on his responsibilities. 
 
In this section, three issues were addressed. First, from a perspective of (legal) property 
rights, ex ante approval of asset related transactions of ZBOs is relevant to prevent the 
ZBO „escaping‟ the governance structure. Second, both civil law and public law have 
provisions that may result in claims towards a minister in the event of unlawful behaviour 
of a ZBO. I will ignore that issue because it is strongly associated to other indicators for 
ZBO relative autonomy. Finally, it is possible to use forms other than traditional vertical 
accountability. In the case of institutionalised horizontal accountability this may especially 
have an effect on relative autonomy of ZBOs. 
6.5 Conclusion: the variety in legal entities and autonomy. 
In this chapter I have discussed several forms of legal entities that may be used to carry 
out ZBO tasks and the way a minister can control the operations of these entities from a 
civil law perspective.  National level public legal entities are either part of the legal entity 
State or have separate legal entity status. A ZBO that is part of the legal entity State has 
no formal status and is – from the perspective of civil law – equal to any other unit of the 
State such as a ministry. This means that the State is owner and liable for the acts of the 
unit. I have labelled these ZBO‟s as „Shelter ZBOs‟. The second option is a public law ZBO, 
which are labelled as „Subsidiary ZBOs‟. Such an entity is created by a specific public law 
– ZBO case law - in which the minister has the opportunity to specify responsibility and 
accountability relationships between the Subsidiary ZBO and himself. 
Civil law ZBOs may exist in three forms. The largest number of civil law ZBOs are 
foundations (Foundation ZBOs).  The extent to which a minister can influence operations 
of the entity depends on the exact regulations in the statute of the Foundation ZBO – 
which are influenced by the type and number of parties that were involved in its 
establishment. With respect to Enterprise ZBOs, powers are similar to those for 
foundations as long as a Minister-Principal holds a relevant portion of the shares or can 
make provisions in legislation – or at the start of a company - in the statutes. With 
respect to the last group, Association ZBOs, the governance structure does not allow for a 
privileged position by a minister. Only in cases where the minister was involved in 
creating an Enterprise ZBO can he influence the statutes and create a position in which 
he has more direct influence than might be expected from his share in the Enterprise. It 
should be noted however, that Association ZBOs and Enterprise ZBOs are relatively rare. 
Furthermore, government policy with respect to Enterprise ZBOs no longer allows a 
special position (e.g. golden share, Parliament, 2006c, p. 38).  
Secondly, relative autonomy is influenced by the quasi contract relationship that 
exists between ministers and ZBOs. I have identified four different quasi contract 
relationships, from full state commissioning, funding and using services to a full free 
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market model in which government no longer intervenes, implying a declining influence of 
the minister (on behalf of Parliament) as attributor of a ZBO task. 
Finally, the Civil Code does not specify regulations for public law entities except for 
use of assets and liabilities. The civil acts of a Subsidiary ZBO will affect the assets of the 
entity immediately. A minister who has not intervened ex ante on this control of assets 
has not reduced the autonomy of the Subsidiary ZBO. In the end the budgetary effects of 
that choice may have a negative impact on Parliament‟s authorisation functions. In terms 
of responsibility however, the minister can only be held accountable for not regulating 
asset control, rather than for the behaviour of management.   
 
Figure 6.3: Legal forms of ZBOs, contract relations and expected autonomy 
 
Based on the relative autonomy that can be derived from the basic legal status of the 
ZBO and the main characteristics of commissioning services, Figure 6.3 provides an 
overview of the level of ZBO autonomy in a civil law context. This classification is only an 
indication, specifically for ZBOs having a public legal status as well as for Foundation 
ZBOs. Under public law, additional measures may exist that do affect the relative 
autonomy of one or another ZBO. 
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7. The effect of legal control tools on ZBO autonomy 
In this part, I have focused on relative autonomy indicators from a legal perspective. The 
concept of autonomy is not explicitly used in Dutch legislation. Autonomy is included in 
the concepts of delegation, attribution and mandate (Awb, chapter 10). Mandates only 
cover decision making on behalf of a public office; the other two imply a separate 
authority to decide, given a legal framework. As the concepts are very general, further 
implementation is delegated and attributed authority has to be realised. This is done by 
evaluating the general legal framework on ZBOs, at this stage only on a general level. This 
part of the study focuses on identifying autonomy indicators and the impact including or 
excluding a particular authority issue has on autonomy of operations. Therefore, I shall 
only focus on autonomy indicators derived from the existing general legal framework and 
not consider case laws. ZBO case law will be discussed in Part D and by then a 
relationship to the discussion in Part B can be made. 
 
The research question in this part of the study was: 
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from legal theory and how do 
they match control of ZBO operations? 
Key issues in the legal framework are ministerial responsibility and the controls for 
Parliament to decide upon distribution of authority for ZBO case laws and budget 
authorisation. I recall that the concept of ministerial responsibility with respect to entities 
outside the hierarchical structure of a ministry includes three elements: a.) responsibility 
for authority attributed to the minister, b.) system responsibility which means that the 
minister is supposed to monitor and intervene when the setting in which a public task is 
to be performed does not achieve the desired output or outcome and c.) his individual 
acts towards an entity outside the hierarchical structure. From the perspective of ZBO 
autonomy, the first two responsibilities are the most relevant.  
The legislation that is relevant for control of ZBOs‟ operations mainly consists of three 
groups of legislation: a) budgeting and accounting (CW); b) public law framework 
legislation on ZBOs (AW1996, AW2008 and kZBO) as well as the relevant ZBO case laws. 
Finally, c) civil law is discussed particularly with respect to legal entities and contract 
relations. These three main themes are addressed here. 
I note that most parts of general administrative law (Awb) regard processes on 
programs but some elements also concern ZBO operations. When studying control of a 
ZBO as an organisation, they are of minor relevance as most Awb regulations regard 
ZBOs as a public office in their relation to individual citizens. 
 
Parliament‟s influence on ZBO operations is performed during the process of creating a 
ZBO and the corresponding attribution or delegation of authority as well as by the ex ante 
control tools laid down in the ZBO budgeting procedures. From a budgeting perspective, 
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constitutional arrangements imply that budgets authorised by Parliament have no 
external effect and that only the spending levels as included in the budget law have a 
binding legal status between Parliament and Minister. Thus, Parliament can only 
indirectly influence spending levels within a ZBO. In ministry budget documents, the level 
of aggregation of ZBO budgets varies from full disclosure of grand total budgets in a 
separate budget section to no disclosure at all. From a budgeting perspective, the full 
disclosure option would be preferable although Parliament has – at least theoretically - 
the power to set spending limits by separating out a ZBO budget for the minister. The 
effect of the aggregation level on the autonomy of a ZBO is relatively low because Dutch 
budget laws no longer distinguish separate budgets for groups of operating costs. That 
does not however exclude the possibility that at the lower level of distributing funds from 
minister to ZBO specific groups of operating costs may be earmarked. If earmarking is 
carried out, that would in practice have a negative effect on autonomy, at least compared 
to cases without earmarked budgets. 
Second, in CW2001 and its predecessors very little attention is given to ZBOs. What 
has been regulated is that the establishment of civil law ZBOs has to be proposed to 
Parliament and if Parliament requests it, a law has to be passed to implement 
establishment of the entity. Public law ZBOs (PLAs) are created and dissolved under the 
regular legislative framework for adopting legislation. Two other issues are regulated 
under CW2001. One is the specification of the non-financial information required in 
ministry budget documents which has no effect on autonomy. The other is the possibility 
that a ZBO has to pool its treasury function within the treasury function of the Ministry of 
Finance. When a ZBO is obliged to pool its treasury function that is an indication that the 
(relative) autonomy of the entity is lower than for those cases where a ZBO does not have 
this obligation. The treasury pooling itself affects the freedom to use financial assets but 
in principle does not immediately affect ZBO operations, which indicates that the effect 
on operational autonomy will be low. 
Third, two financial elements affecting budget authorisation and appropriation might 
be covered in ZBO case law and also affect autonomy. First, when the budget of a ZBO is 
based on fees rather than appropriation by the minister, tax law theory suggests that 
criteria should be set for calculating such fees. If not, this means that the ZBO has more 
autonomy in their funding than if strict regulation existed. Secondly, the (accumulated) 
difference between budgeted and actual financial result leads to equity on the ZBO‟s 
balance sheet. When no provisions have been stipulated, the equity is at the free 
disposal of ZBO management rather than at the disposal of Parliament for possible 
reallocation. I note that this is not a normative statement, merely an indicator for relative 
autonomy given to the ZBO‟s management. 
A final remark is that from the literature I concluded that from an authorisation 
perspective, ZBO budgets and investments levels can best be based on an expenditure 
based budgeting system. This does not imply that the ZBO itself must also use an 
expenditure based system; if the entity has to ensure its continuity, then an accruals 
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based budgeting and accounting system will be required. Two issues with respect to 
accruals budgeting and accounting need attention here. First, it is remarkable that no 
procedures exist to assess whether a ZBO is capable of using accruals budgeting and 
accounting.  Second, accruals accounting allows consolidating financial information of 
more than one legal entity. I have shown that consolidation of the financial statements of 
all ZBOs to the level of the Dutch State does not solve problems on information provision 
to stakeholders such as Parliament and investors.  
The purely budgetary perspective thus allows for several options of control with 
different levels of impact on operational autonomy of a ZBO. 
 
The second line of theory looks at the attribution and distribution of authority to minister 
and ZBO. In general, the attribution of authority is regulated in the framework legislation 
on creating ZBOs (originally AW1996, by the end of 2008 kZBO and AW2008) and is 
ultimately reflected in the ZBO case law (PLA) or ZBO Statutes (PLB). Parliament has ex 
ante influence on the attribution of authority by 1.) modifying the framework legislation 
and 2.) including elements mentioned in the framework legislation in the ZBO case law. 
The influence of Parliament on ZBO statutes (PLB) is more passive.  Only if Parliament 
explicitly requires a law to be passed before creating a private law based entity, is 
Parliament likely to influence the statutes.  
From a legal perspective, autonomy is a relative concept. If a minister can instruct an 
entity on acts in individual cases, the entity is subordinate to the minister; in other cases 
some degrees of autonomy exist. This means that depending on the authority attributed 
to the ZBO board, different levels of authority can be observed. I have argued that cyclical 
and governance measures are particularly relevant when assessing autonomy once a 
ZBO has been created. Two lines of impact on autonomy can be discussed generally. 
First, several framework legislation (AW1996, kZBO) measures have an optional 
character. Not including them in ZBO case law means that the executive board of the ZBO 
has degrees of freedom. If however the optional measures are included, this generally 
means that authority is attributed to a minister at the expense of the executive board. 
Second, kZBO is a general law. If Parliament and minister decide to exclude some 
measures stipulated in kZBO from a specific ZBO case law, this implies that more 
autonomy is given to the executive board of the ZBO. The main exception to this general 
rule is kZBO:33 on creating an equalisation reserve. If not allowed, dependency on 
budgetary measures by Parliament increases.  
The new framework law kZBO came into effect in 2008. The law has to be 
implemented by changing individual ZBO case law or statutes. The proposals that existed 
by the end of 2008 create a distinction between ZBOs that will be subject to kZBO and 
those that will not. Ceteris paribus, from a legal perspective, this means that those ZBOs 
which are subject to kZBO will have less relative autonomy than those which are not 
subject to kZBO.  
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The conclusion on attribution of authority in general is that framework legislation still 
allows for variety, affecting autonomy negatively if optional authority measures are 
included in ZBO case law. In most cases, autonomy is affected positively if an exception is 
made, including an exception to a compulsory measure in kZBO. 
 
The third line of theory to be discussed looks at civil law. ZBOs operate in a mixed public 
and private law setting; therefore a civil law perspective must also be discussed. First, 
ZBOs exist in different civil law legal formats. Basically the public law ZBO legal entity 
(PLA) is the format that allows for most control by the legislature, thus having a relatively 
low level of autonomy. Under kZBO, more controls are laid down for PLAs than for PLBs, 
although the kZBO measures for both groups are the same in terms of financial controls. 
The key from a civil law perspective is found in the governance structure. In a PLA setting, 
requirements on appointment and the role of the (non) executive board are explicitly 
included. With respect to PLBs, the key measures are found in BW2. It is up to the 
legislature to influence PLB statutes, either by requiring additional controls in statutes, 
standard setting in program laws or including conditions in a program law to qualify as a 
PLB.  
In the case of share based PLBs, it is possible to generate direct control by having a 
majority of voting rights. In the case of foundations, the most common type of PLB, 
control must be implemented by statutes and program law. In principle a minister has the 
most scope to control a foundation if he is actively involved in creating the entity. In fact 
in that case only Parliament has a theoretical say in the decision. If a minister only 
supports creating a foundation, controls have to be implemented in legislation, often 
afterwards. Whatever arrangement is used, both formal and actual autonomy still 
depends on the authority attributed to the minister in the individual statutes of the PLB. 
Second, based on civil law concepts, I have developed a model consisting of different 
„quasi (service level) contracts‟ between minister and ZBO. At this level, from a public law 
perspective regarded as the appropriation stage of budgeting, the influence of Parliament 
is ex post rather than ex ante. Depending on who is commissioning, funding and using 
the services, the quasi contract forms have different impacts on a ZBO. From that 
perspective, individual demand from citizens for ZBO services provides relatively more 
opportunities for autonomy than in those cases where demand is directly driven and 
commissioned from within the State. The use of „quasi contracts‟ which include 
performance agreements between minister and ZBO does not alter the budgeting system 
as such because „quasi contract‟ documents are not part of the budget authorisation. 
According to the literature performance information as well as financial information from 
annual reports, including possible effects of third party liabilities should be used in future 
budgeting processes. At the same time the literature indicates that such options are 
seldom used. In this study, the actual use of ex post information in future budgeting 
procedures can be used as an indication for autonomy: the less information is debated, 
the more autonomy may exist for the entity under scrutiny. 
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Third, a ZBO with separate legal status has the same position under civil law as a 
natural person, unless the law – in a PLA case – states otherwise. In cases of changing 
statutes, damages and financial distress, this may have an impact on Parliamentary and 
ministerial (financial) control of ZBOs. Civil law allows restricting the freedom of decision 
making by ZBO management in these cases, for example in changing a statute. If so, the 
relative autonomy of a ZBO declines compared to cases where no arrangements have 
been made. 
Finally, governance structures need not to be only vertical or top down. The literature 
suggests that forms of horizontal accountability can be a partial substitute for traditional 
vertical accountability. Some forms of horizontal accountability may be institutionalised in 
the law by which the ZBO was established. The value of horizontal accountability 
measures will probably depend on the party commissioning the ZBO activities. When 
government is commissioning and funding activities on behalf of ministers and 
departments, horizontal (democratic) accountability measures are likely to be less 
important than in cases where commissioning originates from citizens. 
 
With respect to civil law, the conclusion is that the variety of legal entities alone suggests 
different levels of autonomy and also results in different types of risks with respect to the 
financial position of a particular type of ZBO. Another important aspect is that an analysis 
of „quasi-contract‟ relations shows that differentiation of control is possible. The key issue 
with respect to contracting is that a declining relevance of political influence can be 
observed. If that is the case, the other measures for distributing authority should be in 
line with the actual type of „quasi-contracting‟ form to end up with a match between 
authority and operations of a ZBO. 
Table 7.1: Indicators affecting relative autonomy of ZBOs from a legal perspective. 
Budgeting law General ZBO law & ZBO case law Private law 
Budget types: 
Full budgetary control to fully 
open ended without control 
(section 4.4) 
Inclusion under kZBO (section 5.1) Type of legal entity used 
(section 6.2) 
Aggregation level of budgets: 
Separate article to not 
included in budgets at all 
(section 4.5) 
Actual authority elements attributed to 
the minister (sections 5.3; 5.4) 
Contracting model used to 
assign annual service level 
(section 6.3) 
Treasury and investment 
restrictions (section 4.2.3) 
Level of detail in criteria for calculating 
fees (section 4.2.4) 
Existence of provisions on 
property rights and third party 
liabilities (sections 6.4.1; 
6.4.2) 
 Reallocation of excess equity (section 
4.3.2.1) 
Use and relevance of 
horizontal accountability 
structures (section 6.4.3) 
 
This part of the study focused on ZBO relative autonomy indicators from a legal 
perspective. I have summarised the main indicators found in Table 7.1. However one 
must be aware that only studying the formal attribution of authority may be misleading.  
Actual behaviour by a minister may result in either stricter control than formally described 
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or a higher degree of management freedom. The actual autonomy related to the 
attribution of authority of a minister must therefore be assessed on an individual basis of 
actual behaviour. This will be tested in the empirical part of the study. 
Before I can evaluate actual autonomy, I will focus on the economic dimension of ZBO 
autonomy in Part C of this study. 
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8. Introduction to Part C 
8.1 Research question 
In the previous part, the characteristics determining (relative) autonomy from a legal 
perspective were discussed. Indicators that affect (relative) autonomy of ZBOs were 
identified from budgeting law, public law as well as from private law. In this part of the 
study, the emphasis is on the economic dimension of relative autonomy. The research 
question in this chapter is: 
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from economic theory and how 
do they match control of ZBO operations? 
The relation between ZBO and government is one of organising production at arm‟s 
length. From an economic perspective, that means that the focus is on the ZBO as an 
organisation rather than as a public office. Key control tools are desired levels of 
production and operating resources required. These control tools can be related to the 
product and market characteristics of the services delivered. 
 
The concept of autonomy is discussed in economic theory. Bouma‟s concept of economic 
independence is a description of organisational autonomy from an income generation 
perspective. According to Bouma, economic independence refers to the possibility that an 
organisation is able to assure its near term continuity by covering all its costs out of 
revenues (Bouma, 1982, p. 41). This definition creates a dichotomy: either the entity is 
economically independent or it is not. Authors like Anthony and Young (1999, p. 301) and 
Merchant (1998, p. 305) refer to the responsibilities for costs and revenues as well as 
assets and liabilities within an organisation. (Economic) responsibilities can be regarded 
as autonomy indicators from an empirical perspective but can also be used normatively. 
Given a particular (desired) level of autonomy, a specific set of economic responsibilities 
has to be given to management under the condition that product and market 
characteristics allow that level of autonomy. In general, management can be regarded as 
managing an autonomous organisation if the organisation can be classified as an 
investment centre. Anthony and Young (1999, p. 301) note that on a higher level – what 
could be labelled the owner-manager differentiation as identified by Berle and Means 
(1932/2009) – the organisation as a whole is regarded as a responsibility centre without 
differentiation. Even in that case, a classification as an investment centre with 
responsibility for return on assets is an indication for autonomy of the organisation.  A key 
feature of autonomisation of a ZBO is that there is still an arm‟s length relationship with 
government. This implies that autonomy as meant by Bouma is not likely to be the most 
common position of ZBOs. In the previous Part B on the legal setting, distribution of 
authority was discussed as a key element in determining autonomy and levels of control 
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by Parliament and minister. From an empirical perspective, Anthony and Young note that 
investment centre classifications in government and not-for-profit bodies (which includes 
ZBOs) are not common. 
Problems arise in an arm‟s length relationship from a mixture of ministerial roles (on 
behalf of Parliament) as owner-principal as well as commissioner within one organisation 
on the one hand and a separation between ownership and management on the other. 
These problems are extensively described in Neo Institutional Economics. This theoretical 
framework can be used to identify the different roles and interests in the relationship 
between a minister who is politically responsible for a ZBO and the ZBO management 
which is actually responsible for daily operations given the framework set by the owner. 
The neo-institutional framework is a tool for analysing the relevant instruments that 
allow controlling relations between a minister as owner and management of ZBOs as the 
agent which is ideally working in the interest of the owner. It does not directly provide an 
answer to the control issues that result from the economic characteristics of the services 
delivered by a ZBO. The economic characteristics of the services ultimately determine the 
options available for planning and control tools within the organisation, ranging from 
political control on an abstract strategic level to routine control for well described and 
repetitive services (Hofstede, 1981, p. 196). I will develop a set of indicators based on 
the economic characteristics of the services provided to be able to determine autonomy 
of ZBO operations from an economic perspective. 
8.2 Structure of Part C 
A ZBO produces its services in an environment in which owner and management are not 
one and the same. Neo Institutional Economics [NIE] provides a framework that allows 
the relationship between owner and management to be classified. The issues addressed 
in NIE therefore have an impact on the formal planning and control structure. The result 
is a planning and control system that is determined by the (relative) autonomy of a ZBO 
from the traditional hierarchy.  
Because the formal budget authorisation process is an important annual ex ante 
Parliamentary control tool, it is useful to start an economic analysis by identifying the 
product characteristics of the services provided by a ZBO. These product characteristics 
determine the possible options for budget authorisation ranging from a traditional line 
item budget to an activity based budget. Whether or not a particular (more sophisticated) 
form of budgeting is chosen is mainly a political preference. An activity based budget is 
however useless unless measurable production can be identified. 
In general, an analysis of an entity‟s autonomy in relation to the market in which the 
entity operates is determined by product characteristics on the one hand and market 
characteristics on the other. In a pure market setting, Adam Smith‟s invisible hand 
controls the market for services. In a public finance setting however, product 
characteristics determine whether political allocation is inevitable (pure public goods; e.g. 
Hillman, 2003, p. 64), is politically preferable (impure public goods) or can be left to the 
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power of the market (market goods). Product characteristics have an impact on demand 
for the particular services including the possible variations in funding of services. 
Another matter is how production is organised. Theoretically, production can be fully 
controlled by the political system or can – at the other extreme – be left to the power of 
competitive markets. These extremes in production settings are an indication that a 
variety of organisational production settings can be used. The contracting models as 
discussed in Part B reflect the options to find a match between production structure and 
demand for a particular public service. From this match between product characteristics 
and the possible market settings available, a ZBO autonomy framework can be derived 
which results in a planning and control system that is theoretically aligned with the 
underlying economic characteristics of the services to be delivered.  
The planning and control system to be used in a specific economic context can be 
derived from the autonomy framework which is based on product and market 
characteristics as well as the controls that are available within the framework of neo-
institutional economy. The actual operationalisation under attribution of authority based 
on the concept of responsibility accounting (e.g. Lapsley, 1994) and the accounting 
system used as part of the whole planning and control model reflect the actual autonomy 
of a ZBO from an economic perspective.  Figure 8.1 gives a brief overview of the 
economic dimensions with an impact on autonomy.   
 
Figure 8.1: Economic issues with an impact on autonomy of ZBO operations 
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The outline of Part C is as follows: Chapter 9 starts with a discussion on neo-institutional 
economics. Chapter 10 discusses various economic dimensions of services provided and 
starts with the organisation of supply (section 10.2). In section 10.3, demand is 
discussed including an elaboration on the difference between funding and financing 
(section 10.3.2), the theory of public goods (section 10.3.3) and the various forms of 
funding that can be identified (section 10.3.4). In section 10.4, I will focus on product 
and production characteristics and the impact they have on control tools that can be 
used for the various forms of services delivered by ZBOs that were identified in Part A. 
The theoretical options that exist on transferring supply and demand responsibility from 
public control to private control have an effect on the planning and control system as 
well. In chapter 11, I will discuss the control tools that might be used given the product 
and market characteristics of the services delivered. Section 11.1 discusses 
responsibility accounting as the main reflection of control given product and production 
characteristics. In section 11.2 a discussion on operational control tools available in 
relation to ministerial responsibility is provided. Part C is concluded with a short 
summarising chapter. 
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9. Neo institutional economy applied to ZBOs 
9.1 Introduction 
Distribution of power and authority can be discussed from a legal perspective as was 
done in Part B, but it also has an economic dimension. Berle and Means (1932) showed 
that when a separation between ownership and management exist, agency losses can 
occur due to unaligned interests between management and owners of a private 
organisation (Berle and Means, 1932/2009, p. 7). Coase (1937) noted that within an 
organisation, market price as a coordination mechanism is replaced by hierarchy, based 
on the differences in transaction costs when purchasing the service/commodity on the 
market compared to organising services by a hierarchical control mechanism. The ideas 
of Berle and Means as well as Coase are at the basis of what is now labelled Neo 
Institutional Economics (NIE).  
 
Neo Institutional Economics contests rational choice models and the assumption of the 
availability of full information for decisions to be taken (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 7-8). The 
two main issues covered in NIE are the transaction costs that have to be incurred to 
gather the relevant information to make decisions (Williamson, 1973) and the concept of 
property rights which provide owners of these rights some form of control on the assets to 
be used (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972). A third part of NIE is agency theory [AT], which 
discusses the relationship between principals and agents based on what is labelled 
information asymmetry. Agency theory is regarded as a linchpin (Mol, Verbon and De 
Vries, 1997, p. 8) between the two basic theories or as a derivative from transaction cost 
theory [TCT] (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 40) as it requires specific measures and thus costs to 
cover the differences in information between two contracting individuals or entities 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Authors like Niskanen (1968) claim that bureaucrats – in this 
case ZBO management – tend to maximise budgets at the expense of political principals. 
NIE can be applied to private sector units – which were the prime objects of Coase and 
Berle and Means – but also to the public domain (e.g. Furubotn & Pejovich (1972) in 
former Yugoslavia or, applied to the Dutch context, Künneke (1991, 1997) , Künneke and 
Manders (1997) and Ter Bogt, (1998)).  
 
In Part A, I have already discussed the relationship between ZBO and government from a 
NIE perspective. I explained why I use „owner‟ and „commissioner‟ as two separate 
concepts that are relevant in assigning tasks to ZBOs. The „owner‟ of an entity refers to 
the principal in AT whereas the supplying entity and its management can be regarded as 
the agent. The separation of owner and commissioner is particularly relevant when 
demand is driven by individuals rather than government.  
In this chapter, I will elaborate on the impact of the three main lines of theory under 
NIE on the autonomy of ZBOs. I will start with TCT (subsection 9.2.1), then focus on PRT 
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(subsection 9.2.2) and finally address AT (subsection 9.2.3). The last section (9.3) 
summarises the most important aspects of NIE that affect ZBO autonomy. 
9.2 Neo Institutional theories 
9.2.1 Transaction costs theory and relative autonomy of ZBOs 
The theory of transaction costs is based on the view that costs of individual transactions 
determine whether or not a particular service or commodity is produced within the 
organisation or purchased on the market. The idea is that not only are actual service 
production costs relevant but also the costs for the transactions required to generate 
actual production (Douma & Schreuder, 1998, p. 124). In a more empirically based 
setting, the concept of Total Cost of Ownership (Wouters, Anderson & Wynstra, 2005) 
attempts to calculate the costs of purchasing and using outsourced services within an 
organisation. 
In TCT, rational behaviour in decision making is contested. Williamson (1973) noted 
that individuals have limited capacity to assess available information. Simon (1978, p. 
10) notes that bounded rationality results in decisions which are driven by an implicit 
assumption of the additional effort needed to acquire the necessary information for a 
more complete assessment of the alternatives available. Furthermore, in decision 
making, some elements of self interest or opportunistic behaviour may exist. This can 
result in differences between the interest of the individual and the interest of an 
organisation as a whole. As a result, organisations should – according to Williamson 
(1990, p. 12) - organise their transactions „so as to economise on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism‟. 
Williamson (1973) argues that the problems of bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour are less severe in relatively uncomplicated organisational structures. If this is 
not the case, three elements influence the intra- and inter-organisational contracting 
relations. The most important element is „asset specificity‟ which refers to the access to 
technology and knowledge with respect to certain production processes on the market. 
Asset specificity is classified into six groups which affect governance structure within the 
organisation (site specificity, human asset specificity and temporal specificity), or the 
arrangement in the market contract (physical asset specificity and dedicated asset 
specificity). The last item is brand capital, related to the reputation of the organisation 
(Lohtia, Brooks & Krapfel, 1994, p. 262). Whatever the type of asset specificity, the key 
argument is that when asset specificity is low, technology and knowledge are readily 
available in the market and the organisation has the ability to choose an efficient 
provider of the commodity or service to be delivered. If, however, asset specificity is high, 
only one or a few providers can deliver the commodity or service and the organisation 
that needs the services will be depending on that particular provider. That might be an 
argument to have the relevant technology to produce the service within the organisation 
rather than purchasing it on the market. From an empirical perspective, Sclar (2000) 
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noted that once an outsourcing decision has been made, it may be very difficult to 
reverse such a decision due to asset specificity.  
The second element in TCT is uncertainty, which is strongly related to the problem of 
bounded rationality (Douma & Schreuder, 1998, p. 131) and to changes in the 
environment. As an effect, uncertainty may result in continuous discussions on the 
contents of contracts (Epstein & O‟Halloran, 1999, p 38). Van Genugten (2008, p. 212) 
has split uncertainty in a public sector setting into two different aspects: 1) environmental 
uncertainty based upon political sensitivity and technical and policy changes with respect 
to the public service and 2) behavioural uncertainty which is related to the possibility to 
measure production of services. 
The last element is the frequency of transactions (Williamson, 1973; Tijdink, 1998, p. 
44; Van Leerdam, 1999, p. 104). Van Leerdam (1999, p. 104) and Van Helden (1997, p. 
41) note on the frequency of transactions that it may be that if similar transactions 
appear frequently, this allows a tailor made governance structure to be created for these 
similar transactions as the cost of the governance structure can be spread over a number 
of transactions. It also implies that if a transaction has a low frequency (incidental cases), 
the organisation will be better off by using a rather uncomplicated market transaction 
(Van Genugten, 2008, p. 39).  
 
Theoretically, application of TCT results in particular forms of organisation structures 
ranging from unitary (or hierarchical) to multi-divisional or semi-autonomous self 
governing models (Van Leerdam, 1999, p. 110), depending on the characteristics of the 
three main elements of TCT. Bokkes (1989, p. 203) commented that TCT has a strong 
theoretical emphasis and that many assumptions have to be made in order to apply or 
test the theory. Similar comments are made by Van Helden (1997, p. 50) when he notes 
that TCT should be extended to provide improved explanations for autonomisation. These 
theoretical comments are confirmed by empirical studies on autonomisation in the 
Netherlands.  
Ter Bogt (1999) states that for the 6 cases of autonomisation he studied, the choices 
made on and the degree of autonomy cannot be explained from an asset specificity 
perspective. He even emphasises that although NIE principles are relevant in 
autonomisation discussions, other perspectives such as public administration or 
sociology are needed to explain choices made in autonomisation. Van Thiel (2006) noted 
in a study on styles of creating Dutch quangos that the managerial style – which is 
closest to the concepts of NPM and aspects of NIE (jdk) – is hardly used for creating 
Dutch quangos. Van Leerdam (1999, p. 195-196) argues that from a transaction cost 
perspective, an ideal type ZBO has more delegated powers, greater autonomy, greater 
opportunities for participation by third parties and less scope for intervention by political 
principals than an ideal type executive agency. He notes that these ideal types cannot be 
used as deterministic models but are an indication of the direction of the choice for an 
organisational form in the event of autonomisation. Van Genugten‟s contribution is that 
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she found that even in an – at first glance rather uncomplicated - issue such as 
household waste collection, uncertainty is an important factor and has an impact on the 
level of transaction costs to be made. As a result, Van Genugten raises questions on 
using hybrid forms of governance structures (implying arm‟s length organisations, jdk) for 
the provision of public services (Van Genugten, 2008, p. 207-208). The comments made 
above indicate that TCT does not provide an explanation for autonomisation. The 
elements identified in TCT do suggest that they may restrict or extend the possibilities for 
arm‟s length control. Underlying product characteristics may also have an impact on the 
TCT elements, which will be discussed in section 10.4. 
 
In this section, TCT and its impact on autonomy was discussed. Transaction costs theory 
aims at identifying all costs involved in producing and organising production of a service. 
Due to bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour, arrangements have to be made 
to find a governance structure that covers the risks implied in asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency of transactions. The theory is considered to be weak in 
explaining why a particular form of autonomisation will emerge. It can however be used to 
estimate the impact on autonomy in the relationship between ZBO and minister by 
assessing each of the individual elements. Asset specificity is expected to affect 
autonomy positively and can result in additional monitoring tools used by the 
commissioner in order to reduce this effect, whereas high (environmental) uncertainty 
and high frequency of transactions are expected to affect autonomy negatively.  
9.2.2 Property rights theory and relative autonomy of ZBOs 
The second line of theory in NIE is property rights theory (PRT). In PRT, the emphasis is on 
ownership and control of property. The concept of property in property rights theory is 
broader than the traditional legal interpretation of ownership of property. Eggertson 
(1990, p. 38) states that property rights are regarded as undiminished when there are no 
restrictions on individual rights to use, earn income from and exchange assets. Under the 
property right concept an individual is not allowed to cause physical damage to someone 
else‟s resources. Künneke (1997, p. 31) even gives an example of air pollution that can 
be covered under property rights although it initially did not exist as a property right at all. 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) state that three elements are relevant in PRT. First, 
individuals pursue their own interest rather than the organisation‟s interest. Second, 
property rights have a variety of forms that have a different impact on the distribution of 
the organisation‟s residual income. Third, transaction costs exist and are greater than 
zero. The first two PRT items are the main ones of relevance for ZBOs. Pursuing own 
interests holds in any organisation. The issue of residual income is relevant in terms of 
controlling resources generated from services delivered on behalf of government. The 
transaction cost issue is reflected in the monitoring costs discussed in section 9.2.1 on 
TCT. These elements result in an emphasis on maximising utility with a focus on the 
individuals within the organisation rather than a focus on the organisational level. 
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Property rights theory assumes rational behaviour of individuals as can be derived from 
the claim that „the crucial task for the property rights approach is to show that the 
content of property rights affects the allocation and use of resources in specific and 
predictable ways‟ (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972, p. 1139, italics in original; see also Van 
Leerdam, 1999, p. 89). 
 
Property rights theory is based on the idea that property rights are not necessarily 
controlled by one individual or entity. The theory identifies three different forms of 
property rights with a decreasing level of control on the particular asset.131  
The most encompassing property right is the „abusus‟ right which means that the 
owner is allowed to realise any transaction with respect to the specific asset ranging from 
use to changing or selling it. At the other end of the spectrum is the „usus‟ right. The 
owner of a usus right is only allowed to use the asset and cannot claim any residual 
value. In the „usus fructus‟ case, the owner of this right is allowed to use the asset and 
can also claim some residual value from the asset. However, he is supposed to maintain 
the asset (or its value, jdk) in the present state because he is using someone else‟s 
resources (see e.g. Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972, p. 1155 on Yugoslavia). Künneke (1997, 
p. 26-29) describes the impact of property rights with respect to autonomised 
government organisations. If all residual income has to be transferred to the owner (i.e. 
government), this means that the autonomous organisation has no interest in improving 
the efficiency of the organisation. Having access to a share in residual income implies 
that the organisation has an incentive to realise efficiency gains. As a result it allows the 
autonomised organisation to guarantee continuity of the organisation or, in Bouma‟s 
(1982, p. 42) words, its economic independence. Theoretically, efficiency improvement is 
most stimulated if the autonomised organisation has full access to residual income. 
However, Künneke (1997, p. 26) notes that substantial aggregated amounts of residual 
income or equity may also result in inefficient behaviour.  
A second issue with respect to autonomisation is the contents of the abusus rights 
attributed to the organisation. In the case of a Shelter ZBO without separate legal status, 
no abusus rights exist at all. In the case of a Subsidiary ZBO, abusus rights might cover 
some assets, but sale of a Subsidiary ZBO is a political rather than a managerial decision. 
For PLBs, there is no full abusus right in the (Dutch) public sector as there are restrictions 
on selling shares in public companies. An abusus right may however also be attributed by 
means of access to capital markets (Künneke, 1991, p. 135-142). Basically access to the 
capital markets holds for separate legal entities, i.e. Subsidiary ZBOs and PLBs if no legal 
restrictions are set. Borrowing on the capital market means that the organisation 
provides some form of collateral to the lender to ensure it will pay back the borrowed 
amounts of money. Providing collateral can be regarded as an incentive for the borrowing 
                                                 
131 Hart and Moore (1990, p. 1150) note that it is unclear what authority or control on human assets 
actually means. In their study they focused on tangible assets, but they suspect that the argument also 
holds for intangibles such as goodwill.   
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organisation to at least stabilise or improve efficiency. If not, the value of the collateral 
provided may decline and, as a result, capital markets may no longer be willing to lend 
money. Without free access to the capital markets or if access to the capital markets is 
guaranteed, the efficiency incentive for the borrowing entity is less strong. 
A third issue with respect to autonomisation is the possibility of shared property 
rights. If this is the case, the problems identified by Berle and Means (1932/2009, p. 53) 
on separation of ownership and management emerge. Particularly in a public sector 
context, Künneke (1997, p. 29) notes that when separate democratic institutions share 
property rights, the democratic decision making procedures will result in compromises 
not fully in line with the original objectives of individual owners. This allows the 
management of the autonomised organisation to avoid responsibility (shirking, see e.g. 
Flynn, 2007, p. 127) by supporting a compromise that best fits its own objectives. At the 
national level one formal democratic institution exists. The risk of shirking responsibility is 
still realistic on the national level as well in those cases where the Minister-Principal of a 
particular ZBO has to deal with other Ministers-Commissioners and possible conflicts 
emerge. 
 
Property rights theory provides a perspective on the possibilities for autonomisation and 
improved efficiency. As long as services provided are measurable, autonomisation seems 
to be possible. To prevent from shirking in such cases, attribution of abusus rights either 
with respect to access to residual income or free access to the capital market are 
relevant issues for improving efficiency in organisations. This implies that from a PRT 
perspective, an increase in autonomy is expected to result in improved service delivery 
efficiency. Particularly in the setting of separate democratic institutions or more generally 
multiple public sector commissioners, there is an additional risk in shirking due to the 
fact that compromises have to be made that allow management to follow their own 
interests. 
 
Economic autonomisation in a government setting is according to Künneke (1997, p. 22) 
a restructuring of the property rights controlled by government in a way that the 
characteristics of private control of property rights will have a stronger impact on 
operations. Property rights theory can be used to explain autonomisation (Van Leerdam, 
1999, p. 93). The main tools for implementing autonomisation are found in attributing 
„abusus‟ or at least „usus fructus‟ rights. A mere „usus‟ right suggests that the entity that 
has attributed the usus right will have made provisions to assure that the assets made 
available to the usus rights holder are properly taken care of. In the other two cases, 
there is less need to do so as usus fructus and abusus imply that some of the funds 
generated are at the disposal of the owner of the relevant right. 
Theory also indicates that there are restrictions depending on the characteristics of 
the services provided (Blankart, 1986, p. 351), on the possibilities of identifying and 
enforcing property rights and in the distribution of property rights amongst economic 
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actors (Künneke, 1997, p. 32-33). Some ZBOs seem to provide services that can be 
qualified under Blankart‟s „trust‟-type. If that is the case, attribution of property rights is 
not likely to improve efficiency of the organisation. However compared to government 
units that provide similar services, autonomy is greater due to the assigned property 
rights but it is not likely that this will have an impact on budget authorisation processes. 
 
Applied to ZBOs it is not the explanation as to why the organisation was autonomised that 
is at stake in PRT, but the impact the attribution of a particular set of property rights has 
on efficiency and autonomy of the organisation. This affects the production structure that 
is used in the organisation. I will start with the abusus concept. PRT argues that providing 
abusus rights to an autonomised organisation will contribute to more efficiency. Abusus 
rights basically consist of two elements: right to use parts of residual income for the 
organisation and the right to sell or change assets. If these rights are institutionalised in 
the setting of a particular ZBO, this means that the organisation has more degrees of 
freedom to use resources than an organisation that does not have such rights. A 
particular form of abusus is the right of free access to the capital market. Künneke 
(1997, p. 27) claims that this can improve the efficiency of an organisation in similar 
ways as when direct access to residual income is available. In an organisation such as a 
ZBO that is funded by government, this may not be completely true. Economic theory 
assumes that a State can borrow on the capital market at a risk free interest rate (e.g. 
Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1996, p. 125; Pike & Neale, 2006, p. 16). This still holds for the 
Dutch State.132 Borrowing on the capital market for any other entity, including arm‟s 
length organisations, will not be performed at that risk free rate, but at a substantially 
higher level.133 These additional costs will have to be covered either by efficiency gains or 
by additional budgets. Therefore, free access to the capital markets might negatively 
affect efficiency gains or residual income in budgeted organisations. Compared to ZBOs 
that are only allowed to borrow from government, the autonomy of a ZBO that borrows 
from the capital markets may be wider, but at the expense of higher budgets. 
Another issue that should be considered when assessing abusus rights is that such 
rights can have negative effects when granted inadequately. When full abusus rights on 
transfer of assets exist, undesired outcomes cannot be reversed as long as the abusus 
right is not violated. This may mean that residual income realised from sale of assets may 
be fully at the disposal of management at the expense of the public sector. That this is 
not only a theoretical issue can be shown from the GAK/ASZ case in which an originally 
public domain ICT unit was transferred to a private law entity and ultimately sold. An 
abusus right was attributed, resulting in a donation of publicly funded assets to a private 
                                                 
132 In a Eurozone context, one can argue that the risk free interest rate is the lowest interest rate that is 
offered on the market for government bonds, actually German Bunds. Spreads between Dutch 
Government Bonds and German Bunds are in general very low, effectively resulting in as good as risk 
free interest rates for the Dutch State as well. See also Mann (1999) on the US. 
133 In the Netherlands, the mutual assurance fund for the health sector (WFZ) notes that borrowing for 
hospitals on the capital market resulted in risk premiums of 100-150 basis points (WFZ, 2009). 
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company. At the time of the attribution of the abusus right no one realised the impact of 
this decision. When the sale was completed, it appeared that the revenues could no 
longer be used in the public sector (Parliament, 2000g; CTSV, 2000). In hindsight, a usus 
fructus measure would have been a better solution given the original public funding of 
the ICT-unit. Abusus rights may not be complete for reasons such as that shown by this 
example. Depending on the level of the restrictions, the relative autonomy of a particular 
ZBO may then be relatively low compared to a case where abusus rights exist. I refer to 
kZBO:32 and CW2001:45 which can impose restrictions on property rights transactions 
as well as access to capital markets as tools to manage risks of abusus rights. 
If only a usus fructus right is assigned, relative autonomy of a particular ZBO is lower 
than in case of abusus rights. In principle usus fructus rights mean that a form of access 
to residual income is granted in order to improve efficiency. As Eggertson (1990, p. 38) 
noted, any regulation that restricts the behaviour of economic actors implies the 
attribution of property rights. Given the context in which ZBOs operate, particularly the 
variation in regulations due to options in the legal framework kZBO, differences arise in 
attributed property rights and thus in the relative autonomy. The key issues on variation 
in regulations were discussed in Part B. 
A last point to be made is the issue of shared ownership. If shared ownership exists, 
management has more degrees of freedom (Künneke, 1997, p. 28-29). This issue is 
relevant for those ZBOs that can be regarded as hybrids or part of a larger private law 
based unit. In those cases, restrictions are imposed upon the organisation by government 
for the ZBO activities to be realised and by the other (group) of owners that are 
responsible for the market activities of the organisation in which the ZBO-activities are 
performed. Thus, if shared ownership can be identified, this is an indicator of relatively 
greater autonomy for that particular ZBO. 
9.2.3 AT and political control of ZBOs 
In Agency theory, the organisation is studied from the perspective that ownership and 
management are not controlled by one single person and that the control relationship 
between owner and management is covered in contractual terms. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p. 308) define an agency relationship as „a contract under which one or more 
persons engage (the principal(s)) another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf. This involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent‟. As 
explained in Part A, I have chosen to substitute „principal‟ by „owner‟ to be able to make a 
distinction between the theoretical residual claimant and the person(s) generating 
demand for services of the agent. Under AT, the main assumptions are that owner and 
manager have different objectives and utility functions as well as different access to 
information regarding the organisations (Van Leerdam, 1999, p. 95). Despite these 
differences, owner and agent both benefit from mutual co-operation because the owner 
can use the agent‟s specialised knowledge and skills as long as the agent receives 
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appropriate incentives and rewards for his services (Moe, 1984, p. 756; Petersen, 1993, 
p. 278). 
Agency theory has two main lines (Jensen, 1983, p. 334-335): one is labelled 
„principal-agent‟ literature and focuses on contract, uncertainty and information 
structures. In the principal-agent literature, risk and welfare effects related to the 
contractual equilibrium between owner/principal and agent are discussed. The principal-
agent literature focuses on optimal solutions for the problems that arise from information 
asymmetry and diverging interests. The other line of theory is the positive agency theory. 
It emphasises the effects of the contracting environment and the control tools applied 
within the principal agent relationship. In positive agency theory, it is not the optimisation 
problem that is the key issue, but the operational tools used to manage and monitor the 
relationship between owner/principal and agent. For the purpose of this study, positive 
agency theory is more relevant. The problem is not on an optimal distribution of welfare 
effects, but on the control tools available once the decision to separate ownership and 
management has been made by creating an arm‟s length organisation like a ZBO and the 
subsequent use of these control tools. The remaining issue then is how to make 
arrangements that cover the problems which emerge from a separation of ownership and 
management and the consequences this has for ZBO autonomy.  
9.2.3.1 Information asymmetry 
If full transparency on the organisation‟s operations existed, agency problems would not 
arise. However, the organisation has to cope with information asymmetry between owner 
and management, as expressed by issues such as uncertainty, problems in measurement 
and programmability (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61-62).  
 
The problems of information asymmetry and unaligned interests of owners and managers 
(agents) of an organisation in private companies can partly be mitigated based on market 
mechanisms in the stock market. Agents (managers) of listed companies know that 
inefficient behaviour might result in take-overs or mergers and that their reputation might 
be at stake (Eggertson, 1990, p. 134-135).  
In not-for-profit organisations, there is no residual income to be distributed to owners, 
which means that the market mechanisms that contribute to controlling the owner-agent 
problem do not exist (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 318-321). As a result, control 
mechanisms such as sale and merger do not exist and the monitoring and bonding 
elements in the contract between owner and agent become more important. Several 
authors (Moe 1984, p. 765; Garner, 1996, p. 87; Bouckaert, 1998, p. 141-142) discuss 
the fact that the governance systems in a public sector setting are essentially different 
from those in the private sector. Neelen (1997, p. 70) distinguishes three forms of control 
mechanisms: control by persuasion, by incentives and by directives and or authority. In a 
bureaucratic public sector setting, directives and authority are important because public 
sector organisations operate in a complex environment in which many interests have to 
be managed and accounted for.  
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The complexity of the public sector is also caused by the objectives to be realised by 
policy instruments and the objectives to be realised when running an organisation. 
Verhoest states that when government as principal – he implies commissioner as the 
discussion is on policy objectives, jdk - only sets standards at a strategic policy level, for 
example by only setting outcome standards, the agent has far more degrees of freedom 
compared to the case in which government sets operations standards within the agent‟s 
organisation (Verhoest, 2002, p. 36-37). Standards for both policy instruments and 
operational instruments can be set at different levels of the organisation. The key issues 
are presented in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Levels of policy and operational control of an executive central government 
organisation (Source: Verhoest, 2002, p. 37) 
Level Policy control Managerial control 
Strategic Effect control 
Objectives and effects 
 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Input control 
General rules, principles and volume of input 
resources 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Tactic Output control 
Policy tools and performance 
 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Input control 
Specific rules, procedures for each category 
of input resources 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Operational Process control 
Process and procedures 
 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Input control 
Individual decisions regarding use of input 
resources 
Standards, compliance and evaluation/ 
adjustment 
Source: Verhoest, 2002, p. 37 
 
No matter at what level the standards are set, problems of information asymmetry will 
exist. Verhoest (2002, p. 66) identified five characteristics of public sector organisations 
that explain why the information asymmetry problem in a public sector setting results in 
less efficient and effective operations. These issues are a.) multiple hierarchy of 
principals; b.) multiple conflicting and ambiguous policy objectives; c.) difficulties in 
performance measurement; d.) no clear relation between funding and organisational 
performance  and e.) relatively low level of autonomy compared to the private sector 
setting. Despite these differences, quasi contracting based on AT can contribute to 
improved performance by public sector organisations (Verhoest, 2002, p. 76). In his 
model, Verhoest (2002, p. 76-77) identifies four main actors134 governing the operations 
of an autonomised government unit. In addition to the agent (i.e. the autonomised unit), a 
central principal/commissioner – the minister who is responsible for the content of the 
activities of the agent – and two horizontal principals/owners exist. The latter are the 
minister of finance with respect to financing and budgeting issues and the minister 
responsible for the civil service. Whether or not the governance setting under which the 
                                                 
134 Verhoest‟s model neglects other stakeholders that may have an interest in the public sector such as 
private commissioners for the services of the organisation. These may to some extent also behave as 
principals, for example when an advisory board of stakeholders can monitor the operations of the agent. 
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agent operates is successful depends according to Verhoest (2002, p.76-77) on four 
factors: a.) degree of operational autonomy of the agent; b.) level of coordination between 
the principals135; c.) management of information asymmetry and d.) goal alignment 
between principal and agent. Mitigating the principal - agent problem by means of quasi 
contracting has to address each of these elements. Regarding the degrees of operational 
autonomy, this will be reflected in the input controls laid down at the different levels of 
operations. Such controls will often be formalised in laws and decrees. Information 
asymmetry and goal alignment can be mitigated by solutions from quasi contracting by 
monitoring and bonding agreements. From the agent‟s perspective, the level of 
coordination between the principals is a black box; ideally some general rules cover the 
arrangements between central principal/ commissioner and the horizontal principals/ 
owners. In that case, both the principals and the agent know the authority limitations of 
all parties involved, although some ambiguity may continue to exist. 
9.2.3.2 Monitoring and bonding 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 62-63) claims that some of the information asymmetry problems 
can be overcome for long term relationships between owner and agent because it is likely 
that in the long run the owner will learn from the behaviour of the agent.  
In the contractual relationship between owner and agent, several tools can be used to 
reduce the risks that arise from information asymmetry. From the owner perspective, 
monitoring the activities of the agent can be realised by using several tools, including 
auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions and an incentive compensation 
system (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 323). Not all of these control tools are suitable for 
each and every organisation. From the agent‟s perspective, bonding activities can be part 
of the contractual relationship. Control by bonding can be realised by contractual 
guarantees on auditing, limitations on the agent‟s decision making power and bonding 
against possible malfeasance by the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 325).  
 
Whether monitoring or bonding activities are performed, they all can be expressed as 
expenses that will negatively affect the residual income of the organisation. Along with 
monitoring and bonding costs, a third cost category exists, which is the result of the fact 
that practice will always deviate from maximal utility for the owner of the organisation 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). The loss incurred as a result of these decisions is 
labelled „residual loss‟. In an ideal contract, in Jensen‟s (1983) terms part of the principal 
agent literature, the mixture of monitoring and bonding costs on the one hand and 
residual loss on the other result in a situation in which total agency costs are minimal. If 
few monitoring and bonding activities are performed, the degree of freedom for the agent 
will be relatively large. This results in high residual losses for the owner. On the other 
hand, if monitoring and bonding is strict, the degree of freedom for the agent is low and 
                                                 
135 Co-ordination between principals should be read as co-ordination between owner(s) and commissioners. 
These two groups have diverging interests, and co-ordination between principals in subgroups is what 
can be performed here. 
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as a consequence, residual loss is low. Both the owner and the agent have found an 
optimal solution if the sum of all agency costs is minimal, which means that a trade off 
between the ex ante monitoring and bonding activities and the ex post residual losses 
has to be found. 
9.2.3.3 Operational control and information asymmetry 
Under the assumption that policy control is given in this study, it is possible to focus on 
the operational control issues that result from information asymmetry, more specifically 
monitoring and bonding arrangements and their possible impact on ZBOs. I will follow the 
classification of arrangements given by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Auditing implies 
that the processes and reports of the agent are reviewed and, if possible certified. A first 
option is to include arrangements for certifying public accounts. That provides 
information on financial data but not on non financial outputs or outcomes. Schillemans 
and Bovens (2004) and Schillemans (2005) identify a second option: diagonal 
monitoring, which means that a separate institution monitors the agent‟s performance on 
behalf of a minister with respect to the minister‟s system responsibility. This is another 
solution than using a non-executive board which primarily monitors the continuity of the 
arm‟s length organisation on behalf of the owner. Applied to the Dutch case, inspections 
and or policy monitoring institutions exist that are allowed to review the performance of 
an individual agent. An example of diagonal monitoring is the Public Safety Inspectorate 
(Inspectie voor Openbare orde en veiligheid [IOOV]) which monitors the quality of services 
provided by police forces and other emergency services. 
Formal control systems can have the characteristics of behaviour and or performance 
controls. Such controls may be applied to more than one single agent and might be 
relevant in case of multiple principals. Regulations that cover standards for a group of 
agents - like kZBO – which are meant to align the interests of the different principals, can 
be classified under formal controls as well. Reporting can be included in the formal 
control system, but also be part of the voluntary bonding arrangement by the agent. The 
level of detail and frequency of reporting, both on financial as well as non financial 
indicators should match the economic characteristics of services provided and the 
autonomy that follows from these economic characteristics. High reporting frequency 
implies stricter supervision by the principals than in case of low frequency reporting. 
Product and market characteristics may require a high frequency of reporting. If not, it is 
a reflection of a mismatch between autonomy derived from economic characteristics and 
actual control practices. Therefore, reporting frequency can be regarded as a relevant 
indicator for (relative) autonomy. Formal control may also include the governance 
structure at the institutional level. The appointment of the executive board of the agent, 
as well as the existence of a non-executive or an advisory board appointed by the 
principal may be part of the formal control structure. In terms of control, selection 
processes for members of these boards can be regarded as a form of Ouchi‟s (1979) 
social controls. One of the roles of non-executive or advisory boards might be to fill a gap 
in democratic legitimisation of the agent particularly when users or commissioners of the 
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agency‟s services are involved (Cornforth, 2003, p. 13; Locke, Begum & Robson, 2003, p. 
63) and an effect of such boards might therefore be that there is less need for control 
from the owner/principal. The task assigned to a non-executive board may also be an 
indication of (relative) autonomy. If the non-executive board focuses on compliance with 
regulations, the board has a bias towards the principal, whereas in the case of focus on 
performance and strategy, emphasis is biased towards the agent and the users of the 
agent‟s services (Cornforth, 2003, p. 14). If no non-executive or advisory boards exist, 
then the only relation that remains is that between owner and agents, which provides for 
more direct intervention by the owner of the autonomised organisation.  
Budgetary controls can have a variety of forms, from pure input based controls on 
operational issues to only limited price controls. The variety of budgetary issues has been 
discussed in Part B and will be discussed from an economic perspective in section 
11.2.1. Similarly, in section 9.2.2 on residual income from a property right perspective, 
access to residual income was described as a tool for management to improve efficiency 
in the organisation. Management is in that case allowed to use part of the residual 
income at its own discretion which can be regarded as a form of an incentive. Other 
incentives may be found in the personal rewards and penalties for management (Arrow, 
1985, p. 47-48; Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 302-303; Bouma & van Helden, 1994, p. 44-
46; Verhoest, 2002, p. 60). 
In a public sector setting, most other bonding controls will be included in the 
monitoring part of the contract as well due to the more rule driven perspective in the 
public sector compared to the private sector. The voluntary decision to use external 
auditors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 325) is often included in the legal framework as is 
the case with controls against malfeasance. I refer to the discussion on AW1996 and 
kZBO in Part B for examples of these forms of arrangements. A particular form of bonding 
control is the imposition of fines if contractual targets are not achieved (Bouma & Van 
Helden, 1994, p. 46-47). If this occurs for a particular ZBO, it would mean that forms of 
contractual arrangements, rather than formal regulation, are regarded as an important 
management incentive.  One might conclude that if contractual fines in the owner – agent 
relationship exist, this allows for more autonomy than if agency costs are mainly based on 
monitoring activities.  
 
If persuasion and incentives (Neelen, 1997, p. 69-72) are used, implicit degrees of 
freedom exist because the agent has scope to act on persuasive actions or incentives. If 
directives and authority are used, the agent has less choice and is thus less autonomous 
than under the other two governance models. In many cases of autonomisation, a 
mixture of these governance tools is used. In the ZBO case, Part B has discussed the 
variety of directives that can exist in the law. However, within directives, degrees of 
freedom exist as well. Neelen claims that autonomisation as expressed in directives can 
be found in two trends: one is the emphasis on output rather than input and process type 
controls; the other is that controls focus on procedures rather than on the contents of 
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operations (Neelen, 1997, p. 71). From the perspective of this study, this means that 
indicators for relative autonomy can be found in the existence of persuasion and 
incentive based control mechanisms as well as in the characteristics of the directives. 
Autonomy may however be negatively affected if monitoring procedures such as reporting 
have a relatively high frequency. The same holds if monitoring procedures have an 
emphasis on vertical accountability rather than horizontal or diagonal accountability. 
9.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter the three lines of Neo Institutional Economics were discussed. In all cases, 
there is a problem with respect to achieving efficient production of services due to a 
separation between ownership and management.  
The main question is how the conflicting interests between owner and manager can 
be overcome. Property rights theory emphasises the distribution of access to (intangible) 
assets within the organisation and argues that management has additional incentives to 
perform efficiently if few restrictions on access to the assets of the organisation (abusus-
rights) exist. Access to assets has three basic forms: access to residual income, access to 
the capital market and rights to sell or change assets. All three forms of abusus rights 
may, to some extent, be relevant for ZBOs and affect autonomy. It should however be 
noted that inadequately attributed property rights are in principle not reversible in case of 
undesired outcomes because these rights are included in the arrangements. Property 
rights can only be reconsidered after the event but at the expense of losses incurred by 
the owner of the organisation. If only usus fructus or usus rights are attributed to ZBO‟s 
management, autonomy is relatively low compared to when abusus rights exist. 
The other two lines of theory focus on the transactions between owner and 
management of the organisation. In transaction cost theory, uncertainty is an important 
issue and allows for opportunistic behaviour by management. However, the most 
important issue in TCT is the impact of asset specificity on arriving at efficient 
transactions. If the commissioner of services strongly depends on assets only available 
from the supplier, efficient transactions would result in integrating both entities, whereas 
in case of low asset specificity, market competition exists and there is no immediate need 
to integrate both entities. Whether or not integration is the most efficient solution also 
depends on the level of uncertainty and frequency of transactions. From the perspective 
of ZBO autonomy, given the existence of a ZBO as a separate legal entity, asset specificity 
has a positive impact on autonomy, although it can be expected that the commissioning 
entity will use additional monitoring tools to reduce this.  
Agency theory specifically focuses on the information asymmetry problem and 
divergence of interest between owner and agent. In order to manage this problem, a 
balance between monitoring tools and efficiency loss as a result of the information 
problem has to be found, resulting in a solution in which total costs of the agency 
problem can be minimised. Increasing autonomy will result, according to this theory, in an 
increase in efficiency losses, whereas reduced autonomy by intensive monitoring will 
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reduce efficiency losses although at the expense of increased monitoring costs. Basically 
three types of controls can be used: persuasion, incentives and directives. Both 
incentives and directives allow for relative autonomy of ZBO management as these 
control tools include an element of choice. Directives however affect autonomy negatively 
as they tend to enforce compliance and thus restrict management‟s choices. 
Tijdink, (1998, p. 53) notes that the three lines of NIE-theory have become „separate 
islands of knowledge‟ and that there may be contradictions between these thee lines. 
Whereas PRT states that management autonomy including free (re)allocation of assets 
and claims on residual value will enhance efficiency, AT stresses that the separation of 
management and ownership of an organisation requires additional control tools to 
prevent management creating inefficiencies at the expense of the owners. Tijdink (1998, 
p. 63) concluded that the common denominator in this apparent contradiction are the 
incentives for management. From the perspective of budget authorisation and ex ante 
controls in general, three incentives are relevant. First, the degrees of freedom in 
(re)allocating assets given to a ZBO, second the issue of residual claims as reflected in 
remuneration of management and access to residual income, and third the control 
mechanisms related to operations. All these elements may be used as indicators to 
analyse relative autonomy of ZBOs. 
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10. The economic dimensions of ZBO services 
10.1 Introduction 
By definition, a ZBO produces public services based on unilateral binding decisions. From 
a perspective of democratic legitimacy, public services are produced by government 
institutions. The traditional production setting for public services has been contested 
under the influence of NIE theories (Behn, 2001, p. 22; Lane, 2000, p. 143; Hood, 2004, 
p. 17). Lane (2000, p. 156) notes that a key point in public sector reform is to set up a 
model that stimulates productivity and effectiveness by trying to use competitive factors 
rather than authority factors in the system of resource allocation. This means that 
methods based on hierarchy and compliance to the allocation decisions of the political 
principals is transferred to an (internal) privatisation model based on supply and demand. 
He refers to internal privatisation as a method of generating competition between 
bureaus within the hierarchy. Particularly when production can be transferred to entities 
outside government, there might be an additional stimulus to decide rationally on supply 
of services (Lane, 2000, p. 158). 
In the classic system of providing government services, compliance with a 
democratically authorised decision on levels of supply is realised based on the allocation 
of resources for production. Demand is an implicit factor as the same Parliament which 
decides upon the allocation of resources is supposed to represent the preferences in 
aggregate demand for services. As a result, government controls both demand and 
supply by the process of budget authorisation in Parliament and the acts of the executive 
(minister) based on that decision. By introducing „market‟-prices instead of general taxes 
or competition between suppliers, control mechanisms on either demand or supply or 
possibly a combination of the two are introduced, which allows for a control approach 
that has less emphasis on compliance than on matching demand with supply.  
 
Boorsma and Mol (1983) were among the first to introduce a distinction between 
privatisation of demand and privatisation of supply. Privatisation of supply implies that 
the organisational setting under which services are produced is no longer controlled by 
government which means that there is another (non-government) legal entity that 
produces the government services.136 ZBOs are a particular way of organising production 
outside the immediate control of the hierarchical government structure. The analysis of 
privatisation of supply can be used to assess the position of a ZBO in terms of (relative) 
autonomy from the perspective of production. Simultaneously, if funding of a ZBO is not 
necessarily based on direct allocation of resources from government, an analysis of 
demand for ZBO services is also required. 
                                                 
136 I note that in a legal context, Maeijer referred to privatisation as any form of creating an entity with a 
separate legal status; cases in which the organisation‟s setting is what is labelled as PLA in this study 
are forms of autonomisation (Maeijers, 1997, p. 5). In this part of the text, legal setting as such is not 
the core issue. 
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Lane (2000, p. 157) notes that improved efficiency on providing public services can 
theoretically be realised both from a demand and a supply perspective. In his opinion, 
actual public sector reforms have a bias towards supply because it is difficult to reveal 
the real price individuals are willing to pay for public services. From a supply perspective, 
it is possible to let organisations – even within a hierarchical structure - compete to win 
production contracts. As a result cost efficiency of production will be a core issue. 
Although not made explicit by Lane, the compulsory character of a public service might be 
one of the underlying reasons for problems in measuring demand. Whether or not a 
particular public service must be qualified as a compulsory service depends on the 
market characteristics of the service which is known in public finance as the debate on 
public goods and market goods (e.g. Hillman, 2003, p. 63-65). From the perspective of 
this study, the variety in demand forms resulting from an analysis on public goods and 
market goods allows for an analytical perspective with respect to controlling services 
delivered by ZBOs.  
 
In Part A, it was shown that in most cases, ZBOs are not privatised but actually 
autonomised, resulting in reduced government responsibility rather than no 
responsibility. In Boorsma and Mol‟s model, real (economic) privatisation implies that 
government is neither involved in supply nor in demand and the market determines 
whether or not a particular service is to be provided. 
ZBOs do not operate in a competitive market; they are assigned to provide a particular 
service by the political system. Thus real (economic) privatisation is not relevant in ZBO 
cases. In section 10.2, I will address the issue of control of supply by government. 
Furthermore, the role of the organisation in the provision of government services is 
discussed by analysing the position of the organisation in the production chain.  
Privatisation of demand implies a shift from taxation towards pricing which can 
contribute to more transparency on demand for services. Such a shift can only be 
realised if the services delivered allow forms of pricing. Theory on public goods and 
market goods provides conceptual answers based on funding possibilities for services. 
The political system will ultimately decide whether the theoretical solutions available will 
be used as part of controlling demand for public services. It seems obvious that when 
general taxes are used, privatisation of demand is not possible and the traditional 
hierarchical allocation of resources and the corresponding compliance will prevail. In 
section 10.3, I will address the impact of the variety of fees related to the public good 
concept that can be used to fund ZBO services. Each of these forms may have a different 
impact on the possibility of shifting governance models from compliance control to 
matching of supply and demand.  
Market dimensions are not the only relevant issues to discuss with respect to 
controlling production of public services. Although public services provided by ZBOs all 
have a unilaterally binding character; the production process may vary due to the 
underlying characteristics of the services. I will discuss these underlying characteristics in 
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section 10.4. Finally, section 10.5 provides a conclusion on the market settings in which 
ZBOs provide their services. 
10.2 Supply: between government production and privatisation. 
10.2.1 Privatisation and decentralisation 
As noted before, real (economic) privatisation does not apply to ZBOs. Therefore, 
privatisation of supply and demand is studied separately. In the case of privatisation of 
supply, the concept of outsourcing (Kok, 2003; Von Weizsäcker, Young & Finger, 2005) 
and contracting (out) are often referred to in the literature (Kettl, 1993; Domberger, 
1998; Guttman, 2003; Greve, 2008).  
 
Examples of provision of public services. 
Grant provision in relation to ZBOs is hard to find. One of the few examples is „Stichting 
Patiëntenfonds‟ that was created in 1996 after it was concluded that the services to be 
supplied could not be carried out within the framework of public law (Parliament, 1996a, 
p. 12). 
Regulated provision seems to be a more common form for supply of services by ZBOs. 
The regulated provision type can particularly be found in monitoring and research type 
ZBOs. An example is „Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen‟ [CBR], responsible for 
driving licence examination. Government has specified the requirements in the law and 
CBR plans the examination based on the demand from individual citizens who pay fully 
for the service. The CBR case is an example of an institution operating as a monopolist. 
Part-time quality assurance ZBOs in particular operate in a competitive setting. The best 
known example is the periodic motor vehicle test APK performed by licensed car dealers 
and service stations. 
The most common form of service provision is found in contract provision. This form 
exists in a wide variety of cases, ranging from the Kiesraad (Dutch Electoral Council) 
which receives an input based lump sum for its activities to IBGroep which is paid on a 
cost price basis by MinOCW to provide income transfers. 
 
A more fundamental analysis of the various forms of organising supply was developed by 
Boorsma and Mol (1983). They identified five different settings for production of 
government services. In a later study, Bokkes (1989, p. 10) prefers to use service 
provision rather than service production. His argument is that provision better reflects the 
actual relationship because a consolidated market does not have the character of a 
market in economic and legal terms. As this argument also holds for what may be called 
quasi markets in relationships between two public entities, I will adapt Boorsma and 
Mol‟s model by using Bokkes‟ concept of service provision when referring to inter-
organisational transactions within the public sector. The key features of the forms of 
provision of public services are disclosed in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10.1: Forms of provision of public services (source: Boorsma & Mol, 1983) 
 Consolidated 
provision 
Contract 
provision 
Grant 
provision 
Regulated 
provision 
Private 
provision 
Government plans X X - X - 
Government funds X X X - - 
Government produces X - - - - 
 
The other and related concepts like outsourcing and contracting out will be included in 
the more in depth discussion on Boorsma and Mol‟s analysis. The section is concluded 
with an analysis of the impact of the various forms of service supply on ZBO autonomy. 
10.2.1.1 Traditional government provision and full market provision 
In the traditional case, government controls the full process of supply by (1) planning the 
level and quality of production, (2) funding it by general taxes and (3) actually producing 
the service. This form of government provision of services is labelled „consolidated 
provision‟ by Boorsma and Mol, which means that at the national level, the service is 
provided by the traditional structure of ministries.137 Consolidated provision is at one end 
of the scale, including full control of service provision by government. At the other end of 
the scale government has no role whatsoever in the process of delivering services. This 
form is labelled „private provision‟ and is either a traditional market provision of services 
or a service that has been fully privatised as with the former State postal and telecom 
services (Parliament, 2006f, p. 4; Parliament 2007g, p. 3). 
Consolidated provision and private provision are not an adequate description of the 
relationship between ZBO and Parliament and minister. Neither Boorsma and Mol nor 
Bokkes explicitly specify the concept „government‟. From the examples they provide, the 
implicit assumption can be derived that government is regarded as a single entity at a 
territorial level. As ZBOs are in most but not all cases separate legal entities, they do not 
seem to be included in the concept of government as meant by Boorsma and Mol. This 
means that consolidated provision is not relevant for ZBOs under the assumption that 
they can be regarded as units operating separately from the government hierarchical 
command structure.138 In principle, the same holds for private provision because the 
tasks assigned to ZBOs are determined by government decisions. Only if the ZBO is 
allowed to provide market services alongside the authoritative services specified by 
government may the private provision model be relevant.  
In the following subsections, I will discuss the three forms of service provision that 
exist between consolidated and private provision of services. These forms can be applied 
to at least the ZBOs that have a separate legal status. I will also use it for the „Shelter 
ZBOs‟ because these units were created to operate outside the hierarchical command 
                                                 
137 At the time Boorsma and Mol‟s work was published, executive agencies did not exist in the Netherlands.  
I would argue with the present knowledge that as executive agencies are in most cases funded by 
central government, these executive agencies can also be classified under „consolidated provision‟  
138 Only in case of Shelter ZBOs which have no separate legal status there is a case to be made for 
consolidated provision. 
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structure of the ministries and the main reason that they do not have a separate legal 
status is because of the size of the unit. 
10.2.1.2 Contract provision 
Closest to traditional consolidated provision is the case in which only actual provision of 
services is left to the market. Government still controls services‟ funding and planning.  
An example of this is found when government outsources household waste collection 
(Van Genugten, 2008) or hires specific knowledge from the private sector that it cannot 
organise by itself. The concept of contract provision is often referred to in particular in 
concepts as contracting out and outsourcing. 
Contracting out is according to Domberger (1998, p. 12) „the design and 
implementation of contractual relationships between purchasers and suppliers‟. 
Contracting out is possible if the market is contestable, implying that costs of entry and 
exit to the market are low. If not, government should produce the services itself (Vining & 
Weimer, 1990). Others (e.g. Kee & Robbins, 2003; Gregory, 2004) use cost benefit 
criteria for decision making on contracting out, but Vining and Weimer‟s concept is more 
elegant as it fundamentally raises the question of whether or not a specific service can be 
produced in a market setting.  
Kok (2002, p. 2) describes outsourcing as purchasing a service that was formerly 
produced within its own organisation. In Von Weizsäcker et al.‟s (2005, p. 6-7) definition, 
outsourcing is related to transfer of production to private actors. The contracting 
definition of Vining and Weimer provides an indication when to use third parties, whereas 
Kok‟s and Von Weizsäcker et al.‟s definitions emphasise the organisational structure as 
such.  
The concept of „actively hiving off‟ as used by Boorsma and Mol (1983, p. 24) is close 
to outsourcing, but where outsourcing ceases to be performed if demand ceases, hiving 
off implies that supply of services is to be continued under some form of government 
control, only at arm‟s length of the government hierarchy. Boorsma and Mol‟s argument 
implicitly includes elements of the contestability issue also mentioned by Vining and 
Weimer. Apparently there must be some reason not to transfer production to the market 
and such a reason could be problematic market access. 
 
In the contract provision case, supply is left to an entity outside hierarchical government 
but demand is still driven by government. Strictly speaking, contract provision of services 
means that the production of services is realised by entities not controlled by 
government. In this study, I use the characteristic elements „funding by government‟ and 
„planning by government‟ as identified by Boorsma and Mol (1983) to identify the 
relationship between the ZBO and the commissioning ministry. The actual form of 
commissioning by a ministry is not necessarily a contract as is the case when government 
purchases the service in a competitive market as meant by Vining and Weimer (1990). 
The contract provision concept can refer to two different forms of service provision. One 
is the option for government to use a particular service provider to deliver a case specific 
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service, for example an ICT project or temporary staff. This option is often associated with 
outsourcing (e.g. Kok, 2003). The other option is that government wants to provide or use 
a particular service for a long period of time and uses a tendering procedure (Ashworth, 
2002 p. 319; Arrowsmith, 2003, p. 2) to find a service provider in the market. A ZBO is 
generally created to deliver a service for a long period of time; hence the contract 
provision concept for a ZBO has parallels to experience from tendering procedures rather 
than from outsourcing procedures. 
Contract provision may result in risks in controlling the services delivered. Sclar 
(2000, p. 3-15) refers to mutual dependencies between supplier and the commissioning 
organisation. This can for example be caused by the specialised technology or knowledge 
used to deliver the service. Another complicating factor is information asymmetry that is 
the result of the separation between production and commissioning of services. In a ZBO 
context, there is no competition for the production of services, which means that the 
potential benefit of market competition is not realised. That does not mean that no 
efficiency gains are possible, but that these are caused by other conditions, for example 
improved flexibility in the organisation compared to „consolidated government 
production‟. Another point to be made is that total cost reductions might not be as high 
as expected due to the additional monitoring that is required with respect to the services 
delivered. Nijkamp and Ubbels (1998) note in the context of infrastructure projects, that 
changing the project leads to substantial transaction costs. The issue of transaction costs 
is likely to hold for ZBOs as well when the task assigned is substantially changed or other 
issues regarding uncertainty affect operations. As noted in chapter 9, high levels of 
transaction costs and or uncertainty might be an argument not to autonomise production. 
 
Bokkes (1989, p. 14-15) identified several sub-forms of contract provision, each of which 
includes the key factors of planning and funding service provision by government. Two of 
these forms139 seem to be relevant when studying ZBOs because they can be associated 
with the discussion on motives for creating a ZBO. „Special contract provision‟ refers to 
the case in which government does not have the skills and knowledge to provide the 
service themselves. Special contract provision can be associated with the „impartial 
judgement‟, „expertise‟ and „participation of third parties‟ motives as mentioned by 
Boxum et al. (1989, p. 37-38). The second option is „strategic contract provision‟. In 
Bokkes‟ analysis, more flexibility is generated within the organisation by deliberately 
understaffing it. As a result, external staff is required. In the 1980s, budgetary rules were 
rather strict and did not allow for flexibility (see e.g. Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 54). 
Indirectly the „strategic contract provision‟ can be related to the debates on separation 
between policy preparation and policy execution and the role of ministries in the 
organisational structure of government. This debate has led to the creation of executive 
                                                 
139 The other forms are „regular capacity based contract provision‟ meant to be able to handle temporary 
high demand and „enforced capacity based contract provision‟, which refers to the case when 
unexpected factors influence production levels. 
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agencies and the second peak in creating ZBOs in the early 1990s (Van Thiel, Leeuw, 
Siegers & Flap, 1999, p. 34). The inflexibility argument in hiring staff to ministries no 
longer holds; in 1998 questions were raised in Parliament on the level of spending on 
hired staff in government (Parliament, 1998a) and Cabinet imposed restrictions on hiring 
temporary staff in 2003 (Parliament, 2003b p. 66). An extended interpretation of 
„strategic contract provision‟, given the development of ZBOs, would be that the efficiency 
argument140 for creating ZBOs that was regarded as increasingly important under the 
influence of fiscal distress and new public management theories is a version of „strategic 
contract provision‟.  
10.2.1.3 Grant provision 
In the „grant provision‟ case, government‟s role is reduced to (partial) funding. Actual 
production and planning141 are realised outside the government hierarchy. An example is 
found in public education which is for the most part funded by government but organised 
outside the government structure.  
According to Boorsma and Mol (1983, p. 26) the grant provision case requires a 
government role in funding of the service delivered to citizens. The service may be 
provided for free or at a fee below cost price and the difference between total costs and 
fee charged is paid for by government. Grant provision may have two forms. First, 
government can provide a start-up grant to create an entity that is supposed to provide 
particular services to the market and then leaves it to the market to accept the services. 
An example of a start-up grant in the Netherlands is found in the case of the (former ZBO) 
re-integration company Kliq (Parliament, 2003b, p. 3). The end result of this start-up 
grant was that Kliq did not survive in its market. The other option is for government to 
provide a structural grant to the organisation. This is what happens in the case of for 
example public libraries and in education. The grant provision model is more or less 
ambiguous. Boorsma and Mol (1983, p. 27) note that receiving a grant often implies that 
conditions set by government have to be met in order to receive the grant. They only refer 
to mixing up regulation and grant provision, but in the example of the libraries given 
before, one might claim that the specification of services by government actually results 
in a contract relationship. In the Dutch public library case, revenues from sources other 
than government are generally so small that government nearly funds the entire service. 
It might also be that an organisation provides a number of services, some of which are 
funded by citizens and others are funded by government. In that case, grant provision 
holds for the government funded services and the organisation has elements of hybridity 
including the risks of cross subsidisation and production bias as mentioned by Simon 
(1989 and 2005).  
                                                 
140 Boxum et al. noted in their study (1989 p. 39) that the efficiency issue was at that time at best a 
secondary argument for autonomisation. 
141 Bokkes, (1989, p. 14-15) noted that grant provision applies some level of planning by government due 
to the often included conditions for receiving the grant. 
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10.2.1.4 Regulated provision 
Finally some short notes on regulated provision are made. Regulated provision of 
services refers to the case in which government plans service provision but leaves 
production, funding and distribution to the private market. This form of service provision 
implies that government specifies the service requirements but leaves all other issues to 
the market. An example can be found in quality or safety assurance requirements that 
are laid down in the market. The private market will provide the service; if not, the 
product is not allowed on the market or penalties will be awarded if the requirements are 
violated. Government‟s role is then to monitor the specifications set and can include 
licensing organisations to deliver a service. In that case, the market setting exists but only 
organisations that have complied with ex ante controls set by government can enter the 
market.  
10.2.2 Impact of types of service provision on autonomy of ZBOs 
By now, all five forms of service provision for government services have been discussed. 
If a ZBO is used as a service provider, consolidated provision and market provision are 
not relevant. This leaves three options: contract provision, grant provision and regulated 
provision. In more general terms, the literature uses outsourcing (e.g. Kok, 2003; Von 
Weiszäcker et al., 2005) if government is no longer fully in control of service provision. 
The outsourcing concept is ambiguous as some use it only in relation to private provision 
of services (Von Weiszäcker et al., 2005) whereas others use outsourcing irrespective of 
the organisational structures (Kok, 2003). Furthermore, the concept of contracting out 
(Domberger, 1998) is not fully acceptable either for ZBOs because that would suggest 
that competition is possible. Therefore, I prefer to use the differentiation developed by 
Boorsma and Mol using three intermediate stages between full government provision and 
full market provision. 
When assessing the contract provision, grant provision and regulated provision 
possibilities for the different types of ZBOs, the following options are possible. Contract 
provision is relevant for both PLAs and PLBs. Given the fact that government both plans 
and funds, the politically expressed proposition to only use PLBs as an option of last 
resort (AW1996:124b.2; kZBO:4.2 ), it seems likely that contract provision in general will 
be realised by PLAs rather than PLBs. In case of grant provision, the opposite seems to be 
plausible, particularly in the case of structural grants which are meant to cover the 
difference between fees generated from demand and total costs of supplying the service. 
Furthermore, a start-up grant for a PLA is unlikely given the legislative procedure that is 
required to create a PLA. Regulated provision is likely to exist for both PLAs as well as 
PLBs; from a supply perspective there seems to be no specific criterion to choose either 
the PLA or the PLB form. Finally, free market provision with respect to supply of ZBO 
services does not apply, irrespective of the legal status of a ZBO. If the ZBO provides 
multiple services it is possible that some services have a free market-supply character, 
because they do not qualify as an authoritative task. In that case the ZBO has a hybrid 
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character which is primarily possible in relation to PLBs fulfilling a minor ZBO function 
only. 
 
As in all analysis factors in this study, service provision is studied from the perspective of 
a single service provided by a ZBO, unless otherwise stated. This means that when an 
analysis is made from the perspective of supply of services, one has to be aware that 
sales generated by government are only one element in classifying a ZBO. When a ZBO 
provides more than one service, it is possible that different supply relationships exist for 
each of these services. 
Having different supply relations within a single ZBO may result in conflicting interests, 
not only from a perspective of planning and prioritising production. In Simon‟s strategic 
function typology (Simon, 1989, 2005) a differentiation is made between market and 
non-market services. His analysis has a relationship to the market services – (im)pure 
public services discussion (see section 10.3.3) because non-market services are in 
Simon‟s perspective to be controlled by a governing body external to the producing 
organisation (Simon, 2005, p. 39) whereas in a market setting, the organisation 
producing services is fully responsible for continuity. In other words, in a task 
organisation, allocation of resources and desired levels of production are based on 
external decisions (similar to those that are needed to determine the provision of public 
goods), whereas in a market organisation, production is purely a result of matching 
supply and demand. Simon claims that if an organisation is operating on the two 
fundamentally different markets, in the end control will be based on the commonly used 
tools for one of the two markets at the expense of controls for the other market.142 
Simon‟s analysis has a practical relevance when studying the turnover breakdown of an 
organisation. He claims that if market-based turnover increases to over 10% of total 
turnover of an organisation, managerial problems will arise due to the differences in 
required control systems (Simon, 2005, p. 41).  
 
Finally, I will discuss the impact of the various forms of service provision on ZBO 
autonomy. Contract provision has the lowest level of autonomy because government sets 
production standards and funds the activities. This means that budgets have to be 
authorised by Parliament. Next on the scale would be the case in which structural grants 
are provided, due to the required budget authorisation process, but also because it is 
likely that some non financial requirements are set in relation to the grants to be 
received. Regulated provision is close to the structural grant case but has more degrees 
of freedom because funding is generated from citizens. A start-up grant case means that 
government is willing to help the organisation to get started, but then leaves it to the 
market. In terms of autonomy, that is relatively close to the last option of private service 
provision which is fully autonomous from government intervention. Table 10.2 
                                                 
142 In a task environment, controls will tend to compliance which affects flexibility in a (commercial) market 
setting and the other way round. 
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summarises the expected position of ZBO types in relation to supply and autonomy from 
Parliament and minister.  
Table 10.2: Different supply models per ZBO type 
Autonomy Low     High 
Supply Consolidated 
provision 
Contract 
provision 
Structural 
grant 
provision 
Regulated 
provision 
Start-up grant 
provision 
Private 
provision 
PLA 0 +++ + ++ 0 0 
PLB 0 ++ ++ ++ + * 
Legend: 
0: not applicable; +: may exist; ++ likely to exist; +++ highly likely to exist * only in hybrid ZBOs 
 
In this subsection, it was shown that using ZBOs for the production of services can be 
regarded as a form of privatisation of supply. The hierarchical structure of government no 
longer controls the full production process which means that there is no case of 
„consolidated production‟. Government‟s role is reduced to planning and/or funding the 
services produced. Using a ZBO for a single service cannot be classified as a form of 
„pure privatisation‟ because government still has control over at least one element in the 
production process. 
10.3 Demand: funding as an autonomy indicator 
10.3.1 Introduction 
Provision of government services is based on two factors. The first is the desire to provide 
a particular service such as security. The second element is the actual production of the 
service. In the previous section, supply was discussed. In this section the emphasis is on 
demand and in particular the possibilities for privatising demand. The key issue in this 
section is funding of public services as an expression of demand generated. Whether or 
not demand can be privatised depends on the market characteristics of a service which 
can be analysed from theory on public goods. If a service is classified as a public good, it 
means that the possibilities for generating demand are different from services that can 
be classified as market goods. I recall that in the legal section, I have classified demand 
into four categories based on contract relationships, ranging from full state demand to 
free market demand. Full state demand may be an indication that a particular service 
qualifies as a public good. Using a market categorisation is meant to identify relevant 
players in the market; not to define the level of aggregate demand. When different 
(groups) of individuals can be identified as generating demand, it is possible to assess a 
range of forms of funding of services, ranging from general taxation if demand is fully 
generated by the State to market prices if demand is fully individually driven. 
The debate on funding government services is not new. In Medieval Europe personal 
services between lord and vassal were the basis of protection and other (public) services. 
With the revival of the financial system, the growth of cities and the development of 
mercenary armies, there was a need to fund public services by financial resources 
instead of by personal services (Grapperhaus, 1989, p. 11). This development was 
reinforced by the collective interests of those who paid the contributions to the lord. A 
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fine Dutch example of this basic concept of funding is the contribution to a regional water 
board which had – and still has – the task of protecting citizens in their jurisdiction from 
flooding. It was only after the end of the Feudal system that general forms of taxation 
were introduced and the role of contributions for public services was reduced. This 
resulted in funding of goods and services either on the basis of private prices and supply 
or public supply funded by taxation. In modern times, the need to fund public supply 
through taxation is contested, both on ideological grounds and with economic arguments. 
The core of the economic argument lies in the problems that result from the ex ante 
governance system, requiring rationality and full information in order to be able to plan 
production. The critique on the ex ante governance system, reinforced by fiscal distress in 
many countries particularly from the 1980s onwards and changes in technology to pay 
for government services led to reassessment of funding of public services. For example, 
several Dutch local governments nowadays charge citizens per unit of household waste 
collected rather than based on a standard price per household (Dekkers, 2007; Van 
Genugten, 2008). 
I will start with a short description of differences between funding, financing and 
subsidising. These three forms of cash payments to an organisation have different 
impacts on the supply of and demand for services (section 10.3.2). The next step focuses 
on market characteristics of services provided by discussing the public good concept in 
section 10.3.3. In section 10.3.4, this is followed by a general description of prices and 
taxes as an introduction to the several forms of funding that are used in the public sector. 
Finally, section 10.4 provides a summary of the impact of the market for ZBO services on 
autonomy. 
10.3.2 Funding, Financing and Subsidising 
Once the infrastructure in terms of assets is available, an organisation can produce and 
will be paid for the production delivered. This basic model holds for all producing entities, 
be it traditional government or a private company. The resources used to set up the 
infrastructure of an organisation is generally referred to as financing, whereas the 
resources that are generated from operations by means of sale of production is labelled 
revenue or funding. In the following subsections, I will elaborate on the differences 
between funding, financing and subsidising as different types of resources for an 
organisation.   
10.3.2.1 Funding 
Mol (2008, p. 258-259) identifies two main cash flows to and from an organisation. The 
primary cash flows have to do with the operations of the organisation – in the words of 
Bhimani, Horngren, Datar and Foster (2008, p. 475) the operating budgets – consisting 
of incoming cash flows related to production. In this section, emphasis is on the incoming 
cash flow from operations. In a commercial setting, these incoming cash flows are 
labelled as revenues. Bhimani et al (2008, p. 944) refer to them as an „..inflow of assets 
received in exchange for products or services provided to customers.‟ Horngren, Sundem, 
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Stratton, Burgstahler and Schatzberg (2011, p. 640) state that revenues are increases in 
ownership claims arising from the delivery of goods and services. The IPSASB defined 
revenues in IPSAS1 as „gross inflow of economic benefits or service potential during the 
reporting period when these inflows result in an increase in net assets/equity, other than 
increases relating to contributions from owners.‟ All these definitions have the common 
feature of affecting the aggregated equity of an organisation. They differ in scope as the 
IPSAS definition does not have an immediate relationship to a reciprocal transaction – 
delivery of services – as do the other definitions mentioned.  In more general terms, 
revenues reflect the relationship between the actual cost of production (expenses), 
including matching the costs of using assets to the transfer of a good or service to the 
commissioner who will use the goods delivered. Ultimately, it is the cash payment for a 
service delivered.  
From the IPSAS definition, it can be derived that a reciprocal transaction is not always 
required in a public sector environment. Revenue in a public sector setting does not even 
need to be voluntary and can be regarded as a contribution paid by the commissioner – 
in this case not necessarily user – of a service to cover costs incurred. As the concept 
revenue is used differently in public and private sector settings, I will use funding rather 
than revenues when I refer to a payment either made in exchange for a directly delivered 
public service or as a (partial) compensation for indirectly delivered public services. By 
making a distinction between directly and indirectly delivered public services, there is no 
requirement for a direct exchange or claim on a particular service by the one who is 
funding the service. Two examples illustrate the difference. Supplying a passport to an 
individual results in a direct exchange of funding and service, if the individual receiving 
the passport actually pays for it. Funding of a monitoring institution results in delivery of 
services to society as a whole. Those who actually pay the monitoring institution have no 
claim on a particular individual service from the monitoring institution; they merely 
compensate the monitoring institution for incurred costs.  
In a public sector environment funding is a contribution by the commissioner and not 
necessarily the user of a service. Furthermore, it does not always reflect the price a 
commissioner is willing to pay for a service as is the case in a market setting. The choices 
made in the process of calculating full cost recovery determine the sources of funding as 
a combination of (cost) price and – when desired - contributions from government 
budget. The result of this combination is reflected in the income statement of the 
organisation delivering the service (IPSAS1:7).143 In a market setting, commissioner and 
user of a service are in general the same individual or entity which is also a relevant 
distinction in the public sector. Funding can be considered to be equal to prices if the 
consumer has a choice in a market between different suppliers or has the option not to 
consume the service. In most ZBO cases a pure pricing system is unlikely because at 
least one of these two conditions is not met. Only under the accruals accounting system 
                                                 
143 The income statement shows the expenses and revenues that have lead to the profit or loss reported. 
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can the concept of financing be used to express the relationship between the financial 
resources used to obtain the necessary assets for (government) production. 
10.3.2.2 Financing 
Whereas funding is related to (in)direct service delivery, financing is related to the 
resources used to cover capital expenditures (e.g. Brealy and Myers, 1991, p, 287; Groot 
& Van Helden, 2003, p. 105). Financing of capital expenditures comes in two forms. The 
first form is equity, the risk-bearing capital in the organisation, provided by the owners or 
shareholders. The second form is long and short term debts, the relatively low-risk capital 
usually provided by banks and suppliers. In the public sector, equity is a complicated 
concept, as there is in many cases no owner who can claim a share of risk-bearing capital 
and residual income. Equity in this case is a result from the accumulated „profits‟ and 
‟losses‟, in some cases reinforced by voluntary cash payments (gifts) from stakeholders. 
In the IPSAS standards, equity is described as „net assets/equity‟, the residual interest in 
the assets of the entity after deducting all its liabilities (IPSAS1:7).  
Financing is relevant from a perspective of having access to cash flows that allow an 
infrastructure needed for operations to be set up. In a commercial setting, an entity will 
need access to the capital markets when raising financing is required. In a public sector 
setting, more particularly ZBOs, it will depend on the particular arrangements made. 
Financing can be realised by borrowing from the State, grants from the State, access to 
the capital markets by either issuing bonds or generating equity from the capital market 
as well as from accumulated positive results from operations. Given the legal measures 
(CW2001:45) direct access to capital markets is currently excluded for most ZBOs. 
10.3.2.3 Subsidies 
A last concept to be discussed is a subsidy. A subsidy can be described as a financial 
contribution by someone who is not necessarily using a service of the entity that is 
granted the financial contribution (see e.g. Mol, 1998, p. 224). In more general macro-
economic terms, subsidising is referred to as income transfers (see e.g. Goedhart, 1958, 
p. 52; Eijgelshoven, Nentjes & Van Velthoven, 1996, p. 288-289). Eijgelshoven et al. refer 
to two types of income transfers. First, restricted income transfers are meant to be spent 
on a particular project or activity, which might include buying assets. Second, unrestricted 
income transfers are fully at the disposal of the receiving entity. A subsidy is generally 
given on an objectively assessable basis and may be accompanied by reporting and 
spending conditions independent of demand for services. In a subsidy case, the user of 
the service provided is not the same as the one who has transferred the cash flow. If a 
link to demand for services is relevant, there is a case of reciprocity between provider of 
the cash payment and the receiving party which demands that the receiving party does 
deliver to or on behalf of the provider. To be clearer an example may be helpful. Central 
government can require that entrance to higher education must be given to anyone who 
has the relevant qualifications. The individual in question may be made responsible for 
funding (part of) the education program. If they are unable to pay, government may 
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decide to grant a subsidy to the individual to make it possible for them to participate in 
the relevant courses. Another solution is to subsidise or fund the institution providing 
higher education to allow the institution to reduce the fees charged to individuals to 
participate in the program. In this example, the individual is the final user of the service 
whereas commissioning and funding are performed under the responsibility of the 
minister of education, resulting in a citizen‟s request contract form. 
A last point to be made is that if government provides the risk bearing capital in the 
form of a voluntary cash payment without any corresponding service delivered by the 
receiving organisation, that cash payment can be regarded as a (start-up) subsidy. 
Depending on possible restrictions set when the subsidy is granted, the receiving 
organisation is basically allowed to use the payment at its own discretion.  
The difference between funding and subsidy is relevant for two reasons. Funding has 
a relation to supply and demand and the options that may exist to privatise demand. 
Subsidising can lower the fee charged to a user of the service and as a result can have 
an impact on the level of demand. Subsidising does not affect the options for privatising 
demand because it does not affect the characteristics of the service to be provided. 
Furthermore as a result of their production processes, „income transfer‟ ZBOs provide 
cash payments that have the character of a subsidy (grant).144 When assessing the 
position of such an autonomised organisation, the cash flow generated with respect to 
the distributed subsidies is not relevant for the costs of the production process and 
should be excluded. 
10.3.3 Public Services 
In a market setting a service is provided to an individual in exchange for payment. No 
other individual than the one who has demanded the service and has paid for it, has the 
right to have the benefits of that service. In a public setting, the opposite is true. An 
individual can demand a service, be willing to pay for it but cannot exclude others from 
having the same benefits without simultaneously paying for the service. Classic public 
goods/services (Cullis & Jones, 1998, p. 50; Hillman, 2003, p. 63-65; Rosen, 2005, p. 
55-58) have the characteristic of being non-excludable and non-rival. Rosen (2005, p. 
58) states that whether or not a service is regarded as a public service depends on 
market conditions and technology and may vary over time. Furthermore, public services 
need not necessarily be produced by government. In the case of household waste 
collection (Van Genugten, 2008), government can hire private firms to actually do the 
work. Government also has the option to charge citizens by means of a general tax, but it 
is also possible that government permits citizens to pay on the basis of the quantity of 
waste produced by the citizen.  
Production of a public service will in most cases have a monopolistic character; there 
is only one provider who is allowed to deliver the service. To simulate a market setting, a 
                                                 
144 In the example of higher education, in the present (2009) Dutch system, the „grant‟ actually is a mixture 
of subsidy and financing. 
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tendering procedure can be used to select the most efficient provider. This provider will 
then be allowed to provide the service for a specified period of time, after which a new 
tendering procedure is started.  
If either non-excludability or non-rivalness can be contested, the service is regarded 
as an impure public service. Depending on the characteristics of the service, government 
can regulate access to the service by pricing or other requirements resulting in thresholds 
to have access to a market. Take for example a toll road. By using a fee, government can 
try to influence levels of congestion, thus influencing demand. The same tool may also 
have an effect on the supply of transport services: suppose taxis have to pay the fee just 
like private individuals in their own cars. The fee charged from the taxi driver may result 
in a hurdle for access in the taxi market if the fee cannot be priced into the taxi service. 
As a result, supply of taxis will fall until reduced supply allows taxi fares to rise to a level 
that covers the fees imposed upon the taxi driver.  
In case of impure non-rival services, the marginal costs of providing the service to an 
additional individual are zero. Alternatively the costs of excluding an individual can be 
excessively high, resulting in a practical obstacle to exclude an individual. In the first 
case, one can argue that the supply side perspective seems to be leading: the producer is 
indifferent how many individuals are using the service. Actual service delivery is still 
based on demand for services. This implies that funding of the service has a tax based 
characteristic in order to avoid free rider problems (Cullis & Jones, 1998, p. 48). In the 
case of non-excludability, demand is the problem: it is not possible to influence demand 
by supply driven tools because it is expected that the costs incurred to implement 
thresholds are too high. If both non-excludability and non-rivalness can be overcome, a 
publicly provided service actually has the character of a market service. An example of 
this is found in publicly provided housing: excludability and rivalness exists by charging 
rents and leasing the house to a single tenant. In Table 10.3 a summary of the variety of 
(im)pure public services is given. 
Table 10.3: Pure and impure public services 
 Pure public service Impure supply 
driven public 
service 
Impure demand 
driven public 
service 
Market service 
Non-excludable Y Y - - 
Non-rival Y _ y - 
 
In this study, it is not the impact on demand and supply of (impure) public services that is 
under scrutiny. The emphasis is on the production of these services on behalf of 
government by a ZBO. The definition of a ZBO includes ZBO services being characterised 
by a unilateral decision on behalf of government. This suggests that ZBO services can be 
characterised as either pure or impure public services. However, a ZBO may even provide 
authoritative public services that can be characterised as market services rather than as 
im(pure) public services. The „RDW‟ case already mentioned in Part A is an example of 
this. Motor vehicle registration is a service that is performed solely for a single 
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user/owner of the car. No one else has a claim at the same time on that particular 
registration; hence the service has an excludable and rival character. 
The key distinction in services provided from a control perspective is between market 
services, which allow control under Smith‟s invisible hand and (im)pure public services for 
which a form of budgetary control is required. The relevance of the distinction between 
pure and demand driven impure public services on the one hand and impure supply 
driven and market public services on the other is found in the theoretical possibilities for 
funding alternatives. A traditional and a non rival public service can only be funded by 
taxes given the free rider problem implied by the characteristics of the service and thus 
requires a democratically based allocation mechanism. In case of demand driven impure 
as well as market public services funding may be realised by forms of contributions from 
users as price can be used to discriminate between users. This has an impact on controls 
including the budget authorisation process and the ex post controls to be used by 
Parliament to monitor the activities of the various ZBOs. 
10.3.4 Privatisation of demand 
In this section, I discuss the possibilities of changing funding from general taxation into 
forms of funding that have a relation to particular services delivered by government. Lane 
(2000, p. 157) refers to privatisation of demand as a tool that „..strengthens the 
willingness of individuals to pay.‟ I will start with a general elaboration on privatisation of 
demand and then focus on the two key forms that can be identified, authority biased 
funding and market biased funding. The section is concluded by providing an overview of 
the various (sub)types of funding that were identified.  
10.3.4.1 General theory 
In the case of private service provision, funding a service is based on a (cost)price that is 
immediately related to an individually identifiable service (Mol, 1998, p. 147). Pricing is 
the financial reflection of a clearing market for supply and demand of services, under the 
conditions of open competition and full information available to all parties.  
Prices imply that the services have an excludable and rival character. In case of a 
pure public good, these characteristics do not exist and thus some other form of funding 
has to be found, generally referred to as taxes. A tax can be defined as a forced transfer 
of money (or payment in kind) to government without compensation in return. Being 
enforced however does not affect the fact that citizens in a democratic society have 
chosen in freedom to accept that taxation influences their control of individual income 
and property (Grapperhaus, 1989, p. 11). The allocation mechanism used in the political 
system is an expression of the ex ante governance model for the distribution of tax-
funded services provided by the (democratically elected) government. 
 
As indicated, fiscal motives and technology have led to a change in thinking on funding of 
government services. The theoretical notions on using privatised funding are very 
generally provided by Stiglitz (2000, p. 457-475) when he claims that a good tax system 
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should not interfere with the allocation of resources. Bohley (1980, p. 917) mentions 
three motives for non-tax government income. First he mentions the issue of efficiency, 
both Pareto-efficiency as well as cost-efficiency. Second, non-tax income gives 
opportunities to decentralise decision making whereas taxation demands central 
allocation decisions. He even notes that it might be possible for some services to be paid 
for by (small) specific groups, who have a special interest in that service, while if the 
service had been funded by taxes, the service would not be provided at all. Such a case 
exists when the majority of tax-payers have no interest in the service demanded by the 
group for which the service is relevant. Finally, non-tax income can be used as a tool for 
economic interventions (e.g. using environmental levies).  
To these rational motives another, less rational motive can be added. The California 
1978 Proposition 13 was the expression of a trend in the USA to limit the level of 
taxation. Actually it was the first initiative that restricted the ability of local governments 
to raise taxes. Thus government had two options, either reduce spending or find other 
ways of funding their activities. Anderson (1991, p. 13) shows that public opinion would 
accept other sources of funding above general raises in taxation. These developments 
have resulted in a revival of forms of charging for public services. The idea of using 
charges is not limited to the USA alone. The Thatcher administration in the UK strongly 
focused on privatisation and charging and Canada, Australia and New Zealand are also 
known examples of countries using charges (Blair Consulting Group, 1999; GPOC, 2002). 
In the Dutch context, forms of non-tax prices can traditionally be found at the local level, 
in the (former) State enterprises and more recently also in entities at arm‟s length of 
central government.  
Using charges instead of taxes also has disadvantages as Bennet and DiLorenzo 
(1983) show. They find that there is a substantial risk that without adequate control 
mechanisms the budget of non-tax funded public organisations will rise at the expense of 
the users of government services.145 Implicitly this is a plea for budgetary control of 
privately funded government services and thus a plea for a form of ex ante control as 
well. 
 
By introducing a form of prices to be charged for individual services, rather than using 
general taxes, funding is transferred to those individuals that use a particular government 
service.146 The process of changing the funding basis of services is labelled privatisation 
of demand (Boorsma & Mol, 1983). Unlike the variety of options described under 
privatisation of supply, privatisation of demand exists as one single option: to let (groups 
of) individuals pay for the service either by market prices or by (full cost covering) 
contributions. By privatising demand, a shift towards ex post oriented governance 
                                                 
145 Of course monopolists in general have an incentive to raise prices at the expense of consumers. In an 
open market, there is always a possibility of a new competitor contesting the monopolist‟s position. This 
does not hold in a regulated market as is the case with ZBOs. 
146 A voucher giving access to a particular service can also be regarded as a form of creating demand for a 
service. However, it ultimately results in funding by government which has issued the voucher. 
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systems is expected especially when market prices can be used. In the case of 
privatisation of demand, the individual can match demand to individual preferences and 
thus can indirectly influence the level of production. In the end this may lead to more 
efficient production and a withdrawal of the budget mechanism in favour of the market 
mechanism (adapted from Boorsma & Mol, 1983, p. 22-23). When the market 
mechanism takes over, democratic control of production is – from the perspective of 
demand - no longer required. Thus, using other forms of funding rather than traditional 
general taxation may have an impact on service provider autonomy. When contributions 
are used, there is no pure market mechanism. There is still an immediate link between 
use of service and payment generated which does not exist in cases where general 
taxation forms the basis of funding a service. 
The literature suggests numerous labels for the prices to be paid for the delivery of 
government services, ranging from contributions (e.g. Pierson, 1913) to prices (e.g. 
Bohley, 1980). All of these labels have their specific characteristics and are related to the 
commissioning perspective – the contracting models – as described in Part B. The 
classification of types of funding is relevant because from a legal perspective, taxes can 
only imposed by law, whereas for other forms of fees no general regulations exist. This 
means that in the latter case, democratic control by Parliament is at least reduced. The 
classification of fees as a form of taxes or otherwise is thus relevant, not only from a 
formal perspective, but also because it is an indication of the autonomy of the 
organisation that charges fees. An elaboration on the variety of forms of privatised 
funding is therefore necessary.  
 
The formal distinction in legislation between taxes and prices requires all forms of citizen 
funding to be classified on the basis of this distinction, because classification as a tax 
has a different impact on autonomy than classification as a price. Given the context of 
demand and supply that is at the heart of the analysis in this section, I will categorise 
fees under two groups that have (a) an authority bias – suggesting a tax resemblance – 
or (b) a market bias suggesting that individual demand and supply are relevant for the 
payment of fees by citizens.  
10.3.4.2 Authority biased funding 
Public services which still have a non-excludable character need not to be paid for by 
general taxation. In a US context, Buchanan (1991, p. 159), claims that earmarked taxes 
have some relation to services provided. According to this author the fact that earmarked 
taxes exist is based on constitutional restrictions on the imposition of taxes in general. 
Similarly, Anderson (1991, p. 15-17) makes a link to compulsory services of government 
for which earmarked taxes are used to „reimburse government for the costs of the 
provision of the service‟. In practice, the relation between actual costs and earmarked 
taxes paid is weak. Musgrave (1959, p. 178) mentions earmarking of taxes as a tool in 
the allocation branch of government and later adds that (earmarked) taxes are 
compulsory and do not result in a liability for government as is the case when a price is 
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charged (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989, p. 211-212). In a Dutch context, real147 
earmarked taxes are hard to find. A good example is probably the levy imposed by water 
boards used for flood protection.  
In Taylor‟s (1961, p. 250-254) classification, an opening is made to differentiate in 
the domain of compulsory payments. Taylor separates administrative revenues that are 
related to authoritative decisions made by government from taxation, implying that a form 
of reciprocity may also apply for authoritative services. In German and Dutch literature, 
this distinction is developed even further. Authors like Goedhart (1958), Mol (1998) and 
Grossekettler (2000) make a distinction between „retributions‟ for authoritative services 
– for example a passport - which have a reciprocal character and a „levy‟ – see the case 
of the water boards above - in the case of an individual service without a direct reciprocal 
liability by government. Mol (1998, p. 145-146) notes that the difference between 
retributions and levies is not very large and merely institutional, which means that in case 
of levies a public law decision has to be made to set the level of the charge. This is not 
required in case of retributions. In both cases, the services provided have a kind of 
reciprocal character. Neumark (1961, p. 323-334) did not make the distinction and 
labelled all authoritative individual transfers as levies. Whether or not the distinction 
retribution/levy is used, recovery of total costs seems to be the limit for the level of the 
retribution to be paid because the service provided is characterised by a partial individual 
benefit as well as a benefit to society as a whole (Goedhart, 1958, p. 83). Mol (1998, p. 
149) notes that for Dutch local governments this rule was institutionalised in 1990.148  
The word „levy‟ or „contribution‟149 is however also used in the context of non 
reciprocal services for a particular group of users rather than related to an individual 
user. Pierson (1913, p. 578) distinguishes these levies from „prices‟/‟user charges‟ for 
two reasons. The first reason is the lack of individual access to a benefit, the other that 
such contributions do not affect individual demand.  Goedhart (1975, p. 126-127) 
identifies two kinds of contributions. The first is related to quasi-collective services such 
as social insurance premiums, the other is related to „betterment-taxes‟ or „special 
assessments‟150 which are charged as an instrument to recover private benefits as a 
result of public improvements, especially in infrastructure. In the latter case, the 
relationship to government production is rather weak; there is no liability from 
government towards the contributors. The private benefit is in many cases the result of 
side effects of public decisions; whereas quasi-collective services are intended to provide 
benefit towards those who pay the contributions. Freeman and Shoulders classify the 
                                                 
147 In the Netherlands a road tax is charged on owners of motor vehicles. Although the name suggests that 
there is a link to road maintenance costs, the revenues actually form part of government general 
funding in its fiscal revenues plan rather than dedicated income in relation to the department of 
infrastructure‟s budget. 
148 In fact the rule has been re-institutionalised. Pierson (1913, p. 406) noted that before 1897 GW had a 
similarly strong requirement. 
149 In German the word is „Beitrag‟; Pierson (1913, p. 578) refers to this word when discussing 
contributions. 
150 in Dutch: baatbelasting; article 222 GemW. 
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special assessments under taxes which can be paid during a longer period (Freeman & 
Shoulders, 2000, p. 267). In Anglo Saxon literature, these charges on a particular group 
of beneficiaries do not seem to be of much interest, the only reference I found was in 
Freeman and Shoulders (2000, p. 197 and p. 722) who use the word „contribution‟ for 
voluntary non reciprocal transactions to government or non government not-for-profits. 
This is an essentially different approach: the Dutch and German interpretation implies a 
compulsory rather than a voluntary payment made by a particular group. 
10.3.4.3 Market biased funding 
Funding of government services based on the provision of services towards society as a 
whole is generally recognised as taxes. At the other end of the scale, when government 
provides services to individuals, these payments are generally referred to as „(public) 
prices‟ (e.g. Goedhart, 1958, p. 77) or „user charges‟ (e.g. Anderson, 1991, p. 15), or 
more generally, fees. In general, funding of (reciprocal) services that are provided based 
on citizen demand is also labelled as prices (Pierson, 1913, p. 404-407; Goedhart, 1958, 
p. 77; Mol, 1998, p. 146-147). Van de Kar, cited in Groenendijk (1998, p. 155) makes a 
slightly different distinction when he refers to the voluntary character of the reciprocal 
service. If the reciprocal service provided is compulsory (e.g. local government 
restructuring a shopping area), then Van de Kar uses benefit tax rather than price. A 
similar distinction is found in Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, p. 211-212) although they 
label a voluntary payment as a user charge. Groenendijk classifies Van de Kar‟s 
distinction as inadequate because the voluntary character of a government service can 
be disputed. In Groenendijk‟s opinion, as long as demand is generated by citizens, 
payment by citizens qualifies as prices. 
The demand driven character of prices/user charges is emphasised by authors like 
Hillman (2003) who mention the option of using a service as a distinctive feature. Mills 
(1987, p. 767-768) states that the only distinction between a (market) price and a user 
charge is supply by government rather than by private institutions. The OECD (1998) 
seems to have an ambiguous approach. On the one hand, they state that the „legal 
authority‟ for charging must be clearly defined (OECD, 1998, p. 7), suggesting an 
authoritative rather than a reciprocal relation between payment and service. On the other 
hand, the examples given by the OECD range from road pricing and medical service 
pricing to charging for fire fighting, which almost covers all areas of government. A user 
charge in an OECD context is thus anything that is not classified as a general tax.  
Other concepts that are used for reciprocal services are „quid pro quo payments‟ 
(Reed & Swan, 1990, p. 77-83) for any reciprocal government service. Reed and Swan 
use „user fees‟ for cases where government provides business like services such as 
public utilities or health services. Taylor (1961, p. 250-254) uses „commercial revenues‟ 
for payments having a direct relation between receiving a commodity or service and a 
corresponding payment, distinguishing them from „administrative revenues‟ and taxes. 
Although Groves and Bish (1973, p. 304-318) reserve „price‟ for public utility charges and 
„fees‟ for payments regarding privileges or rights given by government, their approach is 
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still based on freedom of choice and thus on demand driven supply. Neumark (1961, p. 
323-334) differentiates between prices if the supplying organisation‟s objective is to at 
least recover full costs. He uses „tax prices‟ if prices should not exceed full costs. 
However, in both cases demand is still optional. Neumark‟s distinction has an impact on 
the budgetary procedures as well. Prices can be budgeted on a net income basis – 
suggesting economic independence of the organisation as illustrated by Neumark‟s 
examples of public utilities and government enterprises. Tax prices should, in Neumark‟s 
opinion be budgeted on a gross basis because of the normative claim that the tax price 
should not exceed – and is often actually below – full costs. 
In general, one can conclude that prices and user charges are concepts used in 
relation to demand driven reciprocal commodities and services provided by government. 
An important point was made by Neumark, when he claimed that if funding does not 
exceed full costs, gross budgeting is required. This results in a dichotomy of market 
biased funding: tax prices if only recovery of costs is allowed and prices if funding can be 
based on a cost plus basis. 
10.3.5 Impact of privatisation of demand 
The analysis presented above is based on the various types of charges that exist, not on 
the underlying cost calculations that are needed to determine the level of the charge to 
be claimed from citizens. When studying funding of an individual ZBO, cost calculation 
will be an issue if the ZBO produces more than one single service and has a variety of 
funding sources. In that case, the attribution of costs towards the different services is 
subject to arbitrary choices. This might even be more relevant in those cases where the 
different services are funded from different sources. In such cases there are risks of 
cross subsidisation, which may have an effect on demand, resulting in inefficient 
allocations. Cross subsidisation is especially relevant when an organisation provides 
services based on both reciprocal demand driven services as well as non authoritative 
services. Essentially, this has been discussed from the hybridity perspective by authors 
like In „t Veld (1995) and Simon (1989, 2005). In effect, that means that budgetary 
controls on authoritative services can be avoided at the expense of the reciprocal 
services to be delivered. This is possible because in most cases, the reciprocal services 
will still be provided in a monopolistic setting rather than a competitive setting. If that is 
the case, using adapted forms of ex ante governance tools such as setting price limits 
might prevent abuse by the monopolistic supplier of the services. 
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By now it is possible to identify the main forms of funding that may be used in the public 
sector in general. Table 10.4 provides an overview of the variety that exists. 
Table 10.4: Concepts and classification of forms of funding in the public sector 
 Type of charge Characteristics 
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 b
ia
s
 Tax Sovereign task, Non reciprocal, All Subjects, Unilaterally determined, 
Gross Budgeting 
Contribution Sovereign task, Non reciprocal, Group of Subjects, Unilaterally 
determined, maximum recovery of full costs, Gross Budgeting 
Levy Sovereign task, Non reciprocal, Individuals, Unilaterally determined, 
maximum recovery of full costs, Gross Budgeting 
M
a
rk
e
t 
b
ia
s
 
Tax Price Demand driven, Reciprocal, Individuals, Unilaterally determined, 
recovery of full costs + allowed, Gross budgeting 
Price Demand driven, Reciprocal, Individuals, Market controlled, at least 
recovery of full costs, Net Budgeting  
 
Two main criteria are relevant in this study: if funding is based on demand driven criteria, 
this is an indication for a market bias – not a market base as there is no real market for 
ZBO services - in the determination of the level of funding for the services. Second, there 
is a distinction between forms of funding that should cover full costs as a maximum and 
those for which full costs plus a profit151 is allowed. In the latter case, the organisation 
charging these forms of funding is in theory economically independent and thus has 
relatively more autonomy than entities that are only allowed to cover full costs. From a 
neo-institutional perspective, it means that a residual income is available and that 
arrangements have to be made on the use or distribution of the residual income. 
Furthermore, from a transaction cost perspective, one can argue that if market biased 
funding can be used, demand ultimately determines production and monitoring can focus 
on the distribution of residual income rather than compliance to costs and production 
levels. That means that transaction costs may be relatively low.  
If only recovery of full costs is allowed, Neumark‟s statement that in that case budgets 
should be based on gross budgets is relevant as an indication for an ex ante control tool 
with respect to the services delivered. Monitoring in this case is likely to be more 
restrictive due to lack of transparency on demand which allows management to use the 
information gap between owner and agent of the organisation. That will lead to increased 
transaction costs. Basically authority biased funding means implies that no structural 
residual income is available. As a result, no property rights arrangements need to be 
made with respect to residual income.  
From the perspective of autonomy of ZBOs, funding can be based on two main 
sources: 1) authority biased privatised funding which still requires an ex ante control tool 
and 2) demand driven market biased funding which allows for relatively more autonomy. 
As the tasks assigned to ZBOs have an authoritative character, an ex ante control tool will 
likely dominate the field. Particular attention is needed for the case where a mixture of 
market biased funding and authoritative funding exists. 
                                                 
151 Or theoretical compensation for additional value received from using the public service (Pierson, 1913) 
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10.4 Activities and services provided 
In the previous sections, focus was on the market for public services. Demand and supply 
may result in different forms of determining control of production levels. The actual 
production process that emerges from supply and demand is affected by characteristics 
of the services to be provided. This has an impact on possibilities for control as well.  
In their conclusions on a study of executive agencies, Pollitt et al. (2004, p 265) note 
that it is extraordinary that „…some texts can discuss particular organisational structures 
and processes at length without ever specifying the particular activities to which they are 
supposed to apply‟. I share their opinion that one cannot understand control of entities at 
arm‟s length of government without knowing what particular activities are performed by 
these organisations. In the case of ZBOs, the authoritative character of services provided 
is given by definition, but that does not give any clues to the activities that have to be 
performed to deliver these services. At first glance, one might argue that the definition 
also implies that there is a relation to the theory of public goods because government is 
the only institution that can impose unilateral decisions upon individuals as discussed 
before.  
Pollitt et al.‟s comment is reflected in debates on the types of services delivered by 
ZBOs. Smullen & Van Thiel (2002) made a classification of five main groups of services 
each with different characteristics (see Part A) which will be used in this study as well. To 
give an example, a decision on income transfers differs from a production process 
perspective from a research based decision. In this subsection, I will address the impact 
of differences in product characteristics when commissioning services. Emphasis is not 
on the different contract relations that are possible, but on the contents of the production 
contract needed to specify the production of a particular service. 
 
Controlling an organisation is a function of the production process in the organisation. 
Woodward (1965) identified three core types of production processes: mass production, 
unit production and process production. Mass production refers to standardised 
production of goods and services ready to be sold on demand, although in the case of 
services, production actually starts on demand. The mass production dimension is based 
on the standard procedure needed to deliver on demand rather than being delivered from 
stock in the case of goods. Unit production refers to custom made products and services 
based on the specifications or requirements of individual customers, including cases in 
which production is performed in small series produced to specific demand. Process 
production is related to continuous flow production, typically related to chemical 
processes. The control structure of these types of organisations is different. As process 
production is a typical industrial process, often found in chemical industries, it can be 
ignored here.  
Mintzberg (1979, p. 253) notes that mass production processes are characterised by 
high levels of regulation and impersonal controls whereas unit production and its 
varieties have less regulated controls. Applied to organisations in the public sector, 
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Kickert (1998, p. 91) differentiates between mass and serial production152 on the one 
hand and unit production on the other. He does not make unit production explicit as such 
but uses two separate groups of service providers that can be regarded as having the 
characteristics of unit production. These two groups are professional autonomous entities 
such as R&D units and higher education on the one hand and monitoring entities that 
focus on the compliance with legislation on the other hand. In both cases, a high level of 
professionalism is required and output cannot be strongly regulated. Kickert elaborates 
on the latter group by diversifying them into units with a relatively high level of policy-
based control (R&D and higher education) to units (compliance) for which policy based 
control is not desired for reasons of impartiality (Kickert, 1998, p. 142-150). 
Some 10 years before, Wilson observed that organisations could be classified along lines 
of measurability of outputs and outcomes (Wilson, 1989, p. 158-171). He argued that the 
four types of organisations identified require different forms of management control. 
Particularly in procedural and coping organisations, the lack of homogeneous outputs 
results in higher levels of degrees of freedom for staff (Wilson, 1989, p. 171).  
Wilson‟s classification has a relation to Kickert‟s classification. In general, one can 
argue that in the case of mass production of rule based decision making, outputs and 
outcomes can be expected to be observable, whereas in professional organisations, there 
can be a debate on whether or not outputs or outcomes can be observable. To illustrate 
the point from a ZBO perspective, the aforementioned „RDW‟ delivers observable rule 
based registrations, whereas the CBP is at best classified as a procedural organisation 
issuing rulings based on the professional assessment of legislation. From a transaction 
cost theory perspective, one can argue that RDW‟s decisions are of high frequency with 
low levels of uncertainty allowing for reduced transaction costs. In the CBP case, 
frequency is low, but specialised knowledge – asset specificity – may require close 
monitoring of operations although without intervening in the impartial character of the 
quasi judicial arrangement.  
 
A weak point in Wilson‟s typology is that output and outcome are characteristics within a 
similar dimension: without production no outcomes will be achieved except for the 
outcomes that were already achieved without intervention. The typology does allow for 
internal management control in terms of capabilities needed for internal controls (see 
Ouchi, 1979 and Hofstede, 1981). From a production perspective the model contributes 
to the commissioning process because it splits the commissioning process in two 
subgroups. In one group, identifiable production is commissioned that allows well 
described service specifications. In the other group, production cannot be clearly 
identified, which means that it is hard to provide adequate services specifications. As a 
result, next to the service specification, additional control arrangements are needed that 
align the interests of commissioner and service provider.  In chapter 11, I will discuss a 
                                                 
152 In the original concept, series production is a subgroup of unit production. 
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similar model that provides a relation towards budgeting and financial control even in 
cases where production cannot be precisely specified. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Type of organisation by characteristics of tasks (source: Wilson, 1989, p. 
158-171) 
 
Another form of classification that is closely related to Kickert‟s one is given by Abma and 
Noordegraaf (2003) who distinguish „routine‟ and „non-routine‟ production in 
organisations. This distinction is made in a context of ambiguous organisational goals 
and the possibility to respond to services delivered by consumers. This results in a matrix 
in which a one-sided interaction is opposed to a two-sided interaction. In the latter case, 
the service is a „negotiated outcome‟ of the interaction between producers and 
consumers. The model is attractive when studying the whole range of quangos, but in the 
case of ZBOs, the concept of a two-sided interaction is missing due to the unilateral 
authority attributed to a ZBO. As a result, only the routine – non-routine scale remains, 
which strongly resembles the mass production organisation – professional organisation 
scale already discussed. Yet another slightly different classification that resembles the 
mass production – professional organisation dichotomy is found in Smullen and Van Thiel 
(2002, p. 39), who use „output production‟ versus „expertise production‟. 
 
In Part A, I have distinguished 5 different types of services provided by ZBOs. The 
attractiveness of that classification can also be illustrated when it is compared to the 
mass production – professional unit production dichotomy as discussed above. In 
general, it is possible to claim that „stewardship‟, „income transfers‟ and „licensing‟ 
The economic dimensions of ZBO services   
 
212  Part C: Autonomy and control of ZBOS from an economic perspective 
 
activities have a strong rule driven, routine character. In these cases frequency and 
uncertainty are relevant aspects from a transaction cost perspective. Furthermore it 
allows for output based directives as well as incentives as described under positive 
agency theory. Stewardship and licensing services may be related to very specific 
activities, which are basically rule driven but have to be processed based on individual 
unique -  in terms of not similar to another case – demand which results in a 
classification of series or even unit production. An in depth analysis of product 
specifications is needed to understand the production processes in these cases. Only 
after doing so a statement on an expected control system can be given. „Monitoring‟ and 
„research‟ activities tend to have a professional „non-routine‟ character, including issues 
on asset specificity and control by persuasion rather than by incentives and authority. In 
some cases, similarities in monitoring and research activities may allow for series 
production as well. The different forms of production are illustrated in Table 10.5. 
Table 10.5: Production characteristics of ZBO services 
 Stewardship Income 
transfer 
Monitor Research Licensing 
Mass Production 
 
X X   X 
Series 
Production 
X  X X X 
Professional unit 
production 
X  X X X 
 
Within the main types of ZBO services, it is possible to identify sub-groups that may be 
more similar to each other than to the population of the group as a whole (Smullen & Van 
Thiel, 2002, p. 41). Such sub-groups will allow for a separate classification in production 
types whereas within the group as a whole, several production options are possible. An 
example from the research cluster is found in differences between quasi judicial services 
and training activities. These differences can be used to derive separate external control 
standards for each of these subgroups of services. 
10.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter economic dimensions of ZBO services were studied. I started by analysing 
supply. Provision of services can be organised in five different forms, ranging from 
consolidated provision by government to private provision in which government no longer 
has a role in the provisions of services.  In the case of ZBOs, the three varieties in 
between are the most relevant options. In the contract provision model, government 
funds and plans production, reducing the demand side of services to a relatively 
subordinate matter. Contract provision thus has strong government controls which are an 
indication of relatively low levels of autonomy given the tasks assigned to ZBOs. Actual 
autonomy within the contract provision framework may still vary due to the differences in 
funding, ranging from lump sum budgets to individual service based payments. 
In the grant provision case, government only (partially) funds services. Although 
government does not plan the services, it can use its power related to grant provision to 
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specify requirements for the quality of services to be delivered. The relevance of demand 
in the grant provision case is higher compared to the contract provision model, but the 
autonomy for the ZBO providing the service will still depend on the requirements 
government imposes upon the use of the grants. When service provision options are 
combined with the demand forms as identified in Part B, the following options result:  
Table 10.6: Relation between demand and provision of services 
 Role citizen Funding 
Consolidated 
provision 
Contract 
provision 
Grant 
provision 
Regulated 
provision 
Private 
provision 
Full state 
demand 
user Taxes X X    
Citizens 
request 
user 
Authority 
bias 
X X X   
Citizens 
demand 
user/ 
commissioner 
Market 
bias 
  X X  
Free 
market 
demand 
commissioner/ 
consumer 
Price     X 
 
The model in Table 10.6 holds for those cases where service provision is based on a 
single contract relation for a single type of demand. If multiple contract relations exist, 
conflicts of interest may emerge which is particularly relevant if the main features of 
contract relations are essentially different. Simon (1989, 2005) noted that service 
provision based on a mixture of task and market services will result in a control system 
that fits only one of the two types of services at the expense of control for other services. 
Applied to this study, it means that if revenues are generated from different services, 
additional attention for control arrangements is needed. 
The second issue discussed in this chapter is funding from a demand perspective. If 
citizens pay for a service, there are several funding options. Two main types can be 
identified: market biased forms of funding which are strongly demand driven and allow 
for recovery of full costs or full costs plus profit. The other group consists of authority 
biased fees, used for non-reciprocal services and for which recovery of full costs is 
regarded as the maximum level of the fee to be charged. ZBOs that can use market 
biased fees have a relatively higher level of autonomy than those that can only use 
authority biased fees.  
By definition, contract provision and consolidated provision of services imply that 
funding is realised by taxes because government funds and plans production. If 
government does not fully fund services, citizens must pay for at least part of the 
services. In a grant provision case, funding can either be authority biased or market 
biased depending on the question of whether or not the citizen can be regarded as 
commissioner of the service. In regulated and private provision cases, market biased 
funding can be used, resulting in tax prices in case of regulated provision and market 
prices if no government intervention exists at all. 
From a neo-institutional perspective, authority biased fees can be associated with 
relatively high transaction costs as management has to comply with rules rather than 
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being stimulated by incentives. In case of market biased fees, a structural residual 
income is theoretically allowed which means that incentive arrangements on behalf of 
management can be made. Furthermore, demand is more transparent and allows for 
relatively unsophisticated control tools reducing transaction costs. 
 
Not only has supply and demand impact on the control tools needed for delivering ZBO 
services. Product characteristics have an effect on how production can be organised and 
what types of control tools are needed to manage production. If relatively simple control 
tools can be used, that means that autonomy of the organisation can increase compared 
to a similar type of organisation in which complex control tools are needed. From a 
production process perspective, two issues were found relevant. First production 
processes range from (standardised) mass production to professional unit production. 
Mass production can be controlled on rules whereas in case of professional unit 
production skills and competences of individuals are important. The latter ones are more 
difficult to control from a commissioner perspective. Second, possibilities for control are 
influenced by possibilities to measure production outputs and outcomes. If it is hard to 
measure production, again it will require additional control tools compared to a case that 
does allow measurement. 
The knowledge on the variety in control given the production characteristics can be 
applied on ZBOs. Literature suggests that not all public services are similar. In general 
this is insufficiently accounted for in debates on controlling arm‟s length organisations 
(Pollitt, 2004, p. 265). I will use a categorisation of five types of ZBO services based on 
earlier studies on Dutch arm‟s length organisations. On a very general level, income 
transfer, stewardship and licensing services allow for mass production. In the latter two 
cases, a case based assessment is needed because complexity might result in unit based 
production as well. Particularly monitoring and research services are produced in a 
complex setting and need control tools in line with complexity. That means that from a 
comparative perspective these two categories of services generate higher levels of 
transaction costs as services allow for mass production. 
 
By now, the economic dimension of service provision by ZBOs has been discussed. In the 
following chapter, I can elaborate on the control tools available to cope with the different 
production and market characteristics. 
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11. Control tools from an economic perspective 
In the previous chapters, the economic framework was discussed by analysing NIE 
theories, product characteristics and the market aspects of ZBO services. This chapter 
will discuss the control tools that are available from an economic perspective, given the 
theoretical framework previously discussed. I will start with an elaboration on 
responsibility centres which reflects the basis distribution of responsibilities within an 
organisation given the economic characteristics of the services delivered. First, the 
responsibility accounting concept is explained (section 11.1) including modifications for 
application in a public sector environment. After the description of the general economic 
control tools amiable, I will focus on operation control issues in relation to ministerial 
responsibility in section 11.2. The chapter is concluded with a summary of tools available. 
11.1 Responsibility accounting 
In an economic context, responsibility accounting is the framework in which autonomy of 
an organisation/entity is reflected and which ultimately determines the control tools 
available for management to achieve the organisation‟s objectives. 
In private organisations with a divisional structure, financial responsibility is attributed 
in relation to what an individual manager can control. The idea of attributed economic 
responsibility is labelled responsibility accounting (e.g. Anthony and Young, 1999, p. 13-
15). Autonomisation of a public sector organisation essentially means from an economic 
perspective that a new organisation is created which is theoretically fully responsible for 
its operations. The management of the autonomised organisation is required to manage 
operations in a way that allows at least a structural balance between revenue and 
expenses. If not, the organisation would not be able to continue its operations in the long 
run and would not be economically independent (Bouma, 1982).  
Like in a private organisation, economic control for a public sector manager can be 
restricted due to characteristics of products and production as well as by financial targets 
set by the owner of the organisation. This means that it is likely that a responsibility 
accounting model may also be applied in a public sector setting. Depending on the 
responsibilities that are derived from the economic environment of the (public sector) 
organisation, high levels of responsibility imply high levels of autonomy. If low levels of 
responsibility are found, autonomy is reduced and also suggests high levels of control by 
the organisation. 
11.1.1 Responsibility accounting: the main concept 
A first step in assessing the degree of managerial autonomy of autonomised government 
units is to characterise these units in line with the concept of responsibility accounting 
based on the authority attributed to the executive board. Generally, in responsibility 
accounting (Lapsley, 1994; Mol, 1997; Merchant 1998; Mol, 2006; Drury, 2008, p. 395-
396), the question is to what extent a specific manager may be held responsible and 
accountable for the financial performance of the organisation he or she is managing. 
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Lapsley as well as Mol discuss responsibility accounting in a public sector context, which 
implies that it is likely that responsibility accounting can be used in the ZBO-context of 
this study. 
Responsibility accounting identifies four specific groups of financial responsibility. The 
most comprehensive of these types is the „investment centre‟, in which case the manager 
is fully responsible for all aspects – including decisions on (dis)investments - of financial 
control of the organisation he is managing. In an investment centre, the performance 
assessment bottom line is the return on investment [ROI]. An investment centre type of 
responsibility centre is only possible in a classic market setting because only in that 
setting it is possible to assess performance of an organisation purely on production and 
sales and in terms of profit and ROI. The most restricted form of a responsibility centre is 
the expense centre, more precisely, the „discretionary expense centre‟ (Drury, 2008, p. 
395). Drury describes the discretionary expense centre as an entity „where output cannot 
be measured in financial terms and there are no clearly observable relationships 
between inputs and the outputs‟. According to Drury, a Research & Development [R&D] 
unit is a typical example of such a discretionary expense centre. Control of discretionary 
expense centres is, according to Drury, aimed at making expenses adhere to budgeted 
expenses and ensuring that assigned tasks are successfully accomplished. In public 
sector terms, adherence would be referred to as compliance with the standards set by 
the powers that have made decisions to allocate resources. The description of a 
discretionary expense centre thus has a resemblance to the traditional control methods 
used in government entities, including budget authorisation. The line item budget as 
traditionally used in many governments (e.g. Anthony & Young, 1999, p. 449) is a form of 
budgeting that resembles control in a discretionary expense centre because the focus is 
on controlling the level of a single part of the budget and does not look at balance sheet 
issues. 
In between the two extremes of responsibility accounting, two other types and a major 
subtype of responsibility accounting exist. First, a „profit centre‟ is very close to an 
investment centre. The main difference between the two is the lack of authority to decide 
on the investments of an entity by a profit centre manager. This means that someone 
else at a higher level in the governance structure decides upon investments. According to 
Merchant (1998, p. 305) a profit centre‟s goal is „normally‟ to break-even with budgeted 
profit and profits higher than budgeted are not desirable. A profit centre exists, like an 
investment centre, basically in a market setting. In a public sector environment and 
market biased funding one can argue that an organisation can be classified as a profit 
centre, although structural profit will be close to zero. 
The second responsibility centre, a „revenue centre‟, is closer to a discretionary 
expense centre. Management of a revenue centre is accountable for generating revenue 
such as a sales department for example. A more elaborate form of a revenue centre also 
holds management accountable for the costs incurred while generating revenues, but not 
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for the costs incurred for the production of the output that actually makes it possible to 
generate the revenues. 
Finally, a major responsibility centre subtype is a subcategory of the expense centre, 
for which I have already discussed the discretionary expense centre. In a standard cost 
centre, the manager is held accountable for the costs of production where output can be 
measured and a required inputs per unit specification is available. Control is based on 
variance analyses of the budgeted costs per product unit and the cost of production 
actually incurred. Although a standard cost centre is useful for production entities, there 
may be complications in setting standards when services rather than commodities are 
produced. Drury (2008, p. 395) recognises that in a standard cost centre additional - non-
financial – controls have to be used in view of service delivery quality characteristics. Mol 
(1988, 1989, 2006) has discussed control in budgeted organisations and refers to 
additional non financial control tools to be used. I will discuss this model in section 
11.2.1.  
11.1.2 Control objects in responsibility centres 
The four basic types of responsibility centre are theoretical models. Merchant (1998, p. 
306) indicates that it is possible that although a manager is held accountable according 
to a specific type of responsibility centre, some of the responsibilities that are 
characteristic given the type of responsibility centre are excluded. He identifies four 
different subtypes of profit centre, from gross margin to complete profit centres with a 
growing level of management responsibilities. To assess the specific position of an entity 
in the classification of responsibility centres, Merchant operationalises the classification 
by using several aspects of the income statement and balance sheet which are part of 
management‟s responsibility in each of the responsibility centre types. Table 11.1 shows 
the indicators which Merchant used.  
In my opinion Merchant‟s operationalisation is not completely adequate. He 
recognises that in a revenue centre, some cost control elements may also be needed as 
well. What he does not mention is the relevance of some balance sheet items for profit 
centres. In a profit centre, management has to earn revenue by selling goods on the 
market. In a traditional setting when payment and transfer of commodities and services 
occur simultaneously, this is a logical step. However, nowadays many commodities and 
services are delivered before payment is made, which results in „accounts receivable‟ and 
„accounts payable‟ when supplies are not paid for immediately. If profit centre 
management is only held accountable for items in the statement of accounts, this might 
give them an incentive to generate revenues without critically assessing whether the cash 
flow that is supposed to follow will actually be received or paid. This can very easily be 
prevented by giving a profit centre manager the responsibility for the working capital of 
the entity.  
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Table 11.1: Elements of responsibility attributed to management 
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INCOME STATEMENT         
Revenue X    X X X X 
Cost of goods sold   X X X X X X 
Gross margin     X X X X 
Advertising & 
Promotion  X  X  X X X 
R&D  X  X  X X X 
Profit      X X X 
Profit after tax      X X X 
BALANCE SHEET         
Fixed assets       X X 
Working capital       X X 
Debt       X X 
ROA        X 
Modified from Merchant, 1998, p. 303-307 
 
Assessment of responsibility centres can be performed from two perspectives. First, 
assessing formal responsibilities attributed to management based on legislation and 
instructions provide the „soll‟ position. Second, assessing actual controls applied in the 
organisation is a bottom up approach for the „ist‟ position. Depending on information 
available one of these or both perspectives can be used to arrive at a conclusion on the 
responsibility centre type of a particular organisation. 
11.1.3 Responsibility accounting in a public sector setting 
To classify public sector entities in terms of responsibility accounting on a similar basis, 
the operationalisation has to fit in a public sector context. An important difference from 
private sector entities is that some public sector entities may be in charge of distributing 
resources to third parties. Such income transfers from the distributive branch of 
government are then core business of the entity. These income transfers – or more 
general program costs – are not part of the operational control system of the entity and 
will not be considered.153 When assessing the type of responsibility centre it is in general 
sufficient to assess control of operating costs and revenues as these are the resources 
that can be influenced by the management of the organisation. 
The fundamental idea of responsibility centres does not change: it still refers to the 
relevant items in financial statements which can be regarded as part of the control 
                                                 
153 Of course, program costs will be included in a planning and control system as well but essentially the 
management of the organisation handling program cost cannot intervene in the cash flow of program 
costs. 
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responsibility of the entity‟s management.154 In 5 cases, adjustments have to be made. 
First, „profit after tax‟ may be excluded as in general only for profit entities are subject to 
corporation tax. Central government may own some profit entities, mostly former state 
enterprises, but these organisations are generally not ZBOs and thus outside the scope of 
this study. Second, public sector entities in general aim at recovering costs through their 
funding, resulting in a positive or negative income at the end of the fiscal year, often at 
the disposal of political superiors. Therefore I prefer to use „net income‟ rather than 
„profit‟ as the latter suggests that surpluses are fully within control of management and 
(non-) executive board of the entity. This is in line with IPSAS definitions. Third, it would be 
better to use „costs of output delivered‟ instead of „costs of goods sold‟ as in many cases, 
public sector output is not actually sold but subject to a budgetary decision or a service 
level agreement. In these cases, it might not be possible to identify individual outputs. If 
no relation between costs and revenues can be identified, „costs of activities‟ is a more 
appropriate description and costs will in most cases equal expenditure. Fourth, with 
respect to Merchant‟s element of „advertising and promotion‟ I chose „provision of 
information‟ as the relevant counterpart in a public sector setting. Marketing to acquire 
new customers only exists if public sector entities can compete with either market 
entities or amongst each other. Most public sector entities however have well defined 
monopolistic tasks where competition is excluded.155 In these cases, communication to 
final users (clients/consumers) aims at giving information on programs and tasks 
performed by the entity. Communication is then aimed at informing those who are 
entitled to use a government program how to apply for it. Fifth, for „research and 
development‟ I substituted „autonomous product development‟ using similar reasoning. 
R&D refers to development of new products with the aim of selling those new products to 
a market. When an autonomised government unit is entitled156 to develop and implement 
new products or services that may be regarded as similar to R&D as meant in a 
commercial setting. The modified scheme is presented in Table 11.2. The rows in Table 
11.2 specify the items of information from which managerial responsibilities may be 
inferred. On the one hand, all-inclusive responsibilities may be attributed when 
performance can be unambiguously assessed in terms of „return on assets‟ (ROA). This 
performance indicator will then encompass all values created and consumed by the 
autonomised government unit, thus measuring both efficiency and effectiveness of its 
production. On the other hand, accounting information restricted to income statement 
elements only will imply that constraints on managerial responsibility are set.  
                                                 
154 I refer to De Kruijf and Mol, (2007a and 2007b) for earlier versions of an elaboration on public sector 
responsibility centres. 
155 I note here that in case of hybrids - organisations with market and public tasks - this might be slightly 
different, as advertising and competition for market activities may be relevant. Some ZBOs are regarded 
as hybrids (e.g. Meijerink, 2005). 
156 This means that the entity is authorised by the political system to develop new products. For example 
Kadaster has been allowed to develop new products as offshoots from their registration tasks. 
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Table 11.2: Elements of responsibility attributed to public sector management 
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INCOME STATEMENT         
Revenue X    X X X X 
Cost of output 
delivered 
 X X X X X X X 
Cost of activities  X       
Gross margin     X X X X 
Information provision    X  X X X 
Autonomous product 
development 
     X X X 
Net income      X X X 
BALANCE SHEET         
Fixed assets       X X 
Working capital     X X X X 
Debt       X X 
ROA        X 
 
In the application of Table 11.2, the proposition is that, given the heterogeneity of 
autonomised government units, the differences in responsibility for results should be 
reflected in their accountability documents. Whether or not there is a match between the 
descriptions given in legislation and instructions including the reflection of this attributed 
authority in annual reports and the actually perceived responsibilities within the planning 
and control system will be discussed in the empirical Part D of this study.  I note here that 
previous research has shown that inconsistencies may arise here (Mol & De Kruijf, 
2004). 
 
In a market setting, demand and supply control the provision of services and theoretically 
allow for investment centre type of organisations. This holds at least in those cases where 
a direct relation between owner and organisation exists.157 In a public sector setting, 
demand and supply are not necessarily related. As a result, the allocation decision is not 
generated by the market but by an authority. If that is the case, then emphasis will be on 
cost control rather than on profit-related controls. In the discussion above, I have 
indicated that several forms of cost centres exist. The differences between these cost 
centres are related to possibilities for measurement of services. In the following 
subsection, I will discuss cost control and measurement of production in cost centres in 
more detail. 
                                                 
157 A direct relation between owner and organisation may exist in case there is no principal agent relation 
but also in a principal agent relation in an organisation where the agent has a direct like to the 
shareholding principals. 
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11.2 Control of operations 
In the previous section, responsibility accounting was discussed as the framework of 
control on organisations given the economic characteristics of the services delivered. In 
this section, focus is on control tools on an operational level from a direct financial 
control perspective. Furthermore, some comments are made on the possible restrictions 
on autonomy that result from using particular accounting systems (section 11.2.2). In the 
last section 11.2.3, I will discuss the control tools mentioned in neo-institutional 
economics and their impact on autonomy of arm‟s length organisations. 
11.2.1 Performance information, production and ministerial responsibility. 
If production of services can be matched with sales and revenues, financial controls are 
basically sufficient for assessment of performance of the organisation. In such a case, 
return on investment (or profit) is the key indicator showing whether or not management 
has fulfilled its task assigned. Of course, present profit is not an indication for good 
performance in the future. Development of control systems such as balanced scorecards 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996) are meant to extend corporate performance beyond traditional 
financial performance. However, from a perspective of financial responsibility the first 
indicator for performance is profit realised. 
11.2.1.1 Budget typology 
If performance measurement in terms of profit cannot be realised due to a lack of 
relation between revenues and expenses, additional control tools have to be used. 
Essentially the debate is then on (budgeted) cost centre organisations. In section 10.4, I 
have already mentioned Wilson‟s (1989) framework in which he attempts to differentiate 
control on the basis of measurable output and outcome. Wilson‟s typology is an 
indication for production types and the related control instruments. The typology does not 
provide an immediate link to financial control and responsibility centres. At around the 
same time, Mol (1988; 1989) defined a classification in which measurable output and 
homogeneity are the relevant variables to address ex ante (budgetary) control based on 
cost calculations for production of services that qualify as (im)pure public services and 
thus need a form of budgetary control. If production is homogeneous, it is possible to 
standardise the production process. This standardisation allows for a relation between 
costs and production based on (empirical) evidence (Mol, 1989, p. 375). If output is 
measurable, it is also possible to set an output standard for production. These standards 
are to be set by the institution allocating resources. In the case of ZBOs that would 
ultimately be Parliament. The two variables can be combined and result in a matrix 
labelled the „budget typology‟. The four options in the budget typology are as follows. If 
output can be measured and cost standards are possible, a budget can be developed 
based on costs per unit and production volume which is labelled an „output budget‟. If 
output is not measurable and no cost standards exist, no standards for control at all can 
be set and control falls back to the classic government type of „input budget‟, in its most 
extreme form set up as line item budgets for each cost category. In between two other 
Control tools from an economic perspective   
 
222  Part C: Autonomy and control of ZBOS from an economic perspective 
 
options exist, classified as „task‟ budget and „process‟ budget. In these two cases 
additional, mostly non-financial control tools are needed to manage operations of an 
organisation. Figure 11.1 gives an overview of this control model. 
 
Figure 11.1: Budget typology (Mol, 1989) 
 
In a mass production setting, one will theoretically expect that experience enables both 
cost standards as well as performance standards to be determined, thus resulting in an 
output budget. In professional unit production settings, a cost standard in terms of input 
used for a single unit of production is not possible.158 This means that the budget control 
type is at best a task budget or even an input budget. 
The classification of ZBO activities as discussed in Part A resulted in three groups of 
activities that are likely to be qualified as mass production. In some cases, series 
production or even unit production may exist as well for stewardship and licensing 
services. From a budgetary perspective, stewardship and licensing are expected to have a 
linear relation between ZBO budget and the operating budget; in the third – income 
transfers – the relationship is regressive due to the program budgets to be spent 
(Dunleavy, 1991, p. 181-188). At least in the income transfer cases a performance 
standard in terms of measurable production can be given and the required input is 
known. The stewardship and licensing category may face some issues with respect to 
measurable output, for example what is the output of managing a data warehouse?159 
But even in this case, a cost standard for data entry can be derived. Controlling (and 
authorising) a budget by Parliament is different for monitoring and research type ZBOs. 
                                                 
158 Of course, one can calculate a cost price based on an hourly labour rate by an employee, but that is not 
a cost standard which has a direct relationship to the service delivered. The essential point is that the 
time needed to deliver a service varies and cannot be calculated in advance. 
159 The key part of the service is that for a particular stewardship service, the key activity to perform this 
service is homogeneous from a perspective of a task assigned. If multiple tasks are assigned, 
homogeneity is at stake but not for the demand based on the individual service. 
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Their budget function is also linear, but mainly due to the fact that the level of staff rather 
than the demand for services determines the cost function. Monitoring and research type 
ZBOs may be classified as task budget type organisations if their production can be 
compared to ex ante set performance standards. In other cases they will only be 
classified as input budget type organisations. In all cases, the actual type of production is 
a determinant for budgetary control possibilities. Mass production (in a research case for 
example blood sample testing) will generally allow for an output type of budget, whereas 
unit production (a research document) will perhaps allow for a performance standard, but 
it is unlikely to calculate a real cost standard given the fact that each unit is unique.  
In the process and task budget cases, non-financial performance indicators may be 
used as additional control tools to assess the performance of an organisation, for 
example in terms of quality of services delivered. Such control tools are part of the actual 
planning and control system and will be discussed in the following section. If an input 
budget is the only solution, the result is that the key control tool will be compliance. 
Mol‟s budget typology can be applied to a single purpose activity unit, but also allows 
diversification within an organisation if different activities are realised. I recall that the 
ZBO activities classification was based on the main tasks of ZBOs as originally identified 
by the NCA. So, if a ZBO performs more than one activity, the budget typology model 
should be applied separately for each individual activity. 
11.2.1.2 Performance information 
The non-financial performance information that is needed in case of cost centre control 
and problems with performance measurement can be included in a SLA or other 
documents describing desired services of a ZBO. Non-financial information can be 
generated independently from the financial accounting system used. An indication of this 
is the evaluation of the application of accruals accounting at minLNV, which concluded 
that the focus should be on providing non-financial policy information to Parliament 
(Parliament, 2008c, p. 3). This conclusion on the information provided in a ministry‟s 
budget document also implicitly concerns the information provided by ZBOs.  
Although poor performance in the public sector does not have an immediate effect on 
the capital market as is the case in the private sector, dysfunctional behaviour can occur. 
From an organisational (administrative) control level, the literature indicates several 
problems. Olson, Humphrey and Guthrie (2001, p. 513) and Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002, 
p. 269) mention the risk of a „tunnel vision‟, focusing on the targets set and neglecting or 
under performing on services which are not specifically included in a contract or SLA. A 
second risk when using financial performance indicators is that the organisation focuses 
totally on its own performance with negative effects in other parts of the policy chain (Van 
Thiel & Leeuw, 2002, p. 272). Financial performance management may also have a 
negative effect on staff; the focus on numbers may force them into a bureaucratic system 
without scope for professional judgement. In many cases, non-financial performance 
indicators are a better fit for responsibility at lower levels in the organisation. It is also 
indicated that non-financial information will be available more quickly than financial 
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information (e.g. Groot & Van Helden, 2003, p. 84), thus allowing for earlier adjustments 
in production processes. 
At the political control level, performance assessment is of course influenced by the 
issues at the organisational level, but some other issues are relevant as well. Potter 
(2001, p. 79) discusses the effects of differences in interpreting results, implying that 
whatever data are used, expressing performance in numbers may suggest reliable data 
despite the world that is behind the numbers. In the Dutch context, the NCA has warned 
that the quality of information provided to government by third parties – including ZBOs – 
is not always assured (Parliament, 2004f, p. 40).  Lee and Burns (2000) show that 
performance measurement is not developing progressively, they observe deterioration in 
the budgeting process in several US-states. A possible explanation for this phenomenon 
is a certain maturation of the budgeting process in which failures of the past may lead to 
some reluctance to introduce new, and often expensive, budgeting processes. On the 
other hand, according to them the process of budget reform is more or less a one-way 
street. It is unlikely that sophisticated computer systems will be replaced with systems 
that provide less information (Lee & Burns, 2000, p. 52). Thus, once a certain accounting 
system has been chosen, developments will tend to broaden and deepen the system, 
resulting in more focus on numbers instead of the effects of programs implemented. The 
remarks made on the evaluation of the present Dutch budgeting system (Parliament, 
2005d, p. 18) show that a smart combination of financial data and objectives may 
contribute to political control on budgeting. To put it more strongly, another conclusion in 
the study is that too much technical and financial data is included in budgets and annual 
reports. What is however not yet realised is that budget cuts are translated into a 
corresponding adjustment in the objectives. Here is a link to the remarks of Robinson 
(2003, p. 23-24) on not matching funding to actual production, despite claims of 
improved control under the new (Australian) accruals accounting system and Behn 
(2002) who states that politicians are not always willing to accept performance 
measurement as a control instrument. Van Meerkerk (2008, p. 94) indicated for example 
for the Dutch Media Authority (Commissariaat voor de Media) that despite an increase in 
assigned tasks, staff levels have been held constant at some 50 people rather than being 
related to the increased level of services. 
Performance measurement might lead to focusing on political choices and not on the 
behaviour of the administrative system and may lead to a decline in political support from 
citizens. Several authors (Wildavsky, 1992, p. 597; Behn, 2002, Robinson, 2003, Mol & 
De Kruijf, 2004) have indicated that although the public sector adheres to the use of non-
financial performance measures, in many cases actual control remains under classic 
budgetary control mechanisms. This is partly due to political constraints such as 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for performance (Wildavsky, 1992; Behn 2002), but 
also due to insufficient matching of objectives to control instruments (Mol & De Kruijf, 
2004). 
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Mol‟s budget typology allows for differentiation in controlling organisations that are 
subject to budget authorisation processes. In some cases, cost controls can be used; in 
others, performance based controls are available as a supplement to the traditional 
budget authorisation process. Non financial control tools can be categorised based on an 
elementary production process model including input, throughput, output and outcomes. 
In an output budget case, outputs of production and possibly outcomes can be measured 
and assessed. If production is not homogeneous or performance standards cannot be 
set, in most cases it will be possible to use process indicators such as for example 
decision processing time. This type of indicators may be used as additional control tools 
in process budget or task budget type organisations. In any case, resource use input 
indicators can be used, but in an input type model, it is the only control tool that is readily 
available. The type of performance indicator disclosed in budget documents and annual 
reports provides clues to the level of control in an organisation. If input indicators are only 
used in a setting that allows for an output budget from a production perspective, that can 
be regarded as a sign that control is probably not aligned to production characteristics. It 
must be noted that the literature also suggests that the use of non-financial information – 
although regarded as relevant – is not always picked up by politicians for several 
reasons. I refer to the work of Behn (2002) as an example of such practices which 
includes arguments like the lack of political usefulness of performance indicators. 
Performance indicators only can thus not serve as hard evidence for a particular control 
model. 
11.2.1.3 Ministerial responsibility 
From a perspective of ministerial responsibility for ZBOs, including and controlling non-
financial information on production is relevant. Parliament even emphasised the 
relevance of including non-financial information by the amendment to include a separate 
section CW2001:44a in which the minister is required to gather non-financial information 
from ZBOs. Parliament also has the opportunity to find the information in the annual 
reports of ZBOs, as these have to be submitted to Parliament under kZBO, again based 
on an amendment in legislation (Parliament, 2002h). As there is no fixed format on the 
contents of the annual reports of ZBOs, what information is actually provided depends on 
the willingness of the ZBO‟s management as well as on any pressure from the minister to 
whom management is accountable. The ultimate question that remains is whether or not 
both minister and Parliament are willing to use differentiation in controlling ZBOs as can 
be derived from Mol‟s model. The question on information provision as such can be 
elaborated upon by studying the data provided by ZBOs; the latter question can only be 
addressed indirectly by looking for questions regarding operations and budgets of ZBOs 
in Parliament.  
11.2.2 Control and accounting systems 
Responsibility accounting describes in financial terms the distribution of responsibility 
between principal and agent. In an investment centre type organisation, full responsibility 
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is in the hands of management (agent) and owners (principals) only are entitled to 
residual income. In a cost centre type organisation, responsibility of management is 
restricted to expenses or even expenditure and owners have set these restrictions. A cost 
centre type organisation thus has less autonomy than an investment type organisation. 
A full assessment of responsibility accounting requires that information on operations 
as well as on financial position of the organisation is available. In a commercial setting 
this is no fundamental problem because the principle of accruing income based on 
results from operations is at the heart of the organisation. In accounting terms, accruals 
accounting systems must be used to be able to measure the financial position of an 
organisation. Balance sheet and statement of accounts provide all relevant information. 
In a traditional public service setting, not accrual of income is at the heart of operations 
but the effects that can be generated by spending money in the general interest 
(Wildavsky, 2001, p. 139-140; McCaffrey & Jones, 2001, p. 2; Mol, 2008, p. 30). This is 
reflected in the traditional cash accounting system. 
If a pure cash accounting system is used, balance sheet information is missing which 
makes it impossible to identify profit and investment centres. In the Dutch setting, the 
cash accounting system used by central government includes a quasi balance sheet 
position on working capital which would theoretically also enable a profit centre to be 
identified. This means that Shelter ZBOs can at best qualify as profit centres whereas all 
legal entity ZBOs, either PLA or PLB, can theoretically be classified as an investment 
centre. 
The accounting system used does not only have an impact on the power to hold a 
manager accountable from a responsibility centre perspective, it also has some other 
economic implications. First, there is a problem with respect to control budgets on a 
flexible rather than a fixed basis. When output related budgets are created based on 
volume and cost per unit, it should not be relevant for the commissioner how the supplier 
achieves his production. Additional controls along with controls based on volume and 
price may directly affect the power to carry through production. Given that perspective, 
one can wonder whether gridlocks expenditure levels or even on detailed issues such as 
number of staff or externally hired staff fit into accruals based accounting systems. 
However, in practice there is evidence that these types of more detailed controls are used 
(Parliament, 2007f).  
A second point to be made has to do with funding of ZBOs. In those cases where 
authoritative services are provided which are paid for by levies or contributions, the 
general rule is that revenues should not exceed expenses (see section 10.3.3). This can 
be realised on an ex ante basis only. On an ex post basis, actual demand is likely to 
deviate from estimated demand and costs might have changed as well. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that revenues will match expenses on an ex post basis. Using an accruals 
accounting basis provides a transparent solution for reporting surplus revenues and 
when necessary returning the surplus to contributors. A similar solution can be used to 
stabilise levies and contributions over a number of years. Surplus or deficit revenues are 
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included in the balance sheet and can be compensated for in the following fiscal year(s). 
This allows for a relatively stable level of the levy or contribution to be charged each year. 
A final point to be mentioned is the effect of changes in demand. Cash outflow control 
on operational costs (i.e. cost prices) by the ministry may interfere with demand from 
applicants for services because the ZBO does not have sufficient production resources. 
This may result in two solutions: first, closing down the unit that is actually processing the 
applications, at the expense of applicants. This is what has happened in some cases (Mol 
& De Kruijf, 2002, p. 100). The other solution is that the ZBO continues to provide 
services and the operating costs will rise as a result of that. At the end of the fiscal year, 
the unpaid part of the activities realised will be transferred to the balance sheet under 
„receivables‟. To cover the cash outflows realised, it is not unlikely that the ZBO has had 
to borrow money from the treasury to pay for their compulsory cash outflows. Although 
from an authorisation point of view, formal cash outflow at the level of a ministry 
complies with Parliamentary decisions including those on the level of the (EMU) deficit; 
through the backdoor, the actual EMU deficit will – ceteris paribus – have risen due to 
the need for the ZBO to at least pay its staff wages. Furthermore, future expenses will rise 
due to the additional interest payments to be made to treasury. 
 
In the cash accounting system, basically income spending is measured and there is no 
difference between income generating assets and consumed goods. Under the condition 
that cash payments must be equal to cash receipts, there are no such issues as risk-
bearing capital or long term debts. Financing under a cash accounting system only exists 
if government is allowed to spend more than is generated from tax receipts based on for 
example the golden balanced budget rule (e.g. Pierson, 1913, p. 674; Goedhart, 1958, p. 
250).160 Furthermore, in a cash accounting system it is difficult to determine full costs of 
services as the costs of using the productive assets available are not reflected in the 
system. Matching income and expenditure then means that the total payments for use of 
services – rather than consumers paying a price – should on an ex ante basis be equal to 
total expenditure. Whether this issue is really relevant also depends on the assets used 
for production. I indicated before that only a minor part of total central government 
expenditure is related to productive (fixed) assets such as machines or real estate. If low 
levels of fixed assets are found in ZBO financial statements that would indicate that there 
is no substantial difference between expenses and expenditures but also that from a 
control perspective, management actually only controls expenses/expenditures. That 
would be an indication for a classification as a cost centre rather than a profit or 
investment centre. 
 
The (additional) expenditure controls imposed by the ministry may either undermine 
production or indirectly total spending limits of the State which conflicts with the 
                                                 
160 This rule on government deficits states that government is only allowed to borrow money for investments 
and operational costs including interest should be covered by tax receipts. 
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authorisation function of Parliament. The issues mentioned above all have an impact on 
ZBO autonomy or on the authorised budgets of individual ZBOs. Therefore, it is relevant 
to assess whether one or more of these issues are part of the arrangements between 
minister and ZBO management. 
11.2.3 Neo institutional theory and control 
In this subsection, I will address the relevance of NIE control tools on the operations of 
ZBOs. I will start with the relation between control and transaction costs, followed by a 
discussion on property rights and agency theory. 
11.2.3.1 Transaction costs and controls 
Several elements in NIE theories provide control instruments which allow using provision 
of services in settings other than traditional consolidated service provision. In TCT theory, 
elements of control are based on the impact of transaction costs. Van Leerdam (1999, p. 
184) notes that delegation and the possibility to describe ex ante decision rules can 
reduce decision making costs. The literature suggests that TCT cannot be used to explain 
the reasons for a form of autonomisation, the core elements of the theory may contribute 
to the analyses of control of individual organisations in relation to product characteristics. 
I will discuss all three elements of TCT and their impact on control separately.  
I will start with the issue of frequency of transactions. The services that are provided 
by ZBOs have a repetitive character and are based on a legal framework in which the 
activities of the ZBO are described. The rule driven character of impartial judgement is 
based on an individual assessment of a case and leads to tailor made decisions. When 
the rule driven character is based on processing large numbers of similar cases, it is the 
decision making rule that determines the actual service delivered. In the latter case, 
frequency of transactions will allow for a reduction in process transaction costs. 
Therefore, a high level of transactions alone is insufficient to arrive at a conclusion on 
control. High level of frequency allows creating a separate organisational structure which 
can be monitored more strictly than is done in infrequent market transactions. 
The second element is uncertainty. At first glance, this element seems to be irrelevant 
for „mass production‟ (rule driven) ZBOs. However, the rules are determined by the 
political system and if there is a political need for frequent changes161 in the rules 
implying changes in the institutional settings for operations (Van Leerdam, 1999, p. 104), 
uncertainty in operations is generated. This may also negatively impact the issue of 
autonomy because new rules require new arrangements on services to be provided 
including the corresponding monitoring and control systems (Van Genugten, 2008, p. 
207-208). The same holds if a system of mass production is changed on an incidental 
basis, for example when provision of services is transferred to another organisation or a 
fundamentally new production process such as an IT system is required. During such a 
transition phase, additional controls may be needed. As long as product specification 
                                                 
161 Such changes are independent from the frequency of transactions to be delivered by the agent (ZBO). 
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remains constant, close monitoring means that the autonomy of the organisation is 
reduced compared to cases where close monitoring is not required.  
In professional type ZBOs, uncertainty is a relevant element in individual decision 
making but expected to have no additional impact on the operations of the organisation. 
In this case uncertainty does not affect the key operational processes to be performed on 
delivering services as an organisational issue but is based on the contents of the case to 
be processed and affects the „verdict‟ of the ZBO as an office. Of course, uncertainty can 
have an impact on decision processing time but that is implied in the professional 
decision making as it is part of the regular control processes within a professional 
organisation. This means that uncertainty is not expected to change the control 
relationship with Parliament and minister. 
The third element is asset specificity. ZBOs provide services rather than commodities 
which mean that not all types of asset specificity as identified by Lohtia et al. (1994) are 
relevant. In particular site specificity is likely to be irrelevant. Production of services can 
be realised from nearly any office available.162 This also holds for „brand specificity‟ 
because ZBO services have an authoritative character rather than a competitive 
character which is relevant for brand specificity. However, if the reputation of a ZBO is 
subject to discussion, brand specificity may be an issue at the political level and result in 
impact on autonomy through interventions. Physical and dedicated asset specificity in a 
ZBO are generally based on the availability of production related ICT systems rather than 
machines and other equipment. For monitoring or research type ZBOs, physical 
equipment can be relevant as well. If these forms of asset specificity exist, this means 
that the ZBO is likely to have some negotiating power with the commissioning ministry, 
which implies that additional control tools might be required to mitigate this negotiating 
power. Again this is an issue that is likely to exist in the „mass production‟ type ZBOs and 
not in professional driven ZBOs. Indirect indicators of asset specificity can be found in the 
balance sheet by focusing on the level of fixed assets available to the organisation, as 
discussed in subsection 11.2.2.  
The most important asset of ZBOs – and any service organisation – is the human 
capital available in the organisation. In this case, asset specificity is primarily relevant for 
professional type ZBOs, because they rely on the knowledge of their staff for decision 
making. This holds particularly for quasi judicial tribunal and research type ZBOs. As a 
result, human capital can generate some autonomy from government control for these 
organisations. In the mass production ZBOs, in some cases temporal specificity may be 
relevant, particularly in case of changes in the services to be provided. However, if that is 
the case, the uncertainty element in production is the driving force behind the position of 
the organisation and is likely to result in an increase in use of control tools. 
                                                 
162 There might be a need to spread the delivery of services regionally. All an organisation needs to deliver 
the service is an office. This is essentially different from industries that depend on particular forms of 
physical infrastructure such as for example water infrastructure in relation to power plants. 
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11.2.3.2 Property rights, agency theory and control 
In general, the responsibility centre type of organisation is also an indication for property 
rights control, at least in terms of the difference between user rights on the one hand and 
usus fructus and abusus rights on the other. Usus fructus and abusus rights will be found 
in profit or investment centres; if a cost centre is identified, that is an indication of a usus 
right because in a cost centre responsibility for assets is not an issue for management. In 
some cases, property rights cannot be enforced due to deficient control or access 
mechanisms such as public roads. This point has a relationship to the product and 
market characteristics of services to be delivered. In these cases, funding is achieved by 
taxation. Enforcement of property rights is according to Künneke (1997, p. 30) related to 
the ability to measure economic performance. He refers to Blankart (1986, p. 350), who 
made a classification of government services based on a previous classification by 
Nelson (1970, p. 312). Blankart identifies three groups of goods: inspection goods, which 
are immediately observable and measurable, experience goods for which quality issues 
exist and trust goods for which measurability as well as quality cannot be assessed. Only 
inspection and experience goods are likely to be provided outside a consolidated service 
provision context according to Blankart (1986, p. 351) because property rights can be 
assigned to these goods/services. Furthermore, Blankart‟s classification has a 
relationship to a differentiation between pure and impure public goods which is also 
discussed in section 10.3.3. Trust goods seem to resemble pure public goods as they 
cannot be attributed to a single individual whereas experience and inspection goods 
seem to allow for some form of individualisation which results in a qualification as an 
impure public good. This differentiation thus has an impact on the scope for privatising 
demand by using forms of funding other than taxes. 
Blankart (1986) noted that trust goods cannot be measured. This implies that 
performance based incentives cannot be used in such organisations. On the level of the 
organisation, Ouchi and Maguire (1975) and Ouchi (1977; 1979) identify three forms of 
control contracts that may be applied in different forms of organisations. Behaviour 
control is possible when production is transparent and programmable. In that case, 
information asymmetry is low. If production is more complex, performance controls may 
be useful. However, performance controls have their own risk profiles: once performance 
targets are contracted, management can shirk by focusing only on the stated targets and 
neglecting all other issues (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). 
Furthermore, performance measurement is not equally suited for different services. If no 
measurement at all is possible, the two controls described above cannot be used 
adequately and the third solution, clan or social control, is needed. As is the case with 
Blankart‟s models, clan and social controls are likely to be applied for pure public goods, 
whereas behavioural controls can be applied for impure public goods which allow for 
measurement of services. Whenever clan and social controls are needed, control is not 
on production but on the human input that is required to carry out production: people‟s 
skills and capabilities. The result is that mechanical production controls and price-volume 
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SLAs cannot be applied in these organisations. In these cases funding can only be based 
on an authority biased funding type due to the lack of reciprocal services. From a 
budgeting perspective, the analysis of Blankart is included in the issues on performance 
measurement as discussed in relation to Mol‟s budget typology. 
11.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed control tools that are available given production and 
market characteristics of services.  
Responsibility accounting is a reflection of the financial control tools that result from 
product, production and market characteristics for market as well as budgeted 
organisations. In a market setting, profit and investment centre types of responsibility 
accounting are possible. These focus primarily on overall financial results in terms of 
profit or return on investment. Cost centre types of responsibility centres can be found 
anywhere and have a prime focus on cost control. Cost centres range from compliance 
control (discretionary cost centres) to lump sum control (complete cost centres). The 
responsibility accounting model originates from divisionalised private organisations but 
can, with some modifications, be applied in a public sector environment as well. 
If an organisation is budgeted rather than depending on market based sales, it is still 
possible to differentiate control based on characteristics of services delivered. Mol‟s 
budget typology differentiates budgeted organisations in four types of control groups 
ranging from output budget types in the case of homogeneous production and defined 
performance standards to a traditional input budget for which compliance measures only 
can be used. The idea is that additional non financial control tools can be used to 
manage budgeted organisations in which an output based budget is not possible. 
Based on these two theoretical concepts, some remarks were made on particular 
control instruments that can be derived from them and can be applied in assessing 
autonomy. From responsibility centres, the financial control elements can be identified 
which is part of the control set of a particular type of responsibility centre type. Particular 
attention is needed for levels of fixed assets within an organisation, the impact of cash 
flows and possible expenditure levels set in the arrangements between ZBO and 
commissioner as well as equalisation reserves intended to create stable levels of fees. 
From the budget typology model, homogeneity and possibilities for performance 
standards in general are relevant. It must be noted that on an analytical level 
performance standards may exist but that they are not applied in practice. A reason for 
not using performance standards is that politicians may not like using them. Absence of 
(non financial) performance indicators can therefore not be used as a single indicator for 
autonomy of an organisation and has to be assessed within the wider context of control 
tools applied. 
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12. Impact on ZBO autonomy from an economic perspective 
After the legal dimensions of autonomy were discussed in Part B, in this part the 
emphasis is on the impact of economic dimensions on relative autonomy. The research 
question in this chapter is:  
Which autonomy indicators can be derived from economic theory and how 
do they match control of ZBO operations? 
In the following four subsections, I will summarise the findings for each of the lines of 
economic theory that were studied.  
12.1 Neo Institutional Economics 
Under Neo institutional Economics [NIE] theories, it is not individual production and 
supply and demand that are relevant but the institutional arrangements that assure that 
production can be carried out as efficiently as possible. The core issue of NIE is on the 
risks and economic impact of the unaligned interests between owners and managers of 
an organisation when these roles are in the hands of different individuals or institutions. 
I have discussed three main lines of NIE and its impact on ZBO autonomy. From the 
perspective of the property rights theory [PRT], the idea is that efficient production will be 
stimulated if management of the organisation has a relatively low level of restrictions on 
its operational choices. This is operationalised under the „abusus rights‟ concept which 
means that management has access to all assets of the organisation and can use them 
as efficiently as possible. Full abusus rights attributed to ZBO management may have 
negative impact on efficiency for society as well. This holds particularly when no 
arrangements are made on distributing residual income and if the ZBO has free access to 
the capital markets. In the latter case, the additional costs incurred due to the fact that a 
ZBO has to borrow at an interest rate above the risk free rate. These are only 
compensated for if efficiency gains exceed the additional costs.  Under PRT, the more 
restrictive the measures governing the relationship between ZBO and government are, 
the lower the autonomy for ZBO management. 
From a transaction cost perspective [TCT], the theoretical discussion is on the balance 
between integrating and outsourcing activities as methods to arrive at the most efficient 
production solution. Three factors determine finding optimal solutions. Asset specificity is 
an indicator for the mutual dependency between supply and demand. High levels of asset 
specificity are an argument for integrated production, whereas low asset specificity allows 
for services to be purchased on the market. The other relevant factors are uncertainty 
and frequency of transactions. If uncertainty is high, that is again an argument for 
integrated production because monitoring outsourced activities would be costly. Low 
frequency, finally, is an argument for outsourcing production because it would be too 
costly to organise incidental production within your own organisation. From the 
perspective of ZBO autonomy, high levels of uncertainty and high frequency will result in a 
tendency for integration of production, which means that – given that a ZBO is organised 
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separately from government – more controls can be expected. In case of asset specificity, 
it depends on the particular character of asset specificity. In principle asset specificity 
provides ZBO management with negotiating power. This can be mitigated by additional 
government control measures.  
The last part of NIE is agency theory [AT]. Here, information asymmetry is the key 
issue. The mismatch in information between owner and manager of the organisation 
allows for shirking by management. AT discusses the control tools that can be used to 
reduce the effects of shirking. In particular, control tools based on persuasion and 
incentives allow such risks to be reduced without fully reducing discretionary powers for 
management. If such tools are used, relative ZBO autonomy is greater than if the option 
of control by directives is used. Alignment of interest is in that case based on compliance 
rather than efficiency. 
12.2 Production characteristics 
After the discussion on the impact of NIE theories on institutional arrangements in 
general, I have focused on the economic dimensions related to control of services 
production by ZBOs. First, I have paid attention to the characteristics of production 
processes. Production forms in a public sector setting may be characterised by mass, 
series or unit production. If mass production is possible, standardisation is an important 
element enabling measurement based control tools. Mass production implies 
standardised procedures whereas in the case of unit production, services are delivered 
based on exact individual demand specifications. In that case other control tools are 
required, often related to staff quality and knowledge. Such control tools have a relatively 
strong internal emphasis and will be affected by the budgetary restrictions as set by the 
commissioning organisation. In series production, some standardisation exists, but in 
each case specifications are matched to particular demand, requiring more flexible 
control tools than used in mass production environments. In the relation between 
commissioner and ZBO this will also imply more emphasis on budgetary controls in 
relation to performance standards. 
Next to the discussion on production type, the characteristics of the services delivered 
are important as well. Control tools for services that cannot be measured are different, 
more complex and often non-financial. That results in different control types in the 
internal management process and generates problems of information asymmetry 
between principal and agent. 
The key conclusion of the product characteristics analysis is that using one standard 
control approach does not contribute to adequate control of ZBOs. From an autonomy 
perspective, mass production allows for an increase in autonomy once the standards for 
production have been set. In series and unit production, autonomy is different and cannot 
be based on procedures but on control of staff and budgets. 
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12.3 Supply and demand 
A third line of theory is based on supply and demand for services. Although mass 
production activities allow for more autonomy than individual services, autonomy also 
depends on the question of the origin of demand. If services are actually commissioned 
and used by government163 only – which is the case for pure public goods – then there is 
essentially no difference from a demand perspective between production in a hierarchical 
structure and production in a ZBO structure. In both cases there is hardly any scope to let 
people pay for services in any way other than by general taxes. This is different when 
demand is generated from individual citizens, who might then be required to pay for the 
service as individually delivered to them. Funding by citizens can be performed in two 
main ways. In a mass production setting, individual pricing is also possible. In 
combination with demand from individual citizens this results in market biased – biased, 
not based because no real market for ZBO services exists - funding and relatively greater 
autonomy for a ZBO compared to the case where demand is generated from groups of 
citizens or based on citizen requests. In the latter case, funding tends to be more 
authority biased and can for example be carried out under forms of pay as you go 
systems. 
It is not only the demand side of the „market‟ that allows for variation in autonomy, 
but the supply side as well. Traditional government production is performed in a 
hierarchical setting in which planning, production and funding of services are all in the 
hands of government. The direct opposite of this production setting is private provision of 
services, in which government has no production role at all. Privatisation of demand 
means that at least one element of the provision of services is separated from 
government hierarchy and transferred to the market. Three different forms of 
privatisation of demand were discussed: contract, grant and regulated provision of 
services. Each of these solutions has an impact on (relative) autonomy. Contract 
provision has relatively low autonomy because government still funds and plans service 
provision, whereas regulated provision has relatively high autonomy because funding is 
performed by citizens. In the case of start up subsidies – a form of grant provision – 
autonomy will even be greater because the government only intervenes when setting up 
the ZBO and afterwards full provision of services is left to the market mechanism. 
Bringing together the forms of demand as identified in Part B and the various forms of 
service provision services results in the possibilities as described in Table 12.1. 
                                                 
163 In this case as representative of society as a whole. 
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Table 12.1: Relation between demand and provision of services 
 Consolidated 
provision 
Contract 
provision 
Grant provision Regulated 
provision 
Private 
provision 
Full state 
demand 
X X    
Citizens 
request 
X X    
Citizens 
demand 
  X X  
Free market 
demand 
    X 
 
The table shows that in contract provision, the State is still in the lead and the role of 
citizens is relatively restricted. In grant provision and regulated provision, demand is 
generated from citizens which allows for a shift in control towards a more market based 
system than in a contract provision case. 
12.4 Control systems 
The differences in production as well as in supply and demand can be reflected in the 
control systems applied in particular cases. Responsibility accounting and responsibility 
centres are an expression of the level of financial controls needed in a particular 
organisation and can be used in a private as well as in a public setting. In very general 
terms, responsibility accounting types range from pure compliance based controls to 
controls on return on investment only. In terms of autonomy they range from 
(hierarchical) subordination to full autonomy.  
In cases where production characteristics do not allow for use of market mechanisms, 
Mol‟s budget typology is based on control determined by the measurability of services 
and homogeneity of production. If homogeneous production for which outputs can be 
measured exists, then control can be based on output levels. If on the contrary neither 
homogeneity nor measurability exists, only input based controls can be used. The input 
control type of services also implies that funding is controlled on an input based level 
with an emphasis on authorisation and compliance. 
The product classification of ZBO services as discussed in Part A can now be related 
to budgeting characteristics. Rule driven, mass production services (stewardship, income 
transfer and licensing) at least enable cost standards to be identified. Licensing and 
income transfers are also likely to qualify as homogeneous production. Therefore, these 
services can be controlled with an „output type‟ budget. In general, cost standards cannot 
be used with respect to the other two types of services (monitoring and research). 
Furthermore, production of these two types of services may not be homogeneous, 
creating additional control problems. In the end, this will at best result in a task budget 
but a traditional input budget is very likely.  
From the autonomy perspective, output based budgets allow for more autonomy than 
input based budgets. In general this means that mass production services would have 
more autonomy than ZBOs that produces individual services. 
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Responsibility accounting and budget typology require the use of financial and non-
financial control tools in line with the economic characteristics of the organisation and 
the services delivered. Issues that need particular attention include asset controls as well 
as restrictions on expenditure levels. Non financial indicators can theoretically be used as 
well. In that case, one has to be aware that from a political perspective, disclosing such 
indicators is not always preferred. Drawing conclusions on autonomy based only on the 
existence or absence of particular types of non financial indicators is therefore not 
possible and should be related to the use of financial control tools as well. 
12.5 Outlook 
As shown above, economic theory can have impact on the relative autonomy of a ZBO. 
Some tools such as full government demand and supply have a negative impact on 
autonomy; other such as nearly full abusus rights has a strong positive impact on 
autonomy, but at a certain cost. In Table 12.2 I have summarised indicators affecting the 
relative autonomy of ZBOs. At this level, it is not possible to indicate the impact on 
autonomy as could be performed in the legal setting where including a rule generally 
implies restricted autonomy. Economic control tools can increase or decrease autonomy. 
In the operationalisation of specific control tools in Part D, I will include indications on the 
impact of individual control tools on autonomy. 
Table 12.2: Indicators affecting relative autonomy of ZBOs from an economic perspective 
Product characteristics Market characteristics 
1. Mass production vs. professional unit 
production 
1. Service provision options 
2. Measurability of services  2a. Pure public services vs. market services 
2b. Options in funding 
 3. Product regulation restrictions 
 4. Commissioner 
 
Based on the different product and market characteristics, the elements of neo 
institutional economy can be used to cover the relation between government and the 
arm‟s length organisation. Main issues from NIE for this study are access to assets (PRT), 
asset specificity (TCT) and incentives and frequency of monitoring (AT). 
As the discussion on the economic dimension has been concluded, it is now time to 
merge what has been learned from legal and economic theory. In Part D, I will develop a 
model that can be used to evaluate ZBO autonomy in both dimensions. The final stage of 
the research will be an empirical assessment of this model. 
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13. Introduction to Part D 
13.1 A model for evaluating ZBO autonomy 
In the previous two parts, the legal and economic dimensions that affect ZBO autonomy 
have been discussed. I have assumed that the political intention to request the provision 
of a service is a given and that the service to be provided is as such not an issue. 
Furthermore, the political system has chosen to deliver the service in the institutional 
setting of a ZBO and not otherwise. If a service is to be provided by a ZBO, actual 
decisions are based on two main issues. First, the governance structure affecting control 
and autonomy is determined by the legal form as well as the conditions included in the 
statute of the ZBO. Second, the specifications and characteristics of the services to be 
provided ultimately determine the planning and control system under which the service 
can be provided. In this part of the study, the final research question will be addressed. 
This question is:  
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit the legal and 
economic characteristics of ZBO services? 
The legal structure was discussed in Part B. Based on the procedures in budget law, 
Parliament decides upon the main governance structure of the ZBO, given the various 
forms of legal entities that exist under civil law. Implicitly, this decision includes the 
consideration to provide a service through an organisation at arm‟s length of government. 
The requirements in general public law, including „Aanwijzingen‟ and kZBO as well as the 
ideas from neo-institutional economic theory164 as discussed in Part C determine the 
distribution of authority between Parliament and minister on the one hand and ZBO 
management on the other, resulting in the governance structure as laid down in the ZBO-
case laws. This is one line of arrangements affecting formal autonomy of a ZBO, which 
can either be reinforced or mitigated by the actual use of authority regarding the ZBO‟s 
operations.  
From an economic perspective – discussed in Part C - the services to be delivered 
may be regarded as a starting point. Market based questions on funding; producing and 
commissioning together with product characteristics determine the planning and control 
options as identified under the concept of budget typology. Planning and control is also 
influenced by the budget authorisation process as laid down in the budget laws. Again, 
NIE is also relevant, particularly the issues on the balance in transaction costs and the 
issue of information asymmetry that has to be managed within the planning and control 
process. A strict or loose P&C system in the relationship between the political owners of 
the organisation and its management ultimately affects the relative autonomy of a ZBO. 
In individual cases, the mismatch between the cash based accounting systems of 
commissioning ministries and the accruals based accounting systems of ZBOs may also 
                                                 
164 And of course the broader NPM philosophy that is excluded here. 
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have an impact on ZBO autonomy The key issues here are investment decisions and 
production levels that can be realised within the ZBO.  
 
The objective in this part of the study is to assess whether or not the economic and legal 
measures on individual ZBOs match each other on two levels. First, is there a match on a 
conceptual theoretical level given the legal arrangements of the ZBO and the services it 
produces? In other words, are the formal ex ante control tools available to Parliament and 
ZBO management in line with the economic characteristics of the services provided? 
Second, is the actual use of the control tools in line with the legal provisions made and 
the observed economic characteristics? The answer to these questions can be visualised 
by plotting the results of these two questions in Figure 13.1.  
 
Figure 13.1: Matching of legal and economic autonomy of ZBOs. 
 
If the results fall on the diagonal line in the diagram, autonomy alignment is observed. If 
the observed autonomy determinants are found above the diagonal line, the legal setting 
provides more autonomy than the economic characteristics of the services provided 
would allow and management faces relatively low levels of control. Below the diagonal 
line, the legal framework restricts management operations given the economic 
characteristics of the services. 
13.2 Outline of Part D 
The structure of the empirical Part D of this study is as follows. In chapter 14, I will focus 
on the implementation of the indicators used as well as on the case selection. The 
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subsequent chapter 15 discusses the key features of each of the selected ZBOs as a 
reference for services provided and the individual institutional setting. Chapters 16 and 
17 assess formal and observed autonomy of Income Transfer and Monitoring ZBOS 
respectively from both legal and economic perspectives for each of the cases to arrive at 
a conclusion on matching of legal and economic autonomy. After discussing the 
autonomy of each individual ZBO, I will give some comments on relative autonomy of the 
ZBOs studied, compared to their peers. Chapter 18 presents the conclusions from the 
assessment of autonomy on the cases studied. Finally, chapter 19 provides a summary 
and conclusions of the study as a whole. 
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14. Operationalisation and case selection 
In this chapter, I will discuss three issues. I will start with a discussion on the 
operationalisation indicators for autonomy as discussed in Parts B and C (section 14.1). 
In Part A, I have reviewed the execution of a multiple case study research program using 
a stratified sample. Section 14.2 discusses how the stratified sample was prepared. Once 
variables have been operationalised and cases have been selected, a standard for the 
relevant subgroups of ZBOs can be prepared which allows assessing formal and actual 
autonomy in section 14.3.  
14.1 Variables and values 
In Parts B and C, some indicators have been discussed at the level of values of an 
operationalised variable. Other elements as discussed in Parts B and C have to be 
developed further into measurable variables. I will discuss here some of the variables 
that were developed into separate variables. A description of all values for each of the 
variables would require a level of detail that would not contribute to the readability of the 
text of this chapter. Full details of variables and values are disclosed in the appendices in 
Part F. 
In this section, I will start with a discussion of the variables that emerge from the legal 
perspective (Table 14.1). First, the legal form of the entity is evaluated. This is rather 
straightforward, except for the foundation type of ZBO, where the involvement of the 
minister can vary from actively creating the foundation to only supporting creation of the 
foundation. Data on creation of foundations are retrieved from Dalhuisen (2004) and 
Parliament (2005b). Second, the authority of the minister is assessed. Some elements of 
authority are compulsory both under „Aanwijzingen‟ and kZBO. I have chosen to classify 
the elements of authority into four subgroups based on Kummeling et al. (1989 p. 39), 
each having a different impact on the (relative) autonomy of the ZBO. All formal authority 
indicators can be derived from legislation and mandates and are disclosed in Table 14.1.  
Legal entity and attributed authority cover the legal dimension of this study. ZBOs provide 
different types of services assigned by law. These services were identified in Part A based 
on similarities between services. Theoretically from both a legal and economic 
perspective one would expect similar services to be controlled in a similar way. These five 
groups of services are classified as stewardship, income transfer, monitoring, research, 
and licensing. I will use the groups as control variables, allowing a comparison between 
ZBOs that provide similar services. 
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Table 14.1: Legal variables, values and their impact on autonomy. 
Theme Variable Values/measurement method Main sources Impact on autonomy 
Legal entity Legal entity Listing in increasing autonomy: 
State, PLA, PLB-foundation, PLB-
Company 
ZBO-case 
law/statute 
Used as control 
variable. 
Authority Normative 
authority 
Number of normative issues in 
ZBO case law deviating from 
kZBO. 
Document 
study, 
interviews 
Counting absolute 
number: positive 
effect +/+ 1; negative 
effect -/- 1 
 Information 
provision 
Number of normative issues in 
ZBO case law deviating from 
kZBO. 
Document 
study, 
interviews 
Counting absolute 
number: positive 
effect +/+ 1; negative 
effect -/- 1 
 Governance 
measures 
Number of normative issues in 
ZBO case law deviating from 
kZBO. 
Document 
study, 
interviews 
Counting absolute 
number: positive 
effect +/+ 1; negative 
effect -/- 1 
 Cyclical 
authority 
Number of normative issues in 
ZBO case law deviating from 
kZBO. 
Document 
study, 
interviews 
Counting absolute 
number: positive 
effect +/+ 1; negative 
effect -/- 1 
 
Table 14.2 shows the economic dimensions used in this study and the impact on 
autonomy. The economic dimensions are categorised into three groups of variables, 
service specifications, market dimensions and planning & control elements. The first 
economic dimension is product characteristics which mainly concerns a discussion on 
identifying (im)pure public goods. 
The second main economic theme is covered under the „market dimension‟ issue. 
From a demand perspective, the first variable to be analysed is the source and method of 
funding. Three elements contribute to autonomy measurement from a funding 
perspective. First, the percentage of actual government funding as measured based on 
data in ZBO fiscal 2006 annual reports. Second, if government funds a ZBO by means of 
a lump sum budget, this is an indicator for a lower level of autonomy compared to when 
government funds it at an activity (production-based) level. The type of funding is derived 
from documents as well as from interviews. Third, if funding is to some extent private, a 
market biased funding allows for greater levels of autonomy than an authority biased type 
of private funding. 
Along with the method of funding, actual commissioning is also an indicator for the 
level of autonomy of a ZBO. The four commissioning types – Full state, Citizens request, 
Citizens demand, Free market – are indicators for an increasing level of autonomy 
because the role of a citizen in the commissioning process increases at the expense of 
control by Parliament.  
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Table 14.2: Economic variables, values and impact on autonomy 
Theme Variable Values/measurement method Main sources Impact on 
autonomy 
Service 
specifications 
Product 
characteristics 
Pure public goods, impure 
supply driven public goods, 
impure demand driven public 
goods, market goods. Based 
on assessment of rivalry and 
excludability of service 
delivered.  
Document study pure public good, 
low autonomy 
 Activities 
realised 
Main task assigned classified 
on the basis of Table2.1, Part 
A. 
Main task identified based on 
ZBO-case law, production 
volume and/or revenues, 
derived from 2006 annual 
reports. 
ZBO-case law 
Document study 
Used as control 
variable 
Market: 
demand 
Funding Percentage of funding 
generated from central 
government 
Form of budget authorisation 
by Parliament: lump sum or 
activity based type of charges 
used in the case of private 
funding (Table 11.3 Part C). 
Document study high percentage: 
low autonomy;  
market biased 
funding high 
autonomy, 
authority biased 
funding low 
autonomy 
lump sum: low 
autonomy 
 Commissioning Commissioner for main task 
assigned to ZBO. 
 
Interviews In increasing order 
of autonomy: 
State 
commissioning;  
Citizens request 
Citizens demand 
Free market 
  Demand dependency; 
Percentage funding by largest 
commissioner. 
Interviews, 
Document study 
In increasing order 
of autonomy: 
Ministry, 
Multiple ministries 
Mixture  
Others 
Market: 
supply 
Competitors Existence of service provision 
competitors. 
Interviews If competition 
possible high 
autonomy 
 Production and 
Budget 
typology 
Homogeneous production and 
measurable outputs as 
reflected in possibilities for 
planning & control. 
 
Document study, 
interviews 
In declining order 
of autonomy: 
Output budget, 
process budget, 
task budget, input 
budget. 
 Production 
form 
Role of government in 
planning, producing and 
funding of services. 
Document study Declining order of 
autonomy: 
Contract, grant 
and regulated 
provision 
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Table 14.3: Economic variables, values and impact on autonomy (continued) 
Theme Variable Values/measurement method Main sources Impact on 
autonomy 
Planning & 
Control 
Responsibility 
accounting 
Classification based on Part C, 
Table 12.3. Sources: ZBO-case 
law, interviews and annual 
reports. Key question: is 
responsibility for each item in 
the table attributed to 
management? 
Document study, 
interviews 
Discretionary cost 
centre: low 
autonomy, 
Investment centre 
high autonomy. 
 Financial data 
disclosed 
Disclosure to Parliament of 
data in a ministry‟s budget 
report (table 4.2 Part B) 
Disclosure of and 
authorisation of ZBO budget  
in policy articles (Table 4.6 
Part B) 
Accounting system (cash vs. 
accruals). 
Document study More items 
disclosed, lower 
autonomy 
Separate budget 
article, lower 
autonomy 
Determines type of 
information to be 
disclosed 
 Performance 
indicators 
disclosed 
Measures on performance 
information to minister and 
parliament: frequency and 
description of items to be 
disclosed. 
Document study, 
interviews 
High frequency 
and large number 
of items: low 
autonomy 
 Political 
debate 
Discussion/questions on ZBO 
operating budget in process of 
authorising a ministry‟s budget 
document, annual report and 
intermediate reports. 
Separate documents 
published on ZBO operations 
during fiscal years. 
Data sources: fiscal years 
2007 and 2008. 
Document study High number 
indicates high 
political attention 
and likely less 
autonomy. 
 
From the supply perspective, existence of competition is an indicator for (relative) 
autonomy. Data on competition was derived from the interviews by asking whether or not 
new tasks or tasks not assigned by the principal ministry165 were assigned after the 
commissioning ministry considered alternative providers. Another indicator is found in 
regulations. If a minister has the power to assign a ZBO task to organisations by decree 
rather than by law, this gives him discretionary power in assigning a task. The supply 
perspective also includes the production typology variable by Wilson (1989) which is 
reflected in the possibilities for planning and control tools in Mol‟s (1989) budget 
typology. This variable has four values, ranging from output budgets to input budgets in a 
declining order of autonomy. Determining the type of budget that fits the major activity of 
the ZBO is done by assessing whether or not mass production exists (homogeneity) and 
whether or not outputs can be measured in terms of decisions made or tangible assets 
delivered. Task descriptions in legislation and the interviews are the main sources for 
determining the classification under the budget typology. A final issue from supply of 
                                                 
165 For example a ZBO has as minister principal minSZW and also provides services for minVWS. The 
question then is what has led to the decision to assigning minVWS‟ task to a ZBO related to minSZW? 
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services is found in the government production role: government has a relative direct 
control in contract provision through commissioning compared to cases where 
government only plays a role as a market regulator prescribing some level of quality with 
respect to services supplied. In assessing the production form, it should be noted that 
only the relationship between government and ZBO must be assessed, not the impact of 
the interventions on society. This may be relevant when the ZBO has a monitoring or 
quasi judicial role resulting in societal regulation by the ZBO. 
 
The third and last main economic theme to be discussed is at the Planning & Control 
level. Planning and control can be theoretically derived from product characteristics and 
market dimensions. The result is a particular form of responsibility centre type. To 
observe (mis)matches between planning and control derived from observed economic 
characteristics and actual planning and control as applied at the managerial level, 
several indicators are used. The first issue under P&C concerns the level of detail in the 
data disclosed to Parliament in ZBO or ministry documents. When more items are 
disclosed, this is an indication that there is a perceived need to be accountable to the 
political system166 as opposed to when only a few items or summarised statements are 
given. Full financial statements may be an indicator of a higher level of transparency. 
However if only simple financial statements without notes are presented, this might be 
regarded as an indicator of perceived autonomy from minister and Parliament. Disclosure 
cannot be regarded as a separate indicator, it must be related to the accounting system 
used (accruals vs. cash based) and the level of ZBO budget detail in ministry budget 
documents and financial statements. Explicit listing of a ZBO budget in a budget law 
implies less autonomy compared to implicit listing or no listing at all.  
The same holds for performance information. High levels of performance information 
at least suggest that accountability is high on the agenda and that the ZBO is aware of its 
role in society. Measurement standards can be found in regulations on information 
provision of a particular ZBO: high frequency and a high level of detail in the prescribed 
information provision are indicators for relatively low levels of autonomy. 
Finally, the political significance of a ZBO‟s operations can be measured. High 
numbers of documents submitted to Parliament, debates in Parliament as well as 
questions asked by members of Parliament on a ZBO‟s operations all suggest that a 
particular ZBO is less autonomous than a ZBO that receives hardly any Parliamentary 
scrutiny. To measure Parliament‟s interest in a ZBO‟s operations, I will use data from 
fiscal 2007 and 2008. Covering two years reduces the risk of measuring a coincidental 
event rather that a structural attitude towards a particular ZBO. Measuring Parliament‟s 
attention is based on two types of information: one on the operations of the ZBO in 
general, the other on case based remarks. The general remarks are the main information 
item to be measured; if case based remarks concern more than a single case, these 
                                                 
166 If information is disclosed in publicly available ZBO annual reports, this also holds for accountability 
towards society as well. 
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remarks may be an indication that the operations of a ZBO are also subject to tighter 
Parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
Up to this point the research model, research methods and relevant variables have been 
discussed. I have focused on ZBOs in general, sometimes illustrated by some case based 
examples. The number of ZBOs is too large to carry out a full study at the level of detail 
implied by the variables identified. In the following section, I will discuss the case 
selection that will serve as the basis for the actual empirical analysis. 
14.2 Finding relevant cases 
14.2.1 The ZBO population classified 
In Part A, a general description of ZBOs and their position relative to other Dutch quangos 
was given. The basic population in this study is the modified list (see Appendix 1) 
disclosed by minBZK, which includes 128 ZBOs. The purpose of the present section is to 
describe the population in more detail to arrive at a selection of ZBO cases to be studied 
in detail using the research model and basic research methodology described in Part A. 
An assessment of ZBO characteristics in both legal and economic terms is time 
consuming. In general, a random sample of a population will provide a good 
representation of the population (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002, p. 23; Babbie, 2008, 
p. 207) to draw general conclusions. Because the population is relatively small and is 
divided between two main groups of legal entities (PLAs and PLBs) as well as five main 
types of services, a random sample is not likely to disclose meaningful data on possible 
(mis)matches between economic and legal autonomy. Therefore, I have chosen to 
prepare a stratified sample of the population. 
 A single solution for a stratified case selection would be to study all ZBOs that are 
under one government ministry. However, Van Thiel (2006) showed that different policy 
sectors in the Netherlands have different styles of quango creation. Using a selection 
based on ministries might not contribute to knowledge which is an argument for not 
following that strategy. More important is that such a selection ignores the legal-
economic perspective which is at the core of this study. Therefore, I chose to look for 
criteria that allow for selection but are not affected by a particular governance structure 
in one part of central government. As the theoretical framework uses two dimensions for 
the governance structure, I will discuss a number of criteria that do allow for a 
„governance-neutral‟ case selection.  
In January 2008, minBZK sent a letter to Parliament in which the minister 
summarised which ZBOs would be subject to the new kZBO (Parliament, 2008b). As a 
result, in the future one group of ZBOs will be subject to a more or less standardised167 
legal format and another group will not. In the descriptions below, I will use this political 
fact to split the population as a whole into these two groups. The criteria discussed below 
are applied to the population as a whole, unless otherwise stated. After presenting a 
                                                 
167 Deviations are allowed, see discussion on kZBO in Part B. 
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more detailed overview of the population as a whole in section 14.2.2, it is possible to 
prepare a stratified case selection for detailed research purposes in section 14.2.3. 
14.2.2 An elaborated overview of the ZBO population 
The basic list of ZBOs used is a modified version of the register published on the Internet 
by minBZK on July 1, 2007. The modification has to do with grouping individual ZBOs that 
perform similar activities either in competition or in separate jurisdictions. An example is 
the „Kamers van Koophandel‟ [KvK]: 20 separate legal entities operating regionally. For 
this study they are treated as one entity. Although formally KvKs are all separate legal 
entities, there is no reason to suppose that at the Parliamentary and ministerial level that 
these entities will be treated differently with respect to control. After modifying the 
minBZK-register, a list of 128 ZBO-items resulted. The total number of single entity ZBOs 
that were identified is 98. In 21 groups, another 296 separate entities could be 
identified. Data on the actual number of two public law ZBO-groups as well as seven 
private law ZBO-groups were not found. All are non-kZBO entities, the private ones 
operating in competition. Data on for example bailiffs and notaries are therefore missing. 
Table 14.4 discloses the distribution of these ZBOs over public and private law entities as 
well as whether or not they are to be subject to kZBO.  
Table 14.4: Unique ZBOs and ZBOs aggregated to group level by legal status 
 Subject to kZBO (n=56) Not subject to kZBO (n=72) Totals 
 Unique 
ZBOs 
# groups  Unique 
ZBOs 
# groups  # groups   
Public law 
entity 
34 4 (90)* 30 3 (23) 2** 73 (113+pm) 
Private law 
entity 
13 5 (30) 21 9 (153) 7** 55 (183+pm) 
Totals 47 9 (120) 51 12 (176) 9 (pm) 128 (296+pm) 
* (actual single entities within a group) 
** (number of single entities unknown=pm) 
 
Five groups of ZBOs are mentioned here in more detail. First, in the public law (kZBO) 
domain, two groups cover 79 entities. These groups are the previously mentioned 
„Kamers van Koophandel‟ and the „Huurcommissies‟. The latter is a group of 59 units for 
which a merger proposal into a single ZBO board has been submitted to Parliament 
(Parliament, 2007h; Parliament, 2009c). In the private law domain, the most important 
group is the health insurance group of 65 private entities responsible for care service 
payments. This group is not included under kZBO due to intended restructuring of these 
ZBOs (Parliament, 2008b; 2008f). Another large group is also in the medical sector: 33 
committees have authority to decide on medical/ethical matters. Finally, I mention 23 
entities in the field of workplace safety, which compete with each other. These three 
groups cover some 80% of the non-kZBO entities that are put into groups. The number of 
unique ZBOs is divided nearly evenly between ZBOs subject to kZBO and those which are 
not. 
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The research problem addresses the impact on autonomy of a ZBO given the economic 
and legal characteristics of ZBOs. When classifying ZBOs given this research problem, the 
most obvious classification would be to look at money spent by the ZBOs. Finding the 
relevant data for ZBOs started by systematically searching for 2006 ZBO annual reports 
on their websites and if necessary requesting a copy of the annual report. I looked for the 
annual report in particular; because that is the information that should be available to 
Parliament under kZBO and it is also included in the governance code developed by a 
number of ZBOs (Handvestgroep publiek verantwoorden, 2005). I found 55 unique 
annual reports (fiscal 2006) as well as reports from individual ZBOs that are included in 6 
different ZBO groups. The annual reports from ZBOs, budgetary documents, ministry 
annual reports as well as the minBZK register are the sources on which the description of 
the population in this section is based. In general, the information is sufficient to classify 
a ZBO on the items described below. Where information was not sufficient for a 
classification, assumptions had to be made. These assumptions are as follows: 
 With the exception of „Kamers van Koophandel‟168, it is assumed that public 
law ZBOs for which no financial information is available are classified as 
publicly funded. Private law ZBOs for which no information is available are 
classified as privately funded. 
 ZBOs, part of the legal entity State for which no financial information is 
available are classified as having operating budgets below €1 million. This 
holds especially for those ZBOs which have the word „committee‟ in their name 
(e.g. Committees on Exams). 
 When staff numbers rather than financial data are known, I have assumed that 
1 FTE staff is equivalent to €120,000 operating costs.169  
 Classification of tasks is based on descriptions in the minBZK register 
When no further information is available, responsibility centre classification results in 
cost-centre type classification for public law ZBOs and profit-centre type classification for 
private law ZBOs. 
 
The information available allowed 95 ZBOs to be classified based on (estimated) 
operating revenues. In Figure 14.1, the distribution on the availability of information is 
given. 
 
                                                 
168 Kamers van Koophandel are public law ZBOs funded by fees. This can be derived both from law and the 
annual reports of individual Kamers van Koophandel that do provide annual reports with financial 
information. 
169 The average operating costs/FTE of 53 ZBOs where both absolute numbers of staff and operating costs 
are available is € 122,861 
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Figure 14.1: Percentage of ZBOs for which (estimated) operating revenues in fiscal 2006 
are available 
 
A large majority of the ZBOs subject to kZBO provide financial information on operating 
expenses. Even for non-kZBO entities, some two thirds enable at least an estimate of 
operating expenses to be made. On the aggregate level, financial information for nearly 
75% of all the ZBOs in this study is available. In many cases where information is not 
available, this concerns private law part-time and commercially operating ZBOs. One can 
also conclude that ZBO transparency to the citizenry is not provided in 20% of kZBO 
cases and in nearly 80% of non-kZBO cases. These are high numbers but are based on 
fiscal 2006 data, which is prior to formal implementation of kZBO. 
The data available reveal that ZBO operating revenues are widely spread. The largest 
ZBO (UWV) had operating expenses of some €1.8 billion; the smallest ones spent less 
than €1 million. ZBOs that are part of the State legal entity use cash accounting and 
therefore only report cash payments, while public and private law legal entities use 
accruals accounting and thus report in expenses. Because there is a difference in 
accounting systems, I have assumed that the assets of cash accounting based units are 
relatively small and do not substantially affect the level of expenses. This assumption 
allows the data to be aggregated as presented in Table 14.5. 
 
Table 14.5: (Estimated) operating expenses/cash payments of ZBOs in fiscal 2006 
  Operating expenses in € * million → Total 
Legal status ↓ < 1 1-10 10-100 >100 
No data 
available   
Public       
kZBO 4 15 8 10 1 38 
not kZBO 23 4 3 5 0 35 
Private       
kZBO 3 1 8 0 6 18 
not kZBO 1 8 0 2 26 37 
Total 31 28 19 17 33 128 
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Although the data is based on the 2006 annual reports, the data reflect the level of 
expenses in more recent years as well. Only 1 ZBO was found with revenues between 
€90M and €110M and none in the range between €9M and €11M. Therefore, the 
classification is in my opinion robust: if services to be provided are not changed, 
substantial changes over 10% of revenues from operations are unlikely. 
 
Increasing and decreasing expenses. 
A case of increasing expenses is found with the RDW: 2006: €165 M; 2007: €179 M; 
2008: €190 M.  
A case of decreasing expenses is found for the COA: 2006: €503 M; 2007: €459 M; 
2008: €472 M. 
In both cases the changes do not affect the classification as presented in Table 14.5. 
 
Data on ZBOs with operating budgets over €10 M are reliable: in only three group cases 
an estimate had to be made due to the fact that not all ZBOs within these groups 
provided their financial information. Overall, some 70% of the ZBOs with operating 
expenses over €10 M will be subject to kZBO. All other ZBOs with revenues from 
operations over €10 M were classified based on data from their annual reports. 
It must be emphasised that Table 14.5 only provides data on operating budgets. The 
annual reports of the ZBOs that provide income transfers such as in health or State 
pensions also provide information on the program costs. The total amount of program 
costs distributed by ZBOs is an estimated €80 billion – some 40% of net central 
government controlled expenditure (own calculations, based on ZBO and Parliament 
data, 2007i, p 33-35)  This is distributed by three ZBOs (CVZ, UWV and SVB) with some € 
2.2 billion operating expenses. 
 
A second form of classification is based on staff numbers. Most ZBO activities are likely to 
be services rather than physical goods. As a result, the level of tangible assets will be 
relatively low and thus there will be a strong relationship between the level of operating 
costs and the number of staff employed. Therefore, I did not prepare staff number 
estimates for those ZBOs where no staff data was available. As a result, the number of 
ZBOs for which no staff data are available is high compared to the number of ZBOs for 
which no operating budget (estimate) is available. The lack of data is an empirical 
indication in line with the REA observation that nobody actually knows the number of civil 
servants employed (Parliament, 2007a, p. 3). The estimate by REA of 56,000 staff 
(Parliament, 2007a, p. 4) seems plausible given estimates on numbers of staff in 
executive agencies (Kraan, 2006, p. 226) which amount to some 65,000. Except for one 
(grouped) ZBO, data on all major ZBO staff numbers were found in my study. These 
numbers amount to some 47,000 for fiscal 2006. The data that was available is 
summarised in Table 14.6. 
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Table 14.6: Staff numbers and operating expenses per ZBO 2006 
 Staff in absolute numbers → Total 
Operating expenses in € ↓ < 100  100-999 >= 1000 No data   
<= €10 M 28 0 0 31 59 
€10-100 M Public 3 15 0 1 19 
> €100 M 0 4 12 1 17 
Not known 1 0 0 32 33 
Total 32 19 12 65 128 
dark area: r2= 0,85 at 95% significance level 
 
After eliminating missing cases, the correlation between operating revenues and staff 
numbers is high. A selection based on staff numbers therefore does not contribute to 
improved case selection if operating expenses have already been used. 
 
From a Parliamentary authorisation point of view, the objective to be met by authorising 
resources for a specific program has become more relevant, at least since the 
introduction of CW2001. This will also hold for ZBOs, at least for those that are 
government funded. Only focusing on resources when selecting cases would therefore 
ignore the differences that exist in the objectives to be achieved by ZBOs. A possible 
solution to create a match might be a classification based on motives for creating ZBOs 
as developed by Boxum et al. (1989). However, a reason for creating an entity is not an 
indication for operations within the entity as such. It can be an indication for a desired 
level of (non)-intervention by Parliament and thus for ZBO autonomy, especially when the 
motive for creating a ZBO is to deliver impartial judgements. As a result, the degree of 
intervention in operating budgets and expenses might vary between ZBOs. 
In Part C, I have elaborated on the development of a classification for the activities 
performed by ZBOs, resulting in five different groups of activities. This classification is 
another approach for a link between authorised resources and objectives to be achieved 
at a general level. The attractiveness of this classification is reinforced by the fact that it 
also allows a distinction to be drawn between mass production activities and unit 
production, which has a link to the homogeneity element in the budget typology variable 
of the research model. More generally, differences in services provided are an important 
factor in determining the economic dimensions of ZBO autonomy. Therefore, I have 
chosen to use this classification as a prime classification for ZBOs in this study, along 
with the legal entity variable. 
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Table 14.7: Classification of ZBOs by main tasks of the entity 
 Main task →  Total 
Entity ↓ Stewardship 
Income 
Transfers 
Monitoring/
Auditing 
Research/ 
Information 
Licensing/ 
Registration Others   
Public        
kZBO 3 11 8 9 7 0 38 
not kZBO 8 6 0 15 4 2 35 
Private        
kZBO 3 5 5 2 3 0 18 
not kZBO 1 13 11 8 3 1 37 
Total 15 35 24 34 17 3 128 
 
Table 14.7 shows which tasks are primarily performed by the ZBOs as mentioned in the 
modified minBZK-list. In some cases, there are more tasks that cannot be classified 
within the same group of tasks. An example of this is organising exams by IBGroep, which 
is a task in the licensing domain rather than in the income distribution domain that 
covers the main activity of IBGroep. In principle, I have not considered such differences 
and classified ZBOs according to their most important tasks. If a ZBO actually provides 
two essentially different tasks, this will emerge in the case study evaluation and will be 
addressed there. Theoretically, this might mean that it is possible that control of that ZBO 
should then be split up over these two different types of activities.  
The category „others‟ includes the ZBO-task of the academic hospitals, a group of 
ZBOs whose tasks had been classified as non authoritative before kZBO was 
implemented. 
Given the classification in tasks and using only the information170 disclosed on ZBO 
operating revenues, an overview of financial relevance can be made.  
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Figure 14.2: Cumulative disclosed 2006 ZBO operating revenues by task group (n=60) 
                                                 
170 Includes both kZBO and non-kZBO entities which have actually disclosed their financial information. See 
also Figure 14.1. 
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Figure 14.2 shows that the operating revenues of the „income-transfer‟ group is by far the 
largest. After eliminating UWV (€1.8 billion), total operating revenues are some €0.9 
billion, which is comparable to the revenues levels of three other task groups. The total 
revenues covered by these 60 (groups) of ZBOs amounts to €6.4 billion. An estimate of 
total revenues for all 128 ZBOs identified is some €6.7 billion. The difference is mainly 
caused by the KvK cluster (estimate €200 million) and certifying institutions in the 
agricultural sector (estimated at €70 million). A last remark to be made is that the 
revenue in the „Other‟ category is the contribution of minOCW with respect to the tasks of 
the academic hospitals. The financial information on the most relevant entities is 
therefore available for further research.  
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Figure 14.3: Ex ante knowledge on 
sources of funding (n=128) 
 
Figure 14.4: Sources of funding of ZBOs 
(n=60) 
 
The level of revenues is one thing; the matter of funding is another which directly 
affects budget authorisation by minister and Parliament. Funding data can be derived 
from information in the annual report as well, by looking to the main sources of income of 
an entity. In a number of cases, more than one source of income was disclosed in annual 
reports. Therefore, I had to make an arbitrary choice on what would be regarded as 
ministerial (authority biased or tax) funding or market biased (fee) funding. Under 
authority biased (tax) funding, I have aggregated all sources of income generated from 
public entities.171 If a ZBO is funded by more than one ministry, it may have more 
autonomy than when funded by only one ministry, but both sources of funding are still 
subject to Parliamentary authorisation. 2006 data on all ZBO show that information on 
the source of funding for 68 ZBOs (53%) is not directly available from ZBO or ministry 
annual reports. The distribution of knowledge on funding public and private ZBOs is 
presented in Figure 14.3. The lack of knowledge is partly explained by ZBO clusters where 
no aggregated information for all ZBOs is available. Another explanation is found in 
                                                 
171 Public entities includes Principal-Ministry, other ministries, local and regional governments and other 
publicly funded entities irrespective of their legal status. 
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monitoring and research ZBOs that have a private legal status and in most of the cases 
only have a partial ZBO-task assigned.  
 
Of the 60 (groups of) ZBOs for which funding is known, the distribution of fees is as 
shown in Figure 14.4. This means that some 60% of these ZBOs are more than 75% tax 
(authority biased) funded and the other 40% less than that percentage. Partial private 
funding is thus relevant for ZBOs and the number of cases found enables private funding 
to be used as a selection criterion for the case studies. 
14.2.3 Selecting cases 
From a budget authorisation point of view, a selection of ZBOs with substantial budgets is 
most relevant. Furthermore, legal entity and source of funding have been identified as 
relevant classifications. Finally, a political fact is that a division exists between ZBOs that 
are subject to kZBO or not, which is supposed to have an effect on political control on 
ZBOs. In Figure 14.5, the variables mentioned are brought together. Data from 95 of the 
128 ZBOs in this study enable a classification on all variables mentioned. The 33 ZBOs 
that cannot be classified are assumed to be publicly funded in case of public law ZBOs 
(PLA) and as privately funded in case of private law ZBOs (PLB). In my opinion this is fair, 
given the fact that most of the public law entities are only small committees operating 
from within the framework of a ministry. With respect to the private law entities, most of 
them only have a partial ZBO task along with the commercial activities carried out by 
these organisations. I have presented them separately in Figure 14.5. 
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Figure 14.5: (Estimated) revenues, legal entity type and source of funding (n=128) 
 
Given the political attention on kZBO-type ZBOs, it seems plausible to focus on this group 
of ZBOs only. However, doing so might result in unwanted bias in the study. The letter 
from minBZK (Parliament, 2008b) on implementation of kZBO discloses not only which 
ZBOs will or will not be subject to kZBO, but also the main reason for the choices made by 
the Cabinet. Figure 14.6 gives details on reasons why ZBOs will not be subject to kZBO. 
The most interesting reasons when preparing a case selection are those ZBOs which are 
no longer listed and those which are excluded from ZBO-status in general. Discontinuing 
or reconsidering an organisation is in my opinion a reason to exclude entities from case 
selection because studying such ZBOs has less impact on future decision making than 
those cases where activities are to be continued. A study on actual reasons for 
discontinuing or reconsidering might be worthwhile but is outside the scope of my 
research question. 
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Figure 14.6: Financial relevance and proposals regarding ZBOs not subject to kZBO 
(n=72, adapted from Parliament, 2008b) 
 
All but one of the 5 cases over €10 M that are „excluded‟ or „not listed‟ are subject to 
minOCW. This covers the public academic hospitals (not listed), the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Royal Library, and TNO, an institute for scientific 
research. The fifth case is Staatsbosbeheer (SBB). Four of the case that were excluded 
from kZBO have budgets over €100 M and were excluded, according to minBZK due to a 
lack of authoritative powers. The public academic hospitals only have a small 
(examination) ZBO-task similar to other academic institutions. When listed, they would 
probably have qualified as a part-time ZBO. TNO, the academic hospitals and SBB earn 
substantial parts of their income from „market‟ activities; the other two are largely funded 
by ministry budgets.  
The above analysis shows that most ZBOs that are not subject to kZBO, are not really 
relevant from the three other perspectives. Only four ZBOs in the non-kZBO group might 
be worthwhile due to relatively large expenses. However, I will not include these in the 
case study because the group is too small and diversified. The actual case selection is 
derived from ZBOs that will be subject to kZBO only. As a result the population is reduced 
from 128 cases to 56 cases (see Figure 14.1). I have indicated that funding, tasks 
assigned and legal status are ex ante indicators for differences in ZBO autonomy. As a 
result, differences in ZBO autonomy from a control perspective can be expected when 
these criteria are used for case selection.  
 
By now, the final stage of case selection can be realised. The group of 56 ZBOs includes 
7 units for which no financial information is available or can be estimated. These 7 seem 
to be small and will also be excluded from further selection. For details, I refer to 
Appendix 1. I will start with providing details on legal status and funding of the remaining 
49 ZBOs.  
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Figure 14.7: Legal status and sources of funding of ZBOs under the kZBO-framework 
(n=49) 
 
Figure 14.7 shows that more than half of the selected cases are classified as either 
„income transfer‟ or „monitoring‟ organisations. There is both a fair diversity of legal 
status as well as sources of funding for these two groups. In the „research‟ group, a non-
response risk exists given the fact that only 1 ZBO is a private law entity. Similarly, in the 
„licensing‟ group, the risk of non-response is on the funding selection criterion. 
Furthermore, particularly for the „licensing‟ group, earlier studies exist that cover some of 
the issues discussed in this study (e.g. Kickert, 1998; Mol & de Kruijf, 2002; Deelen & 
Eertink, 2004). Therefore, I decided to study ZBOs that are classified as „income transfer‟ 
or „monitoring‟. Figure 14.8 shows that the chosen classes „Income Transfer‟ and 
„Monitoring‟ do indeed enable cases to be selected based both on funding characteristics 
and legal status. 
 
 Public law ZBOs Private Law ZBOs 
≥25% 
private 
funding 
1 3 2 0 6 1 1 4 1 2 
 S T M R L S T M R L 
<25% 
private 
funding 
2 8 6 8 1 1 2 0 0 0 
S: Stewardship; T: income transfers; M: monitoring; R: Research; L: Licensing 
Figure 14.8: Distribution of kZBO units based on ex ante classifications (n=49) 
 
Initially, I have selected 7 „income transfer‟ type ZBOs and 5 „monitoring‟ type ZBOs. It 
appeared that one private law monitoring type ZBO was not willing to participate in the 
case studies. I did not search for a replacement, because I had managed to find two 
private law monitoring ZBOs.  Figure 14.9 discloses the selected cases. 
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Figure 14.9: ZBOs participating in the case studies 
 
Case selection was not random; UWV, SVB and CVZ have large program expenditures 
which makes them politically relevant not only from an operational budget perspective. In 
total, the „income transfer‟ ZBOs are controlled by 5 different principal-ministries, which 
gives scope to describe the differences between ministries. In the „monitoring‟ class; 
some players are again more or less comparable to each other: NMa, NZA and AFM all 
cover competition monitoring and regulation on markets. Nak is one out of a group of 
ZBOs, all controlled by one principal-ministry which means that it can be expected that it 
is representative for the position of the other ZBOs within the group. The financial 
relevance of cases selected is particularly high for the „income transfer‟ group: operating 
revenues in 2006 amount to €2.2 billion (80% of estimated revenues). In the „monitoring‟ 
group, operating revenues amount to €133 million (33% of estimated revenues). The 11 
cases to be studied, all have to comply with kZBO although in some cases, exceptions to 
full compliance exist (Parliament, 2008b). During actual case studies it appeared that 
CFV‟s key task had shifted from income transfers to monitoring. This change is accounted 
for in Figure 14.9 and all following texts. From a research perspective, there was no 
reason to exclude CFV as CFV was still in one of the two selected service provision 
categories. 
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14.3 A standard for ZBO autonomy 
The last step is to develop a standard for assessment of expected ZBO autonomy given 
the variables described above and the ZBOs selected. From a legal perspective, a formal 
standard can be derived for ZBOs given the kZBO framework and the provisions of ZBO 
case law. Actual ZBO autonomy is based on practices observed and on interpretation of 
the case law in practice. From an economic perspective, there is no formal standard to be 
set. It is only possible to derive an expected level of autonomy from the economic 
characteristics of the services provided by a particular ZBO. Actual autonomy is then the 
observed level of autonomy based on the economic behaviour of owner, commissioner 
and agent. Therefore, I will use „formal autonomy‟ only from a legal perspective and 
discuss „expected autonomy‟ from an economic perspective. Both are compared to the 
actually observed autonomy as can be derived from behaviour of all parties involved in 
carrying out the ZBO‟s activities.  
 
Monitoring and income transfer ZBOs provide essentially different services. Monitoring is 
likely to be qualified as a pure public good, whereas income transfer is an impure 
demand driven public good. In both cases, it is likely that PLA-type ZBOs are used given 
the political preferences which state that a PLB-type ZBO is only used in exceptional 
circumstances.  
Therefore in my opinion a full assessment of formal and actual autonomy based on 
authority has a bias towards cyclical and governance arrangements because one can 
argue that these two authority issues enable a minister-principal to intervene in the daily 
operations of a ZBO. Normative measures are mainly relevant in the start up phase of the 
ZBO and then determine a certain level of autonomy. I will include the normative measure 
on for appointment of staff because a deviation from the general rule for appointing civil 
servants generates additional autonomy - for example on staff remuneration. 
Information measures are relevant from a transparency perspective and may result in 
questions from Parliament. So, if information measures exist, the individual ZBO is more 
vulnerable to external intervention than if no such measure exists. This of course is only a 
relative argument. Politicians may ask any question they like and it is up to the minister to 
decide whether he feels responsible for the issue at hand.  
The legal variables to be assessed were divided into four subgroups. I will use the 
standard regulation as described in kZBO as the assessment reference point as this 
enables us to see whether existing regulations in 2008 were already in line with the new 
requirements. As all ZBOs selected are subject to kZBO, using this reference point will not 
affect assessing autonomy for individual cases or when cases are compared. 
 
In the economic dimension, product characteristics, market planning and control are the 
key issues. Due to the differences in the services provided, the expected standard 
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measures for the two types of ZBOs vary on issues such as funding, type of production, 
budgetary control and performance information. Income transfer ZBOs are expected to 
provide mass production services enabling activity based budgeting and output 
measurement. Demand is generated from citizens‟ request in a contract based 
production form. Transparency towards Parliament would suggest that the budget of a 
ZBO is disclosed as a single item (line item172) within a budget article of the proposed 
ministry budget law. The structure of Dutch government suggests that each department 
will operate its own income transfer institutions without mutual competition. Given the 
citizen request form of demand, emphasis is on cost control rather than on profit or 
investment centre type control. A minimum standard would be a standard cost centre 
given the production characteristics. ZBOs are expected to use accruals accounting, but 
given the knowledge on the relationship between expenses and expenditures (see Part C 
on accruals accounting) and the production characteristics, low levels of fixed assets are 
expected to be managed. I will use an (arbitrary) 10% of balance sheet total as an 
indicator for this. Given kZBO, one might expect that feedback is given to Parliament on 
the minister-principal approvals on budgets, fees and annual reports, although fees are 
supposed not to be used within an income transfer setting. Because income transfers are 
related to sometimes substantial program costs, it might be expected that production 
feedback to a minister-commissioner is in line with the regular reporting frequency of 
ministries to Parliament. More frequent reporting would result in a position that is similar 
to that of hierarchical subordinate units rather than of at arm‟s length units. Finally, 
related to the production characteristics, output is measurable which allows for output 
based performance indicators in budget documents and annual reports.  
Monitoring ZBOs differ from income transfer ZBOs in several ways. Furthermore, not 
all monitoring ZBOs deliver similar services. In the sample, four market regulators and a 
quality assurance organisation are included. The latter provides mass production 
services, whereas in the other cases, unit production is at the heart of the production 
process. These differences have an impact on control. I will discuss the market regulators 
first. First, production is individual or at best series based rather than mass production 
based. Cost standards cannot be set, which only leaves options for detailed budgeting or 
lump sum budgeting. Given the intended impartiality of monitoring ZBOs, lump sum 
budgeting and complete cost centre responsibilities are to be expected. Production is not 
homogeneous, which means that no cost standards are possible, but output can be 
observed, resulting in task budgets. Monitoring ZBOs of the market regulator type are 
supposed to operate impartially, which also suggests that once the budget has been 
approved, there is no need to report until the end of the fiscal year. Finally, performance 
indicators are difficult to disclose on an ex ante basis, but at the end of a fiscal year 
actual process indicators can be provided. I have included the items discussed in Table 
14.8 below. A quality assurance ZBO is characterised by mass production with power to 
                                                 
172 Thus line item in this case means: budget ZBO x is disclosed, as a total budget. 
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control production generated by citizen‟s demand. As a result, a profit centre and funding 
outside government may be expected. From a legal perspective, kZBO does not include 
relevant differentiations from standards based on impartiality which are similar to those 
of market regulator ZBOs. 
 
Standards for the other three types of ZBOs can be derived on a similar basis, again 
taking into account the differences in production environments. I will discuss them shortly 
below. First, „stewardship ZBOs‟: in this case, the essential difference is found in how 
activities are measured. It is likely that stewardship does not always allow for output to be 
measured because no real services are delivered. Stewardship services do allow for 
citizen contributions because citizens might have a direct stake in the activities of the 
stewardship ZBO and are asked for an authority biased contribution. Therefore, 
government funding is expected to be partial, which also means that the budget is not 
fully disclosed in the ministry‟s budget document. Government will have a regulating 
influence in production rather than a contract relation although one can argue that 
authority biased funding actually means the government only recovers some of its 
expenses from citizens who have an interest in the stewardship service. As part of the 
funding is based on government contributions, it is likely that frequency of reporting is in 
line with reporting by ministries to Parliament given the direct financial interest of the 
State. The expected mixture of government and citizen funding implies that the 
stewardship ZBO has to manage revenues as well. A profit centre type of responsibility is 
plausible, particularly when government contributions can be set relatively low. 
Second, research ZBOs: due to the impartiality issue their role is very similar to 
monitoring ZBOs. The main exception is that government funding is likely to have a „grant‟ 
type character rather than a „contract‟ based character to stress the impartiality 
objective. 
The last group of ZBOs are the „licensing‟ type. Here, there is a direct relationship 
between service provision and individual benefit, which means that market biased 
funding can be used. This means that funding can be fully private, including the impact 
on budget disclosure and reporting to Parliament. Production is government regulated 
rather than contract based. Given the funding possibilities, a profit centre type of 
responsibility centre is a minimum level and an investment centre type responsibility can 
be used, particularly in the case of a PLB type of ZBO. A full overview of the standards set 
is presented in Table 14.8.  
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Table 14.8: Expected standard measures determining ZBO autonomy 
Variable Income 
transfer ZBOs 
Monitoring 
ZBOs* 
Stewardship 
ZBOs* 
Research 
ZBOs* 
Licensing 
ZBOs* 
Governance issues      
Ex ante approval mandates 
(kZBO:8) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Approval kZBO:32 transactions No No No No No 
Intervention in case of 
negligence (kZBO:11) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nullification of decisions 
(kZBO:22) 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Approval governance statute 
(kZBO:11) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Appointment executive board 
(kZBO:12) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provision on secondary jobs 
executive board members 
(kZBO:13) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyclical issues      
Approval of budgets/fees 
(kZBO:17; 24) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reporting on substantial 
differences budget and results 
(kZBO:30) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creation of equalisation reserve 
(kZBO:33) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rules on budget structure given 
(kZBO:27-28) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market dimension      
Source of funding 100% 
government 
100% 
government 
< 100% 
government 
100% 
government 
100% 
private 
Production type Mass Individual Mass Individual Mass 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum Activity 
based 
Lump sum Activity 
based 
Budget typology Output Task Process Task Output 
Production form Contract Contract Regulated Grant Regulated 
Commissioning Request Government Demand Government Request 
Demand dependency 1 department 1 
department 
1 
department 
multiple 
departments 
1 
department 
Competition No No Yes Yes Yes 
Planning & control      
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Complete 
cost centre 
Profit centre Complete 
cost centre 
Investment 
centre 
% fixed assets <10% <10% >10% >10% <10% 
Budget disclosure Line item Line item Partial Line item Not 
Budget instruction by Minister-
Principal 
Yes No Yes No No 
Approval budget documents 
mentioned to Parliament 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Approval fees mentioned to 
Parliament 
Not applicable Not 
applicable 
Yes Not 
applicable 
Yes 
Approval annual report 
mentioned to Parliament 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Frequency of reporting to 
minister 
Parliament‟s 
frequency 
Annually Parliament‟s 
frequency 
Annually Annually 
Ex ante performance indicators Output 
indicators 
Not available Process 
indicators 
Not available Output 
indicators 
Ex post performance indicators Output 
indicators 
Process 
indicators 
Process 
indicators 
Process 
indicators 
Output 
indicators 
* if production type is different, e.g. for quality assurance institutions, the economic standards are different. 
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Based on the full list of elements to be assessed, expected differences in the legal 
position of ZBOs are minimal. This is of course the effect of using kZBO as a framework 
which intends to create a standard for ZBOs. The essential difference is in the approval of 
decisions (kZBO:22) which does not fit with impartial judgement type ZBOs. The financial 
transaction measures in kZBO:32 are optional measures, which implies that from a kZBO 
perspective, the standard does not include such measures. Otherwise the wording of 
kZBO: would have been compulsory. If a ZBO of a particular type is controlled in line with 
the expected values of the variables, this would mean that legal and economic autonomy 
of the ZBO are aligned. In the actual assessment, I will label this position as the neutral or 
matching position (see Figure 13.1). This will enable any deviations found to be assessed. 
Each deviation has the same weight in the assessment, because attributing weights to 
individual items would generate discussions on the relevance of items which cannot be 
objectively assessed. Positive and negative deviations are added up within the economic 
or legal dimension. Actual assessment of the impact of a particular finding is disclosed on 
a case by case basis and derived from the analysis in Parts B and C  
14.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the research model and case selection have been discussed. I have 
operationalised the variables that are included in the research model as presented in 
Figure 13.1. Based on the model, I have used legal entity type, source of funding, level of 
revenues and task classifications as case selection variables. Given the population of 
ZBOs that will be subject to kZBO, I have decided to focus on „income transfer‟ and 
„monitoring‟ class ZBOs. Within these classes, 12 ZBOs were selected of which 11 were 
willing to participate in the case study research. Because of the differences in services 
provided by income transfer and monitoring ZBOs, it is not possible to use a single model 
to test the alignment between legal and economic ZBO autonomy. Actual testing will 
therefore be based on tailor made autonomy indicators for each group of ZBOs. 
In the next chapter, I will start by introducing the eleven ZBOs selected and then focus 
on their relative autonomy with respect to Parliament and minister. 
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15. Selected ZBOs and their institutional context 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the case selection for this study. I originally had 
selected 7 „income transfer‟ type ZBOs and 4 „monitoring‟ type ZBOs. Each of them has a 
specific task assigned by law. In this chapter a description of the history and tasks of the 
organisations studied will be given. These descriptions provide some background 
information on the institutions for those readers who are not familiar with one or more 
individual ZBOs. The description is given group-wise in alphabetical order. 
15.1 Income transfer ZBOs 
There are basically two types of income transfer ZBO. The main type redistributes income 
to citizens or institutions by disbursing money; the other type collects money for a specific 
purpose. All ZBOs selected here were originally created to disburse money rather than to 
collect money. 
15.1.1 CFV 
CFV‟s main task at present is monitoring rather than income transfer. Therefore, I will 
include CFV in the „monitoring‟ group rather than in the „income transfer‟ group (see 
section 15.2.2). 
15.1.2 CVZ 
CVZ – College voor Zorgverzekeringen (Health Insurance Board) - was created in 1999 as 
a result of the division of the former Ziekenfondsraad into a separate income transfer 
and advisory board entity and a monitoring entity. The monitoring entity has now evolved 
into the NZA (see section 15.2.5). Blaauwbroek, Van der Hoeven and Visser (1997) show 
that as early as 1900 efforts had been made to provide a standardised form of health 
insurance. These efforts ultimately resulted in the creation of the Ziekenfondsraad in 
1949, governed by employers, employees and government. The Ziekenfondsraad had the 
character of an advisory board with some monitoring functions on health insurance 
funds. The creation of CVZ was the result of a shift in policy, resulting in more political 
influence on the health insurance program at the expense of employer and employee 
influence. Effectively this meant that the Ziekenfondsraad was hived in by creating new 
entities. 
Formally, CVZ is a separate public legal entity, presently on the basis of the 
Zorgverzekeringswet [ZVW] of 2006. CVZ can be qualified as a subsidiary ZBO. The 
minister of Health, Welfare and Sports (minVWS) is responsible for CVZ. The minister 
relies on his staff, in this case a Director General and a monitoring team for both issues 
of policy and ownership. Policy issues are brought up from more than one directorate 
within minVWS, but the monitoring team coordinates actual commissioning. There is 
neither an interface unit in the ministry to deal with ZBO ownership issues nor a separate 
oversight unit to cover diagonal accountability for the activities of CVZ.  
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CVZ has functions both in the domain of policy advice (mainly on the contents of the 
basic health insurance policy) as well as in executing insurance based activities for some 
dedicated groups, for example Dutch expatriates who are insured under the Dutch 
system and managing health program funds.173 Up until 2006, the insurance based 
activities were only a very small part of the organisation‟s activities. After ZVW came into 
effect, it appeared that partly unforeseen effects of that law required new insurance 
based tasks to be organised. These tasks were assigned to CVZ partly for practical 
reasons but partly also because other ZBOs with similar tasks were – according to 
respondents - not willing to provide these requested services. CVZ does not operate for 
ministries other than minVWS. The policy advice activities of CVZ have an effect on the 
income transfer activities as well because this advice determines the contents of the 
basic health insurance policy. Therefore, there is no need to reconsider the primary 
classification of CVZ. 
As of 2008, CVZ has an executive board and a board of advisors. The executive board 
is appointed by the minister; the board of advisors is appointed by the executive board. 
There is no legislation under which a board of advisors is required. CVZ would have 
preferred to use a non-executive board, but that was not permitted by minVWS. Before 
2008, CVZ had a board and an executive director to manage operations. Client panels or 
other types of horizontal accountability institutions do not exist. With respect to CVZ‟s  
policy advice functions expert committees are used. The CVZ website (www.cvz.nl) 
contains some information on operations such as budget documents and annual reports 
but no intermediate reports. 
The CVZ annual reports are audited by a public auditor, who is appointed by CVZ‟s 
executive board. CVZ operates from one office and had operating expenses in 2008 of 
some €45 million (2006: €52 million) and staff of some 350 FTE. Program costs in 2008 
amounted to € 40 billion (2006: €40 billion).174 
15.1.3 RvR 
RvR – Raden voor Rechtsbijstand (Legal aid funding boards) - refer to 5 separate legal 
entities that all carry out the same function of covering the costs of legal aid to people on 
low incomes that need a form of legal aid. In this study RvR is regarded as a group of 
ZBOs. In practice, there is strong co-operation between the 5 separate entities and they 
are currently in the process of being merged; this was effectively finalised in early 2009. 
Formally, the reorganisation was finalised by July 1st 2010 when a new law on legal aid 
came into effect. RvR was originally part of the Ministry of Justice but was hived off in 
1994. 
                                                 
173 Managing health program funds includes redistribution of funds over insurance companies which is 
based on differences in risk profiles – insurance companies are not allowed to refuse an application for 
basic insurance – and the distribution of resources of the health care fund AWBZ. 
174 Only the care budgets are considered to be part of the ZBO domain; cure insurance is not included in 
ZBO references. The care budget is just over half of the total program costs. The cure budget is relevant 
for non ZBO LEWSTs. 
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Formally RvR has the status of a separate legal entity, based on the „Wet op de 
Rechtsbijstand‟ (Law on legal aid) of 1993. RvR can be qualified as a subsidiary ZBO, 
with a legal basis as of the implementation of the Wet op de Rechtsbijstand (Parliament, 
1995a, p. 70). The Minister of Justice, in actual fact the Secretary of State of Justice175, is 
responsible for RvR. Within the Ministry of Justice there is no separate unit for ownership 
of ZBOs. There is no separate oversight unit monitoring the performance and outcome of 
RvR‟s operations. 
The main function of RvR is to provide legal aid funds to those who (financially) qualify 
for an application. The individual selects a lawyer and RvR pays the lawyer‟s fee directly. 
This system is driven by the practical consideration that the funds are earmarked for legal 
aid and it is more reassuring for lawyers to know that they will be paid directly rather than 
having to send an invoice to the client and rely on the client‟s willingness to pay the bill. 
Some special activities for other ministries are also carried out by RvR, but these are in 
fact all related to the main task of providing funds for legal aid. 
Internally, each RvR has a non-executive board appointed by the minister.176 Daily 
management is the responsibility of an executive director and her staff. RvR is a member 
of the „BenchmarkGroep‟ which provides a form of horizontal accountability. The website 
of RvR (www.rvr.org) provides information on operations, annual reports and budget 
documents but no intermediate financial statements. RvR had operating costs (including 
affiliated foundations) of €53 million in 2008 (2006: €56 million) and program costs of 
some €396 million (2006: €390 million). 
15.1.4 SVB 
 SVB – Sociale Verzekeringsbank (Social Security Board) is one of the oldest ZBOs in 
existence. It was created in 1901 as Rijksverzekeringsbank, providing benefits on the 
basis of a 1901 labour accident law. SVB is a ZBO that was first hived off from 
government (1950s). During the decades that followed, several changes were made, with 
important landmarks being the transfer of labour disability insurance to what is now UWV 
in 1968 and the creation of a separate law on SVB in which it was stipulated that the 
minister appointed the president of the board. Members of the board were proposed to 
the minister by employer and employee organisations and formally appointed by the 
minister. In 1988 a merger with another income transfer (child benefits) organisation was 
performed, resulting in SVB having regional offices. A next step in hiving in was carried 
out in 2002 with the introduction of a new law on the organisation of social security. As of 
2002 the minister appoints the full board of SVB without formal influence from employer 
and employee organisations. 
                                                 
175 A Secretary of State is more or less an under minister, a political function operating formally under the 
responsibility of a minister but having his own political authority. In this study, a Secretary of State is 
practically equivalent to a minister. 
176 The organisational structure as of 2010 includes a single executive board and an Advisory Board which 
both advises the executive board as well as the Minister of Justice (Parliament, 2009d, p. 12). 
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Formally, SVB is a separate public legal entity, in 2007 based on the SUWI law of 
2002. SVB can be qualified as a subsidiary ZBO. The minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment (minSZW) is responsible for SVB. The minister relies on his staff, which in 
2007 consisted of separate policy and ownership units. Furthermore, there is a separate 
oversight unit – IWI (in their own words: inspection service work and income; 
www.iwiweb.nl) - which independently assesses the compliance and effectiveness of 
SVB‟s and others activities177, which is a form of diagonal accountability relationship. IWI 
does not certify SVB‟s annual reports; that is a task assigned to a public auditor who is 
appointed by SVB‟s executive board. 
SVB‟s main task is to implement the nationwide government pension plan178 AOW, 
Child Benefits as well as a Widow(er) and Orphan Benefit plan. These benefit plans are 
tax or premium funded and the responsibility of the Minister of SZW. In addition to this 
main function, SVB also administers some benefit plans for other government ministries 
and more recently has started to administer a specific AOW related benefit program for 
some local governments.  
Internally, SVB has an executive board and a board of advisors, appointed by the SZW 
Minister.  Horizontal accountability of SVB is formally organised by the use of a Client 
panel as well as participation in the „Benchmarkgroep‟, which is a co-operative venture by 
several executive units of government, evaluating each other‟s performance. The SVB 
website (www.svb.nl) contains information on operations such as annual and quarterly 
reports as well as performance information. 
SVB has a head office and several regional offices throughout the country. Some of 
these regional offices perform dedicated tasks for reasons of efficiency of scale. All 
regional offices can be regarded as SVB „divisions‟ and have no separate legal status. 
Managers of regional offices are accountable to SVB‟s executive board. SVB‟s operating 
expenses  in 2008 were some €270 million (2006: €250 million) and staff numbers total 
3,350 employees (2006: 3,250). Program expenses in 2008 were some €31.7 billion 
(2006: €29.2 billion). 
15.1.5 UWV 
UWV – Uitvoeringsorganisatie Werknemersverzekeringen [employee benefit board] - 
started in 2002 as the result of a merger of five private law institutions and a 
coordination board. All these UWV predecessors were regarded as ZBOs. The history of 
UWV goes back to the 1950s when social security benefit programs on, for example, 
unemployment emerged. This was on the initiative of employers and employees.  Until 
1995, employers and employees were almost fully in control of administering these 
programs and managing the relevant funds. In 1995, as a result of a Parliamentary 
inquiry into the efficiency and effectiveness of the programs themselves, it was 
concluded that employer and employee influence had to be minimised. Ultimately that led 
                                                 
177 IWI also operates as an oversight unit for UWV and social security benefits paid by local governments. 
178 AOW is the main part of the first pillar in the pension plans structure, based on a pay as you go funding 
system (see e.g. Boot, 2008). 
  Selected ZBOs and their institutional context 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   273 
 
to the 2002 SUWI law under which UWV was created. The SUWI law ended employee and 
employer representation on the board of the new organisation and can be regarded as a 
substantial step in the process of hiving in.  
The governance structures of UWV and SVB are similar; I refer to the SVB text for 
details. Like SVB, UWV can be qualified as a subsidiary ZBO.  As of January 2009, it was 
intended for UWV to merge with another entity in the social security arena to implement a 
more effective system for re-integrating unemployed and partially disabled people into 
the labour market. This development is not included in this study, but will essentially 
make no difference to the governance and control structures.179 Information on the 
website (www.uwv.nl) provides data on both operations (annual and intermediate reports) 
and performance and programs. 
UWV is classified as an organisation providing income transfers. That core business 
can however be split up into four sub-domains: income provision, re-integration, medical 
assessments and database management, all requiring separate areas of expertise. The 
two main categories of benefits provided by UWV are disability benefits and 
unemployment benefits. The four sub-domains of operations all contribute to the core 
income transfer function. Some small tasks on behalf of third parties are still performed 
for historical reasons, but these tasks are being transferred to other organisations. 
UWV is at present the largest ZBO in the Netherlands. It has a head office and 
regional offices at two levels (front office/back office) throughout the country. All regional 
offices provide all UWV services.  Apart from the separation between front and back 
office, there is no specialisation. Managers of regional offices are accountable to UWV‟s 
executive board. UWV‟s operating expenses in 2008 were €1.6 billion (2006: €1.8 billion) 
and staff numbers in 2008 were some 13,300 FTE (2006: 15,800 FTE). Program 
expenses in 2008 were €19 billion (2006: €20 billion). 
15.1.6 FBKVB 
FBKVB – Fonds voor Beeldende Kunst, Vormgeving en Bouwkunst (Foundation for Visual 
Arts, Design and Architecture) – is one of the 10 funds in 2007180 that operate in the area 
of government funding of the Arts. FBKVB is structured as a private law ZBO – a 
foundation ZBO – under the responsibility of the minister of Education, Culture and 
Science, during 2007/2008 actually the Secretary of State at minOCW. The Fund was 
created in 1987. It is presently governed by the Wet op het Specifiek Cultuurbeleid 1993 
[WSC1993]. Before the creation of the fund, minOCW was directly responsible for 
processing income transfer applications from artists. Therefore these funds are a classic 
example of hiving off. 
Within minOCW, a separate policy unit is responsible for both ownership as well as 
commissioning activities with respect to the fund. There are no separate diagonal 
oversight units or ownership interface units within minOCW.  
                                                 
179 The other merged entity – CWI – was also governed by the SUWI law. 
180 In 2008, two funds merged, but FBKVB was not involved. 
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Within the Fund, the process of evaluating and granting funding is supported by 
dedicated expert committees. The internal organisation of the Fund consists of an 
executive board and a managing director, who is responsible for daily operations. The 
website of the Fund (www.fondsbkvb.nl) only provides information on the programs to be 
carried out, not on operations. The Fund has a staff of 19 FTE and operating expenses in 
2008 totalled €2.2 million (2006: €1.7 million). Program expenses in 2008 were some 
€22 million (2006 €15 million). The budgets of the funds are distributed by minOCW in a 
4 year cycle, based on the „Cultuurnota‟ which is a politically reviewed document on 
distributing all income transfers to the arts sector. The fund uses a one year budget cycle 
for their programs given the budget made available by minOCW. FBKVB annual reports 
are audited by a public auditor, who is appointed by FBKVB‟s executive board. 
15.1.7 Vf/Pf 
Vf/Pf is shorthand for two formally separate legal entities operating in the area of 
replacement, disability and unemployment in the primary education industry. Historically, 
Stichting Vervangingsfonds (replacement and disability), was created by primary and 
secondary education employers and employees in 1992, with the support of minOCW. 
Stichting Participatiefonds was created by the same partners in 1995 and focuses on 
unemployed teaching staff. At present both foundations – classified as „Foundation-ZBOs‟ 
- are governed by separate boards, but the members of the board are by Statute also 
required to be a member of the board of the other foundation. As of 2007 secondary 
education is no longer subject to participation in the programs managed by Vf/Pf. 
Vf/Pf is formally governed by the statutes of the individual entities and two minOCW 
decrees on the functions of the entities. In the governance relationship between minister 
and boards, the minister is supported by the staff of the policy unit responsible for 
primary education, which covers both the commissioning as well as the „ownership‟ role 
on behalf of the minister. The board of Vf/Pf is a one tier board, divided into an executive 
and a non-executive part and supported by a managing director. The „executive board‟ 
has no separate policy authority, which is the domain of the „non-executive board‟. 
Members of the boards are appointed by employer and employee organisations in the 
education sector. The minister has no role in these appointments. There is no separate 
form of horizontal accountability. The website (www.vfpf.nl) provides essentially program 
information and no financial information or annual reports. 
The main task of Vf/Pf is funding of replacement of (temporarily) disabled or 
unemployed educational staff in primary education. Funding is supported by premiums 
paid by the School Boards that are required to fund Vf/Pf. Funding of the School Boards 
however is performed by minOCW, so minOCW indirectly funds Vf/Pf. 
Vf/Pf operates from one office with some 70 FTE and has outsourced some of its 
activities. The organisation had operating costs in 2006 of approximately €13 M. 
Program costs in 2006 amounted to some € 520 M. 
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15.2 Monitoring/Regulating ZBOs 
There is more variation in Monitoring and Regulating ZBOs than in income transfer ZBOs. 
One group performs general oversight on behaviour of citizens or institutions and/or 
regulates behaviour. Another group focuses on quality assurance. A third group focuses 
on monitoring policy effectiveness and a final group focuses on compliance monitoring. In 
the case selection, three general oversight and one quality assurance ZBO are included. 
15.2.1 AFM 
AFM – Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten [Netherlands Authority for the financial 
markets] - is responsible for supervising the conduct of institutions operating in the 
financial markets such as banks, pension funds and insurance companies. Another part 
of its function is licensing of financial market intermediaries as well as licensing public 
auditors. Overall supervision of financial markets in the Netherlands is divided between 
the AFM and DNB – the central bank – who are responsible for prudential supervision. 
AFM was established in 2002 as a Foundation ZBO. Its predecessor STE (Stichting 
Toezicht Effecten verkeer)181 was created in 1989 under the influence of European 
financial market regulations. STE had only been responsible for supervising securities 
trading and also had private law status. Before 1989, regulating and monitoring of the 
financial markets was essentially left to the industry. Although AFM still has private law 
status, history indicates that there has been a trend of hiving in financial market 
regulating and monitoring activities. 
AFM‟s governance structure consists of an executive board as well as a non-executive 
board for its daily operations. AFM‟s executive board is appointed by the Minister of 
Finance, based on a proposal from the non-executive board. The non-executive board is 
also appointed by the Minister of Finance, based on a proposal made by the members of 
the old non-executive board. Within minFin, a policy unit is responsible for both policy as 
well as ownership issues. The governance structure is completed by an advisory panel, 
consisting of representatives of the supervised institutions, which comments on proposed 
legislation and the AFM‟s direct as well as indirect monitoring expenses (Parliament, 
2003d, p. 19). This advisory panel may be regarded as a form of horizontal 
accountability. The motivation for this choice is that the financial industry monitoring body 
should as far as possible copy the institutional and accountability measures that are 
usual within the industry (source: interviews). Information on the website www.afm.nl 
provides both information on policy as well on governance structure, budgets and annual 
reports. Financial statements are audited by a public auditor appointed by AFM‟s non-
executive board. 
                                                 
181 In the 1995 NCA-report on ZBOs (Parliament, 1995a), Effectenvernieuwingsbureau (securities renewal 
office) is mentioned. This entity was discontinued and its tasks were left to the market under BW2:86d 
(see Parliament, 1998b). 
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AFM is an organisation that is in the process of developing its activities. Operating 
expenses in 2008 were €78 M (2006: €72 M) and staff levels were approximately 430 
FTE (both 2008 and 2006). 
15.2.2 CFV 
CFV – Centraal Fonds voor de Volkshuisvesting (Social Housing Associations Fund) was 
originally created in 1988 as the result of a change in financing of Social Housing 
Associations. The creation of the fund was supported by the social housing sector. CFV 
has always had a public law based status. CFV can be qualified as a subsidiary ZBO. 
There was no transfer of staff from a government unit. 
Formally, CFV was created on the basis of the „Woningwet‟ (Law on [Social] Housing). 
The Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration [WWI] is responsible for CFV. The 
organisation of WWI is embedded in the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (minVROM) and was created in 2007 when the Balkenende IV-cabinet took 
office. The minister relies on both a policy staff as well as a special interface unit 
responsible for the ownership role within the department for all ZBOs and executive 
agencies of minVROM. CFV has no separate non-executive board or other horizontal 
accountability structures. There is no form of diagonal accountability structure either. 
CFV‟s website (www.cfv.nl) provides both policy as well as operational documents. 
Intermediate (quarterly) financial reports do exist but are not published on the website. 
The original task of CFV is income transfer from within the social housing sector. 
Before 1988, the Dutch State and local government lent money to social housing 
associations [SHAs].  CFV‟s original role was to support SHAs that faced problems in 
financing their building programs on the market, mostly due to solvency issues, by 
financially supporting restructuring of the debts of such a SHA. Resources were retrieved 
from within the sector by compulsory levies (Van der Schaar, Faber, Koffijberg & Priemus, 
1996, p. 144). Government still subsidised the sector based on previous funding 
programs. By the mid 1990s, financial ties between central government and SHAs were 
ended, resulting in financial liberalisation (Brandsen, 2004, p. 66).  Gradually, CFV‟s task 
has evolved into a form of a financial oversight in which CFV monitors the social housing 
sector on behalf of the minister. At present (end 2008), the core function is the 
monitoring activities, but due to policy emphasis on reallocation of funds available within 
the social housing sector (e.g. Parliament, 2008g) there is a high probability that the 
income transfer role of CFV will grow in the near future. The key of the reallocation 
program is that wealthy SHAs should contribute to the restructuring of areas with a 
relatively weak housing environment. The reallocation of the funds that are needed for 
this program will be executed by CFV. 
CFV has no regional offices or branches. Operating expenses in 2008 were some €6.0 
M (2006: €5.1 M) and staff numbers were 36 FTE. CFV‟s annual report is audited by a 
public auditor who is appointed by the CFV board. 
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Given the fact that the core function of CFV in 2007/2008 actually consists of 
monitoring activities I will compare CFV with the other monitoring ZBOs rather than with 
income transfer ZBOs. 
15.2.3 NMa 
Fair competition is essentially governed by EU regulations. Until 1998 competition 
oversight in the Netherlands was organised within the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
spread over several units (Parliament, 1996b, p. 42). As of 1998, new legislation on 
competition and market concentration (Mededingingswet; Law on competition) was 
implemented, based on EU standards. Within the framework of the new law, the 
organisational structure of market oversight was changed as well. A new unit named NMa 
was created within minEZ, managed by a Director General. Formally, NMa was still 
subject to the hierarchical chain of command within minEZ, but the Director General had 
a mandate which allowed him to operate independently from case based instructions by 
the minister. In the debates on the proposed competition law in Parliament, a discussion 
on independence and impartiality of the new authority was held, partially influenced by 
comments from interest groups (Parliament, 1996c, p. 8). A result of this debate was that 
a resolution was debated in Parliament that required evaluation of the organisational 
structure after 3 years and which changed the status of the new authority into that of a 
ZBO. The cabinet adopted the resolution. As of July 1, 2005, the executive board of NMa 
was attributed ZBO status182; its staff is still part of the ministry‟s structure. Cabinet 
argued that it would take too much time to create a separate legal entity for the whole of 
the organisation and that attributing ZBO status to the Director General (executive board) 
was relatively easy (Parliament, 2001e, p. 21).  
As a result, NMa‟s governance structure consists of an executive board. There is no 
advisory panel or non-executive board. Regarding the decisions to be made by the NMa, a 
distinction is made between the general competition and market regulation tasks on the 
one hand and specialised units for the Energy and Transport Industries. NMa and NZA 
(see 15.2.5) co-operate in cases of mergers in the medical sector. 
NMa is the only ZBO in this study that has no separate legal status. Financial 
management is based on the requirements of CW2001 and cash based. Annual reports 
are audited by minEZ‟s audit unit and implicitly reviewed by the NCA. The website of the 
organisation (www.nma.nl) provides information on policy, governance structure, budgets 
and annual reports. Operational expenditure of NMa was €44 M in 2008 (2006: €36 M). 
Total staff numbers were 405 in 2008 (2006: 380). 
15.2.4 NAK 
NAK – Nederlandse Algemene Keuringsdienst voor zaaizaad en pootgoed [General 
inspection service for agricultural seeds and seed potatoes] - is one of 7 quality certifying 
                                                 
182 In the original proposal, the Director General would have ZBO status. However, having only a single 
executive as decision making authority was regarded as too vulnerable by Parliament and Cabinet, 
therefore, the proposed law was changed by creating an Executive Board (Parliament, 2001f). 
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institutions related to minLNV. The history of this foundation goes back to 1932, when 
farmers organised their own quality assurance system. The Minister of Agriculture was 
not involved in the original creation of the foundation. At present, regulation in this 
domain is mainly based on EU directives, with relatively few possibilities to create 
national regulations. Due to these European regulations, NAK has been forced to hive off 
its commercial activities to a completely different legal entity, possibly with the result of 
losing some efficiency of scale. This change in operations has been discussed in 
Parliament, but the only thing the minister could do was to promise Parliament that the 
expected negative impact of this change would be put onto the European agenda 
(Parliament, 2008h). 
NAK‟s governance structure is based on a board and a managing director for daily 
operations. The board mainly consists of specialists in the sector and is supported by two 
specialised committees, responsible for the contents of the inspection programs. There is 
no separate non-executive board. The president of the board is appointed by the full 
board after approval by minLNV. The other members of the board are appointed by 
relevant interest groups after consulting the president of the board. In the relationship 
between NAK and minLNV, the ministry has separated the policy program role from the 
ownership monitoring role.  Information on fees and annual reports is available on the 
website www.nak.nl. NAK is one of these organisations that would qualify under Bohley‟s 
(1980) decentralisation argument for hiving off183, due to the fact that the activities of the 
organisation are only directly relevant for a very small group, the farmers who grow the 
relevant crops. However, history tells a different story.  NAK is actually hived in into the 
government domain although it is still formally a separate private legal entity. 
NAK is an organisation operating from one office with a staff of approximately 220 
FTE in 2008 (2006: 220).  Operating expenses were €27 M in 2008 and €21 M in 2006. 
15.2.5 NZA 
In section 15.1.1, I have already referred to Ziekenfondsraad, which was split up in 1999 
into a monitoring ZBO and an income distribution and policy advice ZBO. NZA is the legal 
successor to the monitoring ZBO „College Toezicht Zorgverzekeringen‟ [CTZ] (Health 
insurance monitoring Board) that was created after splitting up Ziekenfondsraad. In the 
Dutch healthcare system, many of the fees and prices to be charged by service providers 
are regulated. Although the present law allows for liberalisation of prices, a substantial 
part of the system is still controlled by price regulation. Until 2006, there was a separate 
ZBO (College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg [CTG]; Board on healthcare fees). On October 1, 
2006, CTG and CTZ merged into the new NZA. NZA‟s tasks essentially cover the former 
monitoring functions as well as market regulation function – for example by assessing 
licences to merge hospitals – and a standard setting institution for prices in the regulated 
segment of the market. NZA‟s legal status is a public law legal entity. Given its history, 
NZA can be regarded as an entity that was hived in. 
                                                 
183 See section on privatisation of demand. 
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NZA operates under the responsibility of minVWS. The ministry has organised its 
policy commissioning role as well as its ownership role within one unit of the Directorate 
General Cure. NZA governance structure consists of an (executive) board which is 
appointed by the Minister of VWS. NZA has no non-executive board; however the 
executive board is allowed to appoint an Advisory Board of experts. Such an Advisory 
Board currently exists. The task description of the Advisory Board covers executive board 
operational issues, which implies that the Advisory Board has a function similar to that of 
a non-executive Board rather than being a horizontal accountability instrument. 
Information on the website (www.nza.nl) discloses information on policy documents, 
governance structure and annual reports.  
NZA‟s short history makes it difficult to provide adequate comparative data on 
operations. In 2005, the predecessors CTG and CTZ had operating expenses of €27 M 
and 200 FTE. 2008 data on NZA disclose operating expenses of €30 M and 240 staff 
members.  
 
15.3 Concluding remarks 
The 11 ZBOs described above are split up over two main categories of ZBO functionality. 
They vary in size, organisational structure and legal status. This choice was considered in 
depth when selecting the cases. However, a review of the history of the organisations 
reveals that the majority of the organisations were not hived off but hived in to the 
domain of government. Only FBKVB is an explicit case of hiving off; one may argue that 
NMa has characteristics of hiving off but as its staff is still part of minEZ, that is not a very 
strong case.  
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16. Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs 
In this chapter and the next chapter, I will address the results of assessing formal and 
actual autonomy of the selected ZBOs, starting with income transfer ZBOs and then 
followed by the monitoring ZBOs. These evaluations form the basis for answering the 
research question for the empirical part of the study which is: 
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit the legal and 
economic characteristics of ZBO services? 
The research model used was presented in section 13.1. Because there are two different 
groups of ZBOs included in this study, I will discuss the relevant items for each group 
separately. In this chapter, the income transfer ZBOs will be discussed. In chapter 17, I 
will focus on the monitoring type ZBOs. The main themes for evaluation in both chapters 
are Authority, Service specifications, Market dimensions covering both supply and 
demand as well as Planning & Control including the political debates regarding individual 
ZBOs between 2006 and 2008. These themes were operationalised in section 14.1 and 
led to a reference point of issues for the different types of ZBO functions identified.  
The case selection is based on two groups of ZBOs with different functions. The legal 
dimension of autonomy will be discussed on a case by case basis by elaborating on 
ownership as well as formal and/or actual deviations from the four groups of authority 
issues that were discussed in Part B. The general rule is that if a provision has been 
made in the law or in decrees, this restricts the legal autonomy of the ZBO under 
scrutiny.184 As kZBO defines the general restrictions for all ZBOs, the assessment will 
focus on those restrictions or degrees of freedom in authority attributed in the case law 
that deviate from the kZBO standard. Furthermore, actual practice with respect to these 
regulations will be discussed. The economic indicators will also be discussed for each 
ZBO separately based on the product and market characteristics and actual control 
applied. I will start by discussing the legal dimension of autonomy in section 16.1, 
followed by an elaboration on the economic dimension of autonomy in section 16.2. The 
chapter will be concluded by an elaboration on observed mismatches between legal and 
economic dimension of autonomy and an assessment of the relative autonomy of the 
income transfer ZBOs studied in relation to each other. 
16.1 The legal dimension of autonomy 
For each of the cases the legal dimension of autonomy is discussed along the lines of 
(quasi) ownership and the four groups of authority issues than can be derived from kZBO. 
I will only discuss those areas in which a deviation between kZBO and ZBO case law or 
between kZBO and actual practice is observed, because kZBO is supposed to be the 
standard for controlling new and existing ZBOs which are explicitly listed as subject to 
                                                 
184 Of course, if the arrangement attributes power to the executive board of the ZBO that creates more 
degrees of freedom, autonomy will be increased. 
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kZBO. Differences between ZBO case law and actual practice emerge indirectly from 
these observations: if a deviation between kZBO and case law exists, it is either 
continued, or mitigated in actual practice.  
All assessments are based on data for fiscal 2007/2008. In each case, a short 
comment on developments regarding implementation of kZBO is also given. In the 
discussion on the individual cases, all mismatches are disclosed. In the overview of all 
assessments as well as in the general conclusion at the end of each case, I will focus on 
information, governance and cyclical arrangements because the normative measures are 
in general set when the ZBO is created. Furthermore, I will not consider measures of last 
resort: instruments only needed in very special cases as a tool for intervention. They will 
not affect autonomy during actual operations and several interviewees have indicated 
that tools such as intervening in cases of negligence are not used and are not likely to be 
used since they would fundamentally change the relationship between ZBO and minister. 
In the tables at the end of the discussion on each ZBO, an indication of the relevance of 
the measures is given based on the arguments mentioned above. 
 
Table 16.1: Key data on income transfer ZBOs 
 
C
V
Z
 
R
v
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B
K
V
B
 
V
f/
P
f 
Legal entity PLA, 
subsidiary 
PLA, 
subsidiary 
PLA, 
subsidiary 
PLA, 
subsidiary 
PLB, 
foundation 
PLB, 
foundation 
Funding public public public public public private 
Operating  revenues in €M 
2008 
52 53 270 1,811 2 13 
 
In chapter 14, I discussed the case selection for this study. Key data on the six selected 
income transfer ZBOs is given in Table 16.1. 
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16.1.1 CVZ 
The assessment of CVZ‟s autonomy is based on the arrangements that were effective in 
2007/2008. In his letter on adapting legislation to kZBO (Parliament, 2008f), minVWS 
announced that CVZ would be fully subject to kZBO. The proposed legislation has been 
submitted in 2009 but as of January 2010 is still being debated in Parliament 
(Parliament, 2009e). 
16.1.1.1 Normative measures 
CVZ has PLA status which has been defined in a separate section of the program law 
ZVW. PLA status implies that kZBO is fully applicable unless other measures are included 
in the case law. In the letter from minVWS (Parliament, 2008i) on implementation of 
kZBO, no exceptions are proposed.  
PLA status classifies CVZ as a Subsidiary ZBO which implies that ownership is held by 
minister and the parent ministry. Interviewees in the CVZ case confirm that minVWS 
actually controls operating equity and can be regarded as the (quasi) owner of CVZ. 
On one normative issue a deviation from kZBO is observed. In kZBO:9 the only 
restriction mentioned is on appointment of civil servants in the executive board.185  In 
ZVW, another restriction is introduced: members of the board also have to be recruited 
based on gender and ethnic/cultural background. Although this has no immediate effect 
on autonomy, it is a restriction in the degrees of freedom minVWS enjoys in its selection 
of members of the executive board. In practice, the CVZ executive board consists of one 
woman and two men, the ethnic/cultural dimension has not been covered.  
16.1.1.2 Information measures  
With respect to the information measures, deviations exist on two issues: the general 
right of inquiry is not included in ZVW and no arrangement has been made on submitting 
annual reports to Parliament. The right of inquiry in ZWV is restricted to performance 
information with respect to health insurance companies and relevant differences 
between budgeted and actual operational expenses and does not cover other issues with 
respect to operations. This seems to provide additional degrees of freedom, but some 
interviewees have indicated that the time to process decisions within minVWS depends 
on formal processing by the CVZ board rather than on informal information exchange. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that actual frequency of reporting to minVWS is once a 
month, also an indication of frequent information exchange. Effectively it seems that the 
general right of inquiry exists in practice. CVZ case law requires that the budget (plan) and 
annual reports including financial statements are made available to the general public. 
This is a broader regulation than kZBO in terms of contents. However, in terms of 
publication, it is a passive form rather than an active form as required by kZBO.  In 
practice, Parliament receives annual reports including financial statements from minVWS, 
                                                 
185 In practice, members of ZBO boards are very often former civil servants or politicians. 
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based on the requirement in ZVW:76.2 that minVWS has to comment on the operations 
of CVZ to Parliament. This means that Parliament receives the information including a 
political annotation. This (at least theoretically) affects the autonomy of CVZ in a negative 
way given the possibility to comment on the minister‟s assessment of CVZ. Respondents 
indicate that this practice will cease to exist after fiscal 2007 as kZBO only requires 
submission of annual reports to Parliament and there is no longer a requirement for a 
minVWS assessment (Parliament, 2007j; 2008j). Indeed no separate assessment 
document on minVWS‟ Subsidiary ZBOs has been published as of fiscal 2008, although 
ZVW:76.2 still included this requirement at the end of fiscal 2009.  
16.1.1.3 Governance provisions 
The third group of legal issues regards governance structure. kZBO theoretically includes 
the power to create an executive and a non-executive board. Interviewees indicate that 
the CVZ executive board preferred to include a non-executive board in its governance 
structure as an institution that reflects on the operations of CVZ. MinVWS disagreed, in 
line with the Gerritsen Committee advice (2008), but did allow an advisory board to be 
created (minVWS, 2006a). As there is no formal two tier governance structure, a legal 
arrangement as meant in kZBO:7 seems to be obsolete. One can argue that as there is in 
fact a second - although non authoritative -  body, an arrangement on the relationship 
between the two bodies should exist. In the governance code of the CVZ (executive) 
board, which has been approved by minVWS, the advisory board is mentioned and the 
executive board is entitled to decide on advisory board appointments and tasks. In 
practice, an arrangement as intended in kZBO actually exists. Another point to be 
mentioned is that no intervention measures in the event of negligence exist. Interviewees 
indicated that it is unlikely that such an arrangement will ever be used. 
More important are four other governance issues. First, there are no measures for ex 
ante approval of mandates for assigned tasks. As a result the description of tasks 
assigned to CVZ in ZVW:64-ZVW:70 has a restrictive and limitative character. 
Interviewees have indicated that in particular CVZ functions that are related to some 
groups of individuals (uninsured and expatriates) created problems within CVZ and might 
be performed more efficiently in other ZBOs or government organisations. This has not 
been followed through due to the fact that other organisations were also facing important 
organisational and process changes. Second, ZVW does not include a general 
arrangement on secondary jobs for members of the executive board. Only a limited list of 
incompatibilities exists, which suggests some additional autonomy for CVZ‟s executive 
board, but this is mitigated by lower regulation in „Regeling bezoldiging en beheerskosten 
bestuursorganen volksgezondheid [RBBBV] (Decree on remuneration and operating costs 
ZBOs minVWS), article 7. Furthermore, at the level of decrees based on ZVW, the 
requirement to report and publish secondary jobs is included. Therefore, there is no 
impact on autonomy compared to kZBO regulations. A third point to be discussed here is 
the issue of remuneration. kZBO:14 only stipulates that the minister determines 
remuneration of the board. In this case, RBBBV:1-4, the remuneration arrangement is 
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fully described. It does not affect autonomy from a legal perspective as the regulation 
addresses minVWS rather than CVZ‟s executive board. However, the actual rules are 
more restrictive than the arrangement in kZBO. The legal requirements of WOPT on 
publication of remuneration are met because no member of the board receives 
compensation that exceeds the WOPT standards. In practice, the 2007 annual report 
disclosed remuneration; the generally available 2008 annual report did not. Finally, the 
optional arrangement in kZBO on asset related transactions is not included in ZVW. This 
is particularly relevant when creating legal entities, in the case of real estate transactions 
and providing collateral. Interviewees indicate that the issue of bankruptcy, which is also 
not covered in legislation, is merely theoretical. If CVZ‟s financial position became 
insolvent, respondents indicated that the minister would intervene anyway. On the issue 
of lending and borrowing, CVZ‟s position is covered in a separate law on funding and 
financing social security programs and its operating costs (WFSV). This law is older than 
the arrangement that exists for other ZBOs based on CW2001:45, but has the same 
impact. Therefore there is no impact on autonomy as a result of lending and borrowing 
transactions. Although not formally the case, controls on reserves other than an 
equalisation reserve (kZBO:32f) do exist. Interviewees indicated that at the civil servant 
level minVWS is the least critical about the subject of dedicated reserves in CVZ‟s 
balance sheet.  
16.1.1.4 Cyclical measures 
The last group of legal measures covers cyclical authority. Four issues are covered which 
all restrict CVZ‟s autonomy. First, CVZ‟s budget is not approved by minVWS but 
determined by minVWS. Determining a budget is a stronger authority tool than approval 
because the minister can change the budget. CVZ does not receive a letter of instruction 
to prepare the budget. Respondents indicate that such a letter would conflict with the 
independent character of the ZBO and is not necessary as the tasks assigned to CVZ are, 
according to the respondents, relatively stable in the course of time. This is a typical 
remark because determining the budget by minVWS mitigates the independent character 
of CVZ. Furthermore, the stability of tasks assigned can be contested, given the fact that 
the role attributed to CVZ on health insurance for expatriates was, according to the same 
respondents, a new task that was underestimated. To some extent this also holds for the 
new tasks on health services for illegal immigrants and people that do not pay 
compulsory insurance premiums. The respondents also indicate that after the initial 
budget proposal is submitted to minVWS a negotiation process emerges that effectively 
resembles an ex ante letter of instruction. The legal measures on submitting a budget by 
CVZ and determining the budget by minVWS (ZVW:71-72) provides only 2 months to 
complete this negotiation process, which is a relatively short timeframe given the internal 
processes at minVWS which include, according to respondents, a two stage review of the 
proposed draft and final budget.   
Second, RBBBV requires that CVZ submits a multiyear budget plan. This is an 
arrangement that is not included in kZBO. From a ZBO perspective, it reduces autonomy 
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as the board has to inform the Minister-Principal beforehand on future perspectives 
rather than during the budgeting process for the next fiscal year.186 
Third, although an equalisation reserve is allowed, a ministerial decree (RBBBV:18) 
requires the equalisation reserve not to exceed 5% of the budget. This seems a plausible 
arrangement, but the general arrangement for executive agencies on the same subject 
states that the equalisation reserve must not exceed 5% of the average sales/revenues 
over the last three fiscal years (Regeling Baten-lastendiensten 2007, article 17.4b; 
Decree executive agencies 2007). The latter arrangement is a more flexible way of 
managing the equalisation reserve. Therefore, in my opinion the CVZ arrangement 
restricts autonomy. Respondents note that the issue of the level of reserves allowed is in 
practice still being discussed.  
The last issue is a separate and explicit audit protocol described in RBBBV. This is not 
a requirement demanded by kZBO and restricts the professional judgement of the CVZ 
auditors, particularly because it prescribes in detail the level of control on each of the 
respective articles of ZVW. This also has a negative impact on autonomy.  
16.1.1.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment to kZBO 
The proposed changes in legislation as a result of the implementation of kZBO did not 
pass through Parliament by January 1, 2010.  The proposal includes several changes 
(Parliament, 2009e) which are discussed here. The 2007 legislation on CVZ included 
requirements on women as board members (ZVW:59.5) as well as listed incompatibilities. 
These restrictions are deleted which brings legislation in line with kZBO. 
In the budgeting and reporting procedures, the wording of the legislation is changed 
to maintain requirements on working programs and multiyear budgets in the minVWS 
decision making process. This is in line with the 2007 legislation and thus does not alter 
the autonomy observed in the analysis above. The proposed ZVW:73 clarifies the scope 
of kZBO:26, 34 and 35 by stating that these kZBO articles refer to costs of CVZ‟s 
operations. As far as content is concerned, the legislation has the same (negative) impact 
on autonomy as the 2007 version of ZVW.  
An inconsistency seems to exist with respect to approval of the budget documents in 
ZVW:75. The old and new ZVW:72 requires that minVWS sets the total budget for 
operations of CVZ. A separate budget document approval as referred to in ZVW:75.1 
(new) seems to be obsolete; at least the old legislation did not cover a separate approval 
of working programs and budget documents. Other measures in ZVW:75.3 (new) address 
structure of budgets and annual reports as well as (the level of) the equalisation reserve. 
These measures are specified in the present RBBBV and remain unchanged. Effectively, 
the (negative) impact on autonomy compared to kZBO standards will continue to exist as 
well.  
 
                                                 
186 I recall that under AW1996:124l.4, consent to the multiyear budget was included in the regulation. 
Furthermore, it is common practice for departmental units under CW2001:5. 
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Table 16.2: Legal measures on CVZ, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
Reference 
kZBO 
Reference 
case law 
Actual practice Formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
Actual 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
Not appointing 
civil servant to 
board 
Normative 9 ZVW:59 in line 0 0 
Appointment 
based on gender 
and or cultural 
background 
Normative not 
included 
ZVW:59.5 applied ↓ 0 
Submit annual 
report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 ZVW:76 minister submitted 
annual report, till 
2007 
↓ ↑ 
General right of 
inquiry 
Information 20 ZVW:65-66, 
71 
in line 0 0 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 covered in 
internal 
governance 
statute 
advisory board is 
appointed 
0 0 
Ex ante approval 
of mandates 
Governance 8 limitative 
list of tasks 
ZVW:64-70 
no external 
mandates 
↓ 0 
Measure on 
secondary jobs 
Governance 13 ZVW:59.6 + 
RBBBV:7 
disclosure on 
website; 2007 in 
annual report 
0 0 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
RBBV: 
chapter 1 
2007: disclosed; 
2008: not disclosed 
0 0 
Intervention in 
case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 not 
included 
not used ↑ 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d WFSV:120 in line 0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
control on 
reserves 
Governance 32f not 
included 
minVWS‟ attitude is 
critical 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
bankruptcy 
Governance 32g not 
included 
intervention 
beforehand expected 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
others 
Governance 32a-c; 
32e 
not 
included 
no actions observed 0 0 
Approval of 
budget 
Cyclical 29 ZVW:72.1 minister decides ↓ ↓ 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 RBBBV:18 in discussion ↓ ↓ 
Submit multiyear 
plan 
Cyclical none RBBBV:12 submitted ↓ ↓ 
Audit protocol Cyclical not 
included 
RBBBV:15 basis for auditing ↓ ↓ 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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Finally, minVWS will no longer assess CVZ‟s annual report as was the case under 
ZVW:76.2 (old). The general impression of the changed legislation is that it does not 
change the autonomy of CVZ as observed under the ZVW that was in effect in 2007. 
 
16.1.1.6 Conclusion 
The table above summarises the impact of the legal measures that deviate from the 
standard arrangement as laid down in kZBO. Two levels of deviations can be observed. 
First mismatches between formal and actual measures and the kZBO standard are 
discussed, which I shall label type 1 mismatches. Type 1 mismatches are found in annual 
report submission arrangements including comments by minVWS to Parliament; 
equalisation reserve controls which are stronger than those for executive agencies and 
actually discussed; decision making rather than approving budgets; strict function 
description which do not even allow for a discussion on providing services to other 
ministries; as well as the strict audit protocol used. All have a negative impact on 
autonomy.  
The second level of mismatches is between formal and current actual measures. 
These are Type 2 mismatches. In practice asset controls are imposed, particularly on 
reserves other than the equalisation reserve, although no arrangement formally exists. 
Finally, an inconsistency in information provision is found in providing annual reports 
to Parliament: ZVW still requires a comment by minVWS which as of 2008 has 
announced that due to kZBO there is no need for such a comment. The overall conclusion 
of this section is that CVZ‟s autonomy is formally reduced and practices tend to be even 
stricter, particularly with respect to asset controls. 
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16.1.2 RvR 
RvR is discussed as a (cluster of) 5 separate legal entities, working together with respect 
to efficient organisation of operations. RvR was formally merged on July 1, 2010 and by 
then legislation was aligned with kZBO. In her letter on implementation of kZBO, minJus 
announced she would only make an exception to kZBO:15 on the civil servant status of 
staff (Parliament, 2008i). 
16.1.2.1 Normative measures 
RvR has PLA status which is defined in article 2 of the program law on legal support (Wet 
op de Rechtsbijstand; [WRB]). Due to its PLA status, RvR is fully subject to kZBO, unless 
other measures are included in the case law.  
The PLA status classifies RvR as a Subsidiary ZBO which implies that ownership is 
held by minJus. Interviewees confirm this position, although some of them indicated that 
no fundamental discussion on the ownership position was held. In practice, the 
ownership and commissioning role are attributed to the relevant program directorate 
rather than separated. From a political perspective, the State Secretary for Justice187, is 
formally responsible for RvR. 
 
The compulsory normative requirements as stated in kZBO apply to RvR, except for 
kZBO:9. The July 2007 version of WRB has no restrictions on appointment of civil 
servants. It does have a restriction with respect to the number of lawyers that generally 
represent clients (in Dutch: Rechtsbijstandsverleners) on the Board (WRB:3.3).188 This 
deviation does not affect autonomy: interviewees indicated that no interventions with 
respect to Board members have been made. Furthermore, the Boards are consulted in 
appointment procedures, which gives them some influence on the actual appointments. 
In the optional measures, two deviations from kZBO exist. First, the Minister of Justice 
announced that she would allow an exception on kZBO:15, the regulation on the legal 
position of staff. In her letter on the application of kZBO (Parliament, 2008i) minJus 
proposed to continue the present private law status of RvR‟s staff as defined in WRB:11. 
In theory, this means that RvR has autonomy on staff remuneration. The arrangement on 
the position of RvR staff is made in the program law rather than based on a ministerial 
decree as required by kZBO. This means that it is relatively hard to change the existing 
measures. In a separate decree (Subsidiebesluit raden voor rechtsbijstand [SRvR), an 
arrangement is included on the compensation procedure for wage increases. RvR is given 
compensation based on a fixed rule, which means that the Board has limited power to 
                                                 
187 State Secretary is a political official who represents a minister for a part of his political portfolio 
(GW:46.2) under ministerial responsibility. In practice, a State Secretary‟s political responsibility is 
similar to that of a minister. 
188 Lawyers representing clients have a commercial interest in positive decisions on income transfers by 
RvR. Therefore some restrictions on board membership were made. In the revised version of WRB after 
the merger into one single board, kZBO:9 applies automatically and the only other restriction is 
incompatibility of membership in both Board and advisory board (WRB2010:3.2). 
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increase wages (SRvR:4.1). The arrangement is compulsory and transparent. The only 
way minJUS can reduce compensation for wages is by defining the basis for 
compensation (SRvR:4.2). 
Second, the data protection arrangement (kZBO:41) is not included in WRB. In SRvR a 
data protection arrangement is mentioned as one of the conditions for providing 
subsidies (actually program- and operating costs; SRvR:8.2) to RvR. 
16.1.2.2 Information measures 
RvR submits its annual report informally to MPs, without intervention by minJUS. This 
means that compared to a kZBO context, RvR has a higher level of autonomy because 
there is no minJUS role in this process. Interviewees indicate that policy related 
information is submitted by minJUS to Parliament. As no information on operations is 
provided, this has no effect on RvR‟s operational autonomy. Some interviewees also 
indicated that the RvR annual report is approved by minJUS. Formally an arrangement as 
meant in kZBO:34 does not apply to RvR. The procedure with respect to approval of 
resources spent by RvR is based on the subsidy provided to RvR. At the end of the fiscal 
year minJUS determines the subsidy to be provided to RvR based on the audited 
statement of accounts. This results in a formal letter from minJUS to the Board indicating 
that the subsidy has been approved. As a result, the formal position of RvR is less 
autonomous than in a case where a minister only approves the annual report as meant 
by kZBO:34.  
Other information measures are formally and actually in line with kZBO or not 
applicable at all. Therefore, there is no additional impact on autonomy. 
16.1.2.3 Governance provisions 
In WRB no arrangement has been made for „incoming mandates‟ (Parliament, 2000d, p. 
23) for the ZBO as defined by kZBO:8. This means that RvR is restricted to delivering only 
those services that are described in the law which has a negative impact on autonomy.  
RvR is managed by a board and directors for each of its jurisdictions. During 2007-
2008, debate on the future governance structure was ongoing. Key to the new structure 
would be one single organisation and, according to the respondents, preferably a two tier 
board. The members of the executive board were only part time; therefore an 
arrangement on secondary jobs would be odd. However, except for the limitation on 
lawyers representing clients on the board, no list of incompatibilities exists in the RvR 
legislation before the merger into a single organisation.189 The single organisation concept 
has been implemented; the main governance structure is based on a one tier executive 
board and an advisory board. Arrangements on two tier boards are therefore not found in 
the relevant case laws. 
Given the provision (WRB:6.2) on remuneration in accordance with the measures for 
civil servants, no excess remuneration or bonuses are expected. The annual reports do 
                                                 
189 After the merger, only incompatibility between executive board and advisory board is mentioned. 
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not disclose information, but RvR is not mentioned on the minBZK blacklist of 
organisations that did not report based on WOPT (minBZK, 2009a, 2009b). 
Intervention measures in the event of negligence and provisions on annulling 
decisions are not used in practice; only the intervention measure in kZBO:23 is included 
in the case law. The character of these measures is one of last resort and they do not 
have an impact on autonomy. 
Three issues should be noted on asset related transactions as meant by kZBO:32. 
First, the case law describes explicitly control of a separate legal entity by RvR in WRB18-
23. This legal entity has been created and is operational. Second, the formal case law 
does not include an arrangement on creating other legal entities. In the SRvR decree 
(SRvR:14.1) the control tools regarding assets are mentioned indirectly by referring to 
AWb:4:71. The setup of this part of the governance structure is rather complex, given the 
fact that three separate legal documents have to be studied. In practice, the impact on 
actual autonomy is minimal: they have not yet been used in practice. Secondly, only one 
issue mentioned in kZBO:32 is not covered. This regards bankruptcy arrangement which 
are, given the PLA status of RvR, practically irrelevant. There is therefore no impact due to 
this deviation. The third issue on asset related transactions is not mentioned in kZBO. It 
concerns ministerial consent on subsidising relationships with other entities than the 
legal entity mentioned in WRB:18; consent on changing IT systems and consent to 
transfer program resources from the dedicated equalisation reserve. In practice however 
the measures were not used; in the case of transfer of resources the actual position in 
fiscal 2007 and fiscal 2008 of the equalisation reserve is negative which means that a 
transfer of resources would result in an even more negative position. All these measures 
are included in SRvR rather than in WRB and have a negative effect on autonomy. 
Thematically, except for the subsidising issue, all these restrictions concern asset related 
issues and are assessed as one item.   
16.1.2.4 Cyclical measures 
Two items in the cyclical measures deviate from kZBO and have a negative impact on 
autonomy. First, kZBO requires approval of the annual budget. The formal arrangement is 
that minJUS gives its consent to the annual working program of RvR, which includes the 
budget. This arrangement seems to provide more autonomy to RvR than is given under 
kZBO:29. The autonomy is effectively reduced by lower level regulations. SRvR:6 states 
that the minister provides a budgetary framework and SRvR:7 indicates that minJUS 
decides on the application for subsidy to RvR. Effectively, this means that the consent to 
the working program and budget is formally overruled by the decision on the resources to 
be provided.  Actual practice is in line with SRvR arrangements and confirm a negative 
impact on autonomy.  
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Table 16.3: Legal measures on RvR, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
Not appointing civil 
servants to board 
Normative 9 WRB:3 in line with WRB:3 0 0 
Measure on legal 
position of staff 
Normative 15 WRB:11.1 private law based ↑ ↑ 
Requirement for data 
protection 
Normative 41 Subsidy 
Decree, 
article 8 
in line 0 0 
Submitting annual 
report to Parliament 
Information 18 not included Informally 
submitted to MPs 
↑ ↑ 
Frequency of 
intermediate reports 
to minister 
determined by law 
Information not 
included 
SRvR:9 in line with SRvR ↓ ↓ 
Approval of statement 
of accounts 
Information 34 SRvR:7 
minJUS 
determines 
subsidy 
rather than 
approves 
statement of 
accounts 
in line with SRvR ↓ ↓ 
Ex ante approval of 
mandates to the ZBO 
Governance 8 not included no external 
mandates 
↓ ↓ 
Measure on secondary 
jobs of Board 
members 
Governance 13 not included Board is not full 
time role 
0 0 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
WRB:6.2 2007/2008: not 
disclosed 
0 0 
Annulling of ZBO 
decisions 
Governance 22 not included not used in 
practice 
↑ 0 
Intervention in event 
of negligence 
Governance 23 WRB:9.4 not used in 
practice 
0 0 
Ministerial consent 
when 
creating/participating 
in legal entity 
Governance 32a WRB:18-23 
SRvR:14.1 
only WRB-based 
entities created 
↓ 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and lending 
Governance 32d SRvR:14.1 Not used in 
practice 
↓ 0 
Asset related 
transactions 
Governance 32a-c, e-f 
+ some 
not 
included 
SRvR:14 not used in 
practice + 
equalisation 
reserves are 
negative 
↓ 0 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 WRB:42: 
consent 
SRvR:6/7: 
determining 
Determining 
rather than 
approval 
↓ ↓ 
Creating equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 SRvR:10 equalisation 
reserve negative 
0 ↓ 
Audit protocol Cyclical not 
included 
Separate 
document 
basis for auditing ↓ ↓ 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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Secondly, as is the case with CVZ, a separate audit protocol exists, which states the audit 
requirements with respect to RvR. Again this affects autonomy negatively as it binds 
RvR‟s executive boards to a certain auditing program set by the minister rather than 
allowing the board to determine the scope of the auditing program itself. Interviewees 
indicated that the formal position of the RvR board is that of an executive board, but in 
practice its role tends to be similar to a non-executive board. Issuing a separate audit 
protocol by minJUS means that minJUS has taken over the role of the non-executive 
board in the auditing process, which supports the case for reduced autonomy of RvR. 
16.1.2.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment with kZBO 
Two major changes can be observed in the new legislation: first the creation of the 
executive board and second, the creation of an advisory board, which did not formally 
exist before. In practice, the old boards operated as a form of non-executive board rather 
than an executive board. By creating an advisory board, an arrangement was created as 
defined by kZBO:7 on the relationship between two bodies.  Effectively the impact on 
autonomy is nil. 
The other changes observed in legislation are minor. MinJus does not state that kZBO 
is applicable. Because the new RvR is a new legal entity, kZBO applies directly for all 
compulsory measures within kZBO (Parliament, 2009d). WRB (new) only refers to kZBO 
with respect to the advisory board, the legal position of the staff and the funding 
procedures that are performed under the AWb subsidy framework. Legislation on this 
issue is in line with the legislation effective in 2007. The only relevant change is found on 
„level and supplementing‟ equalisation reserves, which can be regulated by ministerial 
decree. The 2007 version of WRB included an arrangement based on AWb:4.71 and 
AWb:4.72 which is very similar to including measures from kZBO:32 and kZBO:33. In the 
new version of WRB only the equalisation reserve arrangement is continued. The SRvR 
decree has changed due to the new legislation which includes kZBO:32 as a ministerial 
control tool. The explanatory memorandum of WRB (new) on this issue states that the 
arrangement is aligned with kZBO:33. No explanation is given on the wording of the new 
arrangement, particularly on the issue of supplementing reserves. 
The conclusion on the overall impact of the changes in WRB is that they do not affect 
autonomy as assessed on the 2007-2008 arrangements. 
16.1.2.6 Conclusion 
Table 16.3 discloses all deviations from kZBO that have an impact on autonomy. Type 1 
mismatches that have a negative effect on autonomy are observed in minJUS 
determining subsidy rather than approving the statement of accounts, as well as 
budgetary control and the audit protocol. The annual report of RvR is not formally 
submitted to Parliament, which is a positive type 1 mismatch. Type 2 mismatches are 
observed for asset controls that are formalised but not actually used and would affect 
autonomy negatively. It should be noted that these asset controls are more restrictive 
than what is optionally described in kZBO. The overall assessment of RvR‟s legal position 
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is that due to the subsidising relationship between RvR and minJUS governance and 
cyclical measures exist that both formally and actually reduce the autonomy of RvR 
compared to the standard kZBO framework. 
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16.1.3 SVB 
MinSZW announced in his letter on the implementation of kZBO that he would only adapt 
existing SUWI legislation on the issues of kZBO:15 and 33 on the status of ZBO staff and 
the equalisation reserve. Due to the fact that the SUWI law is relatively new, minSZW had 
been able to include kZBO-measures in the original SUWI law (Parliament, 2008k, p. 3). 
New legislation is effective as of January 1, 2009. 
16.1.3.1 Normative measures 
SVB has PLA status which has been defined in the SUWI organisation law. PLA status 
classifies SVB as a Subsidiary ZBO which implies that ownership is held by minister and 
parent ministry. Interviewees confirm the ownership role of the minister, at least by 
stating that legislation has reduced control by the board to such an extent that from a 
material perspective, minSZW controls SVB. One interviewee indicated that the role of 
owner of the organisation is mixed up with the policy objectives to be realised, reducing 
the relevance of the main question of ownership continuity of the organisation. 
Deviations from kZBO are observed on two issues. First, the kZBO:9 measures on 
appointments of civil servants to the board are not included in the SUWI legislation. In 
practice, board members do not have civil servant status although some of them do have 
a history in the civil service. In practice, this deviation has no impact on autonomy. 
Formally, minSZW has the option to appoint a civil servant which theoretically reduces 
SVB‟s autonomy. Second, the position of the staff deviates from the kZBO:15 standard. 
The organisation law stipulates that staff are appointed on the basis of civil law. In the 
SVB case, a hybrid situation exists because the basic arrangement is based on civil law, 
but the pension plan is organised within the framework that is used for civil servants. The 
basic civil law arrangement on the position of staff increases autonomy from 
departmental measures. In the SUWI Regulations [RSUWI], Article 5.9c requires an 
explanation for wage increases but there is no fixed rule for increases in staff 
remuneration. The degrees of freedom for the  SVB board are somewhat reduced by the 
pension plan arrangement because this part of staff costs are beyond the board‟s 
control. 
kZBO:21 defines measures for a minister to give general instructions to a ZBO and 
assign it tasks. This measure is not included in the SUWI law, due to the separation of 
ZBO case law and program law. In the relevant program laws, the possibility to give 
instructions on policy rules are described, including measures to ensure rulings are made 
by impartial courts rather than minSZW if policy rule interpretations differ. For example, 
minSZW can set additional rules on program execution of the national old age pension 
plan AOW (AOW:7.4) and appeal is left to an impartial court (AOW:53). Therefore, 
effectively there is no impact on autonomy compared to the kZBO arrangement. 
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16.1.3.2 Information measures 
Information measures cover issues such as providing annual reports to minister and 
Parliament, minSZW approval of the statement of accounts and rules on structure and 
auditing of the statement of accounts. All these issues are covered in SUWI and or 
RSUWI. The audit regulations describe the auditing process in general, including 
accepted errors and an auditing plan. The auditing plan is not defined in detail as for an 
audit protocol and therefore allows for professional judgement. In general these 
measures do not affect autonomy. 
A minister is expected to have a general right of inquiry, based on kZBO:20. The 
general provision is included in SUWI:72, but it has been elaborated upon in RSUWI, 
section 5.2.  Information provision includes for example minutes of board meetings, 
plans regarding outsourcing, quality and frequency of information. Other provisions in 
RSUWI section 5.2 cover distribution of policy related information. The level of detail of 
information to be provided is an indicator of minSZW‟s control of SVB. I would argue that 
it does not essentially influence autonomy because a general right of inquiry means that 
a minister can ask whatever questions he likes. Regulation of information provision 
makes the relationship between minister and ZBO more transparent compared to a 
situation where no information requirements are specified. 
Due to the restructuring in the way social security was organised in 2002, Parliament 
and minSZW agreed upon a special project status during the restructuring process. One 
of the elements in the special project status was frequent (quarterly) information 
provision towards Parliament on the progress made by SVB, including an assessment by 
minSZW. By the end of 2007 it was decided to discontinue the special project status but 
information provision to Parliament would continue to be on a similar level (Parliament, 
2007k). Compared to kZBO, SUWI legislation extends requirements to the statement of 
accounts on an annual and a quarterly basis. Based on the special project status, in 
practice information provision is extended further to Parliament including a minSZW 
assessment on the reports provided. This practice reduces autonomy compared to the 
general kZBO-arrangement. 
16.1.3.3 Governance provisions 
In kZBO:7, measures are included for situations where two tier boards are used within a 
ZBO. Formally, SVB does not have a two tier board but the executive board is supported 
by an advisory board appointed by minSZW (SUWI:3). After the SUWI evaluation and the 
subsequent change in SUWI law as of 2009, the formal position of the advisory board has 
been discontinued. This was contrary to the advice of the consultant who had been 
commissioned to do the evaluation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, p. 96). In practice 
the executive board still uses an advisory board, but the position of the advisory board is 
different due to a lack of a legislative position. 
Article kZBO:8 on mandates is meant to cover the attribution of tasks to a ZBO by 
organisations other than the principal-ministry. The explanatory notes to the original kZBO 
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proposal refer to a situation where a third party mandate threatens the primary 
operations of the ZBO as a possible reason for disapproval by a minister (Parliament, 
2000d, p. 23). The requirement is not literally found in the SVB case. However, effectively 
in the SVB case law, an article (SUWI:13) is included that is materially equivalent to what 
is meant by kZBO:8. With some exceptions this arrangement is continued in the SUWI 
legislation as of January 1, 2009 (SUWI2009:5; Parliament, 2008l, p. 18). Interviewees 
indicated that SVB provides services to local governments in relation to old age benefits, 
AOW and for a pension support program for a group of unemployed people, which have 
been approved by minSZW. The mixture of activities led to differing interviewee opinions. 
Some claim that it results in less control by SZW, others claim that the mixture of 
activities is one of the reasons for a restrictive equity policy to prevent cross-subsidising 
activities.  
MinSZW approves governance statutes and appoints the executive board of SVB. This 
is in line with kZBO. In SUWI:4, an explicit arrangement is made on secondary jobs of 
board members which is in line with kZBO. 
Based on kZBO:14, the minister determines remuneration of a PLA. In SUWI:5.1 this 
arrangement has been made explicit for SVB. The level of remuneration is not mentioned 
in SUWI:5.1. In practice, for some board members remuneration is above the WOPT 
reporting level. The information is disclosed in SVB‟s annual reports and has led a motion 
in Parliament (Parliament, 2009f). Given the fact that the minister decides upon the 
remuneration there is no impact on autonomy compared to the kZBO-framework.  
Interviewees indicate that tools such as those covered in kZBO:22-23 on annulment 
and intervention in case of negligence are tools of last resort and are not used in 
practice. Interviewees indicated that the tools are needed, but using them might be 
counterproductive and does not fit in with the relationship between board and minSZW. 
Impact on autonomy is therefore nil. 
The SVB (and UWV) case are the only cases studied here in which measures on asset 
related transactions including bankruptcy measure are directly covered in the ZBO case 
law. The kZBO:32 measures are optional, which means that including them in the ZBO 
case law formally reduces autonomy compared to the basic kZBO provisions. In practice, 
only lending and borrowing, creating reserves other than equalisation reserves as well as 
participation in legal entities is relevant for SVB. SVB has been allowed to participate in a 
foundation that services the national pensions register to be operational as of 2011.190 
This was initiated by an amendment to the pension law by MPs (Parliament, 2006g). 
Interviewees indicate that in the mid 1990s SVB was also involved in creating a separate 
information exchange organisation (RINIS) intended to improve information exchange 
between some public organisations. Assessment of asset related transactions other than 
borrowing and lending is regarded as one control instrument. 
                                                 
190 This register aims to provide an overview of all future pension income to be received by an individual 
based on accumulated rights to date from first and second pension plan pillars. 
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On the subject of lending and borrowing, SVB‟s position is technically similar to the 
measures in CW2001. The arrangement is covered in an older law on funding social 
security benefits (Wet Financiering Sociale Verzekeringen [WFSV]. SVB is allowed to 
create reserves other than equalisation reserves after approval by minSZW. Case law is 
therefore stricter than kZBO. In practice such reserves are created. However, some 
interviewees indicated that once approval is given, SVB is not sure that the reserve will be 
maintained in times of budgetary problems. This is illustrated by the provisions made on 
the reorganisation program „SVB Tien‟. In SVB‟s 2007 annual report and statements of 
accounts, it is argued that part of the surplus gained in fiscal 2007 can be used to 
compensate for delays in cost reductions in the „SVB Tien‟ program (SVB Annual report, 
2007, p. 72), to be decided upon by minSZW. It should also be noted that the reserve 
created in relation to „SVB Tien‟ in fiscal 2006 was increased in 2007 (SVB Annual report 
2007, p. 79). The key point is that minSZW still has influence on the use of reserves after 
they have been created, which reduces SVB‟s autonomy.  
16.1.3.4 Cyclical measures 
The last group of measures regards cyclical authority. Most measures are in line with 
kZBO. MinSZW approves SVB‟s budget and SVB has to report on substantial differences 
between budget and actual expenditures. I have already referred to the special project 
status of the SUWI reform which leads to frequent intermediate reporting to Parliament. 
SVB‟s board decides upon the budget and the structure of the budget is given by minSZW 
under RSUWI. All these issues are applied in practice as well. The budgeting process in 
SUWI also covers a multiyear plan (SUWI:46.2), a requirement that is not mentioned in 
kZBO. This additional requirement affects autonomy negatively because developments in 
the near future are more difficult to discern compared to the case in which there is no 
requirement to submit multiyear plans.    
Budget preparation by SVB is supported by a negotiated letter of instruction sent out 
in May t-1 in which the level of the budget and the assumptions are disclosed. Ultimately, 
the budget level is determined by minSZW and is used as a starting point for the internal 
budget processes within SVB, resulting in a final budget proposal to be submitted to 
minSZW by October t-1. According to the interviewees the budgeting process for SVB 
ends with approval of the budget by minSZW including submitting the budgeting 
documents to Parliament. This is contrary to SUWI:46.2 which stipulates that minSZW 
should submit the multiyear plan to Parliament as well. Documents submitted to 
Parliament reveal that the SVB multiyear plan for fiscal 2007 and 2008 was submitted to 
Parliament, the document for fiscal 2009 was not (Parliament, 2006h; 2007l; 2008m).  
Two other deviations from kZBO exist. First, the issue of approval of fees is discussed. 
SVB‟s main activities on behalf of minSZW are funded by authority biased fees based on 
WFSV. Funding covers both the resources needed for the respective programs as well as 
the resources needed for operations with respect to the programs. The fees are set by 
minSZW following a proposal from SVB. With respect to other SVB activities, no explicit 
measures exist. Interviewees indicate that budgets are negotiated and that an ex post re-
  Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   299 
 
calculation is performed based on volume and price levels. This means that fees are 
implicitly used for costs of operations for other services than those commissioned by 
minSZW. The solution provides some additional autonomy for SVB compared to the kZBO 
framework. However, increased autonomy is mitigated by another deviating arrangement, 
which is that minSZW does not allow SVB to use equalisation reserves (kZBO:33).  
Interviewees noted that the decision not to allow SVB to use an equalisation reserve 
was driven by a political decision by minSZW, not by minFin or others. According to 
interviewees, the motivation was to have full control over resources spent by SVB. In the 
explanatory memorandum to the revised SUWI law, it is argued that an equalisation 
reserve does not fit the financial relationship between ZBO and minister, which differs 
from fully fee funded ZBOs (although not explicitly stated, ZBOs like RDW and Kadaster 
are meant here, jdk). MinSZW claims that the use of dedicated reserves provides a more 
transparent solution for use of resources (Parliament, 2008l, p. 18). Not allowing 
equalisation reserves was included in the original SUWI law and this practice has been 
continued. With respect to SVB in particular, some interviewees indicated that it makes it 
more difficult to agree upon fees charged for non-SZW services. In effect, SVB‟s 
autonomy is reduced as a result of this deviation from kZBO. 
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Table 16.4: Legal measures on SVB, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference case law Actual practice formal mismatch 
and impact 
actual mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing civil servants to 
board 
Normative 9 not included none appointed ↓ 0 
Measure on legal position of staff Normative 15 SUWI:2.3 private law based, pension under civil 
servants arrangement 
↑ ↑ 
Minister decides on general 
instructions 
Normative 21 in program laws according to program laws 0 0 
ZBO submits annual report to 
minister 
Information 18 SUWI:49 
RSUWI: appendix 
VIII 
Not only to minister but sent to Parliament 
by minister including assessment by 
minister. 
↓ ↓ 
Frequency of intermediate reports 
to minister determined by law 
Information not included SUWI:49.10 Due to project status also submitted to 
Parliament, continued after end of project 
status 
↓ ↓ 
General right of inquiry Information 20 SUWI:72 
RSUWI, section 5.2 
in line with legislation 0 0 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 SUWI:3 existed but ended, new advisory board 
appointed by executive board in 2009 
0 ↓ 
Ex ante approval of mandates Governance 8 SUWI:13; SUWI:34 some activities realised based on SUWI13 ↑ ↑ 
Decision on and disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
SUWI:5.1 disclosed in annual reports 2007 and 
2008 
0 0 
Annulling  of ZBO decisions Governance 22 SUWI:80 not used in practice 0 0 
Intervention in case of negligence Governance 23 SUWI:80 not used in practice 0 0 
Asset related transactions: 
borrowing and lending 
Governance 32d WFSV applied 0 0 
Asset related transactions: others Governance 32a-c; e-f SUWI:6 participation in pension register; 
arrangement on reserves used, but 
regularly under debate 
↓ ↓ 
Asset related transactions: 
bankruptcy (optional) 
Governance 32g SUWI:6 not used in practice ↓ 0 
Approval of fees by minister Cyclical 17 SUWI:45.3 Only holds for commissioning by minSZW 
not for other services delivered 
↑ ↑ 
Approval of budget by minister Cyclical 29 SUWI:46.1 Approval + submit to Parliament ↓ ↓ 
Submit multiyear plan Cyclical none SUWI:46.2 submitted ↓ ↓ 
Creating equalisation reserve Cyclical 33 not included not allowed ↓ ↓ 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
  Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs  
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives  301 
 
 
16.1.3.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment with kZBO 
New legislation including implementation of kZBO came into effect by January 2009. 
Three issues have been changed. The new provisions on staff and equalisation reserves 
do not change formal measures and the observed autonomy under the SUWI law 
effective in 2007. Along with these measures, minSZW has decided to formally 
discontinue the advisory board of SVB. As SVB has continued to use an advisory board, 
effectively there have been no changes in the autonomy of SVB‟s executive board. 
Direction of impact is in most cases similar. In the cases of mismatches between formal 
and actual measures, autonomy is decreased with respect to the status of the advisory 
board. In the other three cases (not appointing civil servants, measures on secondary 
jobs and bankruptcy) actual autonomy is tan more restricted than at the kZBO level. 
16.1.3.6 Conclusion 
Table 16.4 summarises the impact on autonomy based on the formal and actual 
deviations from kZBO. Type 1 mismatches with a negative impact are found on 
submission of annual as well as quarterly reports to Parliament by minSZW, formal and 
implemented asset controls as meant by kZBO:32, budgetary controls and the lack of an 
equalisation reserve. In the SVB case, some positive Type 1 mismatches can be observed 
as well: additional degrees of freedom exist in the mandates to deliver services to other 
public entities as well as additional degrees of freedom in determining fees for such 
services. In the case of formal abolishment of the advisory board, a negative Type 2 
mismatch is observed due to no longer having a formal legal position for the advisory 
board. The general impression is that SVB faces reduced autonomy on the cyclical 
measures and on governance issues, particularly in the budgeting process as well as with 
respect to the role of the advisory board. An increase of autonomy can be observed in 
SVB‟s relations towards commissioners outside minSZW. 
Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs   
 
302  Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives 
 
 
16.1.4 UWV 
UWV and SVB operate under the same SUWI framework. This means that in essence, 
formal measures are the same. I will emphasise differences with SVB and refer to SVB for 
other deviations. UWV also has PLA legal status. Nobody doubts the ownership role of 
minSZW. According to the interviewees this is performed in practice by a separate 
directorate within minSZW. Some interviewees indicated that materially the position of 
UWV is comparable to that of „Belastingdienst‟ (Revenue services) which is from a formal 
perspective a unit subject to ministerial hierarchy. It was also indicated that UWV‟s 
activities are subject to regular changes and have a high political profile. 
Like SVB, changes in legislation due to kZBO implementation are effective as of 
January 2009 and concern position of staff, equalisation reserve and advisory board. 
16.1.4.1 Normative measures 
As in the SVB case, there are two deviations from kZBO. The prohibition on appointing 
civil servants to the board is not included in the SUWI law, but is carried out in practice. 
This means formally reduced autonomy due to the risk of appointing civil servants. In 
practice, no civil servants are appointed which is in line with kZBO. On the issue of staff 
arrangements, an exception to kZBO:15 is allowed. UWV has its own private labour 
agreement including a separate pension scheme. This means that UWV has full control 
on labour costs, whereas in the SVB case there is some external influence on labour 
costs which is beyond ministerial control.191 The RSUWI:5.9 arrangement on explaining 
increases in wages holds for UWV as well. No fixed rules for wage increases exist. The 
main general reason for maintaining the exception to kZBO:15 is the complexity of 
changing the present system (Gerritsen Committee, 2008, p. 33).  
Data protection measures as defined by kZBO:41 have been made explicit in the 
SUWI law and are also applied. Finally, minSZW‟s authority to decide upon policy rules is, 
like the SVB case, covered in the respective program laws applicable to UWV. 
16.1.4.2 Information measures  
Provision of information to minSZW is covered on the same basis as for SVB. This means 
frequent reporting in a described format and an assessment of the reported documents 
by minSZW is sent to Parliament. Some interviewees indicate that the special project 
status of SUWI was mainly meant for UWV given the complexity of restructuring and the 
high level of political attention for the programs executed by UWV.  
Along with the formal information provision procedures, interviewees noted the high 
frequency (every two weeks) of meetings between minSZW and UWV‟s executive board, 
which is more frequent than meetings with SVB‟s board . One of the interviewees noted 
that there has been a discussion on allowing UWV‟s CEO to attend the regular meetings 
of minSZW and his staff, to at least have some influence on decisions made. The 
                                                 
191 The civil servants pension fund is governed by employers and employees in the public sector and can 
determine premiums independently of ministerial decisions. 
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interviewee noted that control of UWV seems to be similar to that of executive agencies 
but without UWV involvement in operational decision making. Another interviewee noted 
that not only are formal structures relevant to the decision making process, but informal 
lines between different levels of staff are also very important and perhaps not used 
sufficiently which results in less influence in the decision making process. 
16.1.4.3 Governance provisions 
Formally, UWV has a one tier board supported by an advisory board (SUWI:3). Both 
boards are appointed by minSZW. The law also specifies distribution of responsibilities, in 
line with kZBO:7 measures. As of 2009, the formal position of the advisory board was 
discontinued. Interviewees indicated that UWV intends to create an advisory board 
appointed by the executive board. In UWV‟s 2009 Annual Report reference is made to the 
issue, including the idea of implementing a new advisory board in 2010 (UWV, 2009, p. 
40). Some interviewees indicated that they would prefer to use a non-executive board 
because the civil service is not able to organise know how on UWV‟s  operations given the 
political impact of any operational problem that is disclosed publicly.  
Legislation allows other services to be provided than those directly assigned by law. In 
practice only very minor third party functions – historically driven – are still performed by 
UWV. The relevance of third party activities is declining over time. 
Governance statutes (kZBO:4) and annulment and intervention authority (kZBO:22-
23) attributed to minSZW are included in SUWI law. Practices are similar to those for SVB 
and have no further impact on autonomy. One respondent indicated that using 
interventions would fundamentally undermine relations between minister and executive 
board. During the time framework of this research (2007-2008) no formal interventions 
were performed. In 2004, in an exceptional case in which the executive board of UWV 
had misinformed minSZW on issues regarding costs of offices, minSZW actually 
intervened and dismissed UWV‟s CEO (Parliament, 2004g). Again, according to the 
interviewees this is an exceptional case. 
The issue of remuneration is covered in a similar way to SVB. Remuneration of the 
board is decided upon by minSZW and is disclosed in UWV‟s annual report.
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Table 16.5: Legal measures on UWV, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority Group reference 
kZBO 
reference case law Actual practice formal 
mismatch and 
impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing civil servants 
to board 
Normative 9 not included none appointed ↓ 0 
Measure on legal position of 
staff 
Normative 15 SUWI:2.3 private law based, pension under separate  
arrangement 
↑ ↑ 
Minister decides on general 
instructions 
Normative 21 in program laws according to program laws 0 0 
ZBO submits annual report to 
minister 
Information 18 SUWI:49 
RSUWI: appendix 
VI 
Not only to minister but sent to Parliament 
by minister including assessment by 
minister. 
↓ ↓ 
Frequency of intermediate 
reporting set in legislation 
Information not 
included 
SUWI:49.10 Due to project status also submitted to 
Parliament, continued after end of project 
status 
↓ ↓ 
General right of inquiry Information 20 SUWI:72 
RSUWI, section 5.2 
in line with legislation but very high level of 
meetings between CEO and minSZW. 
0 0 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 SUWI:3 existed but ended; intention to continue 
informally 
0 ↓ 
Ex ante approval of mandates Governance 8 SUWI:13; SUWI:34 in practice not substantial (<1%) ↑ 0 
Decision on and disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
SUWI:5.1 disclosed in annual reports 2007 and 2008 0 0 
Annulling of ZBO decisions Governance 22 SUWI:80 not used in practice 0 0 
Intervention in case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 SUWI:80 not used in practice 0 0 
Asset related transactions: 
borrowing and lending 
Governance 32d WFSV applied 0 0 
Asset related transactions: 
others 
Governance 32a-c; e-f SUWI:6 participation in pension register; 
arrangement on reserves used, but regularly 
under debate; 
real estate under political scrutiny 
↓ ↓ 
Asset related transactions: 
creating/participating legal 
entity (optional) 
Governance 32a SUWI:6 participation in pension register ↓ ↓ 
Asset related transactions: 
bankruptcy (optional) 
Governance 32g SUWI:6 not used in practice ↓ 0 
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Authority issue Authority Group reference 
kZBO 
reference case law Actual practice formal 
mismatch and 
impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Frequency of meetings board 
and minister 
Cyclical none none 2 weekly frequency 0 ↓ 
Approval of fees by minister Cyclical 17 SUWI:45.3 Program fees set by minSZW, including 
costs of operations 
↑ 0 
Approval of budget by minister Cyclical 29 SUWI:46.1 Approval + submit to Parliament ↓ ↓ 
Submit multiyear plan Cyclical none SUWI:46.2 submitted ↓ ↓ 
Approval of budget by minister Cyclical 29 SUWI:45.1-2 Approval + multiyear plan + submit to 
Parliament 
↓ ↓ 
Creating equalisation reserve Cyclical 33 not included not allowed ↓ ↓ 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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The optional measures on asset related transactions (kZBO:32) are included in SUWI 
case law, which means a reduction of autonomy compared to the standard kZBO 
arrangement. The lending and borrowing provisions are based on WFSV rather than on 
CW2001, but the impact is the same. UWV also participates in RINIS, a decision made by 
predecessors of UWV. Under SUWI law no participations in third parties were discussed or 
implemented. The issue of real estate management (kZBO:32b-c) is formally included in 
the SUWI law. This fact implies a reduction in autonomy compared to the kZBO 
framework as the wording of kZBO:32 is optional. In practice, UWV does not own real 
estate but leases its offices. The UWV re-organisation process has led to a reduction in 
staff. In the debate on the preparation of minSZW‟s 2008 budget, MPs explicitly 
addressed the impact of staff reduction on unused offices in UWV branches and 
requested information on standards of office space used by UWV compared to central 
government‟s standards. Furthermore they urged minSZW to initiate activities to reduce 
the area of unoccupied office space (Parliament, 2007m, p. 11). MinSZW responded by 
asking UWV in the letter of instruction to the 2009 budget (May 2008; minSZW, 2008, p. 
4) to revise their office use plans. This means that UWV‟s autonomy  on leasing office 
space is reduced as well. 
The issue of creating reserves is a difficult matter, given the explicit position of 
minSZW on this. In practice, reserves can be created after consent from minSZW, but this 
also means according to some interviewees that administrative procedures are more 
complex than if UWV had more autonomy on the subject. On the other hand, interviewees 
are aware of the fact that UWV is currently funded by authority biased fees and has a high 
political profile, unlike some other ZBOs, which explains minSZW‟s position on the issue 
of creating reserves. 
16.1.4.4 Cyclical measures 
UWV budgets are approved by minSZW, in line with both kZBO and the SUWI law. I recall 
the special project status of SUWI which leads to frequent reporting to Parliament, 
effectively reducing UWV‟s autonomy compared to kZBO standards. The process of 
budgeting is based on a negotiated letter of instruction, resulting in submission of a 
formal budget document to minSZW by October t-1. In the UWV-case, the multiyear plans 
are submitted to Parliament separately from the budget for a particular fiscal year. Unlike 
the SVB case, a multiyear plan for fiscal 2010-2014 has been submitted to Parliament 
(Parliament, 2007n, 2008n, 2009g). 
UWV is funded by authority biased fees, which are set by minSZW. Fees are set based 
on the expected program cost including cost of operations, which practically means that 
the budget needed for operations is negotiated and then included in the calculation of 
the overall fee. As UWV has no significant other commissioners, the kZBO measures on 
fees has no real meaning from an operations perspective and therefore does not affect 
autonomy. 
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Like SVB, UWV is not allowed to create an equalisation reserve. The motivation for this 
divergence from kZBO is exactly the same as in the SVB case. Effectively it reduces 
UWV‟s autonomy compared to the kZBO-framework. 
16.1.4.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment with kZBO 
New legislation including implementation of kZBO came into effect by January 2009. 
Three issues have been changed. The new measures on staff and an equalisation reserve 
do not change formal measures and the observed autonomy under the SUWI law 
effective in 2007. Along with these measures, minSZW has decided to formally 
discontinue the UWV advisory board. UWV has not been able to create a new advisory 
board during 2009.  
16.1.4.6 Conclusion 
UWV‟s autonomy is in general reduced compared to the kZBO-framework. UWV is faced 
with the same negative type 1 mismatches as observed for SVB regarding reporting, 
budgets, asset controls and equalisation reserves. With respect to real estate 
transactions the asset control issue was also subject to debate in Parliament. Type 2 
mismatches are found in the abolishment of the advisory board and on the high 
frequency of meetings between the UWV executive board and minister. The main 
explanation for reduced autonomy is the high political profile of the organisation, 
including regular changes in the programs that ultimately determine the services and 
thus operations. 
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16.1.5 FBKVB 
FBKVB is a private law foundation, operating in the arena of stimulating the arts. Under 
kZBO, the measures for PLBs are slightly different from those for PLAs. Basically, only 
kZBO:1-9 on creating ZBOs, kZBO:17-23 on information provision and control and 
kZBO:26-35 on budgeting and reporting measures will apply. The main legal measures for 
FBKVB are its statutes as well as WSC1993 on culture policy. 
MinOCW announced in his letter on implementation of kZBO (Parliament, 2008d) that 
he would change legislation on the art funds only with respect to kZBO:22 on annulling 
individual decisions. New legislation would be prepared, but by January 2010, no 
changes in WSC had been implemented or proposed. 
16.1.5.1 Normative measures 
No provisions for appointing civil servants are included in the statutes or in WSC1993. In 
practice, no civil servants are appointed which means that although the formal position is 
not in line with kZBO, the actual position of FBKVB is. Autonomy is therefore in line with 
kZBO measures. 
The legal status of FBKVB staff (kZBO:15-16) is in line with the funds PLB status. 
There is no need to create separate measures to protect against minOCW influence.  
On two normative issues, deviations from kZBO can be observed. First, no data 
protection measures exist. The FBKVB annual report discloses the names of artists who 
received a contribution from FBKVB. No further practical indications on data protection 
were found. Second, minOCW must approve general rules set by the fund‟s board and is 
even allowed to require a change in regulations set by the fund‟s board. The bottom line 
is that this wording formally seems to provide autonomy to FBKVB, but this autonomy is 
mitigated by the WSC1993:10.4 arrangement in which minOCW can instruct the board to 
change rules. Effectively this means that final power is in the hands of minOCW. 
16.1.5.2 Information measures 
In the relationship between minOCW and FBKVB, the main information measures are 
settled. This means that minOCW receives annual reports, has a general right of inquiry 
and rules are laid down on the structure of the statements of accounts. In a decree, an 
audit protocol is included which specifies what should be audited at a detailed level. 
MinOCW does not approve the FBKVB annual report but ultimately decides upon the 
subsidies to be provided. Given the funding structure of FBKVB (four year periods of 
funding), in general this will mean that FBKVB has some increased autonomy compared 
to the kZBO-framework.  
FBKVB annual reports are not formally sent to Parliament. Interviewees indicated that 
the document is sent to MPs. 
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16.1.5.3 Governance provisions 
From a governance perspective, FBKVB is supported by an advisory board mentioned in 
the statutes. Its role is described. However, the advisory board is not a body as defined by 
kZBO:7. The use of the advisory board has no impact on the board‟s autonomy in relation 
to minOCW. Art funds are dedicated organisations that are not likely to provide services 
for other ministries. The objective of FBKVB is laid down in the statutes and thus prevents 
it from delivering other services.  Interviewees referred to the possibility of art funds being 
merged to operate more efficiently. Such a merger decision is taken by minOCW and will 
result in a new organisation. Interviewees indicated that discussions on a merger 
between FBKVB and other funds may be relevant in the future. In the present setting, the 
autonomy impact of not including kZBO:8 is neutral. 
The issue of intervention in the event of negligence is not included in the statutes or 
WSC1993 but is left to the standard arrangement in BW2:298 which allows a court to 
dismiss board members. This is a standard procedure for all foundations and thus does 
not affect autonomy. 
Control of asset related transactions varies. Treasury management is governed by the 
CW2001 provisions on borrowing and lending via minFin. It reduces autonomy of a 
foundation but is in fact a standard for ZBOs that is not covered in kZBO. Therefore there 
is no impact on autonomy from a ZBO perspective. This is different for the issue of using 
reserves: funding for the arts funds is based on a 4 year time frame. Within this time 
frame it is up to the board to use resources and create a reserve. In practice this means 
that reserves for unused program resources can be found, after costs of operations have 
been deduced. Bankruptcy measures are not included in statutes or law and are subject 
to standard BW2 procedures thus not affecting autonomy of FBKVB due to the optional 
character of kZBO:32. In the event of a decision to dissolve the fund, statutes include a 
provision that minOCW has to approve this decision, or decide directly on dissolving the 
fund in line with WSC1993:10.3. This measure might be relevant in case of a possible 
merger as referred to by the interviewees and formally reduces autonomy.  
16.1.5.4 Cyclical measures 
Budget procedure measures are generally in line with kZBO. FBKVB does not use fees for 
services, hence rules on this issue are obsolete. Given the subsidy relationship between 
fund and minister, minOCW formally determines the budget of the fund. According to 
interviewees this effectively means that minOCW, after hearing advice from the Council 
on Culture, sets a four year period budget on behalf of the FBKVB programs, including 
costs of operations. Separate measures on equalisation reserves are used. After the four 
year period, the subsidy is determined at the level of total expenses and then a new 
subsidy period will start. 
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Table 16.6: Legal measures on FBKVB, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing 
civil servants to 
the board 
Normative 9 none no civil servants 
appointed 
↓ 0 
Appointment of 
staff 
Normative kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
none civil law 
appointments 
0 0 
Minister decides 
upon general 
instructions 
Normative 21 WSC1993:
10.4  
approval by minOCW 
with right to instruct 
the board 
0 0 
Requirement for 
data protection 
Normative 41 none no specific attention ↑ 0 
Submit annual 
report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 none informally sent to 
MPs 
↑ ↑ 
Approval of 
statement of 
accounts by 
minister 
Information 34 none decision by board ↑ ↑ 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 none advisory body based 
on statutes 
0 0 
Ex ante approval 
of mandates 
Governance 8 in 
objectives 
laid down 
in statutes 
not needed 0 0 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
none not reported in 
annual reports, also 
not on minBZK 
blacklist 
0 0 
Intervention in 
case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 none not used, covered in 
BW2:298 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d CW2001:4
5 
in line with CW2001 0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
control on 
reserves 
Governance 32f none 4 year funding period 
is relevant 
0 ↑ 
Asset related 
transactions: 
bankruptcy 
Governance 32g none not applicable, in line 
with BW2 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
dissolving entity 
Governance none WSC:10.3 not used, but relevant 
in possible cases of 
mergers with other 
funds 
↓ 0 
Approval of 
budget 
Cyclical 29 BCU:33 determined once 
every four years 
↑ ↑ 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 none program reserves 
during four years 
0 0 
Audit protocol Cyclical not 
included 
RCU:9 in line with legislation ↓ ↓ 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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A final remark concerns auditing instructions which are not included in kZBO but in this 
case are included as a condition for providing subsidies to FBKVB. It reduces autonomy in 
the auditing process but within this framework, interviewees indicated that FBKVB‟s 
board is still responsible for appointing its auditor. 
16.1.5.5 Conclusion 
In the case of FBVKB, three positive Type 1 mismatches can be observed. These regard 
the relatively restricted role of minOCW in approving statements of accounts and budgets 
as well as providing annual reports to Parliament. This is partly mitigated by the relatively 
strict audit protocol which has been laid down. Given the four year budget cycle, control 
on reserves during this period is relatively low as well, resulting in a positive Type 2 
mismatch because during this period there will be no discussion on the subject with 
minOCW and its staff. 
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16.1.6 Vf/Pf 
Like FBKVB, Vf/Pf is a PLB-type ZBO; actually two separate legal entities controlled by a 
boards that consist of the same people. Legal arrangements are basically the same for 
the two foundations. All income transfer ZBOs discussed above are regarded as owned by 
the relevant minister. This is different for Vf/Pf. Respondents indicate that although 
historically Vf/Pf was created on the initiative of minOCW, in practice the ownership role 
of minOCW is reduced although in case of dissolving Vf/Pf, assets would flow to minOCW.  
MinOCW announced that he would postpone implementation of kZBO with respect to 
Vf/Pf until a new vision on particularly Vf has been developed. Effectively, till January 
2010, no new legislation was prepared.  
16.1.6.1 Normative measures  
As Vf/Pf are PLBs, the main document which governs the organisations are the statutes. 
The board is responsible for staff, special arrangements are from a kZBO perspective not 
needed and not applied in practice as well. Members of the board can only be appointed 
from representatives of employers and employees in primary and secondary education. 
The independent president of the board cannot be a member of the groups mentioned 
before, but is no civil servant. Given the restrictions on appointing board members as well 
as the practice in appointing the president of the board, effectively the arrangement of 
kZBO:9 is met.  
In the Vf/Pf case, no specific measures on systematic data protection exist. The basic 
legislation on education specifies that information on individuals may only be provided in 
specific cases. Effectively that reduces the possibilities of Vf/Pf to use the data, but the 
arrangement does not cover unauthorised access to data which is the key of kZBO:41. 
MinOCW announced that it would revise legislation on Vf/Pf based on a full reassessment 
of the position of the organisations (Parliament, 2008d). As a result, at least for the time 
being Vf/Pf has additional autonomy on the issue of data protection.  
16.1.6.2 Information measures  
Most information measures are in line with kZBO requirements. MinOCW has a right of 
inquiry and specifies several issues of program information to be submitted to him. 
Annual reports are sent to minOCW and by minOCW to Parliament. The latter issue is 
formalised in program laws rather than in statutes or decrees. Formally, WPO:187.3 
requires an annual report sent to Parliament. In practice, annual reports and statements 
of accounts are submitted, including a comment by minOCW. Annual reports and 
statements of accounts are submitted after the dates required by law. According to 
respondents this is due to the need to receive third party data before the Vf/Pf 
documents can be created. The time lag is covered by an intermediate letter of minOCW 
in which she discusses the financial position of Vf/Pf (e.g. Parliament, 2009h), but these 
letters are late as well. Effectively, the procedure has some negative impact on autonomy 
due to the requirement that minOCW is commenting on the annual report. This is a more 
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active form of reporting compared to the mere kZBO-requirement of submitting a report 
to Parliament by the ZBO.  
Autonomy is positively affected by the lack of a requirement to approve statements of 
accounts by minOCW. Statutes of Vf/Pf only cover that minOCW is informed on the 
statements of accounts. 
Finally, the separate accounts requirement of kZBO:38 is not relevant as Vf/Pf only 
provide public services.  
16.1.6.3 Governance provisions  
Statutes of Vf/Pf describe a one tier board based on a split between managerial board 
and general board. Responsibilities of both parts of the board are described in the 
statutes which have to be approved by minOCW. Formally, BVf:2/BPf:2 do not include a 
precise requirement on the operations of the board, which means that this element in 
organising the board is part of the boards authority. It thus provides more autonomy than 
the requirement meant in kZBO:7 on multiple bodies. In practice, kZBO:7 does not apply 
as Pf/Vf only has a one tier board.  
Articles k:ZBO11-13 are not applicable given the PLB status. In practice no measures 
exist. This holds for kZBO:14 on remuneration as well, but Vf/Pf are subject to WOPT. 
Vf/Pf’s statutes do not include arrangements on remuneration, neither do annual reports 
available. Based on the WOPT report 2008 and the non response document (blacklist) on 
WOPT 2008 (MinBZK, 2009a; 2009b), it can be concluded that remuneration is within 
the legal framework.  
On the issue of asset related transactions, only the issue of lending and borrowing is 
included based on CW2001. This does reduce autonomy from a kZBO-perspective, but on 
the other hand, no full time-ZBO is excluded from the CW2001 measures. Therefore from 
a comparative perspective autonomy is not reduced. MinOCW has no control on creating 
reserves as meant in kZBO:32. Given the optional character of kZBO measures this has 
no effect on autonomy. In the statutes, an arrangement on dissolving the entity is 
included which requires approval of minOCW (statutes:15-16). This affects autonomy 
negatively as it is an arrangement that is not included in kZBO. Actually, the arrangement 
has not been used. Furthermore minOCW has to be involved in reallocation of remaining 
equity in case of dissolving Vf/Pf. This condition is in line with previous AW1996:124o3.  
Intervention in case of negligence is not covered in measures. Interviewees indicate 
that minOCW sometime uses informal pressure to achieve particular policy objectives. 
With respect to intervention in case of negligence this has not been the case. Because 
statutes do not include an arrangement on dismissal of a board member by the board in 
other than in specifically listed cases - not including negligence - influence of minOCW on 
this issue can only be informal and thus generates increased autonomy for Vf/Pf. 
Although not likely to be used, the lack of an intervention measure including the relatively 
weak position of minOCW in appointing the board of Vf/Pf generates additional degrees 
of freedom for the ZBO.  
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Table 16.7: Legal measures on Vf/Pf, formally or actually deviating from kZBO 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing 
civil servants to 
the board 
Normative 9 Statutes: 5 in line with statutes 0 0 
Appointment of 
staff 
Normative kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
none civil law 
appointments 
0 0 
Requirement for 
data protection 
Normative 41 none limitation of use of 
individual data in 
WPO:184 
↑ ↑ 
Submit annual 
report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 submitted 
by 
minOCW: 
WPO:187.
3 
submitted by 
minOCW: WPO:187.3 
↓ ↓ 
Approval of 
statement of 
accounts by 
minister 
Information 34 Statutes:1
3.3 for 
informatio
n 
in line with statutes ↑ ↑ 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 Statutes, 
BVf:2; 
BPf:2 
in line with statutes: 
theoretically multiple 
body possible; in 
practice single body 
↑ ↑ 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
none not disclosed but also 
not mentioned in 
WOPT non-response 
document 
0 0 
Intervention in 
case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 none not used or likely to 
be used 
↑ ↑ 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d CW2001:4
5 
in line with CW 0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
dissolving entity 
Governance none BPf:4.2g 
BVf:4.2g 
not applied yet ↓ 0 
Approval of 
budget 
Cyclical 29 none realised based on 
fees, no formal 
approval 
↑ 0 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 none in line with control 
agreement and 
actually used 
↑ 0 
Explanation:       
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
16.1.6.4 Cyclical measures  
The last group of measures regards cyclical issues. MinOCW has a role in approving the 
general fees set by Vf/Pf, which include costs of operations. This is in line with kZBO:17. 
Other measures in line with kZBO regard the decision of the board to determine the 
budget and the requirement to report on substantial differences from planning based on 
a „control agreement‟ which is a bilateral document rather than a ministerial decree.  
MinOCW does not approve budgets, she merely approves fees and assesses the level 
of fees on risks regarding continuity in operations of school boards subject to Vf/Pf’s 
jurisdiction (BPf:5.2). As total costs of Vf/Pf have to be covered by fees, approval of 
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budgets would not have any additional value. Interviewees indicate that they are aware of 
kZBO regulations on this issue, but no criteria for assessment of budgets were prepared 
at that time. Effectively, the impact on autonomy of not approving budgets is neutral.  
Finally, the measure on equalisation reserves is mentioned. Again, no measure is 
found in the law. In the „control agreement‟ an arrangement is made, based on a range 
of solvency levels. If solvency is outside this range, minOCW and Vf/Pf discuss how the 
solvency level should be achieved again. Effectively, this has resulted into transfers of 
excess reserves at Pf to minOCW (Annual report Pf 2006). The control agreement uses 
solvency levels actually focusing on program costs rather than costs of operations and 
uses different ranges for reserves for each of the two funds. Negative results on 
operations are covered within the reserve level for programs as well. Effectively, the 
formal position suggests autonomy, whereas the actual position on equalisation reserves 
is in line with kZBO.  
16.1.6.5 Conclusion 
In the Vf/Pf case, positive Type 1 mismatches are observed in the lack of submitting 
annual reports to Parliament, the degrees of freedom given in the statement of accounts 
and the options to create a non-executive board. A negative Type 1 mismatch is found in 
the comments to the annual report to be submitted to Parliament by minOCW, including 
the annual report s of Vf/Pf. Type 2 mismatches are found in the regulations on the 
approval of budgets and equalisation reserve. From a formal perspective, autonomy 
seems above kZBO standard, but additional control agreements mitigate the degrees of 
freedom on equalisation reserve as well as the decision on the budget, which is ultimately 
determined by the fees set and approved by minOCW. 
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16.1.7 Relative autonomy of income transfer ZBOs from a legal perspective 
In the previous sections, the autonomy of the individual income transfer ZBOs was 
discussed from a legal perspective. The general conclusion is that on a number of issues, 
mismatches exist. In this section, I will not consider the normative measures and the 
measures of last resort as discussed in section 16.1. An overview of all indicators used 
for the assessment is disclosed in appendix 10. 
The general conclusion is that most ZBOs studied here have a level of autonomy that 
is both formally (type 1 mismatch) as well as actually (type 2 mismatch) below the 
standards set in kZBO given their status of income transfer ZBOs. Only PLB ZBOs have 
higher levels of autonomy than the standards used. For the PLBs, actual autonomy is at a 
higher level than formal autonomy. In the FBKVB case, planning and control elements 
generate additional degrees of freedom due to the four year budget cycle which results in 
limited use of tools such as submitting annual reports and approval of statements of 
accounts. In the case of Vf/Pf, the increase in actual autonomy is explained by a lack of a 
direct relationships between board and minister.  
The PLA type ZBOs all have reduced autonomy compared to the standard used. In the 
RvR case, formal and actual autonomy at a general level are in line, but at a more 
detailed level differences in formal and actual autonomy can be observed due to the 
negative equalisation reserve and low level relationship between minister and RvR 
boards. The upward shift in autonomy for CVZ is also explained by a low level of 
relationship between minister and CVZ board. SVB and UWV are subject to the same 
legislation resulting in similar levels of formal autonomy. Here, practices diverge strongly. 
SVB‟s autonomy is further reduced due to the ending of the formal role of the advisory 
board. This also holds for UWV, but in that case, intensity of the relationship between 
minister and board as well as fewer degrees of freedom on providing services for other 
commissioners explains the difference compared to SVB. Figure 16.1 discloses the 
formal and actual level of control on income transfer ZBOs compared to each other. 
 
 low 
auto-
nomy 
      neutral: 
kZBO 
      high 
auto-
nomy 
Formal   CVZ  
RvR 
SVB 
UWV 
    
FBKVB 
Vf/Pf 
     
 
Actual 
 
UWV    SVB RvR CVZ     Vf/Pf FBKVB    
Figure 16.1: Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs from a legal 
perspective 
 
In the following section, I will address the economic dimensions related to autonomy, 
starting with the service specifications for the services provided by the ZBOs. 
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16.2 The economic dimension of autonomy 
In this subsection, I will discuss the impact of economic variables on income transfer 
ZBOs. I will discuss each ZBO separately and start the assessment with the issue of 
market dimensions and service specifications. Thereafter, responsibility accounting 
including planning and control issues will be discussed. Unlike the assessment from the 
legal perspective, mismatch can only be based on differences between the expected (see 
Table 14.8) economic characteristics and the actual characteristics found. This is due to 
the fact that income transfers imply commissioning based on citizen demand and mass 
production processes.192 Deviations from standards may have a positive or a negative 
impact which will also be indicated. This means that whereas in the legal setting 
differences between similar ZBOs could be found in a formal setting, in an economic 
setting the starting point for all ZBOs of a subtype is the same. With respect to 
documents submitted to Parliament on ZBO operations, I have chosen to conclude there 
is a negative impact on autonomy if more than 5 documents are submitted. Five 
documents would cover a budget document, a document regarding the annual reports as 
well as two intermediate reports related to VJN and NJN which are the regular 
intermediate reports submitted to Parliament.  
After discussing the last case, a comparative assessment on the autonomy of income 
transfer ZBOs studied will be given, which shows the deviations from the standard as well 
as differences between ZBOs. In the summary tables below, the factors used in a 
comparative setting are highlighted. In general an indicator is only included once to avoid 
overemphasising particular indicators such as performance. The same assessment 
structure will be used for the monitoring/regulating type ZBOs in chapter 17. 
                                                 
192 Only in very specialised forms of income transfers, for example in relation to companies and 
investments, is unit production possible. This is not the case here. 
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16.2.1 CVZ 
16.2.1.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
Unlike the other ZBOs CVZ is not a pure income transfer organisation. A substantial part 
of the activities performed within the organisation are to define standard health 
insurance policies as well as for research purposes. This is reflected in the share of 
income transfer activities to total cost of operations. CVZ‟s income transfers to health 
insurance companies resemble series production rather than mass production because it 
is based on an ex ante estimated transaction and a single ex post transaction. These 
income transfers are still strongly rule driven. Mass production does exist with respect to 
the income transfers to particular groups of individuals who have to comply with the 
general ZVW health insurance law.  
The policy advice services delivered can be characterised as unit production close to 
research activities. The complexity of services delivered is reflected in the amount of 
funding based on income transfers.  This reduces autonomy compared to a full income 
transfer institution because series and individual production requires additional control 
by commissioners. 
Table 16.8: Classification and impact of market characteristics on CVZ's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 52 ↑ 
Production type 
Mass 
Mass, Series 
& Individual 
↓ 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
Type of funding charges Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum ↓ 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 1 department 1 department 0 
Supply 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
CVZ is fully dependent on one ministry for its demand, like most of the other income 
transfer ZBOs selected. From a budget typology perspective, one might expect that a 
mass production income transfer organisation could be funded with an output based 
budget.  In actual fact the budget has an input character at the level of a lump sum for 
total costs of operations, or at least a lump sum for both defining health insurance 
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policies and income transfer on the one hand and for research on the other (source: 
interviews + Parliament, 2006i, p. 184). The additional controls affect both the policy 
advice as well as the income transfer activities. As a result, the autonomy of CVZ is 
reduced. 
16.2.1.2 Planning and control 
CVZ uses accruals accounting in line with the expected standards for ZBOs. The actual 
level of fixed assets are above the standard set here, but 2007 data disclose that some 
75% of fixed assets concern furniture and installations in the leased office premises. The 
other assets are related to IT. One of the interviewees noted that CVZ was having a 
debate with minVWS on this issue because including computer software as assets on the 
balance sheet is not standard practice within the Dutch government.193 Asset specificity is 
thus not an issue and autonomy is not affected.  
CVZ‟s budget has been in a transition phase during 2007 and 2008. Initially, the budget 
was not fully included in ministry budgets due to the funding history of its predecessor. 
This had changed in 2006, but some parts of the CVZ budget were still divided over a 
number of budget articles. During 2006 and 2007 budgets were transferred to one 
budget line item in which all budgets for all Health Sector ZBOs are included (Parliament, 
2006i, p. 126; 2007o, p. 117-119). Transparency in terms of disclosing a separate 
budget for CVZ therefore does not exist, generating additional autonomy for CVZ. 
Parliament is informed on the approval of CVZ‟s annual reports, but not separately on the 
budgets. There are no instructions on how budgets are to be calculated. According to 
interviewees this is because such an instruction would conflict with the „impartial status‟ 
of CVZ as a ZBO. The original CVZ 2007 budget was not approved by the minVWS, 
because in his opinion, the link between budget and activities was insufficiently 
transparent (minVWS, 2006b). In the letters of approval by minVWS to CVZ two issues 
can be mentioned: first the administratively separate research budget, which is a lump 
sum budget for research activities performed by CVZ. Management thus does not have 
full flexibility in the use of resources attributed to CVZ. Secondly, an explicit cash-flow 
forecast is given on a monthly basis (MinVWS, 2007a; MinVWS, 2008a). Interviewees 
indicate that one of the reasons for a separate research budget is that in the past not all 
research resources were used and unused resources should be at the disposal of 
minVWS. The disclosure of cash flows in the approval letter is unusual for ZBOs. 
According to interviewees this can be explained by the desire of minVWS to have 
adequate liquidity planning for the full minVWS budget. A final point to be made is that 
investment programs or projects can be applied for on a separate basis, which is an 
indication for separate investment control by minVWS. Such investment controls are 
basically in line with cost centre responsibilities, but they are based on ad hoc proposals 
if they cannot be financed from within CVZ‟s full authorised budget. 
 
                                                 
193 Except for executive agencies for which inclusion of software on the balance sheet is permitted. 
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Table 16.9: Planning & control of CVZ and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 15% 17% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in 
ministry budgets  
Line item Multiple 
articles 
Included in 
article 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Discretionary 
Cost Centre 
Discretionary 
Cost Centre 
↓ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Separate 
assessment 
No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to 
Parliament  Yearly 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
↓ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ budget documents  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Various types 0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Parliament‟s 
frequency 
Quarterly Quarterly ↓ 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to 
Parliament regarding operations of ZBO  
0 15 8 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs related to budget 
and annual report  
0 5 2 0 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs other than budget 
and annual report  
0 8 1 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Planning & Control in the relationship between Parliament, minVWS and CVZ is based on 
the regular arrangements of Budget, First and Second supplementary budget and annual 
report. At the level of the arrangements between minVWS and CVZ, the governance 
agreement stipulates quarterly reporting by CVZ to minVWS. Interviewees indicated that 
as of 2009 planning and control will be aligned with the monthly procedures that apply to 
ministry units, which reduces the autonomy of CVZ. One other issue regarding planning 
and control should be mentioned. CVZ made a formal objection to a reduction in its staff 
levels under a government restructuring program. This is an exceptional step in a 
relationship between ZBO and ministry. Interviewees indicated that part of the problem 
was caused by misinterpretation and uncertainty on tasks to be delivered by CVZ and the 
fact that some temporary staff was not included in CVZ‟s structural staff levels. The 
problem was solved by a mutual agreement between CVZ and minVWS and the complaint 
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was withdrawn. From a control perspective, this discussion is in my opinion another 
indicator that CVZ is input controlled rather than output controlled and thus more a 
discretionary cost centre than a standard cost centre.  
Parliament does not have high awareness of the discussions described above. In 
2007 and 2008, a total of 16 questions were raised on operations, mainly focusing on 
technicalities related to budget transfers. Four questions concern the level of budget, 3 
concern impact of operations on quality of services. Direct questions on performance do 
not exist; there is no performance related information available to Parliament. 
 
The general impression on CVZ is that CVZ faces some restrictions in autonomy 
compared to the expected standard for ZBOs. Particularly in the planning and control 
domain, it is remarkable to see that minVWS uses rather strict controls but that 
disclosure of information on CVZ to Parliament does not cover performance indicators or 
information on budget approval. Furthermore, an assessment of CVZ‟s performance by 
minVWS is no longer performed. From a Parliamentary perspective, one could claim that 
CVZ has substantial autonomy, but in the relationship between minVWS and CVZ the 
opposite seems to be the case. 
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16.2.2 RvR 
16.2.2.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
RvR is in line with the expected market perspective characteristics. In this case, the 
budget seems to be activity based  This is for example suggested by the performance 
indicators in the minJus budget documents which disclose price and volume, but in the 
end budget overruns due to changes in volume result in a future cash flow claim on 
minJus which is disclosed in the annual reports as (fixed) financial assets, rather than 
receivables. According to interviewees, these fixed financial assets can be regarded as a 
form of negative equalisation reserve. Given the context of growth in demand and 
proposed budget cuts, interviewees doubt whether a positive equalisation reserve is 
realistic. Formally, RvR is controlled on a standard cost centre basis but as the 
corresponding compensation is not provided by minJus, materially RvR is controlled as a 
discretionary cost centre. 
A last note is that RvR provides services for minJus as well as minVROM. From a 
commissioning point of view, demand is driven by requests from citizens funded by 
minJus only. The financial relevance of tasks assigned by minVROM is according to the 
interviewees minimal and cannot be found in budget documents because the costs of 
operations for the minVROM activities are included in minJus‟ budget. 
Table 16.10: Classification and impact of market characteristics on RvR's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
Type of funding charges Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum ↓ 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 
1 department 
multiple 
departments 
0 
Supply 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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16.2.2.2 Planning and control 
In the RvR case, the program budget and operating budget are mixed up in one line item 
in the budget of minJUS. There are no explicit documents to assess or approve budget 
documents or annual reports submitted to Parliament194. Key data including output type 
performance information is given in the ministry‟s budget documents. Fixed assets are 
only a small figure in RvR‟s balance sheet. From a perspective of asset specificity, the 
assets listed are not relevant as they relate to leased offices. 
Table 16.11: Planning & control of RvR and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 1% 1% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in 
ministry‟s budgets  
Line item 
Line item Line item 0 
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Standard cost 
centre 
Standard cost 
centre 
↓ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes Yes Yes 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to 
Parliament  Yearly 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
↓ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ budget documents  
Output Output Output 0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output Output Output 0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Minister 
Parliamentary 
frequency 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
0 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to 
Parliament regarding operations of ZBO  
0 12 17 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs related to budget 
and annual report  
0 2 3 0 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs other than budget 
and annual report  
0 1 3 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Within the planning & control process, minJUS sends a letter of instruction to RvR, 
including an estimate of volume of services and price levels. This letter may be seen as a 
                                                 
194 These documents are submitted to RvR. 
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form of commissioning instruction. The budget proposal which is submitted by RvR to 
minJUS based on the instruction is a proposal for a single fiscal year instead of a 
multiyear proposal. The relevant letters of instruction also only cover a single fiscal year. 
In the ministry‟s budget documents however, both a multiyear budget estimate is given as 
well as a multiyear estimate on income transfer volumes (Parliament, 2007p, p. 45). 
Frequency of reporting by RvR to minJUS is on a four monthly basis, which is in line with 
the reporting frequency of a minister to Parliament. 
RvR‟s annual budget is then approved by a letter which has the status of a decision 
open to appeal. Respondents indicate that this is merely a matter of form of approving 
the budget proposal given the best estimate of production at a certain moment. 
According to respondents processes within RvR are  relatively stable. As a result there is 
no need to discuss the level of budget and processes in detail.  
At the point when the formal letter of approval is sent out, according to the 
interviewees it is internally known that the budget will be changed in the First supplement 
to the annual budget, basically due to changes in the volume of income transfers 
provided by RvR. The budget decision making process is a matter of debate at the civil 
servant level without intervention at the political level. At the political level, involvement is 
found when the First and Second supplement to the budget have to be authorised. In 
fact, the emphasis is on program costs rather than on costs of operations. The main 
political issue on budgets in fiscal 2007 and 2008 has been a proposed cut to the 
program budget. This is reflected in the questions submitted in Parliament: 7 out of 9 
questions are related to this issue. One question focused on a technical explanation of a 
budget overrun on costs of operations and one addressed internal procedures for a 
particular group of legal aid cases.  
The annual report discloses the actual volume and price of income transfers delivered 
and this is confirmed in the final supplement to the budget for a fiscal year, in which the 
actual financial result will be authorised by Parliament. Differences due to variations in 
average costs of income transfers are included in the equalisation reserve on the balance 
sheet and not included in the final supplement to the budget. Interviewees indicate that 
this method of accounting is difficult to understand for outsiders.  
 
The overall impression on the economic characteristics of RvR is similar to that for CVZ. 
Strict control by minJUS even results in structurally negative equalisation reserves. 
Information provision to Parliament on operations is minimal because no explicit 
statement on approval of budgets or performance assessment is given. 
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16.2.3 SVB 
16.2.3.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
SVB operates in a quasi competitive market. SVB‟s main function of providing old age 
pensions is supplemented by other activities for a number of ministries as well as local 
governments. There is no explicit specification as to the volume of services by ministries 
other than minSZW according to respondents. In the minSZW case, a budget letter in May 
specifies the requirements and budget level for the next fiscal year.  
Table 16.12: Classification and impact of market characteristics on SVB's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 26 ↑ 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 88 0 
Type of funding charges Authority 
biased 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum ↓ 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 1 department mixture ↑ 
Supply 
Competitors No Yes ↑ 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
The quasi competitive environment SVB operates in can be illustrated by the assignment 
of executing a program on schoolbooks to SVB rather than IBGroep in 2008 (Parliament, 
2008o). Although the budget of SVB is based on a cost calculation and allocation model, 
the budget effectively has the character of a lump sum budget. This is best illustrated by 
the authority of minSZW to authorise reallocation of unused resources at the end of a 
fiscal year (contrary to the regulations in kZBO:33). The character of the budget 
instruction letter sent out in May stipulates the maximum level of budget for most of 
SVB‟s activities (minSZW, 2006) as well as the political desire to control SVB‟s operations 
from within one ministry. The minister of Youth and Family (minJG) once stated in 
Parliament that he does not like the idea that political responsibility for SVB‟s operations 
is divided over different ministries (Parliament, 2007q, p. 27-2095). This is an implicit 
reference to Verhoest‟s (2002, p. 66-67) co-ordination issue seemingly aiming at the 
Minister-Principal responsibility of minSZW as the funding for minJG‟s child benefit 
program is still under minJG‟s own budget. Funding of SVB is partially based on 
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contributions by ministries (some 26%), on premiums levied directly from citizens195 and 
payments from local governments which have commissioned SVB to provide supplements 
in case of partial AOW benefits. From a control perspective, 88% of resources are 
generated from activities related to minSZW.  
16.2.3.2 Planning and control 
SVB uses accruals accounting for its financial control. In this case assets as a percentage 
of balance sheet totals are low but that is due to the substantial levels of program cost 
related items on the balance sheet. SVB owns rather than leases offices, which cover 
95% of fixed assets on the balance sheet. IT infrastructure is only a minor issue, which 
indicates that asset specificity does not seem to be relevant. Some respondents 
indicated that human capital is a relevant asset within SVB. This is also a form of asset 
specificity but not reflected in financial statements. Human capital asset specificity 
effectively has some positive effect on autonomy. 
SVB is the organisation which has the widest variety of commissioners of the ZBOs 
selected for this study. There is no single SVB budget disclosed in ministry documents. 
The data provided in the appendix on ZBOs and RWTs in budgets and annual reports by 
minSZW (Parliament, 2006j, p. 171; Parliament, 2007r, p. 165) only discloses what is 
included in the minSZW budget instructions and therefore does not include some of the 
activities on behalf of minVWS as well as estimated revenues generated from local 
governments for services to supplement AOW pensions. The missing revenues cover 
some 10% of total operating costs in 2007. From a formal perspective, the majority of 
operating costs are not included in the budget proposal as there is no formal budget 
article for costs of AOW operations. This is due to the premium based funding system for 
AOW, which is not a part of the formal government budget. Therefore, the formal 
conclusion is that only part of SVB‟s budget is included in the budget document. If one 
accepts a wider definition of government budget, the conclusion would be that SVB‟s 
budget is disclosed over multiple items within minSZW‟s budget.196 Related to the issue of 
funding disclosure is the approval of fees for SVB. SVB‟s costs of operations are included 
in the calculation of program fees, but not as separate fees for services delivered. 
Therefore, one can argue that approval of fees is not applicable from an operations 
perspective.197  
SVB is one of the three ZBOs that are subject to the SUWI legislation. The 
restructuring process that is at the heart of this legislation has been declared as a special 
project in Parliament, which requires frequent information exchange between minister 
and Parliament. Some respondents commented that the arrangements between minister 
and Parliament were not necessary in the SVB case as SVB is an organisation without 
                                                 
195 In practice premiums are levied directly by the fiscal authorities (Belastingdienst) and then transferred to 
SVB. 
196 The fees charged from local government for the AOW supplement are according to the respondents 
negotiated and not subject to ministerial approval. 
197 The premiums set for relevant programs are however reported to Parliament and are even fixed by law in 
the case of the AOW pension plan. 
  Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs  
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   327 
 
new tasks assigned and programs that are well developed and do not often change. 
Given the number of questions submitted with respect to SVB‟s operations (6 in 2007 
and 18 in 2008) respondents have a point: questions with respect to UWV add up to over 
100. 
 
Table 16.13: Planning & control of SVB and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 1% 1% 0 
Budget disclosure operating costs in 
ministry‟s budgets  
Line item Partially 
included 
Partially 
included 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
↓ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes Yes Yes 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Separate 
document 
Separate 
document 
0 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Separate 
document 
including 
assessment 
Separate 
document 
including 
assessment 
↓ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to 
Parliament  
Yearly Quarterly May/August ↓ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ budget documents  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Parliamentary 
frequency 
Quarterly May/August 0 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to 
Parliament regarding operations of ZBO  
0 25 40 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs related to budget 
and annual report  
0 1 8 0 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs other than budget 
and annual report  
0 5 10 ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Due to the special project status, Parliament is informed quarterly on approval of budgets 
as well as receiving annual reports and receives performance information on programs 
and operations of SVB. These reports are submitted by minSZW and include an 
assessment of SVB‟s performance, implying restrictions on autonomy compared to the 
standards. In 2008 minSZW and the SUWI partners changed the frequency of 
intermediate reporting to two reports on a 4 monthly basis. The frequency implemented 
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in 2008 is practically in line with intermediate reporting procedures to Parliament. This 
reporting practice was continued after the special project status ended by June 2008 
(Parliament, 2008p). Although respondents indicated that performance is relevant when 
calculating budgets, the level of budget is in fact set by the letter of instruction sent out in 
May. This is sufficient to conclude that SVB classifies as a discretionary responsibility 
centre. The argument is even emphasised by direct remarks and questions by members 
of Parliament on the level of remuneration of top management (Parliament, 2009f; in fact 
a motion) and the promise by minSZW to report separately on costs of housing and ICT of 
the SUWI organisations as of 2009 (Parliament, 2008q).  
 
In the SVB case, autonomy is reduced by the planning and control tools applied. 
Information to Parliament is submitted frequently, including an assessment by minSZW. 
This practice results in transparency but also reduces autonomy of operations given the 
fact that reporting is done several times a year. Although market characteristics allow for 
increased autonomy given the variety in commissioning, actual control resembles a 
discretionary cost centre level rather than a standard cost centre level, which also 
reduces autonomy. 
  Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs  
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   329 
 
 
16.2.4 UWV 
16.2.4.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
UWV has market characteristics similar to SVB. However, there are differences as well. 
The main difference between UWV and SVB is that in 2007 and 2008 UWV only delivered 
services that were assigned by minSZW. One of the reasons for this difference might 
according to some of the interviewees be that there are differences in the degree in 
which the operations of both organisations can be classified as „in control‟. The 
documents sent to Parliament with respect to the SUWI operation are an indication of this 
difference: whereas the SVB re-organisation program is hardly mentioned in these 
documents, UWV operations are discussed in detail due to errors and failures (e.g. on ICT 
projects; most recently, see Parliament, 2008r198).  
 
Table 16.14: Classification and impact of market characteristics on UWV's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
Type of funding charges Authority 
biased 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum ↓ 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 1 department 1 department 0 
Supply 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
16.2.4.2 Planning and control 
This section on UWV is to be regarded as a selection by the researcher on the issues that 
were discussed during fiscal 2007 and 2008. A full discussion is far beyond the scope or 
the purpose of the study as a whole. The examples however do indicate that the 
environment in which UWV operates is turbulent and that this has an impact on political 
attention for the organisation and the level of detail of political control. UWV is not only 
the largest (in staff and operating costs) but also the most complex ZBO of the ZBOs 
discussed here. 
                                                 
198 In this document, 47 questions are raised by MPs on the failure of an important ICT project within UWV. 
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Like SVB, the financial relevance of fixed assets compared to balance sheet totals is 
minimal due to large amounts of program cost related balance sheet items. Most of the 
fixed assets listed concern investments in the (leased) offices. Outside the balance sheet, 
asset specificity is found in human capital, particularly in the medical staff responsible for 
assessing disability. Human capital influences production levels of services but does not 
contribute to additional autonomy related to Parliamentary control. 
From a control perspective, UWV and SVB are managed under the same rules. 
Economic context as well as planning and control have a similar structure. However, UWV 
is under far more political scrutiny than SVB . This is due to a few reasons which are 
reflected in the type of questions asked by MPs. First, UWV is a merged organisation that 
started in 2002 under a single management. Procedures had to be lined up, harmonised 
and modernised. In some cases this was not immediately successful such as with the 
sickness benefit ICT system that failed in the last quarter of 2006 (Parliament, 2006k). 
Secondly, Parliament had passed several new program laws that had to be implemented, 
amongst them one on a full restructuring of disability benefits. This led to discussions on 
re-assessing beneficiaries under the old program. With respect to the old program, 
debate on assessment fairness was part of the political discussions, implying that UWV 
management was imposing pressure on physicians to compromise their professional 
standards, resulting in a motion for an independent investigation (Parliament 2007s).  It 
also resulted in the development of a new ICT system for the new program. Due to 
managerial problems, the ICT project for the new program failed (e.g. Parliament, 2008s). 
MPs asked nearly 50 questions regarding this problem.199 The third important project was 
a transfer in levying premiums (the main funding source) from UWV‟s predecessors to the 
tax authorities. This again resulted in ICT related problems which were regularly 
discussed in Parliament (e.g. Parliament, 2007t).  
By mid fiscal 2008, a proposal for a revised SUWI law was submitted in Parliament. In 
this law a merger of UWV and CWI as of 2009 is the main issue. The idea of the merger 
was supported by the management of both organisations (Parliament, 2008t; Parliament, 
2008u). 
On a more practical level, the merger and the process of reducing staff levels from 
some 24,000 to a little over 16,000 employees in 6 years (UWV, 2009, p. 31) led to 
unoccupied office space and MPs explicitly addressed minSZW to co-ordinate better use 
of office space, at least within the SUWI domain but even across government if necessary 
(Parliament, 2007u). These examples indicate that UWV operates in a relatively unstable 
environment, unlike most other ZBOs studied here. At some stages, minSZW indicated 
that its responsibility for UWV operations was only limited: the minister is responsible for 
program outcomes; quality assurance is the responsibility of UWV management 
(Parliament, 2008v).  
 
                                                 
199 In the analysis of the number of questions, this example is regarded as a single question on one single 
issue. 
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Table 16.15: Planning & control of UWV and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 1% 1% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in 
ministry budgets  
Line item Partially 
included 
Partially 
included 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
↓ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes Yes Yes 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Separate 
document 
Separate 
document 
0 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Separate 
document 
including 
assessment 
Separate 
document 
including 
assessment 
↓ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to 
Parliament  
Yearly Quarterly May/August ↓ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ budget documents  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Input to 
outcome 
Input to 
outcome 
0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Parliamentary 
frequency 
Quarterly May/August 0 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to 
Parliament regarding operations of ZBO  
0 42 62 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs related to budget 
and annual report  
0 9 15 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs other than budget 
and annual report  
0 54 90 ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Respondents indicated that some of the measures laid down on planning and control of 
UWV make it difficult to manage the organisation. They feel for example that monitoring 
of UWV‟s activities by IWI – the monitoring institution of minSZW – is pro-active rather 
than re-active as would be logical, given the role of IWI in relation to the tasks of the core 
staff in minSZW which also discuss control of UWV. Furthermore, requests for ex ante 
assessment on viability of new programs from a perspective of operations 
(„uitvoeringstoets‟) by UWV are not always sent to Parliament, which means that 
Parliament might not be fully aware of possible risks. Respondents also indicated that 
UWV is sometimes reluctant to be sufficiently critical in these ex ante program 
assessments. On the unoccupied office space problem, a respondent indicated that 
before ending lease of an office, UWV has to have minSZW‟s consent, which might have 
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an impact on the power to act proactively. Respondents also indicate that they have 
problems with the level of detail of control by minSZW on the issue of staff reductions as 
well as on performing programs more efficiently. The latter problem is related to the strict 
separation of program budgets and operating budgets which does not enable additional 
operating resources to be used to stop benefits from having to be paid to individuals. 
In the UWV case, both Parliament and minister use control tools that have a negative 
impact on autonomy. Indicators are found in cost control and frequency of reporting 
including the special project status of SUWI implementation. The underlying problem is 
the complexity of the organisation, high political attention, the instability of its programs 
and its size, which is particularly reflected in questions asked by MPs.  
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16.2.5 FBKVB 
16.2.5.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
FBKVB is not really a mass production organisation like the other organisations selected. 
Based on the decision making process described by the interviewees, one can argue that 
selecting projects to be subsidised within fund sub-committees resembles series 
production including elements of professional judgement200 rather than continuous mass 
production. 
Table 16.16: Classification and impact of market characteristics on FBKVB's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass 
Series 
including 
professional 
judgement 
↑ 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
Type of funding charges Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Budget funding Lump  sum Lump  sum 0 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 1 department 1 department 0 
Supply 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Grant 
Provision 
↑ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Furthermore, the budget structure of the art funds is different from all other income 
transfer organisations selected. A budget is allocated for a 4 years period and it is up to 
the fund to manage the distribution of resources over both operating costs and program 
costs. Only after the end of the 4 year period is a final (financial) conclusion drawn. 
According to the interviewees this form of budgeting was chosen to deliberately create an 
arm‟s length relationship between the State supporting Art and an impartial judgement 
on the allocation of the budget both to the various art funds as well as to artists applying 
for financial support. In fact, the services provided resemble a grant provision type of 
service rather than contract service provision. This can be derived from the present 
system of budget allocation but also from history. An interviewee indicated that one of the 
arguments for creating the art funds – particularly as a private law entity - was to avoid 
                                                 
200 Dedicated committees assess proposals from artists. 
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procedures akin to Awb from individual applicants for grants. Although this idea did not 
hold from a legal perspective, it does have its impact on autonomy from an economic 
perspective through the funding systems.  
Overall, production in the FBKVB environment does not allow for output budgeting 
controls. In practice the control level is close to an input budget with traditional cost 
control within the organisation and a budgeted level of costs of operations over a four 
year period. 
 
FBKVB is one of 10 art funds; they compete amongst each other and with other interest 
groups for part of the 4 year budget to be distributed. Once the impartial allocation of 
budgets has been decided, the different funds operate in different areas of the arts and 
do not compete for delivering services. Interviewees indicated that FBKVB‟s activities are 
related to some other art funds‟ activities.  According to one interviewee mergers are not 
on the agenda yet, particularly due to the expected increase in power of a merged fund 
within the arts sector as a whole. Therefore, my conclusion is that there is no market 
competition between the different funds. 
16.2.5.2 Planning and control 
FBKVB is one of a group of ZBOs distributing income transfers in the arts sector. 
Budgeting for these organisations is based on an independent decision on behalf of 
minOCW and basically applies for four years. Respondents indicated that the Minister of 
OCW as well as Parliament only intervene on the distributed level of budgets if there is a 
general need for fiscal interventions, otherwise the budget is allocated for four years. As a 
result, intermediate questions on budgeting as well as reporting to Parliament do not 
exist. Furthermore, FBKVB‟s budget is not disclosed separately in minOCW‟s budget but is 
part of the larger budget for all income transfers in the arts sector. There are no clear 
budget instructions for setting up a bottom up budget. A reporting structure document is 
provided by minOCW. Respondents indicated that during a fiscal year budget monitoring 
is performed at the civil servant level only. From the ministry‟s perspective, it was 
indicated that there is a desire to link objectives to resources. However, this has not yet 
been carried out. Costs of operations are included in the budget. There are no separate 
measures although an estimate for total costs of operations during the four year period is 
made. 
Some questions have been raised in Parliament during fiscal 2007 and 2008. The 
main issue was the creation of a governance code for the individual funds. Respondents 
indicated that this is related to the actual position of the board of a fund with respect to 
management and the advisory boards that evaluate applications for an income transfer. 
Some questions were raised on the actual distribution of funds to individuals or classes 
of artists, but minOCW explicitly does not intervene in decisions by the fund unless 
legislation on freedom of speech and expression is violated (Parliament, 2007v). 
Given the level of detail in the requirements for the annual reports to be provided, one 
can argue that actual control is at the level of separate cost classes such as wages of 
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separate sub-units in the organisation, costs of offices, depreciation and the like 
(minOCW, 2005, p. 15). Therefore management responsibility tends to be at a 
discretionary cost centre level rather than a standard cost centre level as might be 
expected in an income transfer ZBO.  
 
Table 16.17: Planning & control of FBKVB and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 2% 3% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in 
ministry budgets  
Line item Included in 
article 
Included in 
article 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Standard cost 
centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
↓ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No No No ↑ 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to 
Parliament  
Yearly Yearly Yearly 0 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ budget documents  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to 
Parliament in ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Yearly Yearly Yearly 0 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to 
Parliament regarding operations of ZBO  
0 10 6 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs related to budget 
and annual report  
0 0 0 0 
Number of discussion/questions on 
operations of ZBO by MPs other than budget 
and annual report  
0 6 3 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
In general, FBKVB has additional degrees of freedom compared to the expected 
standards, particularly because information to Parliament during and after a fiscal year is 
minimal. This is partially explained by the four year funding cycle. Actual control of 
operations at the ministerial and executive board level is at a discretionary cost centre 
rather than the expected standard cost centre level. 
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16.2.6 Vf/Pf 
16.2.6.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
Finally, Vf/Pf is discussed. The activities of Vf/Pf focus on services for school boards and 
are indirectly funded by minOCW as part of minOCW‟s funding of the school boards. 
Therefore, formal funding from central government does not occur. Given the number of 
the (locally organised) school boards (see. e.g. Parliament, 2006a, p 76), there is no 
largest demand generating organisation to be identified, resulting in some additional 
autonomy. Theoretically, the Minister of OCW decides appointments to the organisation 
executing the programs now performed by Vf/Pf (WetPO:184). This suggests that 
competition would be possible between service providers. However, Vf/Pf was 
deliberately created to deliver these services and therefore, there is no competition on 
providing the services. As Vf/Pf is not allowed to provide other services than those on 
unemployment and disability benefits, it cannot compete with other ZBOs as is the case 
with SVB.  
Table 16.18: Classification and impact of market characteristics on Vf/Pf's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
Product characteristics 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
Activities 
% income transfer activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
Demand 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 0 0 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) low low 0 
Type of funding charges Authority 
biased 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Activity based 0 
Commissioning Request Request 0 
Demand dependency 
outside 
departments 
outside 
departments 
0 
Supply 
Competitors Yes No ↓ 
Budget Typology Output Input ↓ 
Production form 
Contract 
provision 
Regulated 
Provision 
↑ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
A remark should be made on the fees charged, which can be characterised as authority 
biased fees rather than market biased fees. Indications for this conclusion include the 
fact that school boards are obliged to participate in the Vf/Pf system plus the link 
between approval of fees by the Minister of OCW and the compensation given by minOCW 
in the funding of school boards for the costs charged by Vf/Pf (Besluit 
Particiaptiefonds:5). Furthermore, from a demand perspective, there is no immediate 
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relationship between the services provided by Vf/Pf and the level of funding charged from 
an individual school board.  
Compared to the other income transfer organisations for which an activity based 
budget was expected, Vf/Pf is the only one for which it can be argued that the actual 
operations budget is still activity based. Interviewees indicated that although part of the 
operations are subsidised by minOCW, no criteria exist to evaluate and control Vf/Pf‟s 
operating costs.  As a result, volume of activities rather than a given budget determines 
total operating costs. 
16.2.6.2 Planning and control 
The budget of Vf/Pf is implicitly included in minOCW‟s budget. The main source of 
income Vf/Pf receives is meant to cover program costs. This budget is generated by levies 
from primary schools, whose budgets are included in minOCW‟s budget. A second source 
of income is a direct transfer of resources from minOCW to Vf/Pf to cover costs of 
operations. The annual reports of Vf/Pf show that not all costs of operations are covered 
by minOCW‟s contribution (Vf/Pf, 2007). Therefore, the conclusion is that Vf/Pf‟s budget 
is only partly included in minOCW‟s budget documents. Asset specificity is not an issue, 
nor are human resources as part of the activities are outsourced and nor are fixed assets. 
The Vf/Pf balance sheet does not show any fixed assets at all. 
The budgeting process is based on a bottom up process from within Vf/Pf without 
instructions by minOCW. Respondents indicated that informally general trends in primary 
school funding and wage increases are mentioned by minOCW to Vf/Pf. These general 
indications cannot be regarded as instructions for service levels when preparing the 
budget. 
Vf/Pf does include some performance indicators in its annual report, mainly process 
and some output indicators with respect to the programs executed. Reporting is on a 
quarterly basis to minOCW at the civil servant level. Respondents indicate that there is no 
attention on Vf/Pf operations at a political level. When necessary, minOCW includes 
changes in Vf/Pf‟s budgets  in the First and Second supplement to the budget. This only 
happens on rare occasions. In fiscal 2007 and 2008, excess equity from Pf was returned 
to minOCW. This is disclosed in the relevant budget documents and has lead to some 
questions in Parliament (Parliament, 2007w, p. 10). This intervention had no impact on 
Vf/Pf operations but concerns program continuity. If too much equity was withdrawn, it 
might result in higher premiums in the future.  
Respondents indicated that there is no framework given for planning and control. 
Furthermore, no formal approval procedures and assessment criteria for costs of 
operations exist. On the other hand, respondents at minOCW indicated that they do have 
an interest in the estimates of the volume of users for Vf/Pf‟s programs because this has 
an impact on minOCW‟s budget levels. A last point to be mentioned with respect to 
planning and control is that respondents indicated that there is a standard for minimum 
and maximum levels of equity, which is different for the two funds. Respondents 
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indicated that there is no rationale given for maximum levels. Minimum levels vary (1% 
Pf; 3% Vf; source: respondents) due to different levels of uncertainty in the two funds.  
Vf/Pf can be characterised as a profit centre rather than a cost centre. The role of the 
ZBO is to match revenues raised by premiums with expenses. The board of Vf/Pf has the 
power to determine the premium, which is different from for example UWV where a 
premium level is merely a suggestion they make to minSZW. Given the fact that Vf/Pf‟s 
budgets are not approved by minOCW and that there are hardly any planning and control 
measures between minOCW and Vf/Pf, the executive board‟s responsibility is broader 
than mere cost controls. 
Table 16.19: Planning & control of Vf/Pf and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
Accounting issues 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets <10% 0% 0% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budgets  
Line item 
Partially 
included 
Partially 
included 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type 
Standard 
cost centre 
Profit centre Profit centre ↑ 
Planning & control 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No No No ↑ 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of annual report mentioned to Parliament 
by minister  
Yes 
Yes 
including 
assessment 
Yes 
including 
assessment 
↓ 
Frequency of reporting by minister to Parliament  Yearly 
Intermediat
e report 
Intermediat
e report 
0 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ budget documents  
Output No No ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output No No ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Annual reports  
Output Output Output 0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Yearly Quarterly Quarterly ↓ 
Political Debate  
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 9 11 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual report  
0 0 0 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual report  
0 1 2 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
The Vf/Pf case shows very contrasting perspectives. On the one hand, the organisation 
seems to be managed as a profit centre rather than a cost centre but the controls applied 
by minOCW in terms of frequency of reporting as well as explicit assessment of the 
annual report by minOCW towards Parliament indicate stronger controls than expected in 
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an income transfer ZBO setting.  On all other control items, the autonomy experienced by 
Vf/Pf is above expected levels. 
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16.2.7 Relative economic autonomy of income transfer ZBO’s 
Income transfer ZBOs can ideally be controlled at a level of activity which implies 
standard cost centres. They are expected to be fully funded by government controlled 
resources due to the characteristics of income transfers. Production is expected to be at 
a contract based level as government is in control of the program and citizens can only 
apply for an income transfer rather than generate actual demand. These characteristics, 
together with demand driven by a single ministry, are classified as a neutral position on a 
scale of autonomy. FBKVB and Vf/Pf deviate somewhat from this general standard. 
FBKVB is expected to have a lower frequency of reporting to minOCW given the four year 
budget cycle that is used in this case. In the Vf/Pf case, regulations suggest competition 
allowing for more degrees of freedom and the reporting frequency can be low as there is 
only an indirect relationship between minOCW and Vf/Pf operations. Actual autonomy of 
an income transfer ZBO is assessed based on not only the market characteristics, but 
also the system of planning and control implemented in the relationship between ministry 
and ZBO. Figure 16.2 shows the expected and actual autonomy of the selected income 
transfer ZBOs. 
 
 low 
auto-
nomy 
      neu-
tral 
      high 
auto-
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Expected        
CVZ 
RvR 
SVB 
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Vf/
Pf 
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RvR 
    
Vf/
Pf 
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Figure 16.2 Expected and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs from an economic 
perspective 
 
The four public law income transfer ZBOs were expected to comply with a standard cost 
centre, contract based service provision model indicated in Figure 16.2 as the „neutral‟ 
position on autonomy. The two private law entities are expected to have some additional 
autonomy due to differences in markets and funding. 
 
The actual position on a scale of economic autonomy shows that autonomy is at a lower 
level for all PLAs and that autonomy increases for the two PLBs. Appendix 10 gives an 
overview of factors which have a positive or negative impact on a particular ZBO‟s 
autonomy. 
The analysis shows a remarkable difference between control by Parliament and 
control by the Minister-Principal. In general, Ministers-Principals use more control tools 
than might be expected for a ZBO income transfer organisation. This is most clearly 
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expressed in the responsibility centre type of ZBO which can in most cases only be 
classified as discretionary cost centres rather than the expected standard cost centre.  
Parliamentary control varies. I have used mentioning of approval of budgets and 
annual reports as a standard for income transfer ZBOs. In these cases, a strong 
divergence is disclosed. In three cases, the annual report of the ZBO is explicitly assessed 
by the Minister-Principal in Parliamentary documents. MinSZW acts consistently and 
assesses the annual reports of its ZBOs on behalf of Parliament.201 MinOCW does not 
operate consistently; Vf/Pf‟s annual reports are explicitly assessed whereas the annual 
report of FBVKB is not assessed. The annual reports of CVZ and RvR are not assessed by 
their Minister-Principal on behalf of Parliament. In the case of CVZ it should be noted that 
the initial practice of assessing annual reports was discontinued after fiscal 2007. The 
effect is that Parliament has a less direct control tool than in cases where an explicit 
assessment is given.  
Differences in control and autonomy are also found in ex ante and ex post 
performance indicators submitted to Parliament. Performance information is submitted 
both ex ante and ex post in only two cases.  In the case of CVZ and Vf/Pf ex post 
information is given. For RvR only ex ante information is submitted to Parliament and no 
performance data on FBKVB is available to Parliament. Not submitting performance 
information increases ZBO autonomy ZBO because Parliament is not fully able to assess 
production and possible impact on budgets of a particular ZBO. 
For UWV and SVB, a reduction in autonomy can be observed due to a high level of 
reporting to Parliament, partially driven by the special project status during the research 
period. The reporting frequency continued after the special project status had ended. The 
autonomy of the two PLB ZBOs is in general increased by the relatively low level of 
information provided to Parliament.  
When the focus shifts from information to Parliament to information to the Minister-
Principal, a different conclusion must be made. The standard used here is that a minister 
must be able to inform Parliament on a timely basis within the regular budgetary process 
in Parliament, implying two intermediate reports – VJN and NJN – a year. In practice, two 
ZBOs – CVZ and Vf/Pf report more frequently to their Ministers-Principal. For CVZ 
reporting tends to be on a monthly basis, which is in line with (hierarchical) departmental 
reporting rather than reporting by an arm‟s length entity. For Vf/Pf, reporting is on a 
quarterly basis; less frequent than CVZ but not aligned with the Parliamentary reporting 
procedures.  
The general conclusion on economic autonomy of income transfer ZBOS is that PLAs 
experience stronger controls then expected whereas PLBs have more autonomy. The 
expected differences between the services provided by income transfer ZBOS are 
relatively low, which emphasises the contrast between actual and formal control levels 
even more. 
                                                 
201 In fact minSZW is only Minister-Principal for three full time ZBOs, all subject to the SUWI legislation.  
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16.3 Mismatches in income transfer ZBOs 
In this section, I will discuss the mismatches observed between legal and economic 
measures for the individual ZBOs, based on the research question for the empirical 
section of the study: 
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit the legal and 
economic characteristics of (income transfer) ZBO services? 
Appendix 10 gives a comparative overview of the legal and economic indicators used and 
their impact on autonomy. In this section, I will focus only on market and planning and 
control factors because these elements are based on the relationship between services 
delivered and required control levels. If a fully open market existed, ex ante control as in 
traditional government would not be needed, whereas for pure public goods without any 
opportunity to outsource production or obtain funding from sources other than general 
taxation, a traditional compliance based control system would be needed. The fact that 
ZBOs can be used suggests that at least the extreme of full compliance based control 
systems needs not to be used. 
Controlling ZBOs has two levels. I have focused on the political level, not considering 
daily operations within the ZBO. At the political level, two sublevels exist: one in the 
relationship between Parliament and Minister-Principal and/or minister-commissioner, 
the other in the relationship between Minister-Principal and/or minister-commissioner 
and the board of the ZBO. The legal measures on ZBOs refer to authority attributed to the 
minister-principal and in most cases only indirectly affect Parliament‟s position on ZBOs. 
Only on the issue of submitting annual reports to Parliament is a direct relation between 
ZBO and Parliament created based on legislation. Furthermore, it can be observed that 
most information, governance and cyclical measures cover planning and control factors 
rather than market factors as identified in the economic sections of this study. Only the 
measures on approval of mandates for other services (kZBO:8) and approval of fees 
(kZBO:17) can be related to market factors; the latter only if other services are allowed. 
This means that in terms of mismatches, a strong emphasis on planning and control will 
be found. 
In the PLA cases, except for CVZ, formal and actual levels of legal autonomy are below 
the expected standards. Economic autonomy is in practice below the expected level as 
well but compared to the economic standard set for income transfer ZBOs, expected 
levels of autonomy did not diverge. This means that a mismatch in terms of opposite 
developments in economic and legal autonomy does not occur: all PLA income transfer 
ZBOs studied here face reduced autonomy. That does not mean that there are no 
inconsistencies at all. In one case, expected and actual levels of legal autonomy are at 
the same level and only economic autonomy decreases further. In two cases, both legal 
and economic autonomy decrease compared to the standards set. In the last case, legal 
autonomy increases whereas economic autonomy decreases. I will discuss the individual 
  Formal and actual autonomy of income transfer ZBOs  
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   343 
 
cases below, emphasising issues of decreased autonomy and possible inconsistencies 
within economic or legal autonomy. 
 
CVZ shows contrary developments in legal and economic autonomy. Legal autonomy 
would be at the same low level formally and in actual fact if the reporting and assessment 
requirement regarding the annual report had been continued in 2008. Contrary to the 
legislation, as of 2008 minVWS no longer submits an assessed annual report to 
Parliament. In general, legal autonomy is low due to determination rather than approval 
of budgets, the requirement to submit multiyear plans to the Minister-Principal and 
restrictions on the discussion on equalisation reserves. Neither a contract nor an ex ante 
budgeting instruction is given to prepare the following year‟s budget proposal. The CVZ 
budget is determined by minVWS and laid down in a budget letter with a summary of 
discussions on priorities for the next fiscal year. Within the economic dimension, 
contrasts are stronger. The overall effect shown is neutral but consists of factors which 
increase autonomy such as lack of separate approval for and disclosure of budgets, 
mitigated by lack of instructions, frequency of reporting to both Parliament as well as to 
the Minister-Principal. 
In the case of RvR, legal autonomy also shows a reduction between formal and actual 
autonomy. Not submitting the annual report to Parliament both formally and in actual fact 
has a positive impact on autonomy, mitigated by restrictions on services to be provided 
as well as determination of budgets and annual reports by minJUS due to the funding 
arrangement chosen. The additional impact is found in the measure for treatment of 
receivables: rather than including them as receivables on the balance sheet, an 
equalisation reserve is created implying a future claim on minJUS for services delivered. 
This makes the legal arrangement that allows reallocation of equalisation reserves to 
projects practically useless due to a lack of resources. RvR‟s budget is based on a letter 
of instruction and resembles a service level contract based on price and volume, but 
effectively the level of budget approved in the Parliamentary budgeting process overrules 
actual levels and costs of production. In the economic dimension, some factors create 
additional autonomy (reporting of budget and annual report to Parliament) and some 
(responsibility centre type, practically lump sum funding and frequency of reporting to 
Parliament) have a negative effect on autonomy. The overall result is negative, again with 
internal inconsistencies.  
SVB and UWV share the same economic and legal framework, resulting in the same 
formal position compared to standards. This means that formal legal autonomy is below 
standard levels and expected economic autonomy is at the standard level defined. For 
SVB, no changes are observed in the legal position; the additional degrees of freedom on 
services for other commissioners are mitigated by strict controls on budgets, reporting, 
the equalisation reserve and multiyear plans. UWV and SVB have to deal with a budget 
instruction at a given budget level and expected volumes of production. Performance 
standards are included on general levels but only for SZW related services. Economic 
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autonomy is reduced compared to standards; again the option to deliver services to other 
commissioners increases autonomy, whereas detailed reporting and assessment of 
performance towards Parliament reduces autonomy. 
In the UWV case, both legal and economic autonomy show a negative tendency. 
UWV‟s legal autonomy is further decreased by practical restrictions on services to other 
commissioners. In the economic dimension, UWV‟s autonomy is strongly diminished. 
Except for disclosure of budgets in departmental budget documents, actual controls are 
based on a discrete cost centre with high frequency of intermediate reporting to both 
Parliament and minister. 
 
The two PLB-type income transfer ZBOs studied here show higher levels of both economic 
and legal autonomy compared to expected standards. This means that strong 
mismatches between the economic and legal perspective  are not observed. However, 
formal and actual legal autonomy remains at the same general level, whereas in the 
economic dimension, additional increases in actual autonomy can be observed. 
In the FBKVB case, legal autonomy is at a high level due to the funding system for the 
art funds which covers a four year period. This has an impact on approval of statements 
of accounts, approval of budgets and submitting annual reports to Parliament. It should 
be noted that these increases in autonomy are partially mitigated by controls outside the 
direct planning and control factors. MinOCW uses a detailed audit protocol for all 
institutions in the arts sector which also has to be applied to FBKVB. Economic autonomy 
increases above expected levels. Expected economic autonomy was only increased 
based on lower levels of reporting to minOCW. However, actual responsibility centre type 
is below expected levels whereas budget approval and budget disclosure controls and a 
lack of performance information towards Parliament are indicators for increased 
autonomy.  
Finally, in the Vf/Pf case, actual autonomy increases slightly compared to expected 
and formal levels. This is a result of a mixture of strong economic controls laid down by 
minOCW and assessment of annual reports which affect autonomy negatively and 
increased autonomy in terms of responsibility centres and lack of budget and 
performance information towards Parliament. Positive factors slightly outnumber 
negative impacts and most elements diverge from the expected levels of autonomy. 
 
From a legal perspective, there is a distinction between PLA and PLB ZBOs. The latter 
have a higher level of formal as well as observed autonomy. Except for SVB and UWV, the 
focus is mainly on the budget set by Ministers-Principal. In the SVB and UWV cases, 
budgets are also major controls but approval letters on the budgets do include 
performance levels. Therefore, budget approval letters tend to resemble an SLA based 
agreement. From an economic perspective, most budgets are lump sum rather than 
activity based; particularly in the CVZ case, even tending towards segregated budgets 
rather than a single lump sum budget. Investment budgets are not a real issue due to low 
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levels of asset specificity. Furthermore, restructuring programs within organisations are 
authorised by the Minister-Principal and disclosed as earmarked reserves on a balance 
sheet. 
 
The overall conclusion of this section is that mismatches are not found in terms of 
divergent trends in legal versus economic autonomy. All PLA type income transfer ZBOs 
tend to have reduced autonomy and thus more controls than given in the standards, 
whereas the PLB type income transfer ZBOs tend to have an increased level of autonomy 
compared to the standards. Only SVB shows in the observed control tools a match 
between legal and economic control tools; in all other cases a mismatch was observed, 
although not a full divergence between legal and economic control tools. Within the 
individual dimensions, contradictions can be found. In most cases reduced autonomy in 
terms of the responsibility centre type is observed, whereas information on budgets in 
departmental documents tends to indicate more autonomy. 
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17. Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs 
17.1 The legal dimension of autonomy 
In this chapter, the five ZBOs that have been classified as „monitoring‟ ZBOs will be 
discussed. I recall that CFV is included in this group of ZBOs since the activities 
performed by this ZBO have shifted from merely income transfer to an industry 
monitoring institution which is also responsible for income transfers when required. Three 
ZBOs discussed here classify as market regulators (AFM, NMa, NZA). CFV is characterised 
by policy monitoring and income transfers. Finally, NAK can be qualified as a quality 
assurance ZBO, testing and certifying samples. These differences have an impact on the 
expected standard degrees of freedom, particularly from an economic perspective.  
The structure of the chapter is similar to that for income transfer ZBOs: I will start with 
legal issues which impact on autonomy and then focus on the economic dimensions of 
autonomy. The chapter is concluded with a comparative overview on mismatches 
between legal and economic autonomy and relative autonomy of the 5 monitoring ZBOs 
selected. 
Table 17.1: key data on monitoring ZBOs 
 AFM CFV NAK NMa NZA 
Legal entity PLB, 
foundation 
PLA, 
subsidiary 
PLB, 
foundation 
PLA,  
Shelter 
PLA, 
subsidiary 
Funding private private private public public 
Operating  revenues 
in € M 2008 
78 6 27 44 30 
 
Four out of the five ZBOs selected here have a separate legal status. The fifth, NMa, has 
no separate legal status but is part of the legal entity State. I refer to section 15.2.2 for 
more details on the creation of NMa. Here, it is sufficient to state that ownership is in the 
hands of minEZ. Key data on the five ZBOs are presented in Table 17.1. 
 
Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs   
 
348  Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives 
 
 
17.1.1 AFM 
In its letter on implementing kZBO (Parliament, 2008w), minFin announced that he would 
submit a proposal to change relevant legislation in line with kZBO after evaluation of the 
relevant law on financial monitoring [Wet op het financieel toezicht; WFT] in early 2010. 
In the same letter, minFin announced he would exclude the measures for setting of policy 
rules by minFin, annulling measures and creating an equalisation reserve in the future 
legal framework with respect to AFM. 
17.1.1.1 Normative measures 
AFM is a PLB-type ZBO, which implies that normative measures to govern the relationship 
between minister and AFM staff are not required within the kZBO-framework. 
Legislation or statutes do not include an explicit prohibition on appointing civil 
servants. One can argue that AFM‟s statutes implicitly address the prohibition by stating 
that board members operate fully independently and without any instructions from third 
parties. In practice, civil servants are not appointed although board members were 
former civil servants or even former ministers. 
The data protection measure in kZBO are not explicitly included in WFT. Both statutes 
as well as WFT include explicit measures on confidential information which imply that 
AFM has to ensure confidentiality. These measures have no impact on operational 
autonomy. 
17.1.1.2 Information measures 
Deviations on information measures can be found in ministerial consent to the annual 
report rather than approval, not directly submitting the annual report to Parliament and 
the separate accounts requirement of kZBO:38. MinFin receives AFM‟s annual report 
including the statement of accounts. Furthermore, minFin has a general right of inquiry. 
Ministerial consent rather than ministerial approval of annual reports is based on the 
division of authority between executive board, non-executive board and minister. I will 
discuss details of the governance provisions in the following sub-section. It is the non-
executive board which has been the power to approve annual reports. Practice is in line 
with formal provisions and has a positive impact on autonomy. 
AFM‟s annual report is submitted to minFin and minFin is required to submit the 
annual report to Parliament. The wording of WFT separates annual report (WFT:1:36) and 
statement of accounts (WFT:1:33). In practice, the full document is sent to Parliament, 
without comments from minFin (e.g. Parliament, 2009i). This procedure implies that no 
impact on autonomy compared to the kZBO-framework is observed. 
The requirement of kZBO:38 on separate accounts focuses on PLBs that deliver 
public and private services simultaneously. This is not the case for AFM. However, AFM‟s 
funding is based on a separation of costs of activities for groups of monitored institutions. 
Each of these groups pays its own fees. Interviewees indicated that fees can only be 
charged if the group being monitored benefits from the monitoring system. Repressive 
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monitoring is to be funded by government. The basis for this arrangement is found in a 
research document on allocation of monitoring costs. The main principles were officially 
published in 2000 (Staatscourant, 2000). In practice it means that some form of 
separation of costs is required, which is reflected in AFM‟s budget documents and annual 
reports. This practice means that a reduction of autonomy can be observed, AFM cannot 
simply reallocate costs to a particular group of monitored institutions. 
17.1.1.3 Governance provisions 
MinFin appoints AFM‟s executive board based on a proposal from AFM‟s non-executive 
board. MinFin can ignore the non-executive board proposal but interviewees indicated 
that minFin‟s role in relation to the executive and non-executive board is limited to last 
resort decision making. An interviewee indicated that appointments to the board are co-
ordinated on the initiative of AFM before a formal proposal is submitted. This means that 
the formal arrangements for appointing the board reduce autonomy and in practice 
minFin does have power to influence a proposal for the AFM non-executive board. In a 
letter to Parliament on the governance structure, it was explicitly stated that AFM‟s non-
executive board is primarily responsible for operations (Parliament, 2003d, p. 19-21) and 
according to the interviewees minFin is responsible for the institutional setting and 
monitoring framework. The institutional setting is completed by an advisory panel in 
which all stakeholders are represented. This panel focuses on costs, new policy rules and 
administrative burdens resulting from the monitoring process (Parliament, 2003d, p. 19-
21). MinFin has the right to dismiss members of the (non-) executive board; incompatible 
jobs are mentioned for both executive and non-executive board within the statutes. This 
is an additional restriction from a kZBO perspective: the kZBO:13 provision on secondary 
jobs is only aimed at PLA-type ZBOs and therefore there is a reduction in AFM‟s 
autonomy. Overall, the main governance structure of AFM implies that the authority of 
minFin with respect to governance is reduced from a kZBO perspective. 
The law (WFT:1:26.4) stipulates that minFin only consents to remuneration rather 
than deciding upon remuneration. Again this is due to the differences in governance 
structure, and in line with kZBO:14 in which it is stipulated that a minister only 
determines remuneration for PLA type ZBOs. However, minFin has been actively involved 
in reducing remuneration of the board (minFin, 2007b) by discussing the subject with the 
non-executive board. Remuneration is disclosed in AFM‟s 2007 and 2008 annual reports. 
Interviewees indicate that the role of the non-executive board is also relevant in cases 
of negligence. Formally, minFin has a role but respondents indicated that intervention by 
minFin would have a serious impact on markets and is therefore unlikely.  
Financing and treasury management are the only asset related transactions which are 
specifically addressed. Like most ZBOs, AFM has to borrow and lend using minFin‟s 
facilities. Most asset related transactions are not explicitly covered in WFT, but in 
statutes. This means effectively that the non-executive board approves the decisions of 
the executive board. This is in line with kZBO measures which only stipulate asset related 
transactions as optional measures. Only in the event of bankruptcy and dissolution of 
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AFM, does minFin have a role in deciding upon the remaining resources. A formal 
distinction is drawn between bankruptcy and dissolution. In the case of dissolution, 
explicit approval by minFin must be given, whereas in case of bankruptcy minFin has no 
formal role in the decision. The dissolution and bankruptcy provisions reduce autonomy 
on this issue from two perspectives: first, kZBO:32 is merely an optional measure. 
Including it in statutes therefore means that a restriction is created. Secondly, in a normal 
foundation, the (non-) executive board would have the power to decide on reallocation of 
remaining resources rather than minFin. Of course, bankruptcy and dissolution measures 
have not been used in practice. 
In 2007-2008 minFin has the authority to annul AFM decisions. This authority is 
however restricted to the requirement that only general regulations set by AFM can be 
annulled on the condition that minFin issues a decree governing the issue at hand 
(WFT:1:29). A measure like this is in line with the idea of the kZBO measure (Parliament, 
2000d, p. 27). One can argue that it restricts the autonomy of AFM due to the fact that 
minFin has to issue a decree; one can also argue that as it only concerns general 
regulations, AFM is immune to interventions on a case basis and thus has more 
autonomy than under the general kZBO:22 provisions. According to the interviewees in 
practice the measure is another ultimum remedium, which is very unlikely to be used. 
Impact on autonomy is thus minimal if any. In the proposal for changes as a result of the 
implementation of kZBO, the kZBO:22 measure is to be excluded given the international 
regulatory setting in which AFM operates (Parliament, 2008w) and because annulling a 
decision would not be in line with the impartial position AFM holds towards government. 
As a result, AFM‟s formal autonomy will increase, though materially nothing will change.  
17.1.1.4 Cyclical measures 
The governance structure of AFM also has an impact on cyclical measures. MinFin does 
not approve budgets and statements of accounts, it merely consents to them. Cyclical 
measures such as reporting on differences and decision making by the board on the 
budgets are in line with kZBO. An additional requirement in the budgeting process is that 
the advisory panel has to be consulted (WFT:1:39) but this does not affect the decision 
making position of the executive board and thus does not affect autonomy.  
With respect to fees WFT states that minFin determines rather than approves fees. 
Calculating fees is based on separate decrees. The fee is based on relevant cost and 
includes an arrangement for compensation for financial penalties imposed by AFM on the 
financial industry. Some interviewees indicated that this is part of an arrangement to 
compensate the financial industry for activities they perform on behalf of government 
free of charge.202  The restrictions on calculating fees reduces AFM autonomy in 
determining fee levels.  
Formal budget structure rules do not exist, although WFT allows for such rules. 
Respondents indicated that at minFin‟s request the budget is set up based on the 
                                                 
202 In particular reporting of irregular financial transactions was mentioned. 
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principles of the VBTB model used in government. From a practical perspective, the 
budget is split up into sub-budgets for the different sub-groups of monitored institutions. 
MinFin only consents to the budget proposal from AFM‟s non-executive board. Some 
interviewees indicated that approval is given, but the publication of AFM‟s budget 
explicitly uses consent. If the budget as a whole was privately funded by fees, consent 
would be logical given the determination of fees by minFin. A substantial part of the 
budget consists of activities on behalf of the general public, covered by government 
funding. Therefore approval of the budget would be in line with kZBO measures. Present 
measures and practices thus suggest some additional autonomy for AFM. 
A last point to be made is that formally AFM is allowed to create equity due to a net 
income result. This is in line with kZBO:33. In practice, interviewees indicated that net 
income is included in the calculation of fees to be determined for the next fiscal year. This 
means that in practice, autonomy of AFM on creating reserves is reduced. 
17.1.1.5 Conclusion 
Overall, AFM‟s autonomy is reduced both formally and in reality. Key explanations are the 
measures which relate to appointment and remuneration of the board and the 
restrictions on fees and equalisation reserves, which are partially the result of pressure 
from stakeholders. 
Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs   
 
352  Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives 
 
Table 17.2: Legal measures on AFM, formally or actually deviating from kZBO. 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference case law Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing civil servant in board Normative 9 Statutes 5.1.c 
independency 
No civil servants appointed 0 0 
Measure on appointment of staff Normative 15 none Civil law appointments 0 0 
Data protection measure Normative 41 Statutes:17 
WFT:1:89-1:93a 
In line with legislation 0 0 
Submit annual report to Minister and 
Parliament. 
Information 18 submitted by minister; 
WFT:1.36.2 
Officially and electronically published; 
WFT1:33 
0 0 
Approval of statement of accounts Information 34 consent; WFT:1:30.4 Consent, Approval by non executive 
board 
↑ ↑ 
Requirement for separate accounts Information 38 WFT:1:40; BBFT:6 separate 
accounts for public activities 
in line with case law ↓ ↓ 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 Statutes:6 
WFT:1:26 
Power attributed to non-executive 
board and advisory panel 
↑ ↑ 
Appointment of board Governance 12 Statutes:4 Minister appoints on proposal non- 
executive board and is heard informally 
↓ ↓ 
Measure on secondary jobs of Board 
members 
Governance 13 Statutes:5; 10 In line with statutes ↓ ↓ 
Decision on and disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
WFT:1:26.4; ministerial 
consent 
Reported in annual reports, active 
involvement of minFin in remuneration 
0 ↓ 
Intervention in case of negligence Governance 23 WFT:1:43 Ultimum remedium tool, unlikely to be 
used. Primary role non-executive board 
0 0 
Asset related transactions: borrowing 
and lending 
Governance 32d CW2001:45 In line with CW2001 0 0 
Asset related transactions Governance 32a-c; e-f Statutes:6.4, except for 
creating reserves 
In line with authority non executive 
board; including reserves. 
0 0 
Asset related transactions: bankruptcy Governance 32g Statutes:19 Not applied in practice ↓ 0 
Asset related transactions: 
dissolving entity 
Governance none Statutes:19 Minister approves 
and decides upon use of 
remaining resources 
Not applied in practice ↓ 0 
Approval of fees Cyclical 17 WFT:1:40 Minister determines fees ↓ ↓ 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 Statutes:6 Minister consents ↑ ↑ 
Creating equalisation reserve Cyclical 33 WFT:1:35 net income Agreement with stakeholders to use net 
income to decrees future fees; 
WFT:1:35.2 
↓ ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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17.1.2 CFV 
In her letter on implementation of kZBO, minWWI announced she would introduce a new 
governance code for CFV including a non-executive board (Parliament, 2008x). By 
January 2010, no proposals to change the relevant legislation had yet been submitted. 
MinWWI is currently (2008) regarded as the Minister-Principal for CFV. Interviewees 
noted that the minister‟s position on „ownership‟ responsibility is not as straightforward 
as in other cases. This is due to the history of CFV and according to respondents is 
reflected by stakeholder representation on the board. Furthermore, respondents 
indicated that (excess) equity in CFV will not automatically be transferred to minWWI. 
17.1.2.1 Normative measures 
CFV is a PLA type ZBO. Except for a data protection provision, the normative measures on 
the relationship between minister and staff and exclusion of appointing civil servants in 
the executive board are covered in the ZBO case law. MinWWI is allowed to issue general 
instructions on policy rules which has been implemented by a separate decree „Besluit 
Centraal Fonds voor de Volkshuisvesting‟ [BCFV].  
Absence of data protection measure was not explicitly discussed, but one of the 
interviewees mentioned that providing information is one of the core activities of CFV and 
is in line with cabinet policy. In the internal regulations on the board, an explicit 
confidentiality arrangement is included. The confidentiality arrangement covers use of 
information, not the technical aspects of data protection as meant by kZBO:41. Without 
formal measure on technical data protection, CFV‟s autonomy increases compared to the 
kZBO standard. The monitoring framework document on CFV (minVROM, 2006, p. 15) 
announced that kZBO:41 will be implemented for CFV. Materially this implies that CFV is 
expected to organise technical data protection and thus from a kZBO standard, there is 
no impact on autonomy. 
17.1.2.2 Information measures 
The CFV legislation includes measures for submitting annual reports to minWWI, a 
general right of inquiry and rules on the structure of the statement of accounts including 
auditing requirements. The relevant regulation on auditing is an open standard referring 
to BW2 and requires some explicit compliance testing. The Woningwet (law on housing) 
does not formally include measures on approving annual reports. In her letter on the 
2006 annual report, minWWI approved the statement of accounts „in anticipation of 
changes in the law‟ (minWWI, 2007a). In the monitoring framework on CFV, it is 
suggested that the measures then current already allowed for approval of annual reports 
(MinVROM, 2006, p. 18). However, I did not find such measures and the letter of minWWI 
also suggests that no approval rights had been formally institutionalised. Effectively, this 
means that compared to kZBO, no impact on autonomy can be observed. 
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17.1.2.3 Governance provisions 
CFV is managed by a one tier board and a managing director. The relationship between 
board and managing director resembles that of a two tier board given the statute of the 
board and the mandate to the managing director. A report on the future organisation of 
CFV (Schilder Committee, 2006, p. 41) suggested creating a non-executive board in line 
with the governance structure of AFM. Interviewees indicated that this might be 
implemented in the future. The letter from minWWI on implementation of kZBO 
(Parliament, 2008x) explicitly refers to a future two tier board. Effectively, no changes in 
governance structure had been implemented by the end of 2008. The fact that this 
change in governance structure has not yet been implemented, given the discussion on 
two tier boards, has no formal impact on autonomy from a basic kZBO perspective. From 
the CFV perspective it does however mean that formalising an increase in autonomy has 
been delayed. In practice CFV operates as if a two tier board exists, which effectively 
means that autonomy is at a higher level than the kZBO standard. 
MinWWI has included measures on secondary jobs in the law, generally referring to 
stakeholders in CFV including civil servants. The wording of Woningwet:71c.4 consists of 
a limiting list of incompatibilities. This suggests additional autonomy because kZBO 
wording addresses incompatibilities in an open standard, which means that a case based 
assessment is needed (kZBO:13.1). Board members are selected on a particular preset 
profile (internal governance statute, articles 1 and 3). The latter can also be regarded as 
a safeguard against incompatibilities.  Board member secondary jobs are disclosed in the 
annual reports. No provision is included for reporting secondary jobs once a board 
member has been appointed. The overall perspective is that degrees of freedom do exist 
compared to the basic kZBO arrangements. 
According to kZBO:14 board remuneration is determined by minWWI. The internal 
governance statute (article 17) stipulates that the board decides on remuneration and 
minWWI approves the decision of the board. Furthermore, the board decides upon the 
remuneration of the managing director without further approval by minWWI (management 
statute, article 1). These arrangements generates some additional autonomy for CFV. 
MinWWI monitors remuneration critically and referred to remuneration standards based 
on the Dijkstal Committee reports (minWWI, 2007a). In the 2007 and 2008 annual 
reports remuneration of board and managing director are disclosed in line with WOPT 
requirements. In both cases, it was explicitly stated that no financial arrangements exist 
in the event of dismissal of management. Despite minWWI‟s warnings in 2007, the board 
was able to increase management remuneration above the remuneration standards. 
This, and the fact that the board rather than minWWI decides on remuneration are 
indications for increased autonomy compared to kZBO standards. 
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Table 17.3: Legal measures on CFV, formally or actually diverging from kZBO. 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Appointment of 
staff 
Normative kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
Woningwet: 
71j 
public law 
appointments 
0 0 
Data protection 
measure 
Normative 41 none arrangement 
announced 
↑ 0 
ZBO submits 
annual report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 none informally 
submitted by CFV 
↑ 0 
Approval of 
statement of 
accounts 
Information 34 none approved in 
anticipation of 
new legislation 
↑ 0 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 none  explicitly on the 
political agenda + 
practically 
implemented 
↑ ↑ 
Measure on 
secondary jobs of 
board members 
Governance 13 Woningwet: 
71c.4, 
limitative list, 
no reporting 
requirement 
secondary jobs 
disclosed, 
membership 
profiles to be 
used in case of 
selection of board 
members 
↑ ↑ 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
internal 
governance 
statute only 
board decides 
independently 
↑ ↑ 
Annulling of ZBO 
decisions 
Governance 22 not included not needed for 
financial 
monitoring 
↑ 0 
Intervention in case 
of negligence 
Governance 23 Woningwet: 
71k.2 
not used 0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d CW2001:45 in line with 
CW2001 
0 0 
Approval of fees Cyclical 17 Woningwet: 
71e.2; 
consent; 
BCFV:10 
consent ↑ 0 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 Woningwet: 
71f, 
approval 
formally consent, 
monitoring 
document 
requires approval 
0 0 
Reporting on 
substantial 
differences 
between budget 
and actual 
expenditures 
Cyclical 30 none covered in 
monitoring 
arrangement 
↑ 0 
Minister sets rules 
on structure of 
budget 
Cyclical 27, 28 none except 
for fee 
proposal 
BCFV:10 
monitoring 
arrangement 
↑ 0 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 none included in 
balance sheet 
↑ 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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In the event of negligence, minWWI can suspend or dismiss the executive board. This is in 
line with kZBO measures. In addition to kZBO – which merely specifies that the minister 
has to act – an explicit measure on continuation of CFV activities is defined. In the CFV 
case, minWWI has to temporarily take over operations and the costs will be charged to 
CFV (Woningwet:71k.2). The CFV arrangement does not affect autonomy because 
compared to the basic kZBO case, how to act in particular cases is made explicit and thus 
contributes to transparency. Interviewees did not recall any interventions by minWWI with 
respect to negligence. 
The issue of annulling ZBO decisions is not covered in the CFV case law. Interviewees 
indicated that CFV has no formal decision making role with respect to social housing 
associations, except for a decision on financial support. Financial support criteria are set 
in relevant case law. With respect to its monitoring activities, CFV generates the relevant 
data and assesses it, but it is up to minWWI to finally decide upon actions, including 
licensing of social housing associations. Furthermore, a debate continues on the 
monitoring role of CFV, particularly on whether the social housing sector should be 
monitored horizontally or vertically (as is practically the case). The issue of annulling is 
not excluded in the suggested changes due to kZBO. Effectively, the impact of the lack of 
a annulling arrangement on autonomy seems minimal.  
Other governance arrangements are in line with kZBO practices. MinWWI has the 
power to approve internal governance statutes, appoints the board and can intervene in 
case of negligence. On asset related transactions, only the lending and borrowing 
provision under CW2001:45 is applicable. There are no other asset transaction related 
restrictions and given the optional character of such restrictions, there is no impact on 
autonomy. An interviewee commented that if asset related transactions were relevant, 
they would be included in the budget document and as a result be indirectly 
(dis)approved.  
17.1.2.4 Cyclical measures 
The last group of legal measures concerns cyclical measures. Decision making on the 
budget is in line with kZBO measures: the board decides and minWWI approves the 
budget. MinWWI does not approve the fees levied by CFV but only consents. In this case 
consent is sufficient because the decree CFV [BCFV] includes specific instructions as to 
how the fee is to be determined. This includes the requirement that the sum of the fees 
must cover the total budget. As the budget is approved by minWWI, approval of fees 
would thus imply a double approval of the budget (Woningwet:71e; BCFV:10). 
Interviewees note that the budget covers all CFV costs, including program costs due to 
income transfers. In practice the level of income transfers has been nil for several years, 
which means that CFV‟s annual budget actually covers costs of operations. Given the 
relationship between approval of the budget and the description of calculation methods 
for fees to be charged, ministerial consent rather than approval of fees does not have an 
impact on CFV‟s autonomy. In her letter on the 2008 budget, minWWI consents rather 
than approves the budget. It could not be clarified whether this was a deliberate choice or 
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an error in wording as the letter also consents to the level of fees set at nil (minWWI, 
2007b). Based on the wordings used in the internal minVROM monitoring document, 
approval for the budget should be given (minVROM, 2006, p. 11). I therefore conclude 
that practices are in line with formal measures. 
There are no formal measures given on frequency of reporting, reporting on 
substantial differences and budget structure. Woningwet:71f.3 allows rules to be set for 
the budget structure, but this has not been carried out. In the minWWI monitoring 
document reporting and budget structure measures are given, which means that in 
practice an arrangement exists.  
MinWWI did not claim exceptions to the kZBO framework for cyclical measures 
(Parliament, 2008x). Implicitly all cyclical measures should therefore be applied in the 
future. There is an equalisation reserve for operations on CFV‟s balance sheet, but this is 
not based on a formal arrangement. Furthermore, interviewees indicated that there are 
no limitations laid down on the equalisation reserve. From a legal perspective, this means 
that CFV has autonomy in line with kZBO. 
17.1.2.5 Conclusion 
The overall impression on the legal autonomy of CFV is that CFV has increased autonomy 
on issues relating to the board, information structure and on cyclical measures. In 
practice most of the degrees of freedom are mitigated, particularly concerning cyclical 
measures. Only on appointment of the board and related issues such as secondary jobs 
and remuneration is autonomy in practice at a higher level than prescribed by kZBO. 
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17.1.3 NAK 
MinLNV announced in her letter on implementation of kZBO that she would fully apply 
kZBO to monitoring institutions (Parliament, 2008y). As of January 1, 2010 ZPW has been 
changed by simply stating that kZBO applies to the monitoring institutions (ZPW2005:24). 
17.1.3.1 Normative measures 
NAK is a PLB type ZBO which means that arrangements on the position of its staff 
towards the minister are not applicable. NAK statutes and legislation do not cover these 
issues. The same holds for the provision that a member of the board cannot be a civil 
servant. Interviewees indicated that in the past, civil servants were members of the 
board, but this practice has ended. In the present law on the agricultural monitoring 
institutions there is an explicit measure to ensure technical data protection as meant by 
kZBO:41. In practice this means that there is no impact on autonomy compared to the 
kZBO-framework found in normative measures. 
17.1.3.2 Information measures 
NAK submits its annual reports to minLNV based on provisions of ZPW2005:9. This 
article also requires the annual report to be submitted directly to Parliament. 
Interviewees indicated that this is not actual practice: Parliament neither formally nor 
informally receives annual reports from NAK. MinLNV has to approve the annual reports. 
This arrangement is based on the statutes rather than formal legislation. In the former 
ZPW1966, several requirements were included on the contents of statutes but not on 
approval of statements of accounts. In the monitoring protocol based on ZPW1966 (June 
2004) reference is made to approval of statements of accounts, „in anticipation of the 
new ZPW (i.e. ZPW 2005, jdk) and kZBO‟. Effectively minLNV approves statements of 
accounts with a focus on performance information rather than financial information203, 
which means that NAK autonomy increases.  
Finally, legislation requires separate accounting for ZBO activities. This regulation was 
relevant until the formal separation of NAK and NAK-AGRO as of July 2008. Since July 
2008, NAK has only been allowed to provide ZBO services which makes separate 
accounts obsolete. Of course separation of the two entities affects autonomy of the „old‟ 
NAK-organisation, but the requirement to use separate accounts is in line with kZBO. 
17.1.3.3 Governance provisions 
NAK‟s governance structure is based on a one tier board with a managing director. In the 
statutes, it is stipulated that management is responsible for daily operations, „under 
supervision‟ of the board. The board has authoritative powers such as determining fees 
and regulations, which result in a hybrid structure of monitoring and decision making 
within one and the same body of the organisation. Interviewees indicated that an advisory 
board is used which operates as NAK‟s interface to the agricultural industry. No special 
                                                 
203 Only staff budget is explicitly mentioned. 
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arrangements on this advisory board exist, except that the statutes include creation of an 
advisory board by the NAK board, increasing autonomy.  
Ex ante approval of mandates is not explicitly covered in legislation or in practice. The 
wording of ZPW2005:19 allows only a limited list of activities, which also means that no 
other mandates can be given. This is emphasised by the debate on separation of public 
and private services and thus results in a restriction of autonomy. 
The only other formalised governance provisions are intervention in the event of 
negligence and annulling of ZBO decisions (kZBO:22). These minLNV powers have not 
been used on NAK, but interviewees indicated that in the 1990ies, in exceptional cases 
minLNV has exerted substantial pressure using the civil servants on the boards of the 
agricultural monitoring institutions to change some of their procedures. 
Measures for approving internal governance structures, (re) appointment and 
dismissal of the board, measures on secondary jobs and remuneration of the board in 
kZBO only address PLA type ZBOs. NAK‟s statutes include an arrangement on approval of 
the appointment and dismissal of the president of the board by minLNV. After consulting 
the president other members are selected from representatives of NAK‟s stakeholders. 
The ex ante approval arrangement thus has a negative impact on autonomy from the 
kZBO framework. On the issue of remuneration, autonomy seems to increase. NAK is not 
subject to ministerial decisions on remuneration of the board given its PLB status. Based 
on WOPT, NAK has to disclose remuneration. In practice, information on remuneration 
was not filed for fiscal 2008 (minBZK 2009b). It is thus not possible to assess 
remuneration which is an indication for increased autonomy. 
Ministerial consent on lending and borrowing is not included in the legal framework, 
but NAK is subject to CW2001:45.2 in which restrictions on lending and borrowing from 
the market are included. Compared to the standard rule of CW2001:45.1 which covers 
most ZBOs, NAK experiences increased autonomy. The other asset related measures 
except for use of reserves are not included in legislation or statutes. Practically, reserves 
are treated as equalisation reserves and will be discussed in the section on cyclical 
measures. According to interviewees the lack of a provision on creating legal entities 
resulted in NAK being able to create a company without prior knowledge or consent by 
minLNV. Because kZBO:32 is an optional measure, no impact on autonomy can be 
observed. Statutes do include a liquidation measure – not covered in kZBO – which 
requires ministerial consent. This provision theoretically has a negative impact on 
autonomy given the kZBO measures, but has of course not been used yet. 
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Table 17.4: Legal measures on NAK, formally or actually diverging from kZBO. 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and impact 
Not appointing civil 
servants to board 
Normative 9 none no civil 
servants 
appointed 
0 0 
Submit annual report 
to Parliament 
Information 18 ZPW2005: 
9.2 
not performed 0 ↑ 
Approval of statement 
of accounts 
Information 34 Statutes:1
7.5 
approved by 
minLNV, focus 
on 
performance 
0 ↑ 
Requirement to 
separate accounts for 
ZBO activities and non-
ZBO-activities 
Information 38 ZPW2005: 
23 
used, but 
obsolete as of 
July 2008  
0 0 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 none statutes allow 
advisory 
committees 
↑ ↑ 
Ex ante approval by 
minister for mandates 
to the ZBO 
Governance 8 ZPW2005: 
19  limited 
services 
none; but only 
public services 
allowed 
↓ ↓ 
(re)appointment and 
dismissal of board 
Governance 12 Statutes:5.
2 
ex ante 
approval only 
for president 
of board 
↓ ↓ 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
none not disclosed; 
mentioned in 
WOPT non-
response 
document 
0 ↑ 
Intervention in case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 none not used or 
likely to be 
used 
↑ 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and lending 
Governance 32d CW2001: 
45.2 
in line with 
CW2001:45.2 
↑ ↑ 
Asset related 
transactions: others 
Governance 32a-c; 
32e-g 
none creating legal 
entity was 
realised 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
dissolving entity 
Governance none Statutes: 
19.3 
not likely to be 
applied  
↓ 0 
Minister sets rules on 
structure of budget 
Cyclical 27, 28 none no 
arrangements 
with minLNV 
↑ ↑ 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 none realised based 
on fees, 
submitted for 
information 
↑ 0 
Approval of fees Cyclical 17 ZPW2005: 
21 
approved by 
minLNV 
0 0 
Creating equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 statutes17
.2 and 
control 
agreement 
in line with 
control 
agreement 
and actually 
used 
0 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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17.1.3.4 Cyclical measures 
The key cyclical provision for NAK is the approval of fees by minLNV. The budget is not 
approved and not mentioned in ZPW2005.204 NAK‟s statutes include a rule that the 
budget as approved by the board has to be brought to the attention of minLNV. The 
information agreement mentioned before requires a budget to be submitted, but again no 
approval requirements are found. A separate letter sent in June 2007 by minLNV 
discloses assessment criteria for the level of fees proposed by NAK (minLNV, 2007). 
Interviewees indicated that these criteria restrict autonomy compared to the previously 
used procedures, but they only address systematic calculation of fees. Other financial 
technical instructions with respect to preparation of the budget such as the level of 
interest or inflation are not given according to the interviewees. As NAK is fully funded by 
fees, the impact on autonomy of the absence of budget approval is minimal. 
Furthermore, no standards for the structure of the budget (kZBO:27-28) are given. 
Interviewees indicated that investment decisions (kZBO:27a) are left to the board and not 
covered in separate agreements with minLNV. This means that NAK has increased 
autonomy on preparation of the budget compared to kZBO-standards. 
Measures on equalisation reserves are included in the statutes rather than the formal 
law. Other reserves may be used, but in practice reserves are regarded as one line item in 
the balance sheet in discussions with minLNV. The letter on assessment of the 
calculation of fees includes a maximum level of 50% of annual sales for reserves. From a 
kZBO:33 perspective, the arrangement is in line, although the level of reserves is high 
and according to interviewees required due to uncertainty in agricultural production. 
17.1.3.5 Conclusion 
In general, the conclusion on the legal setting of NAK is that formal autonomy is reduced 
on other activities and appointment of the (president) of the board. Increases in formal 
autonomy exist in borrowing and lending procedures as well on budget measures. Actual 
autonomy is above the expected level of autonomy. The main reasons are to do with 
controls on the annual report and statements of accounts as well as on remuneration.  
                                                 
204 ZPW2005 includes a budget arrangement for other entities but that article is explicitly excluded for the 
quality assurance ZBOs. 
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17.1.4 NMa 
NMa is a PLA type ZBO, but has no separate legal status. Hence it qualifies as a „Shelter 
ZBO‟. In her letter on implementation of kZBO, minEZ announced she will apply kZBO to 
NMa, except for the accruals accounting (kZBO:27) measures and the annulment 
provision (kZBO:22). On January 1, 2010, legislation to change relevant legislation (MW) 
was underway in Parliament (Parliament, 2009j) and will be effective as of January 1, 
2011.  
17.1.4.1 Normative measures 
In MW, no explicit measure prohibiting the appointment of civil servants to the board are 
included. In practice, civil servants are not appointed. Normative measures on 
subordination of staff to the board, legal position of staff and setting policy rules are all 
included in legislation. I recall that the provision on subordination of staff is particularly 
relevant in this case since the staff formally consists of civil servants made available to 
the NMa board (MW:5a). The conclusion is that normative measures have no impact on 
autonomy compared to the kZBO framework. 
17.1.4.2 Information measures 
Most of the information measures are explicitly included in MW. The requirement to use 
separate accounts (kZBO:38) is not relevant given the PLA status of NMa. Because NMa 
is a Shelter ZBO, kZBO:34 on approval of statements of accounts is not applicable. 
Effectively this means that minEZ determines NMa‟s financial statements. Some 
respondents indicated that this does not affect the autonomy of NMa. At the final stage of 
determining or approving statements of accounts autonomy may not be affected, but 
during operations actual practice is different. This will be discussed in section 17.2.4.2. 
NMa does not submit its annual report to Parliament. In MW:5g, it is stipulated that 
the annual report is submitted to minEZ and that minEZ is required to submit the annual 
report including assessment to Parliament. This arrangement is stronger than the basic 
arrangement in kZBO:18. It does not affect autonomy immediately, because it has an 
impact on the Minister-Parliament relationship. However, an effect may be observed 
indirectly because Parliament has a direct opportunity to discuss the assessment with 
minEZ.  
Interviewees indicated that discussions in Parliament on annual reports focus on 
policy rather than the financial position of NMa. Interviewees also indicated that informal 
discussions between MPs and the executive board of NMa are sometimes organised. In 
these cases, minEZ has prior knowledge of such meetings.205 The fact that such meetings 
are allowed is an indication of the increased autonomy of the NMa board. 
                                                 
205 Formal meetings between Parliament and Executive Boards of ZBOs regarding accountability are not 
usual in the Dutch political system (Scheltema Committee, 1993, p. 23). 
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17.1.4.3 Governance provisions 
The ZBO status of NMa is formally attributed to the board only. This means that no 
measures on the relationships between different bodies are required. NMa not only 
provides competition services on behalf of minEZ. Present legislation covers 
arrangements for minEZ to grant approval for services to be delivered on behalf of other 
ministries. The competition law explicitly mentions activities of NMa with respect to power 
supply, but it also concerns competition in (public) transport (source: website NMa) as 
well as in the health and care sector (e.g. Parliament, 2007x, p. 4). The provision of 
MW:5a is therefore in line with kZBO:8 and does not affect autonomy.  
The provisions on appointments to the board, secondary jobs and on the internal 
governance statutes all apply to NMa. On the issue of remuneration, minEZ determines 
remuneration of the board. The annual reports of NMa disclose remuneration of the 
president of NMa based on WOPT:6. This implies that the other members of the board 
receive remuneration below the maximum levels mentioned in WOPT. No indications on 
performance related remuneration are given. These measures have no impact on NMA‟s 
board compared to kZBO-arrangements. 
Arrangements on intervention in case of negligence (kZBO:23) exist. Annulling ZBO 
decisions is not included, given the impartial judgement role of NMa (Parliament, 2008z, 
p. 5). This arrangement generates additional autonomy compared to the kZBO-
framework. 
Asset related transactions are not included in MW. This is related to the legal status of 
NMa as a Shelter ZBO rather than a Subsidiary ZBO. In effect this only restricts NMa on 
the issue of borrowing and lending, which has to be performed within the budgetary 
framework of minEZ‟s budget rather than by submitting a financing request to the State 
Treasury. All other asset related arrangements are optional, which means that from a 
kZBO perspective no additional restrictions exist. 
17.1.4.4 Cyclical measures 
The Shelter ZBO status of NMa also has an impact on the cyclical measures. Formally 
kZBO:33 does not apply. Furthermore, kZBO:29 requires budgets to be approved by a 
minister. In the NMa case, minEZ determines the budget which formally restricts 
autonomy. Interviewees indicated that proposed increases are treated similarly to 
proposals from regular units within minEZ. According to interviewees within the financial 
framework the Nma board has  more degrees of freedom to determine a working program 
than regular units within minEZ. This means that NMa operations are managed in a more 
or less similar way to kZBO:29. Reporting on substantial differences (kZBO:30) is covered 
in MW:5i.2. Interviewees also indicated that NMa has to submit multiyear plans in line 
with standard arrangements for departmental units. 
Finally, NMa is not funded by fees, but can in some cases (for example a merger) 
charge a fee as compensation for the costs related to the licence issued. These fees are 
published in a ministerial decree which has not been changed since publication in 2006. 
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There is no role for NMa‟s executive board in determining the fees. As these fees do not 
affect operations, no impact on autonomy can be observed. 
Table 17.5: Legal measures on NMa, formally or actually diverging from kZBO. 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
Not appointing 
civil servants to 
board 
Normative 9 none no civil 
servants 
appointed 
0 0 
Appointment of 
staff 
Normative kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
MW:5a civil servants 
made available 
0 0 
Submit annual 
report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 MW:5g.3 
submitted 
and 
commented 
by minEZ 
in line with 
case law 
↓ ↓ 
Discussing  
activities of NMa 
in Parliament by 
NMa-board 
Information none none Occasional 
Informal 
meetings  
0 ↑ 
Approval of 
statement of 
accounts 
Information 34 none, 
because not 
applicable 
determining 
given Shelter 
ZBO-status 
↓ ↓ 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 none, not 
applicable 
not applicable 0 0 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
MW:4a remuneration 
president NMa 
disclosed in 
annual reports 
2007/2008 
based on WOPT 
0 0 
Annulling of ZBO 
decisions 
Governance 22 none impartial 
judgement 
does not allow 
intervention 
↑ ↑ 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d not 
applicable, 
subject to 
department
al rules 
subject to 
departmental 
rules 
↓ ↓ 
Asset related 
transactions: 
others 
Governance 32a-c; e-g not 
applicable 
not used 0 0 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 MW5i.1: 
submit draft 
budget 
minister 
determines 
financial 
framework, 
working 
program 
decided upon 
by Board 
↓ 0 
Submit multiyear 
plan 
Cyclical none CW:5 in line with CW ↓ ↓ 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 none not applicable 
for Shelter ZBO 
0 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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17.1.4.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment with kZBO 
The proposal to change legislation states that kZBO is applicable except for kZBO:22. 
Furthermore new measures are included in the modified legislation which require minEZ 
to hold discussions with other relevant ministries before intervening if NMa is found 
negligent. NMa‟s annual reports also have to be assessed by minEZ before being 
submitted to Parliament. These minEZ assessments must include the opinions and 
evaluations from other ministers who have commissioned services from NMa. The 
optional measures in kZBO:21 on policy rules to be set by minEZ was divided in two parts: 
general policy rules are laid down by minEZ and NMa is allowed to implement these rules. 
In the new proposal, NMa has to submit draft operational rules to minEZ before they are 
determined by NMa. This new arrangement is a restriction on autonomy compared to the 
current situation.  
17.1.4.6 Conclusion 
The general impression of the legal measures with respect to NMa is that due to its 
Shelter ZBO status, formal autonomy is reduced on financial management issues. Actual 
autonomy is also reduced, but less so than indicated by the formal rules. Due to the 
impartial judgement role of NMa, some increased autonomy can be observed in decision 
making arrangements. A very special case is that sometimes the executive board of NMa 
have direct discussions with MPs which is an indication of the autonomy of NMa has in 
performing its program. 
Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs   
 
366  Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives 
 
 
17.1.5 NZA 
NZA is a separate legal entity PLA type ZBO. In its letter on application of kZBO, minVWS 
announced that NZA would be subject to kZBO except for kZBO:17 on approval of fees 
and kZBO:22 on annulling NZA decisions (Parliament, 2008f). On January 1, 2010, a 
proposal for changes in WMG had been submitted to Parliament. The proposal is still 
being discussed in Parliament.  
17.1.5.1 Normative measures 
The NZA board controls staff based on WMG:6. This article also covers measures 
stipulating that staff have a position similar to that of civil servants within ministries. 
These rules are in line with kZBO arrangements.  
There is explicit measure prohibiting the appointment of civil servants to the board. 
This means that theoretically a civil servant might be appointed, reducing autonomy. 
Practically, civil servants are not appointed, which means that NZA practices are in line 
with kZBO. In 2007 and 2008, a former minister was a member of the board. This 
appointment shows that recruitment of ZBO boards from within the public services is 
permitted. Only hierarchical subordination to a minister, once appointed as a board 
member is not allowed under kZBO. 
An explicit technical data protection arrangement as meant by kZBO:41 is not 
included in legislation. WMG:67 however requires that all information submitted to NZA 
must be treated as confidential and explicit measures on availability of different types of 
information are also included in WMG. This requirement effectively implies that NZA has 
to implement systems to ensure assure data confidentiality. Therefore, there is no impact 
on autonomy. 
MinVWS is allowed to issue general instructions to NZA on tasks assigned under WMG 
but also on operations of NZA (WMG:7.1a). The level of detail used by minVWS in his 
instruction letter on the budget is an indication of minVWS‟ role in planning and 
prioritising NZA‟s operations. The measure reduces autonomy given the kZBO:21 
provision which focuses on policy instructions. 
17.1.5.2 Information measures 
All information issues are included in WMG except for submitting the annual report to 
Parliament. The rules on submitting the annual report diverge to enable minVWS to write 
an assessment on NZA‟s annual report. Interviewees indicated that the practice of writing 
an assessment was continued until fiscal 2007 and then ended. From a formal 
perspective, this means that the arrangement restricts autonomy due to the explicit 
assessment by minVWS. Practically, at least as of 2008, autonomy is increased because 
the annual report is no longer submitted to Parliament. 
Given the PLA status of NZA, no requirements on using separate accounts are 
required by kZBO. In practice, the activities of NZA only focus on public tasks which 
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means that there is no need for such a requirement. Overall, the information measures 
do not affect NZA‟s autonomy 
17.1.5.3 Governance provisions 
An explicit arrangement on relations between different bodies within NZA is not required 
because formally, there is no non-executive board or advisory board. Interviewees 
indicated that in practice an informal advisory board is used by the NZA Board, which is 
accepted by minVWS. Effectively this arrangement has no impact on NZA‟s autonomy. 
The rules on board appointments, internal governance statutes and secondary jobs 
are all included in WMG. Board members are not allowed to be members of other 
regulatory authorities. Furthermore they are not allowed to have a (financial) interest in 
institutions which might lead to discussions on impartiality. Finally, minVWS can issue a 
decree on other incompatibilities. As a result the WMG:4.6 provision is more restrictive 
than kZBO:13, which only requires a Board member not to accept a secondary job with a 
possible conflict of interest. 
With respect to remuneration, RBBBV:2 explicitly describes remuneration to a 
maximum level below top civil servants. This measure reduces minnows‟ degree of 
freedom rather than that of the NZA-board due to the increased transparency if minVWS 
wants to increase remuneration. A minister‟s flexibility is greater under the general 
kZBO:14 rules. Due to the RBBBV:2 provision, WOPT-reporting is not applicable. 
A measure in the event of negligence is included in WMG. This is in line with kZBO. 
The annulling measure in WMG:9 is more restrictive than the kZBO wording. Essentially 
the difference is that under kZBO:22 any decision can be annulled, whereas in WMG:9 
only general decisions can be annulled. In practice, these measures have not been used. 
The current WMG:9 annulling measure will be continued which means that kZBO:22 will 
be excluded after legislation is adapted to kZBO (Parliament, 2008f). Effectively this 
means an increase in autonomy compared to the kZBO measures. 
WMG does not include any measure on asset related transactions. As is the case for 
most ZBOs, NZA is subject to CW2001:45.1. as of 2008. Before 2008, NZA had some 
additional degrees of freedom since it was listed as subject to CW2001:45.2 which only 
sets restrictions on treasury management rather than requiring it to operate via State 
Treasury. The 2008 practice is in line with the practice of many other PLAs, including all 
PLAs discussed in this study. In practice, NZA‟s annual report discloses borrowing from 
minVWS. Interviewees indicated that the procedure for borrowing from minVWS was a 
shortcut which could be facilitated given the budgetary position of minVWS. 
In terms of autonomy no impact can be observed because borrowing is still performed 
within the framework of the Dutch State‟s financial position rather than externally.  
Because kZBO:32 covers optional arrangements, the impact of WMG measures on 
autonomy is nil. 
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17.1.5.4 Cyclical measures 
Finally, cyclical measures are discussed. WMG:12 requires minVWS to determine rather 
than approve the budget. This also implies that the executive board of NZA only submits a 
budget proposal. This measure reduces autonomy compared to the kZBO framework. The 
measure seems to conflict with WMG:14 in which reference is made to approval of the 
budget plan submitted by NZA. If however under WMG:12, minVWS determines the 
budget for NZA operations, such an approval can only cover the allocation within the 
budget as defined by minVWS. Additionally, WMG:11 requires a multiyear budget for the 
four fiscal years following the budget year. This rule is not included in kZBO either and 
brings the budgeting process of NZA more in line with traditional ministerial budgeting. An 
interviewee noted that the multiyear budget must include announced budget reductions if 
relevant in a particular fiscal year. 
As mentioned previously the RBBBV includes a regulation on the level of the 
equalisation reserve (RBBBV:18) as part of the measures which allow minVWS to set 
rules on the structure of the budget in WMG:14.3. Except for the level of the equalisation 
reserve, these arrangements are in line with kZBO. Compared to the regulations on 
equalisation reserves in executive agencies, which allow for an equalisation reserve 
based on a 3 year average budget level (Decree executive agencies 2007:17.4c), the 
arrangement in RBBBV:18 is more restrictive as it only allows reference to the budget for 
the relevant fiscal year.  
A last remark concerns kZBO:17. NZA is allowed to determine the fees for several 
medical services (WMG:1k) and operations are fully funded by minVWS. The kZBO 
arrangement is meant to (partially) cover costs of operations (Parliament, 2000d, p. 26). 
The exception claimed on kZBO:17 by minVWS in its letter on the implementation is 
therefore incorrect (Parliament, 2008f, p. 7) and is ignored as not applicable. 
 
17.1.5.5 Impact of changes in legislation due to alignment with kZBO 
Along with the announced exceptions as stated in the letter on implementation of kZBO 
(Parliament, 2008f), some additional changes were made which will influence the 
autonomy of NZA. Under current legislation some secondary jobs are explicitly excluded. 
This will be changed to the general kZBO arrangement. Furthermore, minVWS is no longer 
entitled to issue instructions on NZA‟s operations. These two changes have a positive 
impact on autonomy. Changes without an impact are a maintaining of the requirement to 
provide a multiyear budget, the requirements regarding intermediate changes in the 
budget and the proposals on auditing, which include not only effectiveness but also 
compliance and auditability. MinVWS will be able to set rules on the level of the 
equalisation reserve, which is a restrictive regulation compared to kZBO but is now 
implemented in RBBBV:18. Finally, in the relationship to Parliament, minVWS will no 
longer submit its assessment on NZA‟s annual report to Parliament. In general, this 
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means that the additional restrictions in current legislation are incorporated into the new 
legal framework. 
 
Table 17.6: Legal measures on NZA, formally or actually diverging from kZBO. 
Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
reference 
case law 
Actual practice formal 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
actual 
mismatch 
and 
impact 
Not appointing civil 
servants to board 
Normative 9 none no civil servants 
appointed 
↓ 0 
Data protection 
measure 
Normative 41 WMG:67 
confidential 
treatment of 
data 
implies 
systematic data 
protection 
0 0 
Minister decides 
upon general 
instructions on 
tasks 
Normative 21 WMG7.1 
includes 
operations 
includes 
operations 
↓ ↓ 
Submit annual 
report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 WMG:15.2 till fiscal 2007 in 
line with WMG, 
afterwards 
discontinued 
↓ ↑ 
Multiple bodies Governance 7 none informal 
advisory board 
accepted by 
minVWS 
0 0 
Measure on 
secondary jobs of 
Board members 
Governance 13 WMG4.6 in line with WMG ↓ ↓ 
Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14 
WOPT:6 
RBBBV:2.3 in line with 
RBBBV 
0 0 
Annulling of ZBO 
decisions 
Governance 22 WMG:9 in line with 
WMG:9 but not 
used 
↑ ↑ 
Asset related 
transactions: 
borrowing and 
lending 
Governance 32d as of 2008: 
CW2001:45 
Incidental 
borrowing from 
minVWS rather 
than from State 
Treasury 
0 0 
Asset related 
transactions: 
others 
Governance 32a-c; e-
g 
none not applicable 0 0 
Approval of budget Cyclical 29 WMG:12: 
minister 
determines 
budget 
in line with 
WMG:12 
↓ ↓ 
Submit multiyear 
budget 
Cyclical none WMG:11.2c in line with 
WMG:11 
↓ ↓ 
Creating 
equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 RBBBV:18 
limitation on 
1 year basis 
in line with 
RBBBV 
↓ ↓ 
Audit protocol Cyclical none   0 ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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17.1.5.6 Conclusion 
Except for the increased autonomy on annulling ZBO decisions which is related to the 
impartial judgement role of NZA, several arrangements exist which negatively affect the 
autonomy of NZA. On budgetary measures and NZA operations in particular, the 
legislation prescribes measures that go beyond the general kZBO measures. Examples 
are multiyear budgets and the determination of the budget by minVWS. Actual autonomy 
is somewhat less restricted because of the change in submitting annual reports to 
Parliament. 
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17.1.6 Relative autonomy of monitoring ZBOs from a legal perspective 
In most cases, substantial differences can be observed between the formal and actual 
autonomy of monitoring ZBOs. Figure 17.1 discloses the position of monitoring ZBOs 
between each other. The scores are based on the findings described above as 
summarised in Appendix 10 for all legal indicators that do not have the character of a 
control tool of last resort.  
First, the group of market regulators is discussed. In all three cases, formal autonomy is 
lower than might be expected from the kZBO framework. Actual autonomy is at a higher 
level for NZA and AFM but not beyond expected standard levels. In the case of NMa, an 
important element in its low formal and actual autonomy is its legal status as a unit 
within minEZ rather than a separate legal entity. A remarkable point in the NMa case is 
that, with prior knowledge of minEZ, the NMa board sometimes discusses its services 
directly with Parliament, which is very unusual in the Dutch context. Furthermore, 
interviewees indicated that frequent meetings between minister and board are organised.  
NZA has nearly as many formal restrictions as NMa, despite its status as a separate 
legal entity. Budgetary control in NZA is at the level of its budget being determined by 
minVWS rather than approving the budget.  Restrictions on reserves also have an effect 
on formal autonomy. The only reason for an increase in autonomy here is the fact that as 
of 2008 the annual report is no longer assessed by minVWS or submitted to Parliament.  
AFM‟s autonomy is determined by a number of factors which reduce autonomy as well 
as factors which increase autonomy. I only mention the role of minFin in the appointment 
of the board, which is included in AFM‟s statutes. In kZBO, measures only exist for 
appointments made to PLA type ZBOs, whereas AFM is a PLB type ZBO. Factors 
negatively affecting AFM‟s autonomy include restrictions on budget and fees as well as 
on creating reserves, based on preventing cross subsidising activities for different target 
groups. The other two market regulating ZBOs are faced with issues that reduce 
autonomy only. AFM‟s actual autonomy increases due to the low number of restrictions 
on structuring budgets and low numbers of meetings between board and minister. On the 
other hand, autonomy is restricted due to an intervention by minFin on remuneration of 
the board. 
In Woningwet, very few arrangements on controlling CFV are made. This results in a 
high level of formal autonomy compared to the kZBO standard. In practice autonomy is at 
a lower level, but still above kZBO standards. The main cyclical issues of CFV are in fact in 
line with kZBO; what remains are governance arrangements on the appointment of board 
and remuneration issues. Finally, NAK‟s autonomy is above standards and in practice is 
even higher compared to the formal measures. Like the AFM case, both formal and 
actual autonomy of NAK are determined by measures some of which have a negative 
effect and some a positive effect on autonomy. I mention the appointment of the 
president of the board is left to the Minister-Principal, which is beyond standards for PLBs 
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and affects autonomy negatively. Issues that increase autonomy are degrees of freedom 
in submitting annual reports and financial statements structures. Another issue worth 
mentioning but not immediately affecting autonomy is the level of the equalisation 
reserve which is very high given the uncertainty in production levels over the years. 
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auto-
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Figure 17.1 Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs from a legal perspective 
 
The following section will address the economic dimension of autonomy of the monitoring 
ZBOs. After that assessment, conclusions can be drawn on mismatches between legal 
and economic autonomy of the monitoring ZBOs studied. 
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17.2 The economic dimension of autonomy 
In this subsection, I will discuss impact of economic variables on the selected monitoring 
ZBOs. Each of the monitoring ZBOs will be assessed on the same market characteristics 
and planning and control indicators as was carried out for the income transfer ZBOs. 
In general monitoring activities are expected to be relatively independent from 
government intervention to ensure impartiality. Since monitoring is performed on behalf 
of society as a whole, government funding based on lump sum budgets and State 
commissioning are to be expected, particularly for market regulators. In market regulatory 
services it is not likely that detailed instructions on budgets and activities can be given by 
the Minister-Commissioner because that might result in a conflict on the issue of 
impartiality. Management has responsibility for operations throughout a fiscal year and 
intermediate reporting to Minister and Parliament are exceptions given the use of lump 
sum budgets and non-intervention policy by the political system. Supply will be based on 
contract services, although production specifications will be abstract rather than detailed. 
This is caused by the fact that monitoring implies individual production rather than mass 
production. 
NAK is a quality assurance ZBO which essentially has two different characteristics. 
NAK services allow for mass production and demand from citizens rather than state 
commissioning as is the case with market regulators. The expected position of NAK is 
adapted to be in line with these characteristics. CFV‟s services have some similarities to 
the services of the market regulators, but it delivers impure public services for a 
particular group rather than services for society as a whole. 
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17.2.1 AFM 
17.2.1.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
The services of AFM are intended to ensure a fair market position for all participants in 
the financial markets. To some extent, this market regulation task may be compared to a 
policing task. AFM‟s website regularly publishes warnings on unfair trading by individuals, 
which is a reflection of this policing activity. Therefore, I have classified AFM‟s function as 
one of a pure public good rather than an impure public good.  
All of AFM‟s activities can be classified as monitoring activities. Respondents 
indicated that some consulting activities are performed on behalf of minFin, which are 
funded by the government. In minFin‟s 2007 budget document, reference is made to the 
activities funded directly by government such as compliance and criminal investigations 
as well as monitoring of some special groups (Parliament, 2006l, p. 27). All other 
activities are funded by the entities monitored. This results in a rather special 
combination of task classification as public good and substantial funding by some groups 
(banks, insurance companies, pension funds, financial consultants) in society. Although 
funding is based on fees rather than on payments by government, this does not affect 
autonomy given the authority biased character of the funding, which does not allow costs 
of operations to exceed the total fees charged. 
Table 17.7: Classification and impact of market characteristics on AFM's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Public good type Pure good Pure good 0 
ACTIVITIES 
% monitoring activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type individual mixture ↑ 
DEMAND 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 30 ↑ 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 30 ↑ 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 30 0 
Type of funding charges not applicable 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Lump sum Lump sum 0 
Commissioning State 
State + 
Request 
0 
Demand dependency 
Single 
ministry 
mixture ↑ 
SUPPLY 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Task Task 0 
Production form 
Contract 
Provision 
Regulated 
Provision + 
Contract 
provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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AFM is not fully dependent on demand from one commissioner; minFin is the largest 
single organisation funding AFM. However the majority of AFM‟s activities are initiated by 
or the result of applying for and obtaining a licence to provide a financial service by 
individual companies. Therefore, commissioning resembles a citizen‟s request for 
something rather than full state commissioning and a mixture of demand dependency 
rather than single demand only. This does not have an impact on autonomy because 
these requests are still part of the market regulation services to be executed by AFM. 
Production is expected to be of a contract provision type given the pure public good 
character. In practice, production is a mixture between contract provision for tasks 
assigned by minFin and regulated provision for all other activities. This mixture of 
provision of services does not affect AFM‟s autonomy because the emphasis in 
production at AFM is on general monitoring rather than on decisions on individual cases 
except for the licensing processes. Only the funding character of production differs. 
Legislation requires a certain specification to allocate costs to monitored entities. This 
specification is aligned along certain types of tasks assigned such as monitoring 
suppliers or inspections with respect to integrity (Parliament, 2008aa, p. 111). The 
classification is also used as a basis to charge fees from the monitored institutions 
(Decree funding financial monitoring, December 2003). Although input control elements 
do exist for AFM – MP‟s refer to the level of staff (Parliament, 2008ab, p.4 and p. 8) and 
respondents indicate that AFM is subject to staff reduction programs imposed by 
government – the budget is better described as a lump sum based task budget. Due to 
the increased functions assigned to AFM, operating costs have increased from some €51 
million  (2005 Annual Report) to some €78 million in 2008. In both cases, the budget 
was substantially higher than actual operating costs. Respondents indicated that the 
influence of government on the budget levels is relatively low, because AFM‟s non-
executive board and advisory boards have a role in the approval of the budgets. 
According to respondents the 2007 coalition agreement has led to an agreement on a 
maximum level of budget for AFM rather than a budget cut which has been proposed for 
many other ZBOs. 
17.2.1.2 Planning and control 
As indicated before, AFM‟s budget is by and large funded by the financial institutions 
being monitored rather than by the State. Therefore, the budget is only partially found in 
minFin‟s budget documents. MinFin does not submit a letter of instruction on services to 
be delivered or on budgets in the preparatory stage of AFM‟s budget. Furthermore, no 
separate budget or fee approval announcement is sent to Parliament. Approval of 
budgets is in this case explicitly published by AFM in the official journal of the State 
„Staatscourant‟. Approval of annual reports is mentioned separately. In the 2007 case, 
this has led to 24 separate questions on the annual report; no questions were submitted 
on the 2008 report.  
AFM‟s balance sheet only shows intangible fixed assets. These assets concern the 
development costs of monitoring programs to be included in future fees. 
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The ministry‟s budget document does not include performance indicators with respect 
to AFM. In AFM‟s budget document as submitted to minFin, performance indicators are 
included. Respondents indicate that minFin and AFM have agreed to present budget 
documents as well as annual reports based on the VBTB format which is also the 
standard for ministries. The annual report does disclose a variety of performance 
indicators. In minFin‟s annual report, some process indicators and an overview of 
expenses is included. The annual report is submitted to Parliament but without 
assessment or explicit statement of consent by minFin, which increases autonomy. The 
increase in autonomy is mitigated due to the fact that the summary in minFin‟s annual 
report also includes relevant financial information on AFM. 
Table 17.8: Planning and control of AFM and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets < 10% 0 0 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budget 
Line item Partially 
included 
Partially 
included 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Complete 
cost centre 
Complete 
cost centre 
Complete 
cost centre 
0 
PLANNING & CONTROL 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No No No 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  Yes 
No; key data 
in annual 
report minFin 
No; key data 
in annual 
report minFin 
0 
Frequency of reporting to Parliament  Yearly Departmental Departmental ↓ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ budget documents  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Throughput Throughput Throughput 0 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Budget documents  
Throughput 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Annual reports  
Throughput 
Throughput 
and output 
Throughput 
and output 
0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister 
Yearly 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
Two 
intermediate 
reports 
↓ 
POLITICAL DEBATE  
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
2 22 27 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual 
report  
0 31 2 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual 
report  
0 10 16 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Respondents indicated that substantial differences in the budget should be reported to 
minFin. In practice this has led to reporting to Parliament in the normal planning and 
  Formal and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   377 
 
control process within ministries with changes in the budget in the second supplement 
2007 as well as in the first and second supplement to the 2008 budget. This means that 
reporting frequencies to both Parliament as well as to minFin are at a higher level than 
might be expected for an impartial market regulator. It should be noted that in the years 
studied here, AFM was still in a development stage. Respondents did not explicitly refer to 
this development stage as a reason for additional control. 
The system of funding for AFM requires all excess fees paid during a fiscal year to be 
returned to contributors in the following fiscal year. This is an indication that cost control 
leads for AFM. AFM is responsible for full costs with relatively low influence from minFin. 
This leads to the conclusion that AFM can be classified as a complete cost centre, in line 
with expectations for monitoring ZBOs. 
A final remark is made on documents submitted to Parliament. Both in 2007 and 
2008 large numbers of documents were submitted. In fiscal 2007 the emphasis was 
directly on AFM operations including substantial numbers of questions on AFM‟s annual 
report. In fiscal 2008, issues varied.  Not only did they discuss operations directly but also 
the impact of new regulations on AFM‟s operations. 
 
The overall perspective is that the mixture of functions result in more autonomy from a 
production perspective, reinforced by the measures  for funding AFM. Under planning and 
control, information on approval of budgets and fees is not given, increasing autonomy. 
The frequency of intermediate reporting mitigates this increase in autonomy to some 
extent. In general AFM‟s economic autonomy is at a higher level than might be expected 
for a market regulator. 
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17.2.2 CFV 
17.2.2.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
CFV‟s monitoring functions concern the financial position of Social Housing Associations 
(SHAs) and are supplemented with income transfers if necessary. A classification as a 
pure public good is not realistic as it exclusively aims at SHAs and not on the real estate 
market as a whole. Therefore, the classification is at best an impure public good. 
Although historically different, respondents indicated that for a number of years, CFV‟s 
actual activities have focused on monitoring the financial resilience of SHAs. No 
applications for income transfers were submitted in fiscal 2007 and 2008. Some old 
applications were however still being processed. Most of the operating costs can 
therefore be allocated to CFV‟s monitoring activities. 
Monitoring activities are generally based on individual production rather than on mass 
production. In this case, monitoring has the characteristics of series production, for 
example when general assessment of the financial position of SHAs is performed. Income 
transfer activities are in general case based, although in the announced temporary 
program forms of series production can be observed. This at least applies for generating 
the incoming income transfers by levies. The observed complexity of activities results in 
some additional autonomy. 
Table 17.9: Classification and impact of market characteristics on CFV's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Public good type Impure good Impure good 0 
ACTIVITIES 
% monitoring activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Individual mixture ↑ 
DEMAND 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 0 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 0 (no funding) 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Type of funding charges 
Not 
applicable 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Lump sum Lump sum 0 
Commissioning State State 0 
Demand dependency 
Single 
ministry 
mixture 0 
SUPPLY 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Task Task 0 
Production form 
Contract 
Provision 
Regulated 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Funding is generated by authoritative levies from within the sector, although the levy has 
been set at zero for a number of years. Costs of operations are covered by interest 
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received on program equity. Low interest rates paid by minFin – due to interest rates on 
the capital and money markets – have an impact on net income from operations. The 
CFV arrangement on treasury management is in line with the rules for PLAs. Interviewees 
indicated that in the past, CFV had more treasury management autonomy than it has 
now. Compared to the past, autonomy is reduced; compared to present standards, 
autonomy is in line with arrangements. The authoritative levies, if applied, have to be 
based on total costs of income transfers including costs of operations. This is not 
essentially different from an authorised budget funded by government from a funding 
perspective, which means that no additional autonomy is generated. 
The State commissions monitoring activities. Only if a SHA is in financial distress, 
demand would be generated on a citizen‟s request basis. A temporary program on 
restructuring urban areas (see e.g. Parliament, 2008g) is likely to result in applications 
for support by SHAs. This means that CFV‟s actual tasks will again be a mixture of 
monitoring and income transfer functions implying that delivery of services is not fully 
dependent on one single source of demand. 
The variety in demand for services does not affect autonomy because the 
characteristics of demand for income transfers is based on citizen requests rather than 
(autonomous) citizen demand in a market setting. The production form of services that 
results has no effect on autonomy because the shift from government provision of 
monitoring services to regulated provision of services is only due to the lack of 
government funding but essentially the same compared to when government funded CFV.  
17.2.2.2 Planning and control 
CFV uses accruals accounting. Only a very small level of fixed assets are  disclosed on the 
balance sheet; staff is the key asset. In terms of asset specificity this means that 
production depends on knowledge rather than on transferable technology. 
CFV‟s budget is not disclosed in minVROM/minWWI‟s budget documents due to the 
fee based funding system. Respondents indicated very little influence by the minister on 
the budgeting process. There are no budget instructions given, although this might have 
been expected given the policy related issues in CFV‟s monitoring functions. In approval 
letters on budgets and annual reports, some general questions are mentioned by 
minWWI which have to be addressed during the following fiscal year but these questions 
do not have the character of instructions on services to be delivered. Levies charged have 
been zero for a number of years. If additional functions are to be performed on behalf of 
minVROM and minWWI, these are discussed at civil servant level and do not reach 
political decision levels. The system of funding including the lack of budgeting 
instructions generates additional autonomy for CFV. 
CFV‟s funding system is based on recovery of costs incurred by fees. Practically 
speaking CFV‟s operations are funded from interest earned on the program costs. At the 
civil service level respondents indicated that it is known that continued funding of 
operating activities from interest is not sustainable due to low interest rates. Whether this 
issue is known at the political level is uncertain. In 2008, interest income was sufficient 
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due to a higher level of financial assets resulting from a new program fee for restructuring 
urban areas rather than higher levels of interest rates. As a result, CFV is controlled on 
total costs without strict boundaries as is the case in a discretionary cost centre, in line 
with the expected responsibility centre type for a monitoring ZBO. 
Table 17.10: Planning and control of CFV and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets < 10% 3% 3% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budgets  
Line item 
none none ↑ 
Responsibility centre type Complete 
cost centre 
Complete 
cost centre 
Complete 
cost centre 
0 
PLANNING & CONTROL 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No 
In 
minVROM‟s 
annual 
report 2007 
↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of annual report mentioned to Parliament 
by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Parliament  Yearly No No ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ budget documents  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ Annual reports  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Budget documents  
Throughput 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Annual reports  Throughput 
informally 
submitted: 
Throughput 
informally 
submitted: 
Throughput 
↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Yearly Quarterly Quarterly ↓ 
POLITICAL DEBATE  
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 2 11 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual report  
0 0 0 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual report  
0 0 12 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Information to Parliament on CFV operations is minimal. Basically, the ZBO appendix in 
the Minister-Principal‟s budget document describes the activities of CFV without any 
financial data either on budgets or on the levels of fees. Respondents indicated that MPs 
receive CFV‟s annual report informally. Theoretically this allows them to submit questions 
to the minister. No questions were raised on the funding of CFV in Parliament‟s 
documents for FY 2007 and 2008. In the ministry‟s 2007 and 2008 annual reports, the 
appendix on ZBOs and RWTs discloses an assessment of CFVs activities. However, this is 
performed inconsistently. With respect to fiscal 2007, approval of CFV‟s 2006 annual 
report and 2008 budget is mentioned; in fiscal 2008 no reference to this subject was 
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found (Parliament, 2008ac, p. 232; Parliament, 2009k, p. 82-83).  The relatively low 
interest in operations is also reflected in the lack of performance information on CFV. 
Monitoring of CFV is based on a monitoring protocol (minVROM, 2006), which has 
later been changed to a more general monitoring protocol for all ZBOs and RWTs 
affiliated to minVROM (minVROM, 2008). In the approval letter of minWWI on the 2008 
budget, CFV is asked to think about controlling the level of operating costs, rather than 
given an instruction to cap or reduce budgets (MinWWI, 2007b). In the letter of approval 
to the 2006 annual report, a discussion on information provision is addressed as an 
issue. The only other point mentioned in this letter refers to remuneration of the 
executive and non-executive board (minVROM, 2007). Apparently no other issues were of 
relevance to be discussed with CFV. The monitoring protocol requires quarterly reports to 
be submitted to the Minister-Principal. This is carried out and reduces autonomy 
compared to the expected frequency of annual reporting only for monitoring ZBOs. 
The data shows a variation in documents submitted. In 2008 the number of 
documents and resulting questions is higher than in 2007. All questions raised that have 
some relation to operations concerned either political debates on the restructuring levy to 
be charged or problems of individual housing associations on governance issues. 
Although questions do concern CFV‟s operations, they actually focus on functions to be 
assigned to CFV and have no immediate impact on autonomy in (daily) operations. 
Although CFV is formally not just a pure monitoring institution, planning and control is 
basically carried out in hindsight; in fact it is almost invisible to MPs. Therefore the actual 
autonomy experienced by CFV is greater than might be expected from a theoretical 
perspective. 
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17.2.3 NAK 
17.2.3.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
NAK is a monitoring institution performing quality assurance functions. This kind of 
service is a sub-type of the monitoring group of services with a different expected market 
profile. Demand and supply are based on a market model; government only regulates 
provision of services. The public service character of quality assurance does not allow for 
more than recovery of structural costs rather than profit based production. As a result, 
expected autonomy is substantially higher than in case of the market regulators that are 
discussed here as well. 
NAK provides quality assurance in the agricultural industry. Anyone who is planning to 
grow and trade agricultural products needs a quality assurance approval. In terms of 
qualification of services, this allows for exclusion and thus cannot qualify as a pure public 
good. Quality assurance is based on world-wide international standards and EU 
regulations and must be controlled by government. Therefore, NAK services qualify as 
impure public goods. In 2007-2008, this led to some debate in Parliament as NAK had to 
separate its private activities from its monitoring activities to comply with international 
standards (Parliament, 2007y). This is also the only topic on which questions were raised 
in Parliament with respect to NAK.  
Table 17.11: Classification and impact of market characteristics on NAK's autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Public good type Pure good Impure good 0 
ACTIVITIES 
% monitoring activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
DEMAND 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 0 0 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 0 0 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Type of funding charges  Authority 
biased 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Activity based Activity based 0 
Commissioning Demand Demand 0 
Demand dependency Others Others 0 
SUPPLY 
Competitors Yes No ↓ 
Budget Typology Output Output 0 
Production form Regulated 
Provision 
Regulated 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
From a market perspective, only one divergence from expected standards can be 
observed. NAK‟s position is one of a group of organisations providing quality assurance in 
the agricultural sector. This might suggest competition and legislation suggests that 
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minLNV assigns the quality assurance role to institutions by decree. In practice there is 
no competition. Each of the quality assurance entities monitors a separate branch of 
agriculture. The lack of competition reduces NAK‟s autonomy to some extent. 
17.2.3.2 Planning and control 
The atypical position of NAK is also found in the planning and control process. In planning 
and control, the expected levels of control deviates for budget disclosure in the Minister-
Principal‟s budget document. This would theoretically result in only disclosing the budget 
in the appendix given the market characteristic of citizen demand. Production allows for 
output related rather than throughput related performance information and reporting to 
the Minster-Principal can be provided on a yearly basis given the regulated service 
provision character of NAK services. The market nature of the services and the legislation 
on services do not require a detailed budget instruction from minLNV and such a 
document does not exist. 
Table 17.12: Planning and control of NAK and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets < 10% 55% 56% ↑ 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budgets  
Only in 
appendix 
None None ↑ 
Responsibility centre type Complete 
cost centre 
Investment 
centre 
Investment 
centre 
↑ 
PLANNING & CONTROL 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No No No 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of annual report mentioned to Parliament 
by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Parliament  Yearly None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ budget documents  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ Annual reports  
Output None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Budget documents  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Yearly Yearly Yearly 0 
POLITICAL DEBATE 
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 12 5 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual report  
0 1 0 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations of 
ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual report  
0 3 2 0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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NAK uses equipment to provide their service, which is reflected in the level of fixed assets 
on the balance sheet. This also results in another level of asset specificity compared to 
other organisations and to more autonomy. NAK receives no formal budget instructions 
from minLNV; the budgeting process is bottom up and left to the managing director and 
the executive board. Although NAK‟s statute prohibits the generation of profits, full 
responsibility for all financial operations including investments remains within the 
organisation, which can therefore be classified as an investment centre. 
Parliament is not informed on the approval of its budget, fees or annual reports by 
minLNV. Since the NAK annual report is not submitted to Parliament, performance 
information is not available. All these indicators demonstrate an increase in autonomy 
compared to what might be expected. 
Respondents indicated that due to the transition of activities under new legislation as 
of 2005, the monitoring role of minLNV has been increasing. This is reflected in a letter 
from minLNV in which criteria for assessing proposed fees are discussed. Essentially, the 
requirements state a balanced budget, transparent calculation of the fees and a 
limitation on the equalisation reserve to a specified (in this case 50%) level (minLNV, 
2007). The civil servants in minLNV handle almost all issues that have to do with NAK 
based on an information protocol (minLNV, 2004). Intermediate financial reporting to 
minLNV is not necessary. The minister is only involved when questions are raised in 
Parliament. Although monitoring is made more explicit by these arrangements, essentially 
they do not affect NAK‟s operational autonomy.  
Finally, a comment must be made about debate in Parliament. In 2007 in particular a 
substantial number of documents were submitted to Parliament. Most of these 
documents concerned tasks assigned to NAK including the separation of public and 
private tasks based on EU regulations. One document is highlighted here: in minBZK‟s 
letter on the civil service (Parliament, 2007f), NAK is included in the list of entities to be 
monitored with respect to staff number developments within the organisation, which is an 
indication for some reduced autonomy for the organisation. 
NAK‟s position as a monitoring ZBO with respect to planning and control implies more 
degrees of freedom than expected. This is mainly due to the very light monitoring 
procedures within minLNV, which are caused by type of monitoring service provided. 
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17.2.4 NMa 
17.2.4.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
NMa is the key market regulating institution. Its role is based on European competition 
regulations, implemented in Dutch competition law. The key function can be classified as 
a pure public service: non-excludable and non-rival. NMa production is individual case 
based, be it on mergers or on reporting of unfair competition. All market indicators are in 
line with this type of service: nearly fully government funded, lump sum budget based on 
tasks assigned and contract provision of services. 
Unlike what might be expected, three ministries are involved in commissioning NMa 
services. The separate Energy Office and Transport Office are commissioned by minEZ 
and minVW respectively. MinEZ also commissions general competition monitoring and 
minFin has a role in commissioning the monitoring of financial services.  
NMa charges fees for some licences. Respondents indicated that merger fees are 
only based on average costs and are not intended to be funding fees. Fees charged to the 
Energy Industry (some €2.6 M in 2007) are according to respondents supposed to cover 
all costs of the Energy Office; whereas the Transport Office is funded by government. 
Respondents were not aware of the logic behind this differentiation. NMa can impose 
fines on organisations; according to respondents these fines are not relevant for 
budgetary control. Overall, these fees do not have an impact on NMa‟s autonomy. 
Table 17.13: Classification and impact of market characteristics on NMa‟s autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Public good type Pure good Pure good 0 
ACTIVITIES 
% monitoring activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 100 0 
Production type Individual Individual 0 
DEMAND 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 94 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 94 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 94 0 
Type of funding charges Not 
applicable 
Authority 
biased 
0 
Budget funding Lump sum Lump sum 0 
Commissioning State State 0 
Demand dependency Single 
ministry 
Multiple 
ministries 
↑ 
SUPPLY 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Task Task 0 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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Although there are some deviations from the expected classification of demand and 
supply, these have a minor impact on the actual autonomy of NMa, compared to what is 
the expected level of autonomy for market regulator. 
17.2.4.2 Planning and control 
The NMa governance structure is based on ZBO status for the executive board and civil 
servant status for the staff, who are seconded to the executive board. As a result, the full 
budget of NMa is included in the standard framework for ministries and is based on cash 
accounting rather than accruals accounting. The budget is found in a separate line item 
in minEZ‟s budget documents. Real budgetary instructions other than within the standard 
departmental framework are not issued to NMa. The NMa budget is disclosed on a gross 
basis: total expenses and total income is presented separately in minEZ‟s budget 
document. 
Table 17.14: Planning and control of NMa and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Accounting System Accruals Cash Cash ↓ 
% fixed assets < 10% not applicable not applicable 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budgets  
Line item 
Line item Line item 0 
Responsibility centre type Complete 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
↓ 
PLANNING & CONTROL 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No No No 0 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Includes 
assessment 
Includes 
assessment 
↓ 
Frequency of reporting to Parliament  Yearly Departmental Departmental ↓ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ budget documents  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Budget documents  
Throughput 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Annual reports  
Throughput Outcome Outcome 0 
Frequency of reporting to Minister Yearly Monthly Monthly ↓ 
POLITICAL DEBATE  
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 28 34 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual 
report  
0 7 5 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual 
report  
0 28 25 ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
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The cash based accounting system suggests that only cost centre based responsibility 
can exist. In practice, respondents indicated that NMa is fully subject to budgeting 
regulations for ministries including those on possible staff reductions (Parliament, 2007f, 
p. 47). There is one exception indicated by respondents: the use of consultants is not as 
strictly regulated as is usual for other government units. In some cases, Parliament has 
discussed the level of staff available for NMa, often in relation to new tasks to be 
assigned (Parliament, 2007x, p. 4-5). In fact, the strong budgetary control means that the 
actual responsibility of management is reduced to that of a discretionary cost centre. 
Due to the governance structure, planning and control is aligned with minEZ‟s 
structure. Respondents indicated that no performance indicators are included in the NMa 
budget documents submitted to minEZ. As a result, no performance indicators are given 
in minEZ‟s budget documents submitted to Parliament. The argument is that this 
emphasises the impartial role NMa has in relation to its funding ministries. In hindsight, 
the NMa annual report is submitted to Parliament and includes various types of 
performance indicators, including outcome indicators. Furthermore, minEZ explicitly 
assesses NMa‟s annual report which reduces autonomy compared to the expected 
practice of merely submitting an annual report to Parliament.  
MPs have asked some questions on the internal standards set by NMa, based on a 
report by the NCA on competition policy. The same document reveals that MPs – and 
their support staff – apparently have missed the essential separation of executive board 
and staff (Parliament, 2007z, question 8) which was extensively discussed in Parliament 
in 1997 and in 2000 (Parliament, 1997d; Parliament 2001h, p. 13). 
Other questions raised in Parliament often refer to monitoring the postal sector, the 
health sector and the energy sector. These questions are mainly related to the program 
but may also have an impact on the work NMa has to carry out for adequate monitoring 
(see for example Parliament, 2007aa, questions 48, 79 and 81). A last issue that 
regularly leads to discussions in Parliament concerns fines imposed by NMa. 
Respondents indicated that the revenues were included in minEZ‟s budget document due 
to financial relevance although it was known that the revenues were being legally 
contested in court. In practice this has led to frequent questions by MPs. According to the 
respondents, the practice used by minEZ was new and court rulings on the initial fines 
sometimes led to reduced and or delayed revenues. These had to be reported in 
supplements to the budgets and attracted attention from MPs. 
 
The organisational set up of NMa reduces autonomy within planning and control. NMa 
has a high level of political attention, including attention on operations, which also 
reduces autonomy. The general conclusion is that NMa‟s autonomy is from a planning 
and control perspective reduced compared to standards for market regulators. 
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17.2.5 NZA 
17.2.5.1 Demand and supply characteristics 
NZA is the market regulator for the health sector. Part of its mission statement is as 
follows: „The NZA creates and monitors properly functioning health and care markets. The 
interests of consumers are central in the performance of these tasks…‟ (NZA, 2009, p. 7). 
This suggests that NZA provides pure public services in the interest of all participants. 
However, one of its main objectives is „proper execution of regulated fees, budgeting and 
insurance laws‟. Part of this task is not based on impartiality, but driven by direct 
budgetary control directives given by minVWS (e.g. Parliament, 2006m). In the search for 
documents on NZA budgets, I found 6 instructions for fiscal 2007 and 2008 aimed at 
budgetary control. In my opinion these instructions mitigate the impartial role of NZA, 
because it acts as if it is an executive office of minVWS. Therefore, NZA services are 
impure public services rather than pure public services. It also means that NZA not only 
provides market regulating services but rather a mixture of services. The data does not 
reveal that NZA is fully funded on a lump sum basis by minVWS and that minVWS is the 
only initiator and commissioner for NZA‟s services.  
Table 17.15: Classification and impact of market characteristics on NZA‟s autonomy 
 Expected Actual Impact 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Public good type Pure good Impure good ↑ 
ACTIVITIES 
% monitoring activities in operating costs (2007, annual 
report) 
100 <100 0 
Production type Mass Mass 0 
DEMAND 
% Funding from central government (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Public funding (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
% Funding largest demand initiator (2007, annual report) 100 100 0 
Type of funding charges Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Budget funding Lump sum Lump sum 0 
Commissioning State State 0 
Demand dependency Single 
ministry 
Single 
ministry 
0 
SUPPLY 
Competitors No No 0 
Budget Typology Task Task 0 
Production form Contract 
provision 
Contract 
Provision 
0 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
The supply side of the market for NZA is as to be expected: no competitors and „contract 
provision‟ based on a task budget. In this case the latter factor is very visible in the 
annual reports. For each separate sub-project, an indication of effort spent in number of 
days is given. Respondents indicated that this is driven by minVWS‟ desire to present 
information along the lines of the VBTB model used in central government. 
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My conclusion is that due to the mixture and characteristics of its services, NZA is not 
fully a market regulator. From a market perspective, NZA characteristics are in line with 
expected characteristics of a market regulator. An exception is the public service type 
observed, which is due to the mixture of services and not a pure but an impure public 
service. 
17.2.5.2 Planning and control 
NZA‟s budget is included in the budget article that covers all health sector ZBOs under 
minVWS; only the appendix on ZBOs discloses the budget to be appropriated to NZA.  
NZA uses accruals accounting. The level of fixed assets on the balance sheet is high, 
but details reveal that these assets are related to leased office space. Therefore, no 
impact on autonomy from asset specificity is observed. 
With respect to commissioning, the letter of instruction sent out by minVWS does not 
only provide a financial framework, but explicitly lists a number of policy related services 
that should be delivered in the relevant fiscal year (minVWS, 2007b). Minister and NZA 
do discuss progress in NZA‟s activities twice a year and high level civil servants discuss 
progress 5 to 6 times a year or when needed. According to the respondents, these 
discussions are mainly focused on policy issues. Respondents indicated that the letter 
has a top down character and is not a negotiated document between NZA and minVWS. 
Furthermore, instructions are at a detailed level and the budget includes the 
announcement of budget cuts in future years (minVWS, 2007b). The proposed 2008 
budget as submitted to minVWS is line item based and includes a separate investment 
budget. In the letter of approval on the 2008 budget, no reference is made to the 
separate investment budget as proposed by NZA. However, the letter includes an 
estimate of the monthly payments by minVWS to NZA. Furthermore, a detailed 
specification of some temporary expenses is required. Respondents indicated that the 
budgeting process is difficult due to changing political priorities on costs of operations. 
Until 2006, staff control was primarily aimed at hiring consultants. As of 2007 attention 
shifted to the core staff. In the NZA case, respondents indicated that this has led to a 
forced reduction in NZA‟s core staff. Formally, the letter of approval by minVWS is to be 
regarded as a decision to which objections can be made (minVWS, 2008b). From a 
responsibility centre perspective, this level of financial management tends to be a 
discretionary cost centre rather than a complete cost centre. 
Respondents indicated that the basic planning and control cycle in the relationship 
between NZA and minVWS is based on a mid-term review only. Some respondents 
indicated that there is a mismatch in the expected role of minVWS in NZA‟s planning and 
control cycle. MinVWS apparently focuses more on controlling rather than on monitoring 
and strategic debates on planning and control at NZA. The information protocol that has 
been defined between minVWS and NZA covers the specification on the information NZA 
has to provide to minVWS as a result of its monitoring activities. In the notes to the 
information protocol, it is admitted that demand is generated by minVWS and in the event 
of unforeseen issues arising, NZA has to arrange extra capacity to cover this. If capacity is 
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not available, it is up to NZA to put forward a proposal to deal with this. Although not 
stated explicitly, this means that either an increase in budget should follow, or – more 
likely – that prioritising means that other activities are delayed. 
Table 17.16: Planning and control of NZA and impact on autonomy 
 Expected fiscal 2007 fiscal 2008 Impact 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Accounting System Accruals Accruals Accruals 0 
% fixed assets < 10% 36% 32% 0 
Budget disclosure of operating costs in ministry 
budgets  
Line item Included in 
article 
Included in 
article 
↑ 
Responsibility centre type Complete 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
↓ 
PLANNING & CONTROL 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal No Yes Yes ↓ 
Approval of budget document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes No No ↑ 
Approval of fees mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
0 
Approval of annual report mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
Yes; separate 
document 
includes 
assessment 
No ↑ 
Frequency of reporting to Parliament  
Yearly 
In regular 
budgeting 
process 
In regular 
budgeting 
process 
↓ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ budget documents  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ministries‟ Annual reports  
Throughput None None ↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Budget documents  
Throughput 
Not 
Submitted 
Not 
Submitted 
↑ 
Performance indicators reported to Parliament 
in ZBO Annual reports  
Throughput 
Input & 
Throughput & 
detailed 
qualitative 
Input & 
Throughput & 
detailed 
qualitative 
↓ 
Frequency of reporting to Minister 
Yearly 
Mid term 
review 
Mid term 
review 
↓ 
POLITICAL DEBATE  
Number of documents submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 14 21 ↓ 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs related to budget and annual 
report  
0 3 4 0 
Number of discussion/questions on operations 
of ZBO by MPs other than budget and annual 
report  
0 7 14 ↓ 
 
Included in determining autonomy Not included in determining autonomy 
 
Having a mid-term review implies that no intermediate reporting to Parliament is 
expected. Only in event of the assignment of new tasks, may Parliament be informed 
during a fiscal year as part of the regular reporting cycle (Parliament, 2007ab, p. 6). 
Performance information is only found in the NZA annual report, not in the minVWS 
documents. Most of the information is of an input or process type. NZA provides 
operational information on each of its main objectives in annual reports, but this 
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information does not allow the costs of each of these objectives to be assessed. The 
financial statements do not disclose segmented information which makes it impossible to 
determine a fair indication of monitoring and other activities (NZA, 2009, p. 177). Again, 
the level of detail is an indication for reduced autonomy on NZA‟s operations. 
MinVWS used to provide separate documents in which approval and assessment of 
annual reports of the relevant ZBOs were discussed (Parliament, 2008j). In this letter the 
minister announced that this practice will not be continued. This change in policy results 
in some additional autonomy, at least because MPs no longer have an incentive to put 
questions to minVWS. 
Finally, some remarks on questions submitted by MPs. The fact that instructions are 
issued and sent to Parliament results in questions from MPs. Furthermore, questions are 
submitted on individual cases with respect to mergers and governance issues and the 
position of NZA in these cases. This affects operations because the implicit question is 
„shouldn‟t NZA have acted?‟ Other issues regard new tasks to be assigned (structurally 
and temporary) either based on documents from minVWS or on the initiative of MPs. For 
example, MPs submitted a motion to let NZA develop criteria for financial support for 
pharmacists as well as a fee structure for pharmacists (Parliament, 2008ad and 
2008ae). Such interventions indicate that MPs play a role in the services provided by 
NZA, but as there are no references made to prioritisation or additional financial 
resources, it seems that such questions are regarded as the well known free lunch. 
The general impression on the planning and control aspects of NZA is that the 
organisation has fewer degrees of freedom than might be expected for a market 
regulator. Although at first glance, budgetary control with only a mid-term review seems 
moderate, the requirements for information provision on a line item basis and strict staff 
control measures reduce autonomy substantially. 
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17.2.6 Relative autonomy of monitoring ZBOs from an economic perspective 
Monitoring-type ZBOs are a less homogeneous group of ZBOs than income transfer ZBOs. 
In the examples selected, three ZBOs qualify as market regulators, one as a policy 
monitoring institution (CFV) and one as a quality assurance institution (NAK). These 
differences have some impact on the expected standard levels of autonomy; particularly 
for quality assurance. The comparative description is based on the findings in the 
individual cases as they are summarised in Appendix 10 excluding arrangements of last 
resort as was also performed from the legal perspective. 
I have used complete cost centres, commissioned by government under contract 
provision of services and demand generated from a single ministry as the standard 
market characteristics for monitoring ZBOs. For quality assurance, regulated provision 
and citizen demand are important deviations from a market perspective. 
On planning and control issues, I have taken as the standard approval of budgets and 
annual reports including yearly reporting to both Parliament and Minister-Principal. Again, 
degrees of freedom for quality assurance are at a higher level because output indicators 
can be used. Due to private funding, disclosure of budgets should be performed in the 
ZBO appendix in the Minister-Principal‟s budget because no contribution from 
government is expected.  
 low 
auto-
nomy 
      neutral       high 
auto-
nomy 
 
Expected 
 
      CFV 
AFM 
NZA  
NMa 
     NAK  
 
Actual 
 
   NMa      
AFM 
NZA 
    
CFV 
NAK 
Figure 17.2 Expected and actual autonomy of monitoring ZBOs from an economic 
perspective 
 
Figure 17.2 shows the expected and actual autonomy from an economic perspective for 
the ZBOs studied here. On the level of expected autonomy, NMa is set at a lower level 
than the other market regulators due to the lack of legal entity status which means that it 
has to comply with departmental procedures and accounting rules. 
 
Actual autonomy for the five monitoring ZBOs varies widely. At one extreme is CFV which 
has substantially more degrees of freedom than might be expected. In general, 
information on CFV‟s operations is minimal, with the exception of a high level of reporting 
to the Minister-Principal. At the other end of the spectrum is NMa. In this case frequency 
of reporting to Parliament, cost control emphasis in terms of a discretionary responsibility 
centre and explicit assessment of annual reports by the Minister-Principal reduce 
autonomy compared to standards. NZA‟s position on autonomy is above neutral, based 
on reporting frequencies to Parliament and the fact that as of 2008 an annual report is 
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no longer submitted to Parliament. NZA‟s  position is negatively affected by its 
discretionary cost centre responsibilities. In the AFM case, an increase in autonomy can 
be observed, which is mainly based on lack of information to Parliament and the mixture 
of services provided, partially mitigated by additional controls for minFin. Finally, NAK‟s 
position is in line with expectations, very low frequency and content of information both to 
Parliament and Minster-Principal. 
 
On a comparative level, Figure 17.2 discloses the differences between the various ZBOs. 
Three observations can be made. First, on the market dimension, hardly any differences 
from standards are found. Second, deviations from standards with respect to information 
to Parliament generally have a positive effect on autonomy; information to Parliament is 
often not explicitly available. The exception is NMa in which case due to the Shelter-ZBO 
characteristics, budgets and financial ex post information are included in the Minister-
Principal‟s documents. Third, overall ministerial control reduces autonomy. This is most 
explicitly visible for NMa, given its legal status, but also for NZA where very detailed levels 
of reporting and cost controls are applied.  
The general conclusion on autonomy of the monitoring ZBOs is that ministerial controls 
are in most cases stronger than the expected standard, reducing autonomy, whereas 
from a Parliamentary perspective, autonomy generally diverges positively from the 
standards. In this case the variation in autonomy is relatively wide. There is no overall 
trend observed in autonomy, even if NAK as a very different type of monitoring institution 
is not considered. 
17.3 Mismatches in monitoring ZBOs 
In this section, I will assess the mismatches observed between legal and economic 
arrangements of the individual monitoring ZBOs, based on the research question for the 
empirical section of the study: 
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit the legal and 
economic characteristics of (monitoring) ZBO services? 
In Appendix 10, a comparative overview of legal and economic indicators used and their 
impact on autonomy is given. In this section, I will focus only on market and planning and 
control elements because these issues are based on the relationship between services 
delivered and required control levels. The discussion on mismatches is based on the 
same principles as was used for the income transfer ZBOs. 
 
If the direction of the legal and economic indicators is negative overall or positive overall, 
a mismatch in terms of full divergence of control tools cannot be observed. 
Inconsistencies within groups of indicators may still exist. With respect to the monitoring 
ZBOs studied here, only the actual position of NZA shows whether a mismatch between 
economic (positive) and legal (negative) autonomy is observed. The overall result on 
market and planning and control indicators of autonomy for the monitoring ZBOs is that 
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legal autonomy tends to increase compared to the standards used, except for CFV, and 
that except for NMa, economic autonomy increases as well.  
 
In the AFM case, only small changes can be observed. From a legal perspective as well as 
from an economic perspective, some indicators generate increased autonomy whereas 
others generate decreased autonomy. What can be noted is that only planning and 
control issues determine the economic position and that this is also found in the legal 
measures on autonomy. Issues to be highlighted are restrictions on reserves, submitting 
multiyear plans and frequency of reporting to both Parliament and minister. 
In the CFV case, formal autonomy is at a high level, but practices reveal that many of 
the legal issues are covered by monitoring arrangements at the level of civil servants. 
From an economic perspective, autonomy increases, mainly because there is hardly any 
flow of information from CFV and minister on operations to Parliament. Although not a 
pure mismatch, the change in position of CFV has elements of a mismatch based on the 
opposite directions of movement from formal to actual autonomy. In general terms, the 
minister imposes more (legal) controls whereas Parliamentary (economically 
characterised) controls are loosened compared to standard levels. 
In the NAK case, both economic and legal autonomy increase compared to the 
standards used. The economic characteristics of NAK allowed for a higher standard level 
of autonomy. In practice, factors such as low political attention by minister and not 
submitting annual reports to Parliament explain part of the increased legal autonomy 
which is mitigated by the role minLNV has in approving NAK‟s budget. From an economic 
perspective, the observed increase in autonomy is stronger, mainly due to planning and 
control factors. NAK is – along with Vf/Pf – one of the few ZBOs for which an increase in 
the responsibility centre classification is observed. The increase in autonomy is partially 
mitigated by NAK‟s position on competition, which cannot be achieved. 
NMa‟s position is from the perspective of operational control strongly determined by 
the legal status of the entity. Compared to expected levels of autonomy, no changes are 
observed in the legal domain; the only positive factor on autonomy is direct informal 
meetings with Parliament. The economic position of NMa is analytically similar to that of 
AFM and NZA and the standard used here for monitoring ZBOs. Actual autonomy is 
strongly reduced by determining rather than approving budgets and statements of 
accounts, the multiyear plans to be submitted as well as the lack of an equalisation 
reserve. Practically this means that NMa‟s economic and legal position match. 
Finally, NZA‟s position can be classified as a real mismatch between actual legal and 
economic indicators. Formally, NZA‟s legal autonomy is reduced by determining the 
budget for operations, multiyear plans and restrictions on equalisation reserves. 
Furthermore, legislation requires that an assessed annual report is submitted to 
Parliament. Actual autonomy increases, but remains below standards due to the fact that 
submission of an assessed annual report has been discontinued.  Economic autonomy 
increases as well, which results in more autonomy than under the standards. As was also 
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observed in other cases, information to Parliament generates additional autonomy, 
partially mitigated due to a downgrade in responsibility centre type and strict reporting 
frequencies to minVWS, which is in line with the strict legal arrangements. The overall 
result on economic indicators remains positive. 
 
Legal status does indicate different levels of control as with the income transfer cases. 
SLAs are not really expected for monitoring ZBOs, particularly not for the market 
regulators. The budgetary instructions to NZA show that in this case minVWS has 
substantial influence on a ZBO that is supposed to operate impartially. An explanation for 
this level of control is found in the mixture of tasks assigned: market regulation does not 
match with budgetary control on cure and care service providers. From an economic 
perspective, budgets can be classified as lump sum budgets as might be expected, 
except for NAK where an activity based budget is possible and practically applied. Like 
the income transfer cases, controls on investments are not found due to low levels of 
asset specificity. Again NAK is the exception. Treasury controls are based on CW and are 
equal for all monitoring ZBOs except for NAK which is allowed to operate at a higher level 
of autonomy. Evidence in the NZA case showed that rules can be ignored, when minVWS 
rather than the State Treasury financed investments in offices to be leased. 
 
The overall impression on mismatches in autonomy for monitoring ZBOs is not as 
straightforward as in the income transfer case. One can observe increases in autonomy 
on both dimensions for PLBs, but the observed differences between AFM as a market 
regulator and NAK as a quality assurance institution are substantial. In the AFM case, a 
match between legal and economic controls is found both formally and in practice; in the 
NMa case, an actual match – at a low level – is observed. In all other cases, mismatches 
although not fundamentally diverging were found.  
Within the PLA group, one can claim that the legal status of NMa as a Shelter ZBO 
explains the difference with the other two market regulators. Furthermore, the real 
mismatch in economic and legal indicators of NZA needs attention; a strong focus on the 
relationship between organisation and minister-principal affects autonomy negatively 
whereas the relationship with Parliament is neglected. Finally, the degrees of freedom in 
legislation for CFV are mitigated in practice, but economically little attention is given to 
the organisation, which generates other degrees of freedom. 
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18. Legal and economic control of assessed ZBOs  
In the previous two chapters, legal and economic variables determining formal and actual 
autonomy of selected income transfer and monitoring ZBOS have been evaluated. At the 
end of each chapter a short evaluation of the mismatches observed was given which 
allows the research question of this study to be answered:  
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
In principle, three answers can be given to the research question. First, a match between 
legal and economic control tools can be observed. Secondly, a mismatch can be based 
on strong legal control tools and relatively weak economic control tools. Third, a 
mismatch can be based on relatively weak legal control tools and strong economic 
control tools. Mismatches may be observed both in the formal legal and expected 
economic control tools on a ZBO, which covers a theoretical assessment. Mismatches 
can also be observed in the practical application of the control tools as they were set. The 
theoretical assessment of control tools has to be based on a standard which allows 
divergences to be observed.  I have developed a standard level of use of legal and 
economic control tools to determine autonomy for both the income transfer ZBOs and 
monitoring ZBOs studied.  
The standard for the legal control tools is derived from kZBO. The choice of kZBO 
rather than AW1996 is driven by the fact that kZBO intends to set a standard for new 
ZBOs and is also meant as a standard for existing ZBOs, although that requires changes 
in the existing (July 2007) ZBO case laws. The only differentiation made in kZBO is based 
on the legal status of a ZBO and this is included in the relevant standards for the 
individual ZBOs studied. Furthermore, the arrangement in kZBO on annulling ministerial 
decisions is not used as part of the standard for market regulator ZBOs because these 
types of ZBOs need to operate on an impartial basis. In general, kZBO covers normative, 
information, governance and cyclical issues. This covers a wide range of control tools 
which are not always relevant from an economic perspective. If mismatches between 
legal and economic control tools have to be assessed, only those legal control tools that 
aim at services provided and planning and control should be included in the assessment. 
Other control tools may affect autonomy as well but do not affect the economic position 
of a ZBO. For example, appointment of a board is not relevant from an economic 
perspective. 
From an economic perspective, market dimensions determine how production can be 
organised. The planning and control tools that are needed are determined by product 
characteristics as well as the market environment in which the individual ZBO delivers its 
services. Unlike the legal setting, this means that no uniform standard for all ZBOs can be 
laid down from an economic perspective. Although not perfect, the classification into five 
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groups of services (Smullen & Van Thiel, 2002) including relevant subgroups does allow 
standards to be set for (sub)groups of ZBOs. 
With respect to income transfer ZBOs, activity based budgeting, and standard cost centre 
responsibility types are expected to be the standard. Demand is generated on a citizen‟s 
request basis as funding is provided by government. As a logical result, planning and 
control will be performed on a frequent basis, at least to ministers, and not just at the 
budgeting and annual reporting stage. Parliament is to be informed on a yearly basis on 
issues regarding operations, which reflects the arm‟s length position of ZBOs. 
Performance information is likely to be available on an ex ante as well as ex post basis 
because income transfer decisions are at least measurable on an output or production 
level. The market and planning and control standards set for market regulation ZBOS are 
different. In a market regulation context, lump sum budgeting and complete cost centre 
responsibility centres related to State commissioning are the standards used. Impartiality 
is an important issue for monitoring institutions, which means that planning and control 
should allow for freedom in operations. As a result, less frequent reporting levels, public 
funding given the pure public good characteristics and process based rather than output 
based performance indicators can be expected.  The market regulator task also implies a 
bias towards ex post information given the degrees of freedom required to operate 
impartially. 
18.1 General conclusions 
The general conclusion on mismatches in economic and legal control is that most ZBOs 
tend to have less legal autonomy than economic autonomy, or in other words, legal 
controls are stronger than economic controls resulting in mismatches between the two 
sets of control tools. In only three cases is matching control actually observed (AFM, SVB, 
NMa) and in one case (AFM) design of control tools is balanced. Balanced control does 
not mean that control is in line with expected economic and legal standards; it merely 
means that increases and decreases in autonomy from a legal and economic perspective 
are balanced as a whole.  
The full answer to the research question therefore is that 3 cases show matching 
economic and legal control tools affecting autonomy to a similar extent and that in 8 
cases a mismatch is observed. 
Table 18.1 shows control bias as observed for the individual ZBOs, both on the level 
of design of control tools as well as on the level of practical application of the control 
tools. The table discloses only direction of control bias based on the relevant standards 
used. It does not disclose the relative position of autonomy of the individual ZBOs. In two 
of the three cases in which matching actual control is observed, control levels are higher 
than standards expected by design, thus reducing autonomy of that particular ZBO. In the 
third case – AFM – control levels are below standard levels, leading to an increase in 
autonomy.  
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Table 18.1: Control bias and level of control of ZBOs studied 
 economic control bias matching control legal control bias 
high level legal controls 
(decreasing autonomy) 
   
SVB 
NMA 
cvz 
rvr 
svb 
uwv 
nma 
nza 
CVZ 
RVR 
UWV 
NZA 
 
standard legal controls 
 
  afm   CFV 
low level legal controls 
(increasing autonomy) 
fbkvb 
cfv 
  
AFM 
 
pf/vf 
nak 
 
FBKVB 
PF/VF 
NAK 
 
standard level of control based on legal and economic characteristics of ZBO services 
xxx: designed position of ZBO related to standard position for ZBO type 
XXX: actual position of ZBO related to standard position for ZBO type 
 
In Figure 18.1 the position of the individual ZBOs on a scale of legal and economic 
autonomy is shown. Two things draw immediate attention. First, the PLB type ZBOs tend 
to have increased levels of autonomy from both a legal as well as from an economic 
perspective, above the standard design given the legal status and product characteristics 
of the services provided and in fact even beyond the levels of control as designed for the 
individual cases. These PLBs therefore have more autonomy compared to the standards 
by design and in practice even more autonomy. 
The assessment of PLA type ZBOs shows the reverse picture. All PLA-type ZBOs – 
except CFV - face restricted legal and economic autonomy with an actual legal control 
bias. In the CFV case a shift from an economic control bias to a legal control bias is 
observed due to the fact that the lack of formal regulation in the law is mitigated by 
practical arrangements. However low levels of disclosure of information, particularly 
towards Parliament result in increased autonomy on planning and control issues. 
The difference between PLA type and PLB type ZBOs is clearly observed with the 
income transfer type ZBOs (CVZ, RvR, SVB, UWV, FBKVB and Vf/Pf) as well as within the 
group of market regulators (AFM, NMa, NZA). The observations generally hold for the 
designed control levels as well as for the actually applied control levels for the individual 
ZBOs. It means that generally the design of control measure for income transfer ZBOs is 
based on a legally biased, more restrictive control for the PLA-type income transfer ZBOs 
and a legally biased, more permissive level of control for the PLB type income transfer 
ZBOs.  
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Designed position of ZBO related to standard position for ZBO-type; 
 Actual position of ZBO related to standard position for ZBO-type. 
1: CVZ; 2: RvR; 3: SVB; 4: UWV; 5: FBKVB; 6: Vf/Pf; 7: AFM; 8: CFV; 9: NAK; 10: NMa; 11: NZA 
Figure 18.1: Designed and actual autonomy of ZBOs studied based on market and 
planning and control autonomy factors. 
 
In the market regulator group, AFM shows an increased but balanced level of autonomy 
compared to standard levels of control whereas NMa also shows a matching but 
substantially more restrictive level of autonomy due to its Shelter rather than Subsidiary 
ZBO status. In the NZA case, a mismatch is observed with a legal control bias although 
control is less tight in practice than it is by design. This is mainly due to limited disclosure 
of information towards Parliament.  
In the last monitoring case – NAK – a legal control bias can be observed, but both 
economic as well as legal control tools are above standards for monitoring ZBOs. The 
main reason for this is that NAK‟s services are based on citizen demand rather than 
being commissioned by the state and/or on citizen request. 
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18.2 Autonomy of income transfer ZBOs 
The general observations stated above are based on an aggregated assessment of the 
individual ZBOs. On a more detailed level, legal control tools on market and planning and 
control for income transfer ZBOs tend to have a negative impact on the ZBOs studied. 
Most prominent control tools deviating from the kZBO standard used are found on three 
issues. First, additional control on equalisation reserves, ranging from not allowing them 
at all (UWV, SVB) to purely theoretical arrangements given the use of reserves (RvR). 
Second, approval of budgets is in some cases changed into determination of budgets as 
if the particular ZBO is subject to a hierarchy (RvR, CVZ) or is explicitly mentioned to 
Parliament, allowing for direct debates between Parliament and minister. Third, in some 
cases (CVZ, SVB, UWV) multiyear plans have to be submitted to the Minister-Principal 
which is also not required by kZBO. These observations hold for the designed as well as 
the actual dispositions. 
Three additional economic controls for income transfer ZBOs are found as well. First, 
although income transfers generally allow for measurable production and thus for activity 
based budgeting, actual practice shows that budgets tend to have a lump sum character. 
This is most visible in the RvR case where budget overruns have to be transferred to fixed 
financial assets on the balance sheet rather than as receivables. It also holds for SVB, 
UWV and CVZ; all three experience a strong focus on the defined level of the budget and 
in the CVZ case even on some separate parts of the budget. Second, and related to this 
funding method is the fact that responsibility centre types do not qualify as standard cost 
centres but as discretionary cost centres with an emphasis on compliance rather than on 
efficient production. A last issue to be mentioned is that in all income transfer cases, 
including the PLB type ZBOs, substantial numbers of documents were submitted to 
Parliament. UWV is clearly at the top of the list, both in number of documents as well as 
in number of questions submitted on operations. Relatively low numbers of questions 
were submitted on the PLB type ZBOs. 
Economic control tools that are less used than might be expected are budget 
instructions including expected service levels. Such instructions are possible given the 
measurable character of the services provided, but in only three cases are they used 
(RvR, SVB, UWV). The other three ZBOs are free to prepare a budget without substantial 
involvement by the minister-commissioner. In the CVZ case, interviewees even indicated 
that a budget instruction would conflict with CVZ‟s arm‟s length position. For Parliament, 
control on an ex ante basis is made difficult because only partial - if any – budgets are 
disclosed on the income transfer ZBOs. Parliament is generally not informed on approval 
of the ZBO budget by the Minister-Principal. Only in the case of SVB and UWV is the lack 
of availability of this control tool mitigated by setting up reporting alongside the formal 
budget documents. Budgets on operations by income transfer ZBOs are not always 
transparent. In an income transfer ZBO, two types of budgets exist: those for providing 
the services and those for the actual income transfers. In annual reports, the different 
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budgets are separately accounted for, but when allocating the budget, particularly in the 
PLBs, the separation between costs of operations and costs of programs is not available. 
The economic control tools used can be attributed to ministerial control tools and 
Parliamentary control tools, when information is supposed to be available to Parliament. 
The data shows that in general, economic control tools relevant for a minister are applied 
more restrictively than expected, except for budget instructions. Control tools towards 
Parliament generate more autonomy; disclosure of information towards Parliament is 
overall lower than expected, except for the issue of frequency of reporting which tends to 
be in line with the basic planning & control cycle towards Parliament. 
 
Finally, I recall a few remarkable issues on individual ZBOs. First, RvR is funded on the 
basis of a subsidy arrangement. This is from an operations perspective unusual as the 
character of the services delivered is based on a contracting out basis rather than a grant 
to reduce costs for citizens. Furthermore, a subsidy arrangement allows for appeals in the 
event of differing opinions which might be undesirable from a governance perspective. 
Although not formally set up as a subsidy relationship, the determination of budgets in 
the case of CVZ resulted in the start of an appeal procedure which shows that this is not 
purely a theoretical situation. Second, intervention in the event of negligence is a control 
tool of last resort, which has not been used within the timeframe of this study. However, 
costs of office leases did lead in the case of UWV to the dismissal of UWV‟s CEO in 2004 
(Parliament, 2004g). Third, in three cases (CVZ, RvR, FBKVB) detailed audit protocols 
were given which specify control levels for auditing the financial statements of ZBOs, 
including required levels of attention when auditing particular items. Even more 
remarkable perhaps is that minOCW behaves inconsistently: it prescribes a detailed audit 
protocol for FBKVB, but similar arrangements are not applied to Vf/Pf which is ultimately 
also funded by minOCW‟s contributions. Fourth, the differences between SVB and UWV, 
both operating under the same basic legislation, are due to the wider variety of services 
allowed for SVB and the high level of political attention given to UWV. Fifth, control tools 
within Vf/Pf show a wide variety. I already mentioned lack of budget instructions 
generating more autonomy, but neither budgets nor fees are reported to Parliament. On 
the other hand, minOCW submits an assessed annual report to Parliament and requires a 
high level of reporting frequency although once (program) fees have been set there is no 
longer any immediate budgetary impact on minOCW. It seems that the same holds for 
legal arrangements; sometimes additional controls are applied, on other issues, control is 
less strict. Compared to the other five income transfer ZBOs which show a clear positive 
or negative impact on autonomy, Vf/Pf‟s position is more ambiguous.  
 
Autonomy of PLA income transfer ZBOs is thus generally below expected levels given the 
product commercial characteristics of the services. Only in one case –SVB - is a balance 
between legal and economic control found, although at reduced levels of autonomy. 
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18.3 Autonomy of monitoring ZBOs 
As in the cases of income transfer ZBOs, autonomy of PLBs in the monitoring ZBO group 
is at a higher level than PLA autonomy. The key divergence of NAK can be explained by its 
role as a quality assurance institution rather than a market regulator or policy monitoring 
institution.  
Application of control tools within the monitoring ZBOs is more ambiguous than in the 
income transfer case. For NMa, both legal and economic control tools reduce autonomy; 
tools that affect autonomy positively are not found. The other two market regulators show 
an ambiguous set of applied control tools. For AFM, economic control tools show high 
levels of reporting to both Parliament as well as minister, but approval and disclosure of 
budgets and fees towards Parliament is not covered. From a legal perspective, audit 
protocols and strict regulation on statements of accounts and budgets are given. In the 
NZA case, legal control tens to be restrictive but economic controls are ambiguous. In this 
case, the ambiguity is found in strict control towards minVWS whereas control tools 
relevant for Parliament such as information on approval of budgets, fees and annual 
reports are not used. 
In the NAK and CFV case the general trend on both legal as well as on economic 
controls is positive; the only exception is the lack of competition in the NAK case which is 
legally implied.  
 
Control tools on monitoring ZBOs relevant for Parliament generally generate additional 
autonomy for the ZBOs selected; only frequency of reporting to Parliament shows a 
variety in applied controls. Reporting on AFM and NMa is frequent whereas for the other 
three ZBOs separate reporting is nothing more than what is found in the appendices on 
ZBOs in the budget and annual report documents of the Principal-Ministers. Information 
on approval of budgets or fees is generally not provided. Frequency of reporting to the 
minister is applied more frequently than expected standard levels, often on a quarterly 
basis or otherwise not aligned to the reporting frequency needed to fit in with the 
budgeting processes in Parliament. Another difference is found in responsibility centre 
types, which express less autonomy in two (NMa, NZA) of the three market regulator 
ZBOs. 
 
Finally, I will note some particular issues on individual ZBOs. First, in the case of CFV, 
legal autonomy seems to be high given the legislation, but practical arrangements as laid 
down in a departmental monitoring document mitigate these degrees of freedom. From 
an economic perspective, service characteristics do not require additional degrees of 
freedom, but in fact a high degree of freedom is provided given the funding system and 
the historical role of stakeholders other than minVROM within CFV. Second, it is 
remarkable that in a market regulation setting a detailed letter of instruction is 
submitted. This applies to NZA and is to some extent due to the two conflicting services to 
be provided. On the one hand NZA provides market regulation services, on the other 
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policy monitoring up to imposing fees on the medical sector. Third and also related to 
NZA, rules can apparently be ignored if needed. The procedure of providing financing by 
minVWS with respect to the new NZA offices is not in line with the basic rule that 
financing is provided by the State Treasury. Fourth, inconsistent policies on the use of 
staff set by political authorities have an impact on operations of a ZBO. This was brought 
to the fore by NZA which was confronted with a focus on reducing the hiring of 
consultants and maintaining relevant knowledge within the core organisation until fiscal 
2006. After that, the emphasis was on reducing core staff rather than consultants 
without a corresponding debate on tasks assigned which made hiring of staff more 
complex. Fifth, although annulment decisions are an instrument of last resort, some 
respondents indicated that a minister can use his powers to change arrangements prior 
to a possible formal annulling of a decision. Sixth, in the case of NAK, equalisation 
reserves are allowed up to a high level compared to other ZBOs or to the executive 
agency arrangement. This is due to uncertainties in demand on a yearly basis related to 
the agricultural sector in which production also depends on the weather during the 
growing season. 
 
From a perspective of the services provided, variation in the group of monitoring ZBOs is 
broader than in the income transfer group. CFV and NAK are part of different sub-groups 
within the monitoring group as a whole. In the market regulation group, variation should 
be low given service characteristics. In this case, the legal status of ZBOs is an indicator 
for the level of autonomy. In the NZA case, control is influenced by a mixture of regulatory 
and policy monitoring tasks in which, according to respondents, balance still has to be 
found given the fact that NZA is a relatively young organisation. 
18.4 Control by ministers 
The eleven ZBOs studied are controlled by seven Ministers-Principal; three Ministers-
Principal are responsible for two ZBOs. Only in the case of minSZW can it be argued that 
control of the respective ZBOs SVB and UWV is aligned. Two comments on this can be 
made. At the en of 2008 minSZW is Minister-Principal of only three full time ZBOs, which 
are all subject to the same legislation. Differences based on legislation are not found. The 
differences that were observed are due to the different market and political positions of 
SVB and UWV. The second remark regards control as Minister-Principal on SVB. MinSZW 
used a separate unit to control SVB from a principal perspective and left the 
commissioning role to the respective commissioning units inside or outside minSZW. In 
practice, the emphasis of the controlling unit is on the services provided by SVB on behalf 
of minSZW. Others are neglected once approval to provide the service has been given. 
This results in a risk of not having a full overview of all services provided by SVB. In a 
statement in Parliament, minJG however implied that he relied on the monitoring and 
controlling role of minSZW for the services provided by SVB. The question is whether 
Ministers-Commissioners can actually rely on minSZW‟s SVB monitoring function. 
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The other two Ministers-Principal, minOCW and minVWS are responsible for more ZBOs, 
with diverging legal frameworks as well as diverging service characteristics. Although 
differences in service characteristics may justify different control tools, it may also be that 
there is no reason for differences in control tools. At least five inconsistencies were 
observed. First, an inconsistency was observed in issuing budget instructions by minVWS. 
In the case of CVZ no budget instruction is provided. According to interviewees this is to 
ensure the arm‟s length position of CVZ. In the NZA case, a budget instruction is given, 
not only on the level of budgets and general instructions on programs but at a rather 
detailed level of the services to be provided in the new fiscal year. NZA‟s role as a market 
regulator suggests that the organisation is able to set its monitoring program impartially 
and independently but in actual fact this is overruled by the instructions from minVWS. 
The differences in arrangements are even more striking as they are set by the same 
Directorate General within minVWS acting as both principal and commissioner for the two 
ZBOs discussed.  
Second, minOCW sets a detailed audit protocol for the art funds including FBKVB. 
Although Vf/Pf has substantially more costs processed, such an audit protocol is not 
defined.  
Third, a more general inconsistency on separation of program budgets and operating 
budgets can be observed. Within the minOCW domain, both Vf/Pf as well as FBKVB have 
budgets which include costs of operations. The former IBGroep used a separation 
between program and operations budget. On a more general level, the same observation 
can be made. SVB, UWV and CVZ are separately controlled on operating budgets as was 
the case for IBGroep. In the case of CVZ this is most visible as CVZ‟s budget is funded by 
minVWS separately from the program budgets. SVB and UWV‟s budgets are funded by 
fees which makes the separation less visible. In the intermediate reports on SVB and 
UWV the focus is on costs of operations and results rather than the key program costs. 
For RvR, again budgets include costs of operations although in the details of minJus‟ 
budget proposal unit costs of operations can be found. The conclusion is that 
transparency on differences between costs of operations and costs of programs is not 
always available for income transfer ZBOs. This is even more remarkable as in the case of 
income transfer executive agencies, program costs are explicitly excluded.  
Fourth, ministers do not act consistently over time. In the appendix on ZBOs by 
minVROM in the 2007 annual report, approval of the 2008 budget and annual report are 
explicitly mentioned, a practice which was discontinued in the 2008 annual report of 
minVROM as well as in minWWI‟s report after the transfer of responsibility for CFV to 
minWWI. Similarly, minVWS discontinued its practice to assess the annual reports of its 
ZBOs with the argument that kZBO made this obsolete but ignoring the still extant legal 
requirement to do so.  
Fifth, another inconsistency when comparing ZBOs and executive agencies is the level 
of the equalisation reserves. I have indicated that minVWS restricts the level of 
equalisation reserves by decree to a maximum of 5% of the budget for a fiscal year. The 
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general rule on executive agencies, including those under minVWS is however 5% on the 
average budget over three years. An explicit motivation for this difference was not given. 
An interviewee suggested that this might have be based on historical reasons. 
 
The discussion on the autonomy of ZBOs is concluded with a best practices comment. 
The debate on ZBOs is a debate on ministerial control, authority and services provided, 
but also a debate on the opportunities for Parliament to use its right to authorise budgets 
and the information required to do so. The arrangement in kZBO to submit ZBO annual 
reports directly to Parliament is a formal expression of the request for information by 
Parliament. However, MPs who were consulted in the context of this study also 
mentioned information overload. The appendices in departmental budget documents and 
annual reports are a form of finding a balance between information overload and relevant 
information. It seems that the solution used by minFin to provide summarised 
performance and financial information within the appendix is a form that provides that 
balance, although information, particularly on the balance sheet, is still missing. This is 
an issue explicitly referred to by the NCA (Parliament, 2006a). Irrespective of the reasons 
for the variation in autonomy as observed in this study, the practice used by minFin can 
contribute to more transparency and improved political understanding of what might be 
labelled an arm‟s length black box delivering public services. After all, one of the main 
reasons for introducing kZBO was political primacy on public services. The new law does 
not achieve these expectations given the divergences from the standards shown here but 
perhaps the more pragmatic information solutions might contribute more substantially. 
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19. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study I have assessed the operational autonomy of a Dutch type of arm's length 
organisations, Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen (ZBOs) from a legal and economic 
perspective. The research question in this study is: 
 
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
 
In the following sections, I will address the relevance of ZBOs and the background to the 
research question. Then I will discuss the methodology used to carry out the research 
project. The actual research project is discussed in sections 19.4 till 19.6. The chapter is 
concluded with an assessment of results and an outlook for future research. 
19.1 Role of ZBOs in Dutch National Government. 
Dutch central government has, like many other governments in the last three decades, 
discussed and implemented a variety of options of privatisation and autonomisation of 
activities that were previously managed within the hierarchical structure of ministries.  
ZBOs are organisations that operate on behalf of central government and deliver 
unilaterally binding decisions given a task and program description set by Parliament and 
ministers, in an organisational setting outside the hierarchical structure of central 
government. This theoretically means that they have more degrees of operational 
management freedom than purely hierarchical units within a ministry which provide 
similar services. Most ZBOs have a public law structure (Public Law Administrations; PLA; 
OECD, 2002, p. 19). Private law based ZBOs do also exist, mostly for historical reasons. 
They are labelled as Private Law Bodies (PLB). 
In many western countries (except Scandinavia; Statskontoret, 2001), creating at 
arm's length entities really started in the 1980s under fiscal pressure and new emerging 
theories on public (financial) management. In the Netherlands, this period was also used 
to re-assess the organisation of service delivery by central government resulting in new 
organisational structures. In the Dutch political context in which corporatist elements and 
organisation of activities within separate religious groups has been an important factor, 
the use of arm's length organisations – including what is now labelled a ZBO, was 
practiced even before World War II. After the war, the development of the welfare state 
led to an increase in government services including an increase in the use of ZBOs (Van 
Thiel, 2000).  
 
The relevance of ZBOs for government can be illustrated based on a variety of indicators. 
First, although the definition of a ZBO seems unambiguous, different publications provide 
different numbers of ZBOs in existence, ranging from over 100 (e.g. Parliament, 2008b) 
to over 600 (Van Thiel, 2009). These differences arise from differences over time, but 
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more importantly from different interpretations as to what is to be counted. Some 
publications count every single organisation which is classified as a ZBO; others group 
together organisations that provide the same type of activities and then start counting. In 
my case, I have used a reference list provided by minBZK on the Internet on July 1 2007. 
This list does not treat all cases equally. Some ZBOs are grouped; others - which might be 
grouped - are listed separately. After modifying the list to produce a more consistent 
grouping of organisations, I ended up with a list of 128 ZBOs, which are associated with 
all central government ministries. 
Another relevant issue is the impact of ZBOs on government budgets. Again estimates 
vary, depending on what is included. A wide definition of financial relevance includes both 
program costs to be processed by ZBOs (particularly in case of income transfers) as well 
as operating costs of the organisations (to put it simply: cost of staff). In the wide 
definition, and based on the 2006 annual reports, estimated total ZBO costs are some 
€80 billion, which is approximately 15% of Dutch GDP and some 40% of total national 
government spending. Using a restricted definition which only focuses on operating costs, 
these same annual reports result in an estimate of some €7 billion, just below the 
estimated operating costs of executive agencies (n=38 in 2006). Unambiguous estimates 
of numbers of staff at ZBOs are not available, but an estimate of 56,000 (Parliament, 
2007a, p. 4) seems plausible given estimates on numbers of staff in executive agencies 
(Kraan, 2006, p. 226). 
ZBOs cannot be ignored, either in number or in financial relevance within the 
structure of central government. To put it differently, it is sufficiently relevant to discuss 
controlling ZBOs in Parliament.  
19.2 The background to the research problem. 
The label ZBO was first used by Scheltema in 1974, when he drew attention to a lack of 
organisational legal framework for these organisations.  This remained the case until 
1995 when ZBOs became a serious issue on the political agenda: the key theme was 
insufficient political accountability. A Netherlands Court of Audit [NCA] report in 1995 
(Parliament, 1995a) led to reconsidering the general institutional arrangements. By 
2009, the NCA concluded that ministries had managed to organise improved control 
tools, but accountability issues at the political level have still not been solved (Parliament, 
2009b). 
 
The issue of accountability is however difficult to manage if service delivery standards are 
not made explicit. For Parliament ministry budget documents are the main source of 
information on ZBOs. These documents are also the basis on which to set budgets when 
a ZBO is fully funded by government. In particular, ZBOs that are not fully funded by 
government are beyond ex ante financial control by Parliament. This is what initially 
triggered this study: how does Parliament control ZBOs when budgets are not even 
disclosed in the budget authorisation process? In the early preparation stage of the study, 
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it appeared that the variety in services provided by ZBOs as well as types of ZBOs 
required an assessment of the control tools available to Parliament that are in line with 
the characteristics of the different types of ZBOs.  
The emphasis on control by Parliament implies that using an organisation and 
management or a public administration perspective on the reasons for creating a ZBO 
cannot provide an answer to the research problem. ZBO operations are determined by 
the legal restrictions that are set when the organisation is created as well as the tasks 
assigned and the economic dimensions that are related to executing these tasks. The two 
legal and economic frameworks can be used to develop an expected standard set of 
control tools given the characteristics of the services delivered by a ZBO. These standards 
can be compared to both the formal standards set for an individual ZBO as well as to the 
actual use of the controls in practice. This is expected to hold for the legal control tools as 
well as the economic control tools. However, if legal standards and economic standards 
set do not correlate with each other, this might result in conflicts in actual ZBO operations 
and ambiguity in the use of controls by Parliament and minister. An assessment of 
matching control arrangements should be based on similarities in legal and economic 
measures. It is not useful to try and find a mismatch between a legal control such as 
appointment of the board of a ZBO with economic control tools because there is no 
economic equivalent of a rule on appointments. Therefore, the focus is on those control 
tools that are relevant for the services to be provided (market characteristics) and for 
planning and control. That does not mean that normative legal control tools do not affect 
autonomy. Ministerial influence and thus impact on ZBO autonomy changes if a minister 
has the power to appoint and dismiss ZBO board members. By testing whether or not 
economic and legal standards match in individual cases these problems can be revealed. 
Figure 19.1 visualises the idea of matching autonomy. On the central point, a full match 
between economic and legal autonomy exists based on the standard level of autonomy 
derived for a particular type of ZBO. If formal and actual autonomy move along the 
diagonal line, there is still a match, only at a higher or lower level of autonomy than was 
expected from the standard. If however formal and actual autonomy are not on the 
diagonal line, then a mismatch is observed. Two options exist: first, above the diagonal 
line, legal autonomy is at a higher level than economic autonomy, which means that 
management has more degrees of freedom than the economic characteristics of a 
particular ZBO allow for. If a ZBO is positioned below the diagonal line, then the legal 
framework restricts management more than is required given the economic 
characteristics of the services provided by that ZBO. To put it into political terms: if a ZBO 
is positioned above the diagonal, politicians have either deliberately set legal autonomy 
at a higher level than expected based on the standards or are not aware of a mismatch 
between economic and legal autonomy. Below the diagonal line, legal control tools 
restrict the autonomy more than might be expected given the characteristics of services, 
again either deliberately or accidentally. On the diagonal line, matching control exists but 
at higher or lower levels than expected. 
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Figure 19.1: Match in legal and economic autonomy of ZBOs 
 
Studies on the legal dimensions of the use of ZBOs and particularly on the neo-
institutional economic dimensions of ZBOs have previously been performed (e.g. Zijlstra, 
1997; Kummeling et al, 1999; Van Leerdam, 1999). On a more general level such 
studies also exist for similar organisations in other (western) jurisdictions (e.g. Barker, 
1982; OECD, 2002). This study contributes to knowledge on ZBOs as it explicitly uses a 
combination of two different sets of knowledge and as a result generates a 
multidisciplinary approach to the use of (a specific form of) organising and providing 
government services at arm's length of the traditional hierarchical structures.  
19.3 Methodology 
The study focuses on operations of ZBOs. A literature study from both a legal and 
economic perspective is used to find relevant indicators for autonomy of ZBOs. Other 
lines of literature provide references for classification and structuring the group of ZBOs 
into similar groups of entities. This grouping enables standards to be developed from a 
legal and economic perspective to assess formal and actual autonomy of the individual 
ZBOs that were selected in the empirical part of the study. 
Based on the knowledge retrieved from the literature, a multiple case study design 
based on a stratified sample was used. This choice was driven by the fact that given the 
size and variety within the population a random sample would not allow general 
conclusions to be drawn. A single case study might have resulted in a more detailed 
description of that individual case but does not allow cases to be compared. By 
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controlling the cases on the main variable „type of services delivered‟, I was able to 
assess whether or not ZBOs providing similar tasks are faced with similar controls from 
the political system. Another reason for a case study design is found in the fact that 
although several studies on ZBOs have been published, these studies generally focus on 
a mono-disciplinary approach, for example purely from a legal or an economic 
perspective. Finally, preparing and executing a survey on the population as a whole would 
probably give an indication of perceived – not observed - autonomy by respondents and 
does not provide the level of detail that can be achieved with case study research. 
Ultimately, I have selected 11 cases within 2 groups of ZBOs (Income Transfers and 
Monitoring). The selection is based on the relevance of the individual groups of ZBOs in 
numbers, financial relevance and a variety in legal status. The individual cases were not 
selected randomly but based on creating sufficient variety within the groups.  
 
The research design is based on data triangulation using different research techniques. I 
started with a description of the field of ZBOs based on a list provided by the Minister of 
the Interior (minBZK) on the Internet as of 1st July 2007. Based on that list, I have 
searched the Internet for annual reports for the ZBOs listed. The list of 1st July 2007 
serves two purposes: (1) mapping the field of ZBOs and (2) defining a starting position for 
actual research by using the relevant regulations and measures in place on that date as a 
framework for assessing ZBO autonomy.  
Actual research is based on a literature study identifying of legal and economic 
variables that affect ZBO control and autonomy. Based on the variables identified, a 
semi-structured questionnaire was developed which is the basis for interviews with 
respondents from within ZBOs as well as from the ministries which have political 
responsibility for ZBO operations. At the ZBO level, respondents were interviewed involved 
in the interaction between ministry and management of the ZBO. At ministry level, 
generally staff from the key financial unit and staff from the relevant policy area were 
interviewed. Interview protocols were produced and then approved by the respondents. 
To obtain an idea on Parliamentary opinions regarding the issue of controlling ZBOs, I 
arranged interviews with Members of Parliament. Their opinions can be used to explain 
some findings, but do not determine the actual assessment of the formal and actual 
autonomy observed from the other data. 
Along with the interviews, a set of (internal) documents regarding planning & control 
on the ZBO were studied. These documents included instructions by ministries and 
proposed ZBO budgets. They provide additional information on formal and actual levels of 
control. A last set of documents regards the documents submitted to Parliament on the 
ZBOs selected. These documents reveal what is regarded as relevant for control by 
Parliament or, when documents are submitted to Parliament by (in)direct request of 
Parliament, on the political emphasis made on operational control of the selected ZBOs.  
All data found was scored on the legal and economic variables derived from the 
literature study. The research was based on data from fiscal 2007 and 2008. The ZBO 
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population changes regularly and some of the ZBOs mentioned in the study no longer 
exist. The ZBOs that are covered in the case studies still exist as of mid-2010 and in only 
one case (UWV) has there been a substantial change in tasks assigned  However this 
does not affect Parliamentary control on this ZBO.  
Internal validity was ensured as far as possible by guaranteeing anonymity for the 
respondents, although it cannot be excluded that in some cases politically driven answers 
were given. External validity was realised by creating a short time frame in which all 
interviews were held and to focus on the last fiscal year that had been concluded in 
Parliament. As there has been no change in political views on ZBOs in the last few years, 
the observed results can be regarded as valid up to mid-2010. 
19.4 The legal dimension of ZBO control 
Control of ZBOs from a legal perspective means that formal regulations and distribution 
of powers (authority) is discussed. The research question in Part B of the study was:  
Which indicators for autonomy can be derived from legal theory and how 
do they match control of ZBO operations? 
The Dutch legal framework does not include the concept of „autonomy‟. Therefore 
indicators have to be derived from legislation in general. In the Dutch constitutional 
setting, ministerial responsibility is a key issue. A minister holds office until he loses a 
vote of confidence. The minister is held accountable for all acts with respect to the 
ministry he is hierarchically leading. In case of arm‟s length organisations outside the 
hierarchical structure there is no full responsibility. The minister is then accountable for: 
a) acts with respect to the responsibilities attributed, b) system responsibility implying 
monitoring and intervention when necessary and c) individual actions towards the entity. 
 
With respect to the issue of ministerial responsibility and autonomy of ZBOs, in fact four 
sources of indicators exist. First, budgeting legislation is the reflection of one of the key 
powers of Parliament: allocation, authorisation and appropriation of budgets. Second, 
ZBOs operate in a public sector environment; therefore a discussion on general public 
law measures must be included. The cluster of legislation also includes civil law given the 
fact that some ZBOs have private entity legal status. Furthermore, civil law covers 
elements of contracting arrangements which might also be relevant for ZBOs. Finally, the 
ZBO-case law is relevant.  ZBO-case law is not a separate dimension but the reflection of 
the will of Parliament on distribution of authority and the tasks assigned to the ZBO. 
Although ZBO case law finalises the formal arrangements on ZBOs, I have made a 
distinction in the discussion on general legal measures and the legal framework in 
individual cases. The individual legal frameworks of ZBOs are only discussed in the 
empirical Part D of this study. 
 
In budgeting law (Comptabiliteitswet 2001; CW2001) a major rule is that a budget 
passed by Parliament only has effect within the hierarchy of the State. A minister cannot 
  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   413 
 
claim that he is out of budget when an individual or institution applies for a service. This 
doctrine also holds in the relationship between minister and ZBO. Thus authorisation of a 
ZBO budget by Parliament does not ensure that the budget is a maximum spending level. 
Furthermore, developments in budgeting methods, particularly to forms of outcome 
based budgeting as expressed in the Dutch VBTB system have resulted in a less detailed 
level of budgets being submitted to Parliament. A ZBO budget might be disclosed 
separately, but it is also possible that it is hidden in a larger budget or that no budget is 
authorised at all. The latter case occurs when a ZBO is fully funded by fees from citizens 
and fees are not authorised by Parliament. As a result, the budgetary control tool is 
relatively blunt. 
Budgeting law includes measures to create private law legal entities. Parliament is 
notified of a proposal to create an entity and can either require that a law is passed or 
accepts the proposal from the minister. Creating a public law entity always requires a law 
to be passed in Parliament. Except for some financing and treasury measures no other 
rules are provided in CW2001. To some extent this is remarkable because no ex ante 
assessment is performed on an organisation before it is given autonomous status as a 
ZBO to look at its readiness to adopt the relevant (accruals) accounting techniques and 
control tools.  
In general, one can claim that autonomy from a budgeting law perspective can be 
derived from three issues: a) the level of detail of disclosure and authorisation of the 
ZBO‟s budget, b) particularly when budgets are based on measurable production: control 
on cost prices, investments and production volume; and finally c), the restrictions 
imposed upon the ZBO on treasury issues which also negatively affect a ZBO‟s autonomy. 
 
The second line of legislation is general public law. ZBOs were not mentioned in the 
Constitution or as separate legal entities in formal law until end 2006. In that year a 
framework law on ZBOs finally passed through Parliament after more than ten years of 
debate. One can split the assessment of general public law into three stages. The first 
stage started with Scheltema‟s inaugural speech in 1974 when he first explicitly 
addressed the issue. At this point all ZBO regulations were actually ZBO case laws. After 
the NCA‟s critical report in 1995, ZBOs became firmly embedded in the political agenda. 
In 1996 this was reflected in a separate section on instructions for writing legislation 
(AW1996). New ZBO-case law had to be based on these instructions which included 
measures on normative, cyclical and governance issues as well as information provision 
(Kummeling et al., 1999, p. 39). In particular the cyclical and governance measures 
include options that may or may not be included in ZBO-case laws. These measures are 
the basic tools for distributing authority between a minister and the management of a 
ZBO. If few options are included in the ZBO-case law, ZBO management autonomy will 
increase. In 2006, a formal framework law (Kaderwet ZBO; kZBO) was passed. The law 
applies to newly created ZBOs. Existing ZBOs may be subject to the new law if Parliament 
and minister decide to do so. Ministers had a one year time span to decide on the 
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position of existing ZBOs, which in practice meant that they had to comply or explain why 
not on individual cases. This process was monitored by a committee of civil servants 
(Gerritsen Committee, 2008). Basically, all PLAs are subject to kZBO, unless a change in 
the positioning or tasks assigned to a PLA is expected in the near future. PLB-type ZBOs 
are also supposed to be subject to kZBO; the main exception being companies that 
provide ZBO services as only a very small part of their core business. Within the 
population of 128 ZBOs as used in this study, 56 are subject to kZBO, the others are not. 
The ZBOs not subject to kZBO are mainly reconsideration and discontinuation cases (34 
ZBOs) or ZBOs that are no longer listed by the Ministry of the Interior (21 ZBOs).  In all 
cases where kZBO is not immediately applied, old legislation is still applicable. The kZBO 
legislation has fewer options for distributing authority than the former AW1996, which 
means that in general ZBO autonomy has been reduced. However, as adoption of ZBO-
case law is based on a „comply or explain‟ rule, it is still possible that exceptions will be 
made for particular measures as described in kZBO. Actual distribution of authority as 
laid down in the ZBO-case law therefore determines the level of autonomy of an individual 
ZBO. 
 
The third line of legislation of relevance for ZBO autonomy  is Civil Law. The basic rule is 
that a ZBO has PLA status. PLA status can be obtained in two ways: first, a separate unit 
as part of the legal entity State is created. Such a unit is attributed operational autonomy 
but for its budgeting procedures is fully subject to the standards used for ministries. This 
form of PLA is labelled a „Shelter‟ ZBO and is generally used for relatively small units 
where it would be inefficient to set up a full organisational structure. The second group of 
PLAs have separate legal entity status and are labelled „Subsidiary‟ ZBOs because their 
position vis a vis a principal-ministry is similar to that of a company operating under a 
holding structure.  A public legal entity is created by law, which means that Parliament 
has to give consent to a proposal by a minister in which the governance structure of the 
new public law legal entity is described. This means that in theory Parliament has full 
control on the issues to be included in the governance structure of the new entity and can 
thus influence the distribution of authority and in effect the level of autonomy of the PLA 
type ZBO.  
In addition to PLA‟s there is another group of ZBOs which are created based on 
private law. The role of Parliament in creating a PLB is less prominent than in case of a 
PLA. If a minister proposes creating a private law legal entity, Parliament is given the 
opportunity to comment or require legislation. If not, the implicit assumption is that the 
minister is allowed to create the private law legal entity. The governance structure for 
Enterprise ZBOs (private companies) is given in civil law and is basically shareholder 
driven. In the case of Foundation ZBOs (no shareholders, no distribution of profit) the 
governance structure as laid down in the statutes is fully at the discretion of those who 
create the entity. Depending on the involvement of a minister when creating a Foundation 
ZBO, one can argue that the autonomy of a Foundation ZBO fully created by a minister is 
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lower than that of a Foundation ZBO which was created by individuals with some kind of 
ministerial backing. 
Creating a new entity and attributing a ZBO status to it is not the only way in which an 
entity is included within the ZBO framework. It is possible that an already existing private 
law entity  provides public services. If the governance structure of such a private entity 
changes into a governance structure with substantial control tools for a minister-principal, 
this is referred to as „hiving in‟ of an entity. Hiving in is a concept that is relevant for 
entities whose governance structure is changed towards more political control. If the 
services provided have a ZBO character of unilateral decision making, this means that 
they might also be subject to the ZBO framework. Several ZBOs have been hived in in the 
past, including some which are discussed in this study. 
 
Another issue related to the legal structure is whether or not a minister allows a non-
executive board and advisory board to be used in the governance structure of the ZBO. 
Non-vertical governance structures may contribute to accountability of arm‟s length 
organisations. These measures do not live up to the expectations of replacing vertical 
governance structures (Schillemans, 2005, 2007). In the past, several ZBOs used non-
vertical governance structures and kZBO includes the power to use such structures. In 
practice, the trend following implementation of kZBO is that ministers have tried to 
abolish formal multi-layer governance structures because they might negatively affect 
ministerial influence (Gerritsen Committee, 2008).  
 
A last point to be made refers to contracting relations. ZBOs provide services on a legal 
basis to several users. Depending on issues of measurability one can compare the 
provision of ZBO services with contract relations. If such a contract relationship is 
essentially a contract between ZBO and ministry as commissioner, funder and user, then 
the ZBO is faced with lower autonomy compared to the case where a ZBO provides a 
service to a citizen who is also paying for the service and using it. In the first case 
budgetary control is driven by the resources available to the ministry, whereas in the 
second case a flexible budget exists, which is based on actual citizen demand. 
 
To summarise the legal perspective on autonomy, four main points are relevant: what is 
the legal status of a ZBO, which control tools are defined in CW2001, what kind of quasi 
contracts on service delivery exist and how is the distribution of authority between 
minister and management settled. 
19.5 The economic dimension of ZBO control 
Whereas distribution of authority affecting autonomy is an issue that is formalised in 
legislation and lower regulations, autonomy is also influenced by characteristics of 
services and the economic environment in which these services are delivered. After all, 
providing ZBO services is not an issue of a free private market, but part of decisions 
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made in the political sphere on the production and delivery of these services. The 
research question in Part C of the study was:  
Which indicators for autonomy can be derived from economic theory and 
how do they match control of ZBO operations? 
Three main issues are covered in the economic dimension of control. First, Neo 
Institutional Economics [NIE] is discussed, followed by comments on the product 
characteristics of services delivered by ZBOs. The third issue concerns market 
characteristics of the services provided. Product and market characteristics result in a 
particular planning and control system appropriate to these characteristics. That planning 
and control system may formally and/or actually exist, perhaps with deviations from 
expected control tools. An assessment on setting up and using planning and control 
systems in the relationship between Parliament, Minster-Principal and ZBO is the last 
step in evaluating economic control tools. 
I will start with some comments on the theoretical framework on the economic 
perspective of service provision by ZBOs as based on Neo Institutional Economics [NIE] 
theories. The general object of study in this theory is that institutional arrangements 
provide for efficient production if the different interests of owners and managers of 
organisations are aligned as far as possible.  
In NIE, the concepts principal and agent are often used. These concepts are also used 
in a public administration context and have a slightly different meaning in this field of 
literature. In brief, the original principal - agent debate is on the unaligned interests of 
shareholder(s) and managers due to information differences. In public administration 
theories the principal is often actually the commissioner or consumer of services who has 
less information than the provider of the service. This is illustrated in the relationship 
between a doctor and a patient, where the patient is the principal and the doctor the 
agent. In a public sector context the politically responsible person often has two roles: 
one as „quasi‟ owner of the organisation (Minister-Principal) and one as commissioner 
and sometimes even consumer of a service. This creates confusion and therefore I have 
used the original interpretation and use „owner‟ or Minister-Principal when referring to the 
institution/person that bears the risk for services to be produced by the organisation and 
is not responsible for demand for services. The latter institution/person is labelled 
„commissioner‟. 
Neo Institutional Economics consists of three main lines of theory, all of which can 
contribute to an assessment of ZBO autonomy. First, „property rights theory‟ claims that 
efficient production will be stimulated when management of an organisation has as much 
control as possible on the productive assets of the organisation. Having full property 
rights („abusus‟) by management indicates a higher level of autonomy than a mere „usus‟ 
right which allows assets to be used but not to benefit from the returns they provide. An 
abusus right has risks from a general interest control perspective for two reasons: 1) 
without regulations there is no control on residual income and 2) financing of assets by a 
non-government institution is generally more expensive than financing government. 
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Therefore, if a ZBO is allowed to finance its assets on the capital market, this will result in 
additional use of public resources due to higher interest rates. Without restrictions on 
abusus rights a ZBO by Parliament, the power of re-allocating resources is handed over to 
management of the ZBO. 
The second line of theory is „transaction cost theory‟. This theory focuses on the 
perspective of optimal production structures between organisations, or in other words 
should an organisation produce particular services within the organisation or should it 
outsource production. Three issues are relevant when making this choice. First, „asset 
specificity‟ is an indication for mutual dependency between organisations. If techniques 
or knowledge are not freely available on the market a mutual dependency between 
organisations exists and theory suggests that it might be better to integrate production. In 
terms of ZBO autonomy, high levels of asset specificity give negotiating power to ZBO‟s 
management and thus a higher level of autonomy can be observed. The second issue is 
uncertainty. If uncertainty is high, it is very costly to monitor production outside your own 
organisation; production processes can be adjusted more efficiently within the 
organisation. The last point is frequency of transactions. If you rarely produce a particular 
type of service, maintaining the knowledge within your organisation is costly and probably 
a specialised firm can provide the service at lower cost. High uncertainty and high 
frequency of transactions are indications for a need to integrate production. However, a 
ZBO is deliberately set at arm‟s length of government but sometimes produces a 
substantial volume of standardised services which would suggest service provision 
should not be outsourced. To manage uncertainty and frequency risks, more control 
instruments in the relationship between minister and ZBO can be expected. 
The third line of theory is „agency theory‟. The key concept here is the possible abuse 
of information asymmetry that exists between owner and manager of an organisation, be 
it only due to time lag. Again several control tools can be used to reduce the risks. If 
regulations –legal controls - are used, this directly affects the discretionary powers of 
management and may negatively affect efficient production. Therefore, control tools like 
persuasion and incentives are proposed, which do not have a negative effect on 
managerial autonomy but result in improved alignment between the interests of owner 
and managers. Applied to ZBOs, this means that a ZBO in which control tools other than 
directives are used has relatively greater autonomy than a ZBO where directives are the 
main control tool. 
 
Neo institutional theory concerns relationships between organisations. A second 
important issue affecting operational autonomy are production characteristics. Two 
issues are relevant from a production characteristics perspective. First, production 
processes are relevant. Control tools used for mass production processes tend to be 
impersonal and based on regulation. If production processes result in (professional) unit 
production, control tools governing staff are more important than regulations. Second, 
measurability of production is relevant. If production can be measured, this allows for 
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relatively unsophisticated control tools and low transaction costs. If production cannot be 
measured other, more complex control tools have to be used which have a negative 
effect the level of transaction costs. 
 
Third, demand and supply for services was discussed. I will start with demand. Public 
finance literature distinguishes between public goods, impure public goods and market 
goods. A pure public good is non-excludable and non-rival. No person can be excluded 
from using the service and an additional user does not harm the use by all other users. 
Impure public goods and market goods may allow for forms of funding other than general 
taxes, particularly when the service is attributable to individual users. The question on 
generating demand was discussed in the legal section of this study from a contracting 
perspective, ranging from full state demand to free market demand. From a funding 
perspective, if a citizen is at least requesting a service, forms of citizen funding are 
possible. The general idea behind user funding is that only those who actually benefit 
from a service pay for it. The economic literature uses a wide variety of labels for different 
forms of funding by citizens. The bottom line of the variety addressed is based on the 
distinction between „authority biased‟ funding in cases where a fee is charged for a non-
reciprocal service without a direct relation between payment and service and „market 
biased‟ funding – generally where output budgets are used - in which case there is a 
direct relationship between service delivered and payment. An example of authority 
biased funding is found in monitoring fees paid by financial institutions to the Dutch 
central bank (DNB); an example of a market biased funding is found in the registration 
fee to be paid for motor vehicle registration to RDW. A ZBO that is able to generate 
market biased funding will in general have a higher level of autonomy than a ZBO that is 
generating authority biased funding or fully depends on a ministry budget for its funding.  
From a supply side perspective, the dichotomy between integrated government 
production and fully private production no longer holds. Government can use the market 
for several parts of the production process. Boorsma and Mol (1983) identified three 
intermediate stages of production. First, contract provision in which government funds 
and plans production but production itself is performed outside government, for example 
in a ZBO. Second, grant provision where government only funds production and third, 
regulated provision in which government only plans production. ZBO autonomy is 
influenced by these different production arrangements. In contract provision government 
control is relatively high and thus autonomy is low, whereas in cases of regulated 
provision and particularly what is labelled „start-up‟ grant provision, government control is 
relatively low and thus autonomy of a ZBO is relatively high. Not all forms of production as 
described here are applicable to all ZBOs or to all forms of demand. For example a start 
up grant given to a PLA is highly unlikely given the legal status of the ZBO. The impact on 
autonomy holds for all ZBOs. 
In terms of autonomy, non government funded ZBOs are expected to have the highest 
level of autonomy. Within non government funded ZBOs, those which are funded with a 
  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   419 
 
market biased fee are expected to have a higher level of autonomy than those which are 
funded by an authority biased fee. Traditional government funding is expected to result in 
a low level of autonomy. 
 
The last issue discussed from an economic perspective are the control tools available to 
minister and Parliament. I will highlight some issues here. First, Verhoest (2002) 
addressed the issue of co-ordination between commissioners of an organisation in the 
case of multiple commissioners. This is an issue that is relevant in the case of ZBOs 
because in most cases a minister has two roles: both owner and commissioner of the 
organisation. In a number of cases, it is possible that the commissioner role in particular 
is performed by more than one minister, which requires co-ordination and prioritising. 
Lack of co-ordination generates degrees of freedom and thus management autonomy.  
A second point to be addressed from a control perspective is the concept of 
responsibility accounting as used in private sector companies with separate divisions. 
There are similarities between divisionally organised companies and the relationship 
between minister and ZBO. This allows using a modified form of the responsibility 
accounting model for assessing relative autonomy of a ZBO. If a ZBO is only allowed to 
manage a fixed cost budget, this means strict control and thus low levels of autonomy. If 
a ZBO is allowed to manage costs and revenues and has nearly full control over available 
assets, the level of autonomy is high. 
A third and last point to be made from a control perspective is the mismatch between 
accounting systems used, which might have an impact on the level of production 
delivered by a ZBO or on a ZBO‟s balance sheet. This issue is relevant in the case of 
government funding and strict application of a fixed budget for the ZBO. In that case, 
demand that exceeds planned demand cannot be met by supply due to a lack of financial 
resources. This might result in waiting lists or if that is not possible, debt financing 
needed for the additional resources in combination with high levels of receivables on the 
balance sheet. It is obvious that a ZBO faced with restrictions as described here faces a 
lower level of autonomy than a ZBO which is at least allowed to be funded directly with a 
flexible budget.  
 
When summarising the economic perspective of autonomy, four points are relevant. First 
NIE provides a general theoretical framework for managing relations between Parliament 
and Minister on the one hand and ZBO on the other. Second, from a production 
perspective, production characteristics and the resulting variety for (budgetary) control 
are relevant. Third, the market perspective provides indicators for autonomy based on the 
origin of demand and corresponding funding of services. The organisation of supply can 
also be used as an indicator. Finally, from a control perspective the idea of responsibility 
accounting and possible mismatches in accounting systems have an impact on ZBO 
autonomy. 
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19.6  Formal and actual autonomy of ZBOs studied 
The last part of the research is the assessment of the legal and economic autonomy of 
11 ZBOs selected from within the „income transfer‟ and „monitoring‟ groups of ZBOs. The 
research question for this part of the study was:  
Do Parliament’s control tools match the control tools that fit to the legal 
and economic characteristics of ZBO services? 
Because income transfer ZBOs and monitoring ZBOs have different characteristics, I first 
developed a standard for assessing the autonomy of these two groups of ZBOs. This 
standard is based on the kZBO framework for the legal perspective, with some variation 
in ministerial power to intervene. The legal framework allows formal and actual autonomy 
to be discussed, based on kZBO and the actual findings and behaviour based on ZBO 
case law.  
The economic framework enables a standard to be derived given the economic 
characteristics of the services provided, but this can only be derived by evaluating 
specific economic characteristics. Therefore, my standard for an economic assessment of 
autonomy is labelled „expected‟ rather than formal autonomy and is then compared to 
the actual behaviour of owners, commissioners and agents in relation to ZBO operations. 
As stated before, only controls that affect market position and planning and control result 
in possible mismatches in legal and economic autonomy. From a legal perspective, 
normative and governance controls particularly have an effect on autonomy but it is hard 
to qualify such control tools in terms of mismatches between legal and economic control 
tools. In Table 19.1 I have summarised the standards on markets and planning and 
control used to assess autonomy of income transfer and monitoring ZBOs. 
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Table 19.1: Expected standard measures determining autonomy of ZBOs 
Variable Income transfer 
ZBOs 
Monitoring ZBOs 
Governance issues   
Ex ante approval mandates (kZBO:8) Yes Yes 
Approval kZBO:32 transactions No No 
Intervention in case of negligence (kZBO:11) Yes Yes 
Nullification of decisions (kZBO:22) Yes No 
Approval of governance statute (kZBO:11) Yes Yes 
Appointment of executive board (kZBO:12) Yes Yes 
Measure secondary jobs of executive board members 
(kZBO:13) 
Yes Yes 
Cyclical issues   
Approval of budgets/fees (kZBO:17; 24) Yes Yes 
Reporting on substantial differences between budget and 
results (kZBO:30) 
Yes Yes 
Creation of equalisation reserve (kZBO:33) Yes Yes 
Rules on structure budget given (kZBO:27-28) Yes Yes 
Market dimension   
Source of funding 100% government 100% government 
Production type Mass Individual 
Budget funding Activity based Lump sum 
Budget typology Output Task 
Production form Contract Contract 
Commissioning Request Government 
Demand dependency 1 ministry 1 ministry 
Competition No No 
Planning & control   
Responsibility centre type Standard cost centre Complete cost 
centre 
% fixed assets <10% <10% 
Budget disclosure Line item Line item 
Budget instruction by Minister-Principal Yes No 
Approval budget documents mentioned to Parliament Yes Yes 
Approval fees mentioned to Parliament Not applicable Not applicable 
Approval annual report mentioned to Parliament Yes Yes 
Frequency of reporting to minister Parliament‟s 
frequency 
Annually 
Ex ante performance indicators Output indicators Not available 
Ex post performance indicators Output indicators Process indicators 
 
Assessing the individual ZBOs based on these standards results in formal or expected 
and actual deviations from the standard set. It also allows positioning the individual ZBOs 
towards each other; not being subject to a measure means ceteris paribus that the 
particular ZBO has a higher level of autonomy than similar ZBOs that do have to comply 
with that measure. Figure 19.2 shows the result of the evaluation. 
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Legend: Designed level of autonomy; Actual level of autonomy 
1: CVZ; 2: RvR; 3: SVB; 4: UWV; 5: FBKVB; 6: Vf/Pf; 7: AFM; 8: CFV; 9: NAK; 10: NMa; 11: NZA. 
Figure 19.2: Designed and actual autonomy of ZBOs studies based on market and 
planning and control autonomy factors. 
 
The summary of conclusions and observations in this study is: 
1. After testing designed and actual control tools in eleven cases, in only three cases 
a match of actual legal and economic control tools is found. 
2. In eight cases, emphasis is on legal controls rather than on economic controls. 
3. Public law ZBOs are controlled on a more restrictive basis than was expected. 
4. Income transfer ZBOs are faced with more restrictive controls than monitoring 
ZBOs. 
5. Ownership and commissioning role are not clearly separated and in some cases 
ministries act inconsistently. 
6. Budgetary control, often based on lump sum budgets prevails over activity based 
budgetary controls. 
7. Performance information is not provided on a consistent basis. 
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I recall the research problem which was:  
Do Parliamentary control tools match the legal and economic operational 
autonomy attributed to ZBOs? 
Based on the results found in the study, the answer to the research problem is that in 
only one case a full match between legal and economic operational autonomy is found. In 
two other cases a match is found in the actual application of legal and economic control 
tools. In all other cases a mismatch either by design or in application of control tools was 
found. On a more detailed level the answer to the research problem can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. Only AFM shows matched controls although the observed controls indicate higher 
levels of autonomy than formal controls. 
2. SVB and NMa show matching observed controls; in both cases formal controls 
have a legal control bias. Control levels in these cases are higher than the 
standards set. 
3. In one case – NZA – observed controls show divergence between legal and 
economic controls although overall control has a legal control bias both in 
observed as well as in formal controls. 
4. Three of four PLA income transfer ZBOs (except SVB) have a strong legal control 
bias and both economic as well as legal controls are more restrictive than 
expected control levels. A key explanation for this is a lack of using real activity 
based funding for these organisations which is theoretically possible given the 
production characteristics of the organisations. 
5. The PLB income transfer ZBOs also face observed legal control bias, but controls 
are less restrictive than for the PLA income transfer ZBOs. FBKVB‟s formal 
autonomy was expected to have an economic control bias but the funding system 
based on a four year period results in a shift from an economic to a legal control 
bias. 
6. Differences between the three market regulation ZBOs are substantial, which can 
mainly be explained by differences in legal status. 
7. With respect to NAK, both by design as well as in practice, relatively few 
restrictions were found. Those that were found were based on legal control tools. 
Overall, NAK has a high level of autonomy compared to the framework used. 
8. CFV‟s position shifts from a formal economic control bias to a low level of legal 
control bias based on operational legal non-formalised control measures and a 
relatively low level of applied economic control tools. 
9. Several inconsistencies were observed even in those cases where ZBOs were 
controlled by one Minister-principal. 
 
Differences in legal status tend to be reflected in autonomy. PLB type ZBOs are faced 
with fewer controls than PLAs although this is not needed given the standards based on 
Summary and Conclusions   
 
424   Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives  
 
service characteristics and markets. Secondly, with the exception of SVB and UWV, real 
performance related quasi contracts were not observed. Third, from an economic 
perspective, budgetary controls are generally more restrictive than might be expected; 
particularly in the income transfer ZBOs where activity based budgets were expected. 
Fourth, asset specificity and investment controls were not really an issue in the cases 
studied. Financing is based on the same rules for most ZBOs, irrespective of services 
provided and legal status. A final point is that if normative and governance controls that 
do not directly affect market or planning and control are included in the assessment, the 
general trend is that PLAs tend to be controlled more strictly and PLBs generally have 
even more degrees of freedom. 
 
From a comparative perspective, RvR and UWV face low levels of autonomy. In the UWV 
case, an important explanation is the restrictions on services to be provided that result in 
lower levels of autonomy than were observed in the SVB case controlled by the same 
Minister-Principal. RvR‟s autonomy is reduced because budgets are explicitly determined 
unilaterally as subsidies rather than as compensation for services provided and excess 
services are not compensated for. CVZ‟s autonomy is from a legal perspective equivalent 
to SVB‟s autonomy but CVZ has some additional degrees of freedom due to relatively low 
levels of transparency towards Parliament.  Finally, a comparison between the three 
market regulators shows substantial differences due to legal status. NZA‟s autonomy is 
reduced because NZA suffers from a mixture of assigned tasks including imposing budget 
restrictions upon hospitals which cannot be classified as part of its impartial monitoring 
task. Furthermore, NZA faces strong budgetary controls partially due to the fact that it is a 
relatively new organisation and its relationship with the commissioning ministry is still 
developing. 
Several inconsistencies were observed in the case studies. I mention minVWS‟ 
relation to NZA and CVZ. First, in the NZA case, focus on staff control shifted from 
temporary staff to core staff which made it hard to build the new organisation. Second, 
CVZ does not receive a letter of instruction on the budget whereas NZA does. From a 
perspective of policy independence one might expect that NZA would have more 
autonomy on this issue. Third, in the CVZ case an advisory board is allowed and in the 
NZA case it is not. In both cases it would be possible to argue that the specific knowledge 
needed to execute tasks assigned allows for an advisory board. Not only minVWS 
operates inconsistently. In the CFV case, a letter of approval on the annual report 2007 
was sent to CFV, but this was not done for fiscal 2008. In the minOCW case, it can be 
observed that FBKVB faces a detailed audit protocol and Vf/Pf does not. This is odd if one 
considers that both PLBs provide income transfers, which means that their core business 
is similar. 
I have now summarised actual findings in a nutshell. The last section of this chapter 
will discuss the implications of these findings for ex ante Parliamentary and ministerial 
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control of ZBOs within a context of opinions from MPs and the comments made by NCA 
on ex post control. 
19.7 Assessment of results 
In this subsection, I will provide a general assessment of results and finalise the actual 
study. In the next chapter, some proposals for improvements based on the study findings 
as well as future research issues will be presented. 
19.7.1 Generalisation 
A multiple case study research design enables individual cases to be assessed and the 
different cases to be compared. It does however not enable full generalisations on the 
population. Two remarks can be made in this respect. First, in two of the cases selected, I 
have actually picked one ZBO out of a number of ZBOs that have been assigned similar 
tasks within a particular policy domain. The art fund and agricultural quality assurance 
organisation can be regarded as representative cases for the other organisations in these 
areas. This means that the assessment results can be generalised to the other relevant 
organisations. Secondly, some conclusions might be indications for general problems. I 
refer to the fact that in only one case – AFM - a full match was found on both formal and 
observed autonomy and that all but one (CFV) PLA type ZBO face lower levels of economic 
autonomy than might be expected given their task description. In 8 of the 11 selected 
cases, observed autonomy on market characteristics and planning and control show 
mismatches between legal and economic controls with a bias towards legal controls. 
Economic autonomy does not change fundamentally when the organisational 
environment of an arm‟s length organisation changes because the services do not 
change. The study also shows that typical issues that are relevant from a Neo-
Institutional perspective such as control on assets and remuneration are not perceived as 
relevant. The focus seems to be on budgetary control by minister and indirectly 
Parliament rather than on production of services delivered. From an economic 
perspective, this means that using a ZBO format, an executive agency format or even a 
private contract provision format is essentially irrelevant. The essential issue from an 
economic perspective will be whether strict budgetary controls prevail over demand 
volumes that require flexible budgets. In the cases studied here, cash based budgetary 
controls from within central government have a stronger impact on political control of 
ZBOs than demand driven issues. A common denominator on these observations seems 
to be that the organisations with low levels of economic autonomy are all primarily funded 
by central government, which might explain the bias towards cash based budgetary 
controls. 
 
The standards used here are derived from the kZBO framework and economic 
characteristics of services. I have not commented on legal controls before, but at least 
two issues need additional attention. First, planning and control in government is based 
on the preparation and approval of an annual budget, which is deliberately 
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complemented by a multiyear perspective on budget levels for the next four fiscal years. 
In only four of the eleven cases does the budget preparation process for the ZBOs studied 
here require inclusion of a multiyear plan and in five cases such a plan is actually 
prepared. This is particularly odd for directly government funded ZBOs since government 
contributions to those ZBOs are to be included in the budget plans of the respective 
ministries. In my opinion, this should have been reflected in kZBO, but it is not.  
Another issue from kZBO is the interpretation of the concept fee. Both minSZW as well 
as minVWS use arguments to decide on economic controls which are not adequate. In 
the minVWS case, a decision can be made on fees to be charged by cure and care 
providers. The fee will be set by NZA on a general instruction by minVWS. This type of fee 
has no relation to the fee for NZA services, which is what is meant by kZBO:17. In the 
NZA-case, fees for operations could not be based on production as is the case with 
activity based services for income transfer ZBOs, but might be applied in a similar context 
as in the AFM-case: covering the costs of NZA‟s market regulation role by those who are 
under NZA supervision. In the minSZW case, the argument is more or less the opposite. 
MinSZW uses the argument that equalisation reserves (kZBO:33) are only relevant in 
cases of fee funded ZBOs rather than for government funded ZBOs. In his argument 
minSZW does not consider that activity based funding which is possible for an income 
transfer ZBO is similar to the case of a fee funded organisation. Actually minSZW implies 
that budgetary compliance control overrules production based controls (see Parliament, 
2008l, p. 18).  
 
I did not study the other three main types of ZBOs (stewardship, research and licensing). 
Other research (e.g. Mol & de Kruijf, 2004; Deelen & Eertink, 2004) includes references 
to some of these groups. Given the findings here, it would also be worthwhile to carry out 
research on these types of ZBOs, preferably starting from the dichotomy between 
substantially government funded and mainly privately funded ZBOs. In stewardship and 
licensing ZBOs in particular, the expected levels of economic autonomy may be higher 
than for income transfer ZBOs, given the possibilities for services based on citizen 
demand and private funding. The research group of ZBOs is expected to have a similar 
level of autonomy to the monitoring ZBOs studied here. 
19.7.2 The role of Parliament 
A second issue that needs some attention here is the political debate on ZBOs in 
Parliament. In three interviews with (former) MPs, the position of ZBOs in government 
operations was discussed. Some general remarks can be derived from these interviews. 
The use of ZBOs is regarded by MPs as problematic, except for those cases where 
impartial judgement is a key argument for creating a ZBO. In other cases, full ministerial 
responsibility should prevail, or the activities should be organised under a private law 
regime. All respondents comment that historical context determines the present 
organisational structure and that it will not be possible to fundamentally change the 
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present situation. Particularly, as one respondent indicated, the debate on kZBO has only 
been completed recently and a fundamental revision of organisational structures is 
politically not feasible. This remark is typical for political practices in the Netherlands: 
once a consensus decision has been made, it is hard to change that decision again. 
If a ZBO structure is used, a deliberate reduction of ministerial responsibility is 
organised. This implies that the organisation can generally be assessed on an ex post 
rather than an ex ante basis. It would not be constitutionally appropriate according to 
respondents for MPs to intervene in the operating budgets of ZBOs by for example 
proposing amendments to the budget. An ex post assessment of ZBOs is however 
problematic, for at least two reasons. First, the present (2008) ex post information 
provision on ZBOs is rather minimal and does not disclose budgets or performance 
information adequately. An increase of ex post information would, for reasons of 
symmetry with the budgeting process, according to respondents imply that similar 
information is also provided on an ex ante basis. Secondly, MPs cannot process the 
information provided to them on a structural basis given the vast amount of information 
submitted. Some respondents suggested that expert Parliamentary staff might assess the 
information for MPs, which might also be a solution for the present fragmented approach 
on policy execution assessment in Parliament. MPs operate on the basis of policy 
domains rather than on a general view of government organisation. Respondents were 
not negative on the use of standard formats for presenting ZBO operations information 
on a similar basis to the information provided on executive agencies or the practices used 
with respect to affiliated entities in local government. 
 
Comments by MPs again stress the relevance of the difference between impartial 
judgement type ZBOs versus other types of ZBOs. In actual fact, it can be seen that two of 
the major impartial judgement type ZBOs have lower levels of operational autonomy than 
the standard used in this study. This is due to a mixture of tasks in one case and the 
governance structure in another. A critical re-assessment of ZBOs providing impartial 
judgement might therefore be considered. Secondly, although not made that explicit, the 
distinction between government funded and privately funded ZBOs is an issue. 
Respondents addressed this implicitly by referring to either full ministerial responsibility 
for real government tasks or further privatisation of other tasks. The problem is most 
explicitly found in this study in the Vf/Pf case, where private funding in fact is a form of 
indirect government funding and control of the ZBO.  This is problematic given both 
freedom in operations as well as on a more fundamental political debate how the key 
service provided by Vf/Pf should be organised. In other cases, particularly in the licensing 
and stewardship ZBOs not studied here, tasks might be regarded as key government 
tasks but due to private funding are not under similar levels of control as fully 
government funded entities. I am not sure whether politicians realise that such 
differences exist, except when case-based questions arise in Parliament. At least, the 
respondents did not address this issue explicitly. More transparency on the relationship 
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between funding and services provided might result in a better understanding of required 
differences in control of ZBOs. 
Despite the relative arm‟s length position of ZBOs, in most cases substantial numbers 
of questions were raised in Parliament. This is particularly the case for UWV (and SVB to a 
lesser extent) due to the frequency of explicit reporting to Parliament. In most other 
cases, questions are based on either changes in programs affecting the operations of a 
ZBO or on events that draw attention from MPs. In the case of the three market 
regulation ZBOs (AFM, NMa, NZA) in particular, questions seem to be event driven, which 
is contrary to the impartial role of these ZBOs. 
19.7.3 Information provision 
A third issue regards information provision in general. On this subject, the NCA has 
produced a series of documents as a result of its original 1995 findings on controlling 
ZBOs.206 I will only summarise the findings of the NCA, based on their 2009 retrospective 
report (Parliament, 2009b). The NCA has focused on monitoring ZBOs by ministers and 
emphasises ex post assessment of ZBOs. On three issues, improvements are observed 
by the NCA based on observations from 2005 and 2008. These issues are monitoring by 
the individual ministries, based on monitoring visions and arrangements; compliance 
levels have improved and finally, ex post public accountability by ZBOs has strongly 
improved.  
What has not been implemented sufficiently by ministries is a risk based monitoring 
system for ZBO operations. In my opinion, this issue should be part of the monitoring 
visions and arrangements. Furthermore, the opinions of minFin as representative of 
Cabinet and NCA diverge on this issue: minFin argues that sufficient attention is given to 
this issue (Parliament, 2009b, p. 22). Although the issue of risk management was not 
explicitly included in my research, the number of event driven questions in Parliament 
with respect to ZBOs as well as the focus on budgetary control in Parliament might be 
indications that the NCA is right. The last issue not being carried out sufficiently is 
information provision to Parliament. Although again NCA and minFin have different 
opinions, this remains a political issue which was also addressed in the interviews held 
within the framework of this study. NCA admits that the majority of fee funded budgets – 
actually program and operating budgets added up (jdk) – are disclosed, especially in the 
minVWS and minSZW budgets (Parliament, 2009b, p. 24). However, examples of 
substantial undisclosed ZBO (operating) budgets are also given. This is an omission that 
needs to be resolved in order to allow for ex ante and ex post assessment of the financial 
position of ZBOs. The issue does not only concern operating budgets, but also the 
financial position, including balance sheet information in general (Parliament, 2009b, p. 
25). The need for such information is stressed again by the debate on the financial 
                                                 
206 The NCA report covers ZBOs as meant in this study but also covers RWTs, not being ZBOs. The appendix 
to the NCA report (Parliament, 2009b, p. 92-93) discloses that only three PLB ZBOs do not yet publicly 
submit their annual reports (fiscal 2007). This means that focusing on ZBOs based on the NCA report 
does not result in bias. 
  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   429 
 
position of Kadaster in 2008/2009 (Parliament, 2009l), when fees had to be increased 
due to a substantial decline in the level of activities and a very low level of equity within 
the organisation. In this study, the equity issue was also illustrated by the risky funding 
position of CFV, which has to rely on the interest received from program equity to cover 
operating costs. 
 
Fourth, the results disclosed in this study are based on an assessment of controls 
formalised and applied during fiscal 2007 and 2008, before formal implementation of 
kZBO. At the start of fiscal 2010, some ZBOs were subject to new legislation arising from 
kZBO, adapting their existing controls to the kZBO framework. However, in four cases, 
new legislation had not even been submitted to Parliament although the intention to do 
so had been announced (Parliament, 2008b). In three other cases, the legislative process 
was not yet complete. Based on what is known on the changes in legislation, the 
conclusions on the autonomy of the ZBOs studied here do not change. 
19.7.4 Public management reform 
Finally, a comment on public management reform in general is made. Ter Bogt (1999, p. 
15) developed a number of hypotheses on the impact of autonomisation. Most of the 
hypotheses regarding the economic dimension of autonomisation seem to have low 
impact. Van Thiel (2006) indicates that although indicators exist on the managerial style 
for creating ZBOs – as a proxy for the economic dimension of autonomisation (jdk) – it is 
not a dominant style for creating ZBOs. Ter Bogt (2003) showed that issues like political 
rationality may also have an impact on autonomisation decisions. Indicators like 
uncertainty as expressed in the UWV case or a mixture of tasks that do not fit very well 
together (NZA) and strict budgetary controls (CVZ) all confirm that the ideas of public 
management reform are not always understood or applied consistently. It is also 
illustrative that one of my political respondents wondered why there was a need to 
change the governance structure of IBGroep from ZBO to executive agency status as 
there were no indications that IBGroep was doing a bad job.207 These findings show that 
the basic line of reforms based on new public management and neo institutional theories 
such as disaggregation and decentralisation (Pollitt, 2004, p. 329; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004, p.88) do not hold and that other elements, for example complexity theory as 
addressed by Teisman and Van Buuren (2007, p. 183), political rationality (Ter Bogt, 
2003) or cultural aspects such as styles of reform (Van Thiel, 2006) have an impact as 
well.  
On a more general level, Rainey (2009, p. 74-80) noted that control of organisations 
is not only based on ownership and funding issues but also on political authority and 
modes of social controls related to stakeholders of the organisation. This results in a 
continuum of autonomy rather than a dichotomy on which organisations can be 
                                                 
207 I refer to Ter Bogt (2003, p. 174) who noted that the original decision on autonomisation of IBGroep was 
driven by political arguments. 
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classified. The variation in ZBO autonomy found in this study is another illustration of this 
continuum. Perhaps the most explicit example is found in the UWV case. UWV is under 
high levels of political scrutiny. Several examples of operational problems leading to 
political attention were mentioned in this study. In a recent paper, Westerveld (2010) 
noted that performance of UWV is not always as it should be, she also noted that one of 
the problems that negatively affects UWV‟s position is excess control in combination with 
new services to be provided in relatively unstable environments. I think that in at least 
three other cases discussed here, similar problems can be observed. I recall CVZ‟s 
problems in finding a solution for (real) mass production based income transfers, NZA‟s 
mixture of tasks which conflicts with its role as market regulator and AFM‟s new tasks 
which will at the very least result in discussions on the level of costs to be allocated to 
those being monitored. 
 
Historical contexts have resulted in the organisational environments for ZBOs as they 
stand in 2010. Changing only the organisational setting in which arm‟s length 
government institutions operate does not solve problems on controlling these 
organisations. One respondent even claimed that although perhaps strongly controlled by 
central government, the arm‟s length position of a ZBO can be useful if negotiations with 
other public sector entities have to be performed in order to achieve some of central 
government‟s goals. The arm‟s length organisation is in that case relatively more flexible 
than a pure hierarchical unit can ever be.  
Politicians should be aware of the differences in service characteristics provided by 
ZBOs as well as of the relative stability of the underlying programs. In all cases, program 
responsibility is a political issue which will (in)directly affect the political system and its 
legitimacy. Taking responsibility for the program is at the heart of transparent service 
provision by any government institution, irrespective of its governance structure. Studying 
legal and economic autonomy of arm‟s length organisations can contribute to identifying 
mismatches in control measures. The examples discussed in this study can at least be 
used as a benchmark for future institutional changes. 
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20. Recommendations and future research 
20.1 Develop standard format for information provision on ZBOs 
This study has shown that the information on ZBOs provided to Parliament varies widely, 
depending on funding and budget disclosure methods in ministry budget documents. The 
only standard that exists is the reference list to ZBOs and RWTs as included in the 
appendices to the ministries‟ budget documents. Even given this standard, ministries 
disclose information on ZBOs differently, ranging from a mere listing including budgetary 
funding (minVWS, annual report 2008) to a detailed level of assessment and financial 
position of selected ZBOs as is the case in the minFin 2008 annual report.  
Balance sheet information is provided in one of these cases, as was suggested by the 
NCA (Parliament, 2009b, p. 35) and originally suggested in the legislative procedures to 
CW2001 (Parliament, 2002e, p. 4-5). Furthermore, the NCA suggests including 
information on non budget funded RWTs, including those of ZBOs (Parliament, 2009b, p. 
25) and refers to discussions in Parliament on this issue. Information provision to 
Parliament is thus still a weak point in ZBO accountability to Parliament. 
Basically, three solutions can be used to overcome the problems observed. First, a 
suggestion might be to include all operating budgets of ZBOs in ministry budgets. This 
solution suggests however that ministerial control on the variety of budgets and fees is 
similar, which is not in line with the responsibility attributed to the minister in several 
cases. A second model could be that ZBO budgets and annual reports are disclosed 
similarly to the procedures used for executive agencies. It means that operating budgets 
as well as investment budgets are disclosed in the ministry‟s budget document/annual 
report and would result in an overview of the full financial position of individual ZBOs. 
Although this solution allows differentiating between regular budgets of ministries and 
other budgets to be authorised, in some cases there might still be a problem in 
authorising fees, particularly if a minister only approves or consents to the level of fees 
for a particular ZBO. A third and last option could be to use the model that has been 
developed for local governments with respect to reporting on associated entities. In this 
model, it is not direct authorisation of budgets that is the main issue, but the objectives 
to be achieved by a particular entity. In more sophisticated examples of reporting, risks 
including a summary of the financial position of individual associated entities is given. 
Disclosing ZBOs along the lines of the associated entity model used by local governments 
reflects the difference between executive agencies and ZBOs from a governance 
perspective and allows for summarised reporting both in the budgeting stage as well as in 
the accountability stage. Full details of a ZBO‟s financial position are not necessary given 
the measures in kZBO on submitting individual ZBO annual reports to Parliament. 
I would not suggest following the line of consolidation as is suggested by IPSAS. 
Although most ZBOs will qualify as controlled entities, consolidation would not contribute 
to transparency for two reasons. First, because ZBOs are financed by the state, their 
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debts are included in State debt. Furthermore, from an asset perspective, at least the 
ZBOs studied here do not show substantial assets which would be disclosed in a 
consolidated financial statement. More important is that consolidation without 
segmentation would not provide relevant decision making information on ZBOs. Relevant 
segmentation would mean that disaggregation at least at the level of ministries of 
government is needed and that is precisely as is suggested in disclosing information 
along the associated entity model used by local governments. 
20.2 Use one Ministry-principal for all ZBOs. 
The results of this study show that a great variety in controlling ZBOs exists despite the 
fact that they deliver similar tasks. This variety seems to be due to different opinions 
within respective ministries on the ownership role with respect to ZBOs. Within the 
present system, emphasis on ZBOs is strongly focused on programs, which is basically 
logical as a ZBO is only an organisational structure in which programs are to be realised. 
The efficiency of operations is not often discussed. Furthermore, it seems that a 
countervailing power that assesses the impact of changes in demand or in programs is 
not strong given the fact that a minister aims at realising his policy objects and 
simultaneously controls the budget of the ZBO. This is reflected for example in the 
debates on using temporary or structural staff in the NZA case, problems in the use of 
resources for restructuring programs such as SVB-Tien, the claim on minJus of RvR and 
the pressure on UWV with regular changes in programs. A last point to be made is that 
expertise on the ownership role towards ZBOs is scattered over nearly all ministries and 
most likely not used efficiently. 
If ownership responsibility is separated from program responsibility, checks and 
balances between the two different types of interest can be realised. A proposal like this 
is certainly not new (Van Thiel, Canté & Meerkerk, 2009) and is even applied for state 
participations in the Netherlands as of 2001 (e.g. Parliament, 2006c, p. 36), in which 
case minFin is responsible for managing the shareholder role of the state. This 
management program can in my opinion be extended to ZBOs given the fact that ZBOs 
are not hierarchically subordinated to ministries. Given the political relevance of ZBOs I 
would suggest that management will be organised within minFin and not in a separate 
foundation as is proposed for shares held by government (Parliament, 2010) in financials 
due to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Of course separating ownership and program 
responsibility does not solve all problems given the fact that minFin also has influence on 
changes in programs of different ministries. 
20.3 Use control structures aligned to services provided 
Not only do the legal status and motives for creating a ZBO vary, but more importantly, 
the type of services and economic characteristics of these services vary greatly between 
ZBOs. The study shows that there is no co-ordinated structure in the budgeting processes 
between ZBO and „parent‟ ministry. Even within groups of ZBOs that deliver similar 
services there is no standard control structure observed. Some ministries seem to regard 
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ZBOs as subsidised units when they allocate resources to a ZBO on the basis of a 
decision that can be appealed; others manage their relationship with ZBOs with some 
form of commissioning by issuing letters of instruction on budgets which aim to define 
the level of services to be expected. Based upon the expected standard arrangements as 
discussed in section 14.3, ministries can develop a control standard for ZBOs that 
reflects relevant differences but also allows disclosing to Parliament the similarities that 
exist amongst ZBOs that deliver services on behalf of different ministries. 
20.4 Changes in kZBO 
Based on the findings, some comments and improvements on kZBO can be given. First, 
in my opinion, kZBO:32d on approval on borrowing and lending is obsolete given the fact 
that based on CW2001:45.1 most ZBOs are already subject to treasury management 
within the State‟s framework and those who are not are at least subject to liquidity 
management under rules set by minFin. Another solution would be to split kZBO:32 in two 
new articles, one for all ZBOs, covering kZBO:32a, b, c, e and f (creating legal entity, 
property rights on assets as well as lease, guarantees and equalisation reserves) and one 
for PLBs covering kZBO:32d and kZBO:32g on bankruptcy and a new sub article covering 
dissolution of PLBs. The issue on dissolution of PLBs is by now not covered. A PLA can 
only be dissolved by law which means that political control is guaranteed. In a PLB case, 
dissolution is, without specific arrangements, the responsibility of the Board. This means 
that the Board also can decide upon residual value after dissolution and use it for other 
than public purposes. Including an arrangement in the statutes of a PLB that the minister-
principal has a final word in dissolution can prevent this. Including such a requirement in 
kZBO:32 would be the logical supplement to a final word of a minister-principal in case of 
bankruptcy. 
Second, kZBO:12-14 on appointment and remuneration of ZBO boards only cover 
measures for PLAs. In practice, it is not unusual that for PLBs similar arrangements are 
included in statutes. Giving a minister responsibility for appointing a PLB board shows the 
relevance of the PLB for public services. It does not block involvement of third parties as 
it is still possible to make arrangements for influence on appointing of the board by third 
parties (see e.g. AFM and Vf/Pf). Furthermore, a measure on remuneration of the Board 
of a PLB which is approved or decided upon by a minister prevents from non-transparent 
responsibilities in case remuneration is set at levels above those which are politically 
acceptable (see Dijkstal Committee, 2004, 2007). The arguments used in the 
explanatory notes to kZBO (Parliament, 2000d) do not hold in my opinion. First, the 
explanatory notes themselves are inconsistent because they state that those PLBs that 
only provide public services are very similar to PLAs (Parliament, 2000d, p. 33). Second, 
the general argument used is that PLB governance arrangements in civil law are 
sufficient and if public law governance measures would be imposed, this might result in 
inconsistencies with the civil law framework, particularly for those PLBs that provide 
private services as well (Parliament, 2000d, p. 7).  We now (as of 2008) know that kZBO 
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generally only is applied to part of the ZBO population, in fact those PLAs and PLBs that 
only provide public services. Given the similarities in service characteristics, there is no 
need for different measures on appointment and remuneration of ZBO boards anymore. It 
would be inappropriate to include measures of this kind within the subsidy requirements 
as meant in Awb.  Therefore I would suggest applying kZBO:12-14 to PLBs only providing 
public services as well. 
Third, based on a request by Parliament (Parliament, 2002h), annual reports of ZBOs 
have to be submitted to Parliament directly (kZBO:18). The wording of kZBO does not 
cover the intentions of MPs to have both annual reports and financial statements and 
should be changed for that reason only. I would suggest that not only annual report and 
financial statements should be submitted, but that the minister-principal is required to 
give an assessment on these documents. Providing an assessment by the minister 
principal is part of his system accountability role when using other organisational 
structures that traditional departmental structures. Furthermore, it highlights the political 
issues with respect to ZBOs and can contribute to the information overload problem as 
observed by MPs. From a practical point of view such an arrangement would prevent that 
ZBOs only provide program information (see NZA) or that ministers simply stop providing 
information because the law does not require doing so (minVWS). 
Fourth, I have observed that it is not common to provide multiyear budgets of ZBOs, 
even in those cases where a ZBO is fully government funded. This is odd, as CW2001 
requires that a multiyear budget is prepared for a department. This can only be done if 
relevant underlying information is available. In case of ZBO-services the underlying 
information must come from the ZBO and if not, the ZBO budget is merely imposed by the 
commissioning minister without taking into account the services to be delivered in the 
future. Including a requirement in kZBO to submit multiyear budgets provides the relevant 
estimate for the future and can be used as an early warning indicator for future 
developments. Given the legal status of multiyear budgets of departments, it would not 
be a binding level of budget beyond political control. 
Fifth, ZBOs can more or less be created out of the blue, without critical assessment 
whether a government unit or other entity is really able to provide services and manage 
operations adequately. This is in strong contrast with creating executive agencies where 
an ex ante assessment of the new organisation, including issues of financial 
management has to be realised before a government unit is granted the executive 
agency status. I would suggest that a similar procedure is explicitly used in case of 
creating new ZBOs. Having a procedure has two advantages: it clarifies whether the 
organisation is fit for the job but it also restricts debates on what is needed to realise a 
ZBO status. The history on executive agencies has shown that there has been a time in 
which the process of creating a new executive agency was overregulated (Mookhoek, 
2008) and clear cut rules helps to focus an assessment for a new organisation. 
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20.5 Authorisation of investments  
In traditional cash accounting system, all cash flows, whether relevant for daily 
operations or for investments in assets are included in a budget. If Parliament is to 
authorise case based budgets, Parliament has the power to decide on production 
capacity of an organisation. In the cases studied here, production capacity strongly 
depends on human capital but also on ICT projects. The impact of project decisions on 
ICT can be substantial as it may affect the level of future expenditures of an organisation. 
In the SVB and UWV case, debates on investment decision were made within the 
framework of a wider reorganisation project and an effort was made to show expected 
effects of investments, at least in the SVB-Tien Program. In the NZA case, investments in 
the new NZA office were financed in a less explicit form: the only indication I found was 
disclosure in NZA‟s annual report 2007. Parliament was thus only indirectly informed. 
Although it would not be efficient to discuss all individual investments of ZBOs, 
transparency would at least require that on the level of total and major investments 
Parliament is informed. Such a practice is common in the case of executive agencies, 
even when they are not funded through the government budget. 
20.6 Define a standard for the level of equalisation reserves 
Unspent resources in a cash accounting system are basically available for reallocation by 
Parliament. In an accruals accounting system, unspent resources may be an indication of 
efficient production and are disclosed on the balance sheet as reserves. The framework 
law on ZBOs allows equalisation reserves on operations as a tool to mitigate different 
results over time. Political opinions on the issue diverge as was expressed by minSZW 
who only allows dedicated reserves with reference to the allocation right of Parliament. In 
the study a variety of levels and control methods on equalisation reserves were found. 
Except for the NAK case, there were no explicit economic reasons used for the 
differences in levels of equalisation reserves. If kZBO allows equalisation reserves, it 
would be useful to define the level of acceptable equalisation reserves, preferably based 
on risk profiles related to production within ZBOs. As ZBOs are not meant to generate 
profits and are in many cases government funded, a basic level of equalisation reserves 
might be similar to what is practice in executive agencies (Regeling Baten Lasten 
diensten 2007; Decree executive agencies 2007). If other arrangements are needed, an 
explicit debate on the level of equalisation reserves can be included in a debate on the 
ZBO case law. A standard arrangement should also include a restriction on negative 
equalisation reserves to prevent from cases as RvR where a huge claim on minJus has 
been accumulated which is unlikely to be realised in the future. 
20.7 A draft decision model on autonomisation 
In this study several issues on controlling ZBOs were discussed. A main conclusion is that 
in the cases studied, an emphasis on legal rather than economic control seems to exist. 
Overemphasising legal controls may result in undesired inefficiencies in service delivery 
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of ZBOs. Although it was not a specific issue in this study, it seems to be reasonable to 
claim that those services delivered by Dutch central government that could have been 
(internally or externally) autonomised actually have been autonomised or were not 
autonomised deliberately. An indication for this is the fact that political focus as of 2010 
seems to be on mergers and efficiencies of scale rather than on creating new 
autonomised entities for tasks that were not autonomised before.  
If restructuring is one of the key issues in the near future, it might be worthwhile to 
use some of the experiences found in this study that allows for an assessment of a 
possible new governance structure for autonomised entities. From an economic 
perspective, two issues may contribute to such a model. First, in my opinion, it looks like 
as if the origins of demand for services have been neglected in the control tools of ZBOs. 
If demand is generated on a citizen‟s demand basis, higher levels of autonomy can be 
used in combination with substantial influence from those in demand for services. This 
means that external autonomisation is a possible solution with relatively low levels of 
control, perhaps essentially only on fees to be determined (see Wattel, 1995) and 
maximum levels of reserves.  
If however demand originates from the State or is based on citizen‟s requests, there is 
a need for more restrictive controls as services are paid for by taxes or at best authority 
biased fees. Within the group of State demand or citizen‟s request services, a group of 
services based on impartial judgement are included (see the main monitoring institutions 
in this study). In these cases a governance structure with involvement from outside the 
political system seems necessary to assure impartiality, but budgetary control is required 
given the fact that funding is realised from compulsory resources. 
 
The second issue regards uncertainty as defined under TCT. If uncertainty exists, regular 
political interventions are likely to occur which means that closer monitoring and possibly 
more intensified control and instructions are required. Uncertainty and external 
autonomisation seem to be conflicting issues as was shown in the cases of UWV, CVZ (on 
new programs) and NZA (on a new organisation). Uncertainty related to the execution of 
programs would suggest that at best internal autonomisation might be a solution. 
Particularly for cases in which measurable production exists, budgeting can essentially be 
based on a flexible basis. If uncertainty is low, external autonomisation is possible, 
particularly if uncertainty on the volume of demand is not likely to exist. If however 
politicians wish to use more restricitve fixed budgets related to measurable services, that 
is possible but at the expense of service levels towards citizens. In an internal 
autonomisation setting, it is immediately clear that political choices made have an effect 
on services towards citizens. That is also a weak point, the question is whether politicians 
are really willing to accept that they have to choose if programs and as a result costs of 
operations result in budget overruns. In those cases where services cannot be measured 
the only solution is that a fixed budget is appropritated. Again, a difference can be 
observed between cases with or without uncertainty. If uncertainty exists, the only logical 
  Recommendations and future research 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   437 
 
solution would be not to autonomise the services. Although the argument is essentially 
incorrect, perceived uncertainty of politicians on their control of „Belastingdienst‟ was the 
reason not to create an executive agency „Belastingdienst‟. If no uncertainty exists and 
services cannot be measured, the additional control tools needed next to a fixed budget 
suggest that a closer monitoring would result in internal autonomisation rather than 
external autonomisation.  
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Figure 20.1: A draft model for deciding on autonomisation. 
 
The draft model that is presented here might need further testing, but can at least 
contribute to the debates on organisation of Dutch national government in the near 
future. 
20.8 Future research. 
This study has focused on two main categories of ZBOs: income transfer ZBOs and 
monitoring ZBOs. Three other groups exist and within the group of monitoring ZBOs, some 
subgroups can be identified that may have different economic characteristics (e.g. quasi 
judicial entities versus training entities). Future research might focus on the groups not 
included in this study.  
A second issue that might be useful is to focus on political stability of services to be 
provided by all types of arm‟s length organisations. The issue of political stability is not 
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new; it was addressed by the Sint Committee in 1994. In some debates it was indirectly 
addressed, for example on the internal autonomisation of Belastingdienst which was not 
allowed for reasons that politicians feared to lose control (Parliament, 2003e). In the NCA 
reports is has not been a separate topic because the NCA mainly focuses on ex post 
information and not on creating (internally) autonomised organisations. Some of the 
problems discussed in the CVZ, UWV and NZA case have to do with instability and would 
be worthwhile to do research on drivers of instability and the necessary control tools if 
instability of programs is to be expected. Knowledge based on instability may be used in 
cases when restructuring of autonomised organisations is to be considered or when new 
organisations have to be created.  
Third, similar arguments can be used for a research project on political relevance of 
services provided by arm‟s length organisations. The debates in the last decades on 
forms of autonomisation have shown trends towards creating ZBOs at one stage and then 
towards executive agencies in another stage. A structural assessment of the required 
political influence and thus on possible relative autonomy from traditional hierarchical 
structures has not been realised. In some cases, it seems that executive agencies have 
more degrees of freedom (for example due to economic characteristics of services) than 
some ZBOs. In other cases, ZBOs were dissolved and integrated into executive agencies 
apparently without rational arguments other than supposed efficiency gains and 
increased ministerial control (Parliament, 2009m). Research focusing on structural 
drivers of political relevance of public services might be helpful to identify preferred forms 
of autonomisation, both for new cases as well as for existing cases if reorganisations are 
to be discussed. Although it is likely to be late, such research could contribute to the 
assessment of the position of those ZBOs which are for other reasons than 
discontinuation not included under the kZBO-framework. 
 
  Bestuurlijke samenvatting 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   439 
 
 
 Bestuurlijke samenvatting 
 Inleiding 
Verzelfstandiging en decentralisatie van publieke dienstverlening is in de afgelopen drie 
decennia een belangrijke thema geweest. Er werden (nieuwe) organisaties op afstand 
van de overheid geplaatst, veelal met als argument efficiëntieverbetering. In mijn 
onderzoek heb ik mij gericht op de bestuurlijke aansturing van een bepaalde vorm van 
verzelfstandiging te weten Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen (ZBOs). De centrale 
probleemstelling voor het onderzoek luidt als volgt: 
Passen de sturingsinstrumenten van het Parlement bij de juridische en 
economische zelfstandigheid zoals die op het gebied van bedrijfsvoering 
aan ZBOs is toebedeeld? 
Verzelfstandiging impliceert dat het management van een organisatie meer 
vrijheidsgraden krijgt om de bedrijfsvoering van de organisatie in te richten en aan te 
sturen. Om dit te kunnen realiseren is het nodig dat een op elkaar aansluitend juridisch 
en economisch beheersingsinstrumentarium voor de organisatie bestaat en wordt 
toegepast. Indien dat niet het geval is ontstaat interpretatieruimte en mogelijk ook een 
conflict over de uitvoering van taken van in dit geval ZBOs. Er kan sprake zijn van een 
gebrek in het formele beheersingsinstrumentarium, maar ook omdat in de praktijk wordt 
afgeweken van wat formeel is voorgeschreven. 
In deze bestuurlijke samenvatting ga ik kort in op de resultaten uit het onderzoek. Een 
meer uitgebreide Nederlandstalige samenvatting is afzonderlijk beschikbaar. 
 
ZBOs zijn organisaties die diensten verlenen namens de centrale overheid. Het centrale 
kenmerk van ZBO diensten ten opzichte door andere verzelfstandigde organisaties 
geleverde diensten is dat het gaat om eenzijdig bindende beslissingen van een 
bestuursorgaan dat opereert buiten de hierarchische structuur van de rijksoverheid. Een 
voorbeeld van een ZBO is het Kadaster. Het Kadaster draagt onder andere zorg voor de 
registratie van vastgoed. Een organisatie als de NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen valt niet 
onder het begrip ZBO; vervoersdiensten zijn niet als eenzijdig bindende beslissingen aan 
te merken. Alhoewel de hierboven gegeven omschrijving lijkt te duiden op een eenduidige 
definitie is dat niet het geval. Bovendien zijn er in de loop van de tijd verschillende 
telmethoden voor het vaststellen van het aantal ZBOs gebruikt. Deze twee factoren 
hebben er toe geleid dat in de literatuur over ZBOs aantallen worden genoemd tussen 
ruim 100 en ruim 600. 
Voor dit onderzoek heb ik gebruik gemaakt van de op 1 juli 2007 door het ministerie 
van Binnenlandse Zaken (minBZK) op internet gepubliceerde lijst van ZBOs. Die lijst is 
zodanig bewerkt dat ZBOs die soortgelijke taken vervullen als één organisatie zijn geteld. 
Ter illustratie: er waren destijds circa 20 regionale Kamers van Koophandel die in dit 
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onderzoek als één organisatie zijn beschouwd omdat de aansturing vanuit het ministerie 
van Economische Zaken niet fundamentaal zal verschillen. Na bewerking van de  lijst van 
minBZK kwam ik uit op 128 verschillende ZBOs die in 2006 samen circa € 7 miljard 
kosten voor hun bedrijfsvoering kenden. Daarnaast gaven ze samen circa € 80 miljard 
programma kosten (uitkeringen) uit. De totale kosten van de ZBOs besloegen ongeveer 
40% van het totaal van de uitgaven op de Rijksbegroting. 
 Theoretische achtergronden 
Verzelfstandiging roept bestuurlijke vraagstukken op. Aan de ene kant wordt doelbewust 
verzelfstandigd, aan de andere kant geven politici regelmatig aan dat ze willen ingrijpen 
op (onderdelen) van de bedrijfsvoering van die organisaties. Verder geldt dat voor het 
Parlement niet altijd helder is vast te stellen welke uitgaven door ZBOs worden gedaan. In 
de Rijksbegroting worden uitgaven van sommige ZBOs niet meegenomen omdat de 
diensten van het ZBO door middel van bijdragen van burgers worden betaald. Ook komt 
het voor dat de informatie over de prestaties van ZBOs summier is. 
Na een jarenlange discussie naar aanleiding van een kritisch rapport van de 
Algemene Rekenkamer in 1995 is in 2007 de kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen 
van kracht geworden. Die wet beoogt een standaard pakket beheersmaatregelen voor 
ZBOs vast te leggen. In hoofdlijnen kiest de kaderwet voor uniformering van regelgeving, 
ongeacht de onderliggende karakteristieken van diensten die de ZBOs leveren. 
Uniformering wordt verder beperkt omdat uitzonderingen op de in de kaderwet 
vastgelegde normen mogelijk blijven. Van de 128 ZBOs uit mijn onderzoek staat slechts 
voor iets minder dan de helft vast dat de kaderwet (gedeeltelijk) daadwerkelijk van 
toepassing zal zijn. De beoogde uniformering van bestuurlijke aansturing wordt dus niet 
gerealiseerd. 
 
Bij het ontwikkelen van het theoretisch kader zijn drie verschillende juridische 
invalshoeken gehanteerd: relevante begrotingswetgeving zoals opgenomen in de 
Comptabiliteitswet, het bestuursrecht en in het bijzonder de relevante regelgeving 
rondom ZBOs en het privaatrecht. Privaatrecht is relevant omdat een aantal ZBOs een 
privaatrechtelijke in plaats van een publiekrechtelijke status heeft. Bovendien kan het 
privaatrecht behulpzaam zijn om de contractuele relaties te beschrijven tussen twee 
organisaties die formeel juridisch onafhankelijk van elkaar zijn. De drie hierboven 
genoemde juridische invalshoeken vormen het algemene kader en ijkpunt voor de 
beoordeling van de positionering van individuele ZBOs. De feitelijke invulling van de 
juridische positionering van een ZBO blijkt uit de specifieke wet voor het desbetreffende 
ZBO.  
Vanuit economisch perspectief is gebruik gemaakt van de in neo-institutionele theorie 
benoemde beheersingsinstrumenten die passen bij organisaties waar sprake is van een 
scheiding tussen management en eigendom van de organisatie. Daarnaast is gebruik 
gemaakt van theorie die betrekking heeft op produktie en product-karakteristieken zoals 
  Bestuurlijke samenvatting 
 
Part D: Matching control from legal and economic perspectives   441 
 
massa- en stuksproduktie en meetbaarheid van produktie. In de derde plaats is de 
„markt‟ voor ZBO-diensten beoordeeld. Alhoewel er gelet op de positionering van ZBOs 
niet echt sprake is van een markt, kunnen marktkenmerken waaronder de organisatie 
van aanbod, bekostiging van diensten en de opdrachtgever-functie een bijdrage leveren 
in de beschrijving van de door ZBOs geleverde diensten. De economische kenmerken die 
uit de theorie kunnen worden afgeleid bepalen uiteindelijk de mogelijkheden voor het 
beheersingsinstrumentarium dat aansluit bij de door het ZBO geleverde diensten. Vanuit 
theoretisch economisch perspectief betekent dit dat differentiatie van het bestuurlijk 
beheersingsinstrumentarium noodzakelijk is. 
 
Mijn onderzoek startte in de tijd dat de discussie over de inhoud van de kaderwet nog 
niet was afgerond. Ik heb ervoor gekozen om onderzoek te doen naar de regelgeving in 
relatie tot de economische kenmerken van ZBOs. De aanleiding daarvoor was dat uit 
eerder onderzoek bekend was dat er een grote variëteit aan ZBOs bestaat, deels 
veroorzaakt door verschillende juridische positionering, deels veroorzaakt door 
verschillen in bekostiging van ZBOs. Door onderzoek te doen naar samenhang tussen 
juridische en economische beheersingsmaatregelen beoog ik meer inzicht te krijgen in 
het spanningsveld tussen verzelfstandiging en bestuurlijke controle op de bedrijfsvoering 
van ZBOs. De veronderstelling is dat wanneer juridische en economische 
beheersingsmaatregelen onvoldoende op elkaar aansluiten, de feitelijke bestuurlijke 
sturing en beheersing van een ZBO problematisch is en leidt tot ongewenste toe- of 
afname van de autonomie van de organisatie. 
 Bevindingen 
Het is niet mogelijk om in een onderzoek tot in detail alle ZBOs door te lichten. Ik heb me 
daarom beperkt tot 11 gevallen uit twee hoofdgroepen ZBOs. Ik heb gekozen voor ZBOs 
die inkomensoverdrachten verstrekken of een toezichtsfunctie vervullen. Bij de selectie 
van de betrokken ZBOs heb ik mij gebaseerd op de beschrijvingen van de kerntaken van 
die ZBOs zoals opgenomen in de jaarstukken. 
In het geval dat de door ZBOs geleverde diensten vergelijkbaar zijn zou mogen 
worden verwacht dat de geformuleerde en toegepaste beheersingsinstrumenten ook 
vergelijkbaar zijn. Dit betekent dat op basis van de gevonden juridische en economische 
kenmerken een toetsingskader kan worden ontwikkeld voor vergelijkbare ZBOs. Ik heb 
dat toetsingskader toegepast op zes ZBOs die inkomensoverdrachten verzorgen en vijf 
ZBOs die een toezichtsfunctie vervullen. 
Er zijn twee onderzoeksmethoden toegepast om tot een beoordeling van de 
aansluiting tussen het juridische en economische beheersingsinstrumentarium te komen. 
In de eerste plaats is gekeken naar de regelgeving en de documenten uit de planning & 
control cyclus van een ZBO. In de tweede plaats zijn interviews met functionarissen van 
ZBOs en de betrokken „eigenaar‟-ministeries gehouden. Aanvullend is ook met enkele 
(voormalige) Kamerleden gesproken. Door gebruik te maken van twee verschillende 
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onderzoeksmethoden wordt inzicht verschaft in zowel de formele als de feitelijke 
toepassing van het beheersingsinstrumentarium voor ZBOs vanuit het bestuurlijk 
perspectief. 
 
De navolgende algemene conclusie en observaties zijn uit het onderzoek af te leiden:  
1. In slechts drie gevallen is feitelijk sprake van aansluiting tussen juridisch en 
economisch beheersinstrumentarium. 
2. In acht gevallen ligt het accent op het juridische beheersingsinstrumentarium. 
3. Publiekrechtelijke ZBOs kennen een meer restrictief 
beheersingsinstrumentarium dan vooraf mocht worden verwacht. 
4. ZBOs die inkomensoverdrachten verzorgen kennen een stringenter 
beheersingsinstrumentarium dan ZBOs met een toezichtsrol 
5. De rollen opdrachtgever en eigenaar worden onvoldoende helder gescheiden 
en in sommige gevallen is sprake van inconsistent gedrag binnen ministeries. 
6. Budgetbeheersing op basis van lump sum gaat ook in gevallen waar 
activiteiten gestuurde budgetten mogeljk zijn toch voor. 
7. Prestatie-informatie wordt maar gedeeltelijk en niet consistent ter beschikking 
gesteld. 
 
Op basis van deze bevindingen is de conclusie uit het onderzoek dat in de meeste 
gevallen geen sprake is van aansluiting tussen het juridische en economische 
beheersingsinstrumentarium voor ZBOs. In de kern ligt het accent op het juridische 
beheersingsinstrumentarium en wordt geen recht gedaan aan de economische 
karakteristieken van de dienstverlening door ZBOs. 
 Kanttekeningen 
De bevindingen uit het onderzoek gelden specifiek voor de elf onderzochte organisaties. 
Toch zijn op basis van het onderzoek ook enkele bredere kanttekeningen te maken. In de 
eerste plaats kunnen de bevindingen niet zondermeer worden gegeneraliseerd. Wel geldt 
dat de bevindingen voor NAK en FBKVB redelijkerwijs ook van toepassing zijn voor de 
overige ZBOs die behoren tot de cultuurfondsen respectievelijk certificeerders van 
landbouwprodukten.  
In de tweede plaats geldt dat op basis van interviews met Kamerleden blijkt dat 
sprake is van moeizame informatievoorziening naar het Parlement. Tegelijkertijd stellen 
de geïnterviewden vast dat ook snel een risico van informatie-overvloed bestaat. Een 
meer gestructureerde benadering van de informatievoorziening naar Kamerleden over 
alle ZBOs en niet alleen die ZBOs die uit de Rijksbegroting worden bekostigd kan 
toegevoegde waarde hebben. Uit de gesprekken met Kamerleden bleek ook dat zij 
denken dat voor ZBOs die een quasi juridische functie uitvoeren (denk aan 
marktmeesters of instellingen als de commissie gelijke behandeling) er andere en minder 
beperkende sturingsinstrumenten nodig zijn dan voor de andere ZBOs.  
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Een laatste kanttekening heeft betrekking op de onderliggende ideëen rondom 
hervormingen in publiek management (Public Management Reform/New Public 
Management). Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat er een grote verscheidenheid aan 
besturingsinstrumenten voor ZBOs is ontstaan. Dat bevestigt eerdere 
onderzoeksbevindingen over beperkte consistentie in het Nederlandse 
verzelfstandigingsbeleid, in ieder geval voor ZBOs. Er zijn in het onderzoek ook binnen 
individuele ministeries procedures en handelwijzen aangetroffen ten opzichte van 
verschillende ZBOs die op zijn minst als onderling niet consistent kunnen worden 
beschouwd. Andere factoren zoals historische achtergronden, verschillen in cultuur bij 
betrokken organisaties en complexiteit van dienstverlening lijken ook een rol te spelen bij 
de inrichting van het beheersingsinstrumentarium in individuele gevallen. 
 Aanbevelingen 
Naar aanleiding van de bevindingen uit het onderzoek zijn de volgende aanbevelingen 
het overwegen waard. 
1. Ontwikkel een eenduidige standaard voor informatievoorziening over ZBOs. 
2. Benoem één eigenaar voor alle ZBOs. 
3. Stem planning en control af op de karakteristieken van de geleverde diensten. 
4. Pas de kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen op punten aan. 
5. Laat de Tweede Kamer investeringen goedkeuren. 
6. Bepaal een norm voor de omvang van egalisatiereserves. 
 
Vanuit onderzoeksperspectief is het te overwegen om nader onderzoek te doen naar 
bestuurlijke relevantie en stabiliteit van door ZBOs te leveren diensten als criterium voor 
besluitvorming over verzelfstandiging van publieke dienstverlening. 
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 List of abbreviations 
 
Aanwijzingen General instructions on legislation; Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving; 
AW1996:x Article x of „Aanwijzingen‟ 1996-2007 version 
AW2008:x Article x of „Aanwijzingen‟ October 2008 version 
ACBG Agency CBG. Operational part of CBG-MEB, has Government Agency status 
AFM Netherlands Authority for the financial Markets. Autoriteit Financiële Markten. 
(ZBO) 
AOB Accrual Output Budgeting (used in Australia) 
AOW National old age pension plan, first pillar. Algemene Ouderdomswet 
AT Agency Theory 
Awb Dutch General Administrative law, Algemene wet bestuursrecht 
AWBZ Medical Care insurance program. Algemene wet bijzondere ziektekosten 
BBV Local Government Accounting Regulations, Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording 
BCFV Decree Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting. Besluit Centraal Fonds 
Volkshuisvesting. 
BCU Decree on funding of cultural activities. Bekostigingsbesluit cultuuruitingen 
BV Besloten Vennootschap (similar to Ltd) 
BW Dutch Civil Code, Burgerlijk wetboek 
BWX:y.z Reference to Book X, article y, section z of Dutch Civil Code. 
CBG-MEB Medicines Evaluation Board. College ter beoordeling van geneesmiddelen (ZBO) 
CBP Dutch Data Protection Authority; College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (ZBO) 
CBR Driving licence examination office; Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen 
(ZBO).  
CFV Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting (ZBO) 
CGB Dutch Equal Treatment Commission; Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 
CTG Board on health/care fees; College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg (ZBO) 
CTZ Health insurance monitoring board; College Toezicht Zorgverzekeringen (ZBO) 
CVZ Health Care insurance board. College voor Zorgverzekeringen (ZBO) 
CW Government Budgeting and Accounting Act; Comptabiliteitswet 
CW1927 Government Budgeting and Accounting Act 1927; Comptabiliteitswet 1927 
CW1976 Government Budgeting and Accounting Act 1976; Comptabiliteitswet 1976 
CW1976-I Government Budgeting and Accounting Act 1976 before 6th revision; 
Comptabiliteitswet 1976, voor 6e wijziging 
CW1976-II Government Budgeting and Accounting Act 1976, as of 6th revision; 
Comptabiliteitswet 1976 vanaf 6e wijziging 
CW2001 Government Budgeting and Accounting Act 2001; Comptabiliteitswet 2001 
CWX:y.z Government Budgeting and Accounting Act year X, paragraph y, subparagraph z 
DNB Dutch Central Bank De Nederlandsche Bank (hybrid ZBO) 
ESA95 European System of Accounts 1995 
EU European Union 
FBKVB Foundation for Visual arts, design and architecture. Fonds Beeldende Kunsten, 
Vormgeving en Bouwkunst. (ZBO) 
GA Government Agency 
GemW Local Government Act; Gemeentewet 
GW Constitution; Grondwet 
IFRS International financial reporting standards (private sector) 
IOOV Inspection on public safety; Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. 
IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standard 
IPSASX:y.z IPSAS nr X, paragraph y, subparagraph z 
IWI Inspection service for work and income; Inspectie Werk en Inkomen. 
HR Supreme Court; Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
Kadaster Land Registry Office. Dienst Kadaster (ZBO) 
KvK Chamber of Commerce, Kamer van Koophandel 
kZBO Framework Law on ZBOs; Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen 
kZBO:x Reference to article x of Framework law on ZBOs 
MinBuZa Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
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MinBZK Ministry of the Interior/Home office. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 
MinDEF Ministry of Defense. Ministerie van Defensie. 
MinEZ Ministry of Economic Affairs/Ministry of Trade and Industry. Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 
MinFin Ministry of Finance/Treasury. Ministerie van Financiën 
MinJus Ministry of Justice. Ministerie van Justitie 
MinJG Ministry of Youth and Family. Ministerie van Jeugd en Gezin 
MinLNV Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality. Ministerie van Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer and Voedselkwaliteit 
MinOCW Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en 
Wetenschappen 
MinSZW Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid 
MinVROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment. Ministerie van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 
MinVW Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Watermanagement. Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat. 
MinVWS Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn 
en Sport 
MinWWI Ministry of Housing, Communities and Integration. Ministerie van Wonen, Wijken 
en Integratie. 
MP Member of Parliament 
NAK Dutch general inspection service for agricultural seeds and seed potatoes. 
Nederlandse Algemene Keuringsdienst voor zaai en pootgoed van 
landbouwgewassen (ZBO) 
NCA Netherlands Court of Audit; Algemene Rekenkamer 
NMa Netherlands Competition Authority. Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (ZBO) 
MW Law on competition; Mededingingswet 
NV Naamloze Vennootschap (similar to PLC) 
NJN Najaarsnota (2nd supplement to budget, november) 
NZA Dutch Healthcare Authority. Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (ZBO) 
P&C Planning & Control 
Vf/Pf Participatiefonds/Vervangingsfonds. Formally 2 ZBOs but operating together. 
PLA Public Law Agency 
PLB Private Law Body 
PRT Property Rights Theory 
Quango Quasi non governmental organisation 
RAB Resource Accounting and Budgeting (UK) 
RBBBV Decree on remuneration and operating costs ZBOs minVWS. Regeling 
bezoldiging en beheerskosten bestuursorganen volksgezondheid. 
RDW Department of Road Transport, Dienst Wegverkeer. 
RINIS (inter)National Information exchange institute. Routeringsinstituut 
(inter)Nationale Informatiestromen 
RSUWI Regulations SUWI. Regeling SUWI. 
RvR Council for legal support. Raad voor Rechtsbijstand (ZBO) 
RWT Legal Entity with Statutory Task;  Rechtspersoon met wettelijke taak 
R&D Research and development 
SHA Social Housing Association; Woningcorporatie 
SLA Service Level Agreement; Service Niveau Overeenkomst 
SRvR Decree on subsidising Council for legal support; Subsidiebesluit raden voor 
Rechtsbijstand 
STE Securities trade monitoring foundation; Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer. 
SUWI Case law on structure of social security organisation; Wet structuur 
uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen. 
SVB Sociale Verzekeringsbank (ZBO) 
TCT Transaction Cost Theory 
UWV Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (ZBO) 
IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IBGroep Informatie Beheer Groep (former ZBO) 
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RCU Decree on subsidising cultural activities. Regeling subsidies en uitkeringen 
cultuuruitingen 
RINIS Data exchange institute. Routeringsinstituut (inter)nationale informatiestromen 
RvS Council of State, Raad van State. High Authority of State, to be consulted on 
every proposal for a law. 
VJN Voorjaarsnota (1st supplement to budget; June) 
WFT Law on financial monitoring. Wet op het financieel toezicht 
WGA Whole of Government Accounts 
WMG Law on market structure in the health/care sector, Wet marktordening 
gezondheidszorg 
WOPT Law on publication of high level remuneration for publicly funded activities, Wet 
Openbaarheid  uit publieke middelen gefinancierde topinkomens 
WRB Law on legal support; Wet op de rechtsbijstand 
WSC1993 Law on Culture policy; Wet op het specifiek cultuurbeleid 
WTE Law on stock trading; Wet Toezicht effecten verkeer 
ZBO Public body; literally: Autonomous Authoritative Body;  Zelfstandig 
Bestuursorgaan, see PLA and PLB 
ZPW2005 Law on agricultural seeds and plants 2005 (Zaaizaad- en Plantgoedwet 2005) 
ZVW Zorgverzekeringswet; law on health care insurance 
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List of frequently used concepts 
 
Association ZBO A ZBO that has the civil law status of an association (or similar entities) 
Cabinet Joint assembly of Ministers under presidency of the Prime Minister 
Eerste Kamer Dutch Senate/House of Lords 
Enterprise ZBO A ZBO that has the civil law legal status of either NV (PLC) or BV (Ltd) 
Foundation APB A ZBO that has the civil law legal status of a foundation 
Government Formal definition of the authority Government: King and Ministers according to 
section 42 of the Constitution 
government Description of the general public authority on the national level 
Minister The minister who is responsible and may be held accountable for the policy 
domain in which an APB operates. When a specific minister is meant this is 
made explicit, e.g. the Minister of Finance 
Parliament General description of the elected bodies at the national level, consists of two 
Houses: House of Representatives and Senate 
Dutch Senate Eerste Kamer 
Slotwet Final budget act, brings authorised budget in line with realisation of spending. 
Subsidiary APB An Autonomous Public Body which has the status as a separate public legal 
entity 
Tweede Kamer Dutch House of Representatives/House of commons 
Shelter APB A ZBO without separate legal status, but part of the legal entity State. 
Regeerakkoord Coalition agreement. Document stating plans of cabinet in office 
Miljoenennota Budget memorandum. Annual document presented by the Minister of Finance 
stating the fiscal position of the Dutch State and the general policy program for a 
fiscal year 
Hiving off Transferring activities from within government to an entity at arm‟s length of 
government 
Hiving in Bringing a former fully private entity under arm‟s length control of government 
Unit Part of organisation that is specifically addressed. In ZBO context it refers to 
either all ZBOs or to those ZBOs that are part of the legal entity State but 
operate at arm‟s length. 
Entity Refers only to organisations that have a separate legal status. In a ZBO context 
using entity excludes those ZBOs that are part of the legal entity State. 
Openbaar Lichaam Public Body as defined in constitution, article 134, not having a ZBO status. 
Slotwet Finalising budget law. Submitted at the end of the fiscal year to approve last 
changes and discharge minister for his responsibility during the fiscal year. 
Quango Quasi autonomous no governmental organisation. Refers to all forms of arm‟s 
length organisations 
Agentschap Similar to executive agency. Also known as „Baten-lastendienst‟ 
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 Financial definitions (Source: IPSAS, 2008) 
 
Cash receipts Cash inflows 
Cash payments Cash outflows 
Cash flow Inflows and outflows of cash 
Contributions from owners means future economic benefits or service potential that has been 
contributed to the entity by parties external to the entity, other than 
those that result in liabilities of the entity, that establish a financial 
interest in the net assets/equity of the entity, which:  
(a) Conveys entitlement both to distributions of future economic 
benefits or service potential by the entity during its life, such 
distributions being at the discretion of the owners or their 
representatives, and to distributions of any excess of assets over 
liabilities in the event of the entity being wound up; and/or 
(b) Can be sold, exchanged, transferred or redeemed. 
Expenses Decreases in economic benefits or service potential during 
the reporting period in the form of outflows or consumption of assets 
or incurrences of liabilities that result in decreases in net 
assets/equity, other than those relating to distributions to owners. 
Revenue The gross inflow of economic benefits or service potential during the 
reporting period when those inflows result in an increase in net 
assets/equity, other than increases relating to contributions from 
owners. 
Consolidation The process of preparing consolidated financial statements. 
Consolidated financial 
statements 
The financial statements of an economic entity presented as those of a 
single entity. 
Economic entity A group of entities comprising a controlling entity and one or more 
controlled entities. 
Segment A distinguishable activity or group of activities of an entity for which it is 
appropriate to separately report financial information for the purpose 
of evaluating the entity‟s past performance in achieving its objectives 
and for making decisions about the future allocation of resources. 
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 Appendix 1A: Full list of ZBOs as of July 1, 2007 
 
The list presented below is adapted from MinBZK, (2007a). The modification regards grouping of entities that actually perform the same 
task but regionally or functionally split over a number of separate legal entities. An example is „Kunstenfondsen‟ which regards of 10 
separate legal entities providing income transfers in the Arts-sector. Column 2 of Table A - 1 gives the list of entities included in the cluster 
when in the original list of minBZK, the entities are presented separately. Column 3 indicates the status of these ZBOs under kZBO based 
on a letter of minBZK (Parliament, 2008b)  and Column 4 indicates (an estimate of) operating turnover as presented in the annual reports 
2006 of the entities. Column 5 indicates the main type of activities realised by this ZBO. The bold printed entities were involved in the case 
studies. 
Table A - 1: ZBOs and clusters of ZBOs 
 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) - Yes 73 PLB (f)* minFin M  
Bevoegde autoriteiten Rijnvaart unknown No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Bureau beheer Landbouwgronden - No 1 PLA (s)** minLNV S  
Bureau Financieel Toezicht - Yes 5 PLA  minJUS M  
Centraal administratiekantoor 
bijzondere ziektekosten 
- No  PLB minVWS  BZK2008-list only 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
(CBS) 
- Yes 182 PLA minEZ S  
Centraal Fonds voor de 
Volkshuisvesting (CFV) 
- Yes 5 PLA minVROM T  
Centraal Orgaan opvang 
Asielzoekers (COA) 
- Yes 501 PLA minJUS S  
Centrale commissie voor 
mensgebondenonderzoek 
- Yes 1 PLA (s) minVWS R  
Centrale Landinrichtingscommissie - Not listed# 1 PLA (s) minLNV S  
Centrale organisatie Werk en 
inkomen (CWI) 
- Yes 383 PLA minSZW L merged wiht UWV in 
2009 
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Centrum indicatiestellingen zorg - No   minVWS  BZK2008-list only 
Certificerende en 
keuringsinstanties 
arbeidsomstandigheden 
23, names not disclosed, part 
time ZBOs 
Not listed 0 PLB minSZW M  
College Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens (CBP) 
- Yes 5 PLA (s) minJUS R  
College Bouw Zorginstellingen - No 12 PLA minVWS L  
College Sanering Zorginstellingen - No 3 PLA minVWS T  
College ter beoordeling van 
geneesmiddelen 
- Yes 1 PLA (s) minVWS L  
College van Toezicht 
auteursrechten en naburige 
rechten 
- Yes 1 PLA (s) minJUS M  
College van Toezicht op de 
Kansspelen 
- No 1 PLA (s) minJus L  
College voor de toelating van 
bestrijdingsmiddelen 
- Yes 7 PLA minLNV L  
College voor Zorgverzekeringen - Yes 52 PLA minVWS T  
Commissariaat voor de media - Yes 5 PLA minOCW M  
Commissie Advies gevaarlijke 
stoffen door de lucht 
- No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Commissie Algemene 
Oorlogsongevallenregeling 
Indonesië 
- No 1 PLA (s) minVWS T  
Commissie Eindtermen 
Accountantsopleiding 
- Yes   minFin R BZK2008-list only 
Commissie examens 
scheepswerktuigkundigen 
- No 1 PLA (s) minVW R  
Commissie gelijke behandeling - Yes 4 PLA (s) minJUS R  
Commissie Schadefonds 
geweldsmisdrijven 
- Yes 1 PLA (s) minJUS R  
Commissie Stuurliedenexamens - No 1 PLA (s) minVW R  
Commissie van beheer 
Geneeskundige verzorging Politie 
- Not listed  1 PLA (s) minBZK T  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Commissie van beroep art 3 Wet 
rijonderricht 
- No 1 PLA (s) minVW R  
Commissie van beroep 
Loodsenexamens 
- No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Commissie voor de 
Zeevisvaartexamens 
- No 1 PLA (s) minVW R  
Commissies voor de 
gebiedsaanwijzing 
12 regionally organised 
committees 
Not listed 1 PLA (s) minVWS L  
Commissies voor de samenstelling 
van de rassenlijsten 
5 for separate groups of 
agricultural products 
Not listed 1 PLA (s) minLNV L  
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) - Yes 90 PLB minFIN M  
Dienst voor het kadaster en 
openbare registers (Kadaster) 
- Yes 225 PLA minVROM L  
Dienst Wegverkeer (RDW) - Yes 181 PLA minVW L  
Erkende particuliere 
onderzoeksbureaus 
Schepenbesluit 
7 Not listed 0 PLB minVW M  
Erkenninghouders APK numerous, unknown No 0 PLB minVW M  
Examencommissie amateur 
radiozendexamens 
- No listed 1 PLA (s) minEZ R  
Examencommissie 
Certificaatloodsen 
- No 1 PLA (s) minVW R  
Examencommissie voor maritieme 
radiocommunicatie 
- Not listed 1 PLA (s) minEZ R  
Examencommissies Luchtvaart - No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Faunafonds - Yes 2 PLA minLNV T  
Fonds MKZ-AI - No   minLNV  BZK2008-list only 
Gerechtsdeurwaarders numerous, unknown Not listed 0 PLB minJUS R  
Grondkamers 6, regionally organised Yes 1 PLA (s) minLNV R  
Herinrichtingscommissie Oost-
Groningen en de Gronings-Drentse 
Veenkoloniën 
- No 1 PLA (s) minLNV R  
Hiswa Vereniging - No 0 PLB minVW L  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Huurcommissies 59 Yes 1 PLA (s) minVROM R in 2010 merged into 
one ZBO 
IJkbevoegden unknown Not listed 0 PLB minEZ M  
Informatie Beheer Groep (IBGroep) - No 148 PLA minOCW T in 2010 merged with 
executive agency 
and lost ZBO status 
Kamer voor de binnenvisserij - No 1 PLA (s) minLNV R  
Kamers van Koophandel 20, regional jurisdictions Yes 200 PLA minEZ L  
Kenniscentra beroepsonderwijs 
bedrijfsleven 
unknown No   minOCW  BZK2008-list only 
Keuringsinstanties art 10.3 
Telecommunicatiewet 
6 Not listed 0 PLB minEZ M  
Keuringsinstanties bouwproducten unknown No 0 PLB minVROM M  
Keuringsinstanties geluidshinder unknown No 0 PLB minVROM M  
Keuringsinstanties 
pleziervaartuigen 
3 No 0 PLB minVW M  
Keuringsinstanties uitrusting 
Zeeschepen 
5 No 0 PLB minVW M  
Keuringsinstanties V&W overig 4 No 0 PLB minVW M  
Keuringsinstanties VWS 7 No 0 PLB minVWS M  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Keuringsinstellingen 
Landbouwproducten 
Stichting Nederlandse 
Algemene Kwaliteitsdienst 
voor de Tuinbouw (NAK-T) 
Stichting 
Bloembollenkeuringsdienst 
Stichting Nederlandse 
Algemene Keuringsdienst voor 
Zaaizaad en Pootgoed 
Landbouwgewassen (NAK) 
Stichting Centraal Orgaan voor 
Kwaliteitsaangelegenheden in 
de Zuivel 
Stichting Controlebureau voor 
Pluimvee, Eieren en 
Eiproducten Stichting 
Kwaliteitscontrolebureau voor 
Groenten en Fruit 
Stichting SKAL 
Yes 70-75  minLNV M Listed separately by 
minBZK 
Kiesraad - No 1 PLA (s) minBZK R  
Koninklijke Bibliotheek - No 41 PLA minOCW S  
Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie 
van Wetenschappen (KNAW) 
- No 134 PLA minOCW R  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Kunstenfondsen Mondriaan Stichting 
Stichting Fonds Beeldende 
Kunsten, Vormgeving en 
Bouwkunst (FBKVB) 
Stichting Fonds voor 
Amateurkunst en 
Podiumkunsten (2008: 
Cultuurparticipatie) 
Stichting Fonds voor de 
Scheppende Toonkunst 
(2008: Podiumkunsten+) 
Stichting Fonds voor 
Podiumprogrammering en 
marketing (2008: 
Podiumkunsten +) 
Stichting Nederlands Fonds 
voor de Film 
Stichting Stimuleringsfonds 
voor Architectuur 
Stichting Fonds voor de 
Letteren 
Stichting Nederlands Literair 
Productie- en Vertalingenfonds 
Stimuleringsfonds 
Nederlandse Culturele 
Omroepproducties 
Yes 10  minOCW T Listed separately by 
minBZK 
Landelijk Bureau Inning 
Onderhoudsbijdragen (LBIO) 
- Yes 9 PLA minJUS T  
Landelijk Selectie- en 
Opleidingsinstituut Politie 
(Politieacademie) 
- Yes 174 PLA minBZK R  
Landelijke commissie Toezicht 
indicatiestelling 
- Not listed 1 PLA (s) minOCW R  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Landelijke en regionale 
examencommissies 
verkeersinformatie en 
verkeersaanwijzingen 
unknown No 0 PLB minVW R  
Landelijke geschillencommissie 
weer samen naar school 
- No 1 PLA (s) minOCW R  
Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland 
(LVNL) 
- Yes 163 PLA minVW S  
Medisch-etische 
toetsingscommissies 
33 regionally organised 
committees 
No 1 PLA (s) minVWS R  
Nationale Commissie voor 
Internationale Samenwerking en 
Duurzame ontwikkeling (NCDO) 
- No 3-5 PLA minBuZa R  
Nederlands Bureau 
Brandweerexamens 
- Yes 3 PLA minBZK R  
Nederlands instituut voor 
Brandweer en Rampenbestrijding 
(Nibra) 
- Yes 24 PLA minBZK R In 2010 known as 
Nederlands instituut 
voor Fysieke 
Veiligheid 
Nederlands Meetinstituut BV - Yes 33 PLB minEZ M  
Nederlandse loodsencorporatie - No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Nederlandse Medediningsautoriteit - Yes 36  minEZ M  
Nederlandse Omroep Stichting 
(NOS) 
- No 105 PLB (f) minOCW T  
Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk 
onderzoek (TNO) 
- No 583 PLA minOCW R  
Nederlandse organisatie voor 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
(NWO) 
- Yes 35 PLA minOCW T  
Nederlandse Transplantatie 
Stichting 
- Yes 21 PLB (f) minVWS S  
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit - Yes 25 PLA minVWS M  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Nederlands-Vlaamse Accreditatie 
organisatie voor het hoger 
onderwijs 
- Yes 6 PLA minOCW M  
Notarissen unknown Not listed 0 PLB minJUS R  
Onafhankelijke Post- en 
Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA) 
- Yes 17 PLA minEZ M  
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid - Yes 8 PLA minBZK R  
Openbare Academische 
Ziekenhuizen 
6 Not listed 512 PLA minOCW R Excluding regular 
medical services 
and 2 similar private 
hospitals also not 
included. 
Organisatie ter verbetering van de 
binnenvisserij 
- Not listed 1 PLA (s) minLNV R  
Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad - No 27 PLA minVWS T  
Pensioenuitvoerders 87 No  PLB minSZW  BZK2008-list only 
Raad voor de plantenrassen - Yes 2 PLA (S) minLNV L  
Raad voor het korps landelijke 
politiediensten 
- Not listed 1 PLA (s) minBZK Other  
Raden voor Rechtsbijstand RvR Amsterdam 
RvR Arnhem 
RvR „s Gravenhage 
RvR „s Hertogenbosch 
RvR Leeuwarden 
Yes 74 PLA minJUS T In 2009 merged into 
one ZBO. 
Reconstructiecommissie Midden-
Delfland 
- No 1 PLA (s) minLNV S  
Regionale loodsencorporaties unknown No   minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Regionale verwijzingscommissies 
voortgezet onderwijs 
unknown No 1 PLB minOCW R  
Registratiecommissies en 
opleidingscolleges KNMG, KNMP 
en NMT 
10 No 0 PLB minVWS L  
Rijkshavenbeheerders unknown No 1 PLA (s) minVW S  
Rijkshavenmeesters unknown No 1 PLA (s) minVW   
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Sociale Verzekeringsbank - Yes 270  minSZW T  
Staatsbosbeheer - No 136 PLA minLNV S  
Staatsexamencommissie - No 1 PLA (s) minOCW R  
Staatsexamencommissie NT-2  No   minOCW  BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Administratie 
Indonesische Pensioenen 
- No 1 PLB (f) minBZK T  
Stichting Airport coordination 
Netherlands 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minVW S  
Stichting Argonaut - No  PLB (f) minVWS  BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Borgstellingsfonds voor 
de Landbouw 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minLNV T  
Stichting Bureau 
Architectenregister 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minVROM L  
Stichting Centraal Bureau 
Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen (CBR) 
- Yes 89 PLB (f) minVW L  
Stichting Donorgegevens 
Kunstmatige Bevruchting 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minJUS S  
Stichting Erkenningregeling 
koeltechniek 
- Not listed 0 PLB (f) minVROM L  
Stichting Examenbureau 
Beroepsvervoer 
- No 0 PLB (f) minVW R  
Stichting Examens 
Vakbekwaamheid honden- en 
kattenbesluit 
- Not listed 0 PLB (f) minLNV R  
Stichting Fonds Patiënten 
Gehandicapten en Ouderen (Fonds 
PGO) 
- No 2 PLB (f) minVWS T  
Stichting Fonds Vrijwillig vervroegd 
uittreden overheidspersoneel 
(VutFonds) 
- No 0 PLB (f) minBZK T  
Stichting Het Gebaar - No 1 PLB (f) minVWS T  
Stichting inschrijving Eigen Vervoer 
(SIEV) 
- No 0 PLB (f) minVW L  
Stichting Joods Humanitair Fonds - No 0 PLB (f) minFIN T  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Stichting Koppeling - No  PLB (f) minVWS  BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Maror-gelden Overheid - No 0 PLB (f) minFIN T  
Stichting Nationale en 
Internationale Wegvervoer 
organisatie 
- Yes 4 PLB (f) minVW L  
Stichting Nidos - No 0 PLB (f) minJUS Other  
Stichting Ontwikkelings- en 
saneringsfonds voor de Landbouw 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minLNV T  
Stichting Ontwikkelings- en 
saneringsfonds voor de Visserij 
- Yes 1 PLB (f) minLNV T  
Stichting opleiding maatschappij en 
gezondheid 
- No  PLB (f) minVWS  BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Rechtsherstel Sinti en 
Roma 
- No 0 PLB (f) minVWS T  
Stichting scheepsafvalstoffen en 
vaardocumenten 
- No  PLB(f) minVW  BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Stimuleringsfonds 
openbare gezondheidszorg 
- Not listed 0 PLB (f) minVWS T  
Stichting Uitvoering 
omslagregelingen WTZ 
- No 3 PLB (f) minVWS T  
Stichting VAM - Yes 0 PLB (f) minVW R  
Stichting VAMEX - Yes  PLB (f) minVW R BZK2008-list only 
Stichting Vf/Pf Stichting Vervangingsfonds 
Stichting Participatiefonds 
Yes 13 PLB (f) minOCW T  
Stichting Waarborgfonds Eigen 
Woningen 
- No 4 PLB (f) minVROM T  
Stichting Ziektekostenverzekering 
Krijgsmacht 
- No 1 PLB (f) minDEF T  
Stimuleringsfonds voor de pers - Yes 1 PLA minOCW T  
TenneT (EnerQ + Certiq) - No 7 PLB minEZ S  
Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzeke-ringen (UWV) 
- Yes 1,811 PLA minSZW T In 2009 merged with 
CWI. 
Uitvoeringsorganen AWBZ 65 private health insurance 
companies 
No 163 PLB minVWS T  
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 (Group)Name Elements of groups kZBO status (Estimated) 
operating 
turnover 
2006 in € 
mln 
Legal Status Minister 
Principal 
Activity Remarks 
Voedselvoorzienings- en 
inkoopbureau 
- Not listed 1 PLA (s) minLNV T  
Waarborginstellingen Edelmetaal Edelmetaal Waarborg 
Nederland BV 
Waarborg Holland BV 
Yes 10 PLB minEZ M  
Waarderingskamer - Yes 2 PLA (s) minFIN M  
Zorg Onderzoek 
Nederland/Medische 
Wetenschappen (ZonMW) 
- Yes 13 PLA minVWS R  
* PLA (s) Shelter ZBO 
** PLB (f) Foundation ZBO 
# not listed in kZBO letter (Parliament, 2008b) 
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 Appendix 1B: Legal basis of selected ZBOs 
Table A - 2: Legal basis of selected ZBOs 
Name Legal basis Character legal basis Original version present 
legislation* 
Last change 
AFM Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995, art 40; 
Overdrachtsbesluit Wet toezicht effectenverkeer 
1995. 
Decree based on Program Law 1995 2002 change legal 
entity name 
CFV Woningwet, art. 71 Program Law Decree, 1992 2001 
CVZ Zorgverzekeringswet, art. 58 Program Law 2006 2006 
FBKVB Wet op het specifiek cultuurbeleid, art. 9 Mandate based on program law 1993 1998 
NAK Zaaizaad- en Plantgoedwet 2005, art. 19 and 89; 
Besluit aanwijzing toezichthouders Zaaizaad- en 
plantgoedwet 2005 
Decree based on Program law 2005 none 
NMa Mededingingswet, art. 2 Program Law 1998 2005, ZBO-status 
NZA Wet Marktordening Gezondheidszorg, art. 3  Program Law 2006 none 
Vf/Pf Wet Primair Onderwijs, art. 183 and 184; 
Besluit Participatiefonds 
Besluit Vervangingsfonds 
Decree based on Program Law 1996 2004 
RvR Wet op de Rechtsbijstand, art. 2 Program Law 1995 2003 
SVB  Wet Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en 
inkomen, art 2 
Organisation Law 2002 none 
UWV  Wet Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en 
inkomen, art 2 
Organisation Law 2002 none 
* In the overview of changes in legislation, I only refer to the changes in the present law that governs the ZBO. Therefore, this is not a full historical overview of the 
legislative history of particular ZBOs 
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 Appendix 2: Documents requested for preparation of interviews 
1. Most recent version of statutes in case of a private law ZBO (PLB) 
2. Management (performance) contracts and decrees on mandates 
3. General instructions on planning and control 
4. Letter of approval of the annual report 2006 as well as separate documents regarding 
approval of allocation of (excess) equity/reserves. 
5. Budget instructions or other documents from the parent ministry that are used to 
prepare the budget for fiscal year 2008. 
6. Approval document budget or fees fiscal 2008 
7. Most recent interim report to the minister on fiscal 2007. 
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 Appendix 3: Documents used in interviews 
This appendix provides an overview of documents received and studied in relation to the 
interviews. Legislation is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/zoeken. Parliamentary 
documents can be found at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten;. If other 
documents are publicly available, the website is referred to. 
 
AFM  
a. Legislation  
Law on securitiestrading 1995 Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995 
Decree monitoring securities trading, withdrawn, 
October 2007 
Besluit Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995, 
ingetrokken, Oktober 2007. 
Revised Statutes Stichting AFM, May 31, 2006 Gewijzigde Statuten Stichting AFM, 31 mei 2006 
Transformation decree Law on securities trading Overdrachtsbesluit Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 
1995 
Regulation monitoring costs law on securities 
trading, fiscal 2000 
Regeling Toezichtskosten Wet Toezicht 
Effectenverkeer 1995, jaar 2000. 
Decree determining percentages of monitoring costs 
law on securities trading, fiscal 2003 
Vaststellingsregeling percentages toezichtskosten 
Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995 voor het jaar 
2003. 
Law on financial monitoring (as of October2006) Wet Financieel Toezicht 
Regulation on funding Financial Monitoring 
((December 19, 2003) 
Regeling bekostiging Financieel Toezicht, 19 
december 2003  
Decree funding Financial monitoring (October 12, 
2006) 
Besluit bekostiging Financieel Toezicht 12 oktober 
2006 
Executive regulations Financial monitoring Uitvoeringsregeling WFT 
b. Other documents  
Policy and priorities document 2007-2009, No date Beleid en prioriteiten AFM. Periode 2007-2009. 
Geen datum 
Annual report 2007 AFM, most recently retrieved on 
June 20, 2010 from 
http://www.afm.nl/layouts/afm/default.aspx~/medi
a/files/jaarverslag/afm-2007.ashx  
Jaarverslag 2007 AFM 
Budget 2008 AFM, dated November 30, 2007, most 
recently retrieved on June 20, 2010 from 
http://www.afm.nl/layouts/afm/default.aspx~/medi
a/files/begroting/begroting-2008.ashx  
Begroting 2008 AFM 
Report „Maat houden‟ referring to proportional 
calculation of monitoring fees. Staatscourant, May 
10, 2000. 
Maat houden. Bekendmaking van het kader voor 
de doorberekening van toelatings- en 
handhavingskosten, Staatscourant, 10 mei 2000 
 
CFV  
a. Legislation  
Law on Housing Woningwet 
Decree of October 17, 1988. Regards subsidising, 
monitoring and policy decrees to be issued by CFV 
Besluit van 17 oktober 1988, tot vaststelling van 
een algemene maatregel van bestuur krachtens 
artikel 59, vijfde lid van de Woningwet.  
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2006 CFV Jaarverslag 2006 
Letter minVROM: Approval annual report 2006. 
dated June 20, 2007, CST/FEZ/2007053681 
Goedkeuring jaarstukken CFV 2006, 20 Juni  2007, 
CST/FEZ/2007053681 
4th Quarterly report 2007. Dated February 2008 Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting. Vierde 
kwartaalrapportage 2007. Februari 2008 
Annual report 2007 CFV Jaarverslag 2007 
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CFV  
Budget and multiyear budget 2008-2012. Dated 
October 2007 
Begroting 2008 en meerjarenprognose 2008 tot en 
met 2012 Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, oktober 
2007 
Letter minVROM: Approval budget 2008. Dated 
December 14, 2007. CST/FEZ2007/120677 
Begroting 2008 inclusief voorgestelde 
heffingsbijdrage. 14 december 2007. 
CST/FEZ2007/120677 
Advice: monitoring SHAs. (Schilder Committee), 
dated June 20, 2006 
Advies toezicht op woningcorporaties (Commissie 
Schilder), dated 20 Juni, 2006 
Monitoring document minVROM, version 2008 Toezicht op basis van vertrouwen. 
Uitvoeringstoezicht op zelfstandige organisaties 
2008 
Monitoring arrangement CFV, May 15, 2006 Toezichtsarrangement Centraal Fonds voor de 
Volkshuisvesting. 15 mei 2006 
Document on main operations CFV 2008. Overzicht primaire processen CFV 2008 
 
CVZ  
a. Legislation  
Health insurance law Zorgverzekeringswet 
Regulation on remuneration and operating costs 
authoritative bodies in the public health sector. 
Regeling bezoldiging en beheerskosten 
bestuursorganen volksgezondheid 
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2006, 
http://www.cvz.nl/resources/CVZ_jaarverslag2006_
tcm28-23044.pdf visited Oct 28, 2008 
Jaarverslag 2006 CVZ 
Annual report CVZ program funds 2006, 
http://www.cvz.nl/resources/rpt0704%20financieel
-jaarverslag_2006_tcm28-23012.pdf visited Oct 28, 
2008 
Financieel Jaarverslag Fondsen CVZ 2006 
Letter minVWS: Approval annual report 2006, dated 
Aug 23, 2007, MC-U-2786671 
Goedkeuring Jaarrekening 2006, 23 augustus 
2007, MC-U-2786671 
Budget 2007 CVZ Jaarplan 2007 CVZ. 
Letter minVWS: Budget 2007 CVZ, dated Oct. 16, 
2006, Z/VU-2723653 
Jaarplan 2007 CVZ, 16 Oktober 2006, Z/VU-
2723653 
Letter minVWS: Budget 2007, dated March 15, 
2007, MC-U-2750381 
Jaarplan en begroting 2007, 15 maart 2007, MC-U-
2750381 
Annual report 2007, 
http://www.cvz.nl/resources/Jaarverslag2007_tcm
28-26706.pdf visited Oct 28, 2008 
Jaarverslag 2007 CVZ 
 Annual report CVZ program funds 2007, 
http://www.cvz.nl/resources/financieeljaarverslag2
007_tcm28-26303.pdf  visited Oct 28, 2008 
Financieel Jaarverslag Fondsen CVZ 2007 
Letter minVWS: approval annual report 2007, dated 
July 28, 2008, MC-U-2861077 
Goedkeuring Jaarverantwoording 2007, 28 juli 
2008, MC-U-2861077 
Budget 2008 CVZ, 
http://www.cvz.nl/resources/CVZ%20Jaarplan%202
008_tcm28-25517.pdf, visited Oct 28, 2008 
Jaarplan 2008 CVZ 
Letter minVWS: Approval budget 2008, dated March 
31, 2008, MC-U2839442 
Goedkeuring Jaarplan/Begroting 2008, 31 maart 
2008, MC-U2839442 
Letter minVWS: Governance structure CVZ as of 
2007, dated April 28, 2006, Z/VU-2677612 
Bestuursmodel CVZ m.i.v. 2007, 28 April  2006, 
Z/VU-2677612 
Information provision document VWS-CVZ, dated 
Dec 21, 2007 
Informatiestatuut VWS-CVZ, 21 december 2007. 
Governance arrangement between CVZ and 
minVWS, dated Dec 21, 2007, including appendix 
Governance arrangement tussen het College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen en het ministerie van VWS, 21 
december 2007, inclusief bijlagen 
http://www.publiekverantwoorden.nl/rapporten/visi
tatierapport_CVZ.pdf , visited Oct 28, 2008 
Verslag van de visitatie van het College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen. Maart, 2007. 
Handvestgroep publiek verantwoorden: Report on 
assessment of CVZ. Dated March 2007. 
Handvestgroep Publiek Verantwoorden. Verslag van 
de visitatie van het College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 
maart 2007 
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FBKVB  
a. Legislation  
Law on culture policy 1993 Wet specifiek cultuurbeleid 
Statutes, dated April 29, 1997 Statuten, 
Decree on funding cultural activities Bekostigingsbesluit cultuuruitingen 
Decree on subsidising and payment of cultural 
activities 
Regeling subsidies en uitkeringen cultuuruitingen. 
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2006 most recently retrieved on June 
20, 2010 from 
http://www.fondsbkvb.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/
jaarverslag_2006.pdf  
Jaarverslag 2006 
Letter minOCW on assessment annual report 2006, 
dated November 23, 2007 
Beoordeling jaarverantwoording 2006 
Letter minOCW on funding procedures fiscal 2009-
2012, dated November 19, 2007 
Subsidieprocedure 2009-2012 cultuurfondsen. 
Accountibility document, dated April 2005 Handboek verantwoording cultuursubsidies 
Fondsen, 
Mandate to director, dated April 17, 2007 Mandaatbesluit directie 
Mandate to deputy director, dated April 17, 2007 Mandaatbesluit adjunct directeur 
Mandate to controller/CFO, dated April 17, 2007 Mandaatbesluit hoofd financiële zaken 
Funding decision by minOCW fiscal 2005-2008, 
dated November 28, 2003 
Subsidiebeschikking periode 2005-2008 
 
NAK  
a. Legislation  
Law on agricultural seeds and plants 2005 Zaaizaad en Plantgoedwet 2005 
Announcement NAK-statutes, dated December 11, 
2007. 
Bekendmaking Statuten Nak, 11 december 2007. 
Mandate to director Plantenziektenkundige Dienst, 
dated August 27, 2007 
Mandaatbesluit LNV Directeur 
Plantenziektenkundige Dienst, 27 augustus 2007 
Mandate to Plantenziektenkundige Dienst and 
monitoring institutions, dated August 31, 2007 
Mandaatbesluit LNV Plantenziektenkundige Dienst 
en de keuringsdiensten, 31 augustus 2007 
Regulation fees Plantenziektenkundige Dienst and 
monitoring institutions, dated August 21, 2007 
Regeling tarieven Plantenziektenkundige Dienst en 
de keuringsdiensten, 21 augustus 2007 
Decree on trading agricultural seeds, dated 
December 8, 2005 
Besluit verhandeling teeltmateriaal, 8 december 
2005 
Decree on appointment of civil servants monitoring 
Law on plant diseases, dated August 31, 2007 
Besluit Aanwijzing ambtenaren en personen belast 
met toezicht Plantenziektenwet, 31 augustus 2007. 
b. Other documents  
Letter minLNV: Approval statement of accounts 
2006. Dated September 10, 2007, 
TRCJZ/2007/2854 
Goedkeuring financieel jaarverslag 2006. 10 
september 2007, TRCJZ/2007/2854 
Annual report 2007 NAK. last retrieved on June 20, 
2010 from 
http://www.nak.nl/documents/NAK%20Jaarverslag-
2007%20definitief.pdf 
Jaarverslag 2007 NAK.  
Letter minLNV: approval fees 2008. Dated April 11, 
2008. TRCJZ/2008/1015 
Goedkeuring tarieven 2008. 11 april 2008. 
TRCJZ/2008/1015 
Letter minLNV: General criteria on assessment of 
fees. Dated June 6, 2007. TRCDL/2007/1529 
Algemene criteria beoordeling fytosanitaire tarieven. 
6 juni 2007. TRCDL/2007/1529 
Letter minLNV: instruction on treasury management. 
Dated August 26, 2004. TRCFEZ/2004/2521 
Aanwijzing rechtspersonen met een beperkte 
kasbeheerfunctie. 26 augustus 2004. 
TRCFEZ/2004/2521 
Monitoring and information protocol NAK, dated 
June 4, 2004. Based on old legislation. 
Aansturings- en informatieprotocol Nederlandse 
Algemene Keuringsdienst voor zaaizaad en 
pootgoed van Landbouw gewassen. 4 juni 2004 
(oude regelgeving) 
Letter minLNV: draft mandate. Dated June 8, 2007, Letter minLNV: aanbieding concept mandaatbesluit 
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TRCJZ/2007/1887 Plantkeur. 8 Juni 2007, TRCJZ/2007/1887 
Multiyear agreement minLNV and NAK on tasks 
assigned. Dated June 15, 2007, TRCJZ/2007/1974 
Meerjarige overeenkomst Plantkeur tussen minLNV 
en NAK, 15 Juni  2007, TRCJZ/2007/1974 
Management Statute, dated November 13, 2007. Directiestatuut, 13 november 2007 
Company profile 2007. 75 years Nak. Bedrijfsinformatie 2007. 75 Jaar Nak 
 
NMa  
a. Legislation  
Law on competition Mededingingswet. 
Decree on NMa fees Besluit kostenverhaal NMa 
Governance arrangement minEZ-NMa. 
Staatscourant, 20 december 2005 nr 247, p. 14 
Relatiestatuut EZ-NMA. Staatscourant, 20 december 
2005 nr 247, p. 14 
Information exchange arrangement minEZ-NMa, 
dated December 8, 2005. WJZ 5719432 
Regeling gegevensuitwisseling NMA-EZ, 8 december 
2005. WJZ 5719432 
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2007, last retrieved on June 20, 
2010 from 
http://www.nmanet.nl/Images/Jaarverslag%20NMa
%202007%20integraal_tcm16-113025.pdf  
NMa Jaarverslag 2007 
 
 
NZA  
a. Legislation  
Law on market structure health sector Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg 
Decree on governance structure NZA 2007, dated 
December 17, 2007 
Besluit organisatie, mandaat, volmacht en 
machtiging NZa 2007, 17 december 2007. 
Appendix 1 to Decree of December 17, 2007 Bijlage 1 bij Besluit organisatie etc: Werkwijze NZA: 
Sturing en verantwoording. Juli 2007. OV/8608240 
Appendix 2 to Decree of December 17, 2007. Bijlage 2 bij Besluit organisatie etc: Rechtspositie 
personeel. OV/8608238 
Provisional Governance regulations NZA. Dated 
September 29, 2006. MC/MO-2716649 
Voorlopig Bestuursreglement van de Nederlandse 
Zorgautoriteit, zoals vastgesteld op grond van artikel 
124, derde lid, van de Wet marktordening 
gezondheidszorg door de Minister van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport bij brief van 29 
september 2006, nr MC/MO-2716649 
Governance regulations NZA. Dated March 7, 2007, 
MC-U-2753768 
Bestuursreglement Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit. 7 
maart 2007, MC-U-2753768 
Regulation on remuneration and operating costs 
authoritative bodies in the public health sector. 
Regeling bezoldiging en beheerskosten 
bestuursorganen volksgezondheid 
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2007 part 1. last retrieved on June 
20, 2010 from 
http://www.nza.nl/104107/141620/NZa-
jaarverslag-2007.pdf 
NZA in beeld. Jaarverslag 2007.  
Annual report 2007 part 2. last retrieved on June 
20, 2010 from 
http://www.nza.nl/104107/141620/NZa-
jaarverslag-2007.pdf 
Jaarverslag 2007. Verantwoordingsdocument. last 
retrieved on June 20, 2010 from 
http://www.nza.nl/104107/141620/NZa-
jaarverslag-2007.pdf 
Statement of accounts 2007. Dated March 7, 2008. Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit. Jaarrekening 2007. 7 
maart 2008. 
Letter minVWS: approval annual report 2007. dated 
July 28, 2008, MC-U-2866567 
Letter minVWS: goedkeuring jaarverantwoording 
2007. 28 juli 2008, MC-U-2866567 
Letter minVWS: instructions budget 2008, dated 
July 12, 2007, MC-U-2784765 
Letter minVWS: aandachtspunten voor de begroting 
en werkprogramma 2008, 12 juli, 2007, MC-U-
2784765 
Information arrangement VWS-NZA, October 2, 
2006. 
Informatiestatuut VWS-NZA, 2 oktober 2006 
Budget and activities 2008 NZA, December 17, 
2007 
Werkprogramma 2008 en begroting 2008 NZA, 17 
december 2007 
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NZA  
Letter minVWS: approval budget 2008. Dated 
September 16, 2008. MC-U-2875463 
Letter minVWS: goedkeuring werkprogramma en 
begroting (2008). 16 september 2008. MC-U-
2875463 
Document on activities NZA 2008, no date. Consultatiedoucment NZA agenda 2008, geen 
datum. 
 
RvR  
a. Legislation  
Law on legal support Wet op de rechtsbijstand. 
b. Other documents  
Letter minJUS: Framework 2006. Dated July 13, 
2005. 5360843/05/DTR 
Kaderbrief 2006. 13 juli 2005. 5360843/05/DTR 
Budget 2006 RvR The Hague Jaarplan en begroting 2006. RvR Den Haag. 
Letter minJUS: Funding 2006. Approval of budget. 
Dated February 6, 2006. 5401576/06/DTR 
Subsidiebrief 2006. 6 februari 2006. 
5401576/06/DTR 
Letter minJUS: supplement on funding 2006. Dated 
November 28, 2006. 5455481/06/DIRR 
Aanvullende subsidiebrief 2006. 28 november 
2006. 5455481/06/DIRR 
Statement of accounts RvR 2006 The Hague.  Jaarrekening 2006 RvR Den Haag. 
Letter minJUS: finalising funding 2006/approval 
annual report 2006. Dated February 15, 2008. 
5530374/08 
Subsidievaststelling 2006. Goedkeuring jaarverslag. 
15 februari 2008. 5530374/08 
Report external auditor RvR The Hague 2006. 
February 28, 2007. 
Rapport van bevindingen accountant RvR Den Haag 
2006. 28 februari 2007  
Management letter 2006 external auditor RvR The 
Hague. February 28, 2007.  
Management letter accountant RvR Den Haag 2006. 
28 februari 2007 
Letter minJUS: Framework 2007. Dated July 19, 
2006. 5432104/06/DRB 
Kaderbrief 2007. 19 juli 2006. 5432104/06/DRB 
Draft Annual report 2007 The Hague Branch, 
version March 21, 2008 
Concept jaarverslag RvR Den Haag. 21 maart 2008. 
Budget 2007, Estimate 2006, Dated October 11, 
2006. Management document 
Begroting 2007/Raming 2006. 11 oktober 2006. 
Budget 2007. Draft for approval to Board. Dated 
October 11 , 2006. 
Concept jaarplan 2007. Ter goedkeuring voor de 
Raad. 11 Oktober 2006. 
Letter minJUS: Funding 2007. Approval of budget. 
Dated February 28, 2007. 5469527/07/DIRR 
Subsidiebrief 2007. 28 februari 2007. 
5469527/07/DIRR 
Letter minJUS: supplement on funding 2007. Dated 
November 28, 2007. 5517170/07 
Aanvullende subsidiebrief 2007. 28 november 
2007. 5517170/07 
Management letter external auditor RvR The Hague 
2007. February 7, 2008. (powerpoint presentation) 
Management letter accountant RvR Den Haag 2007. 
7 februari 2008 (powerpoint) 
Report external auditor RvR The Hague 2007. 
February 7, 2008. (powerpoint presentation) 
Rapport van bevindingen accountant RvR Den Haag 
2007. 7 februari 2008 (powerpoint) 
Reassessment of funding system 2001. No date Herijking bekostigingsysteem 2001. 
Letter minJUS: management summary reporting. 
Dated March 26, 2008. 5536985/08. Including 
appendix full report. 
aangepaste management samenvatting verantwoord 
gerapporteerd. 26 maart 2008. 5536985/08. 
Integraal rapport ook beschikbaar. 
Letter minJUS: Financial reporting. Dated April 25, 
2003. 5222491/803 
Financiële verantwoording. 25 april 2003. 
5222491/803 
Benchmark Group. Benchmark RvR 2006/2007. 
March 2007. including appendices. 
Rijksbrede benchmark. Benchmark RvR 
2006/2007. met bijlagen. 
Memo dated September 15, 2006 on internal 
benchmark 2005. 
Memo 15 september 2006. Concept Benchmark 
Raden 2005. 
Memo dated May 9, 2007 on internal benchmark 
2005/2006 
Memo 9 mei 2007. interne benchmark 2005-2006. 
Memo dated August 21, 2007. Budget 2008 Memo 21 augustus 2007. Jaarplan 2008. 
Budget 2008. No date Jaarplan/Begroting 2008. Raad voor Rechtsbijstand. 
Monitoring document minJUS, dated January 2, 
2007. 
Financieel-economisch toezichtsstatuut ZBO‟s, 
RWT‟s en overige instellingen. DFEZ, 2 januari 2007. 
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SVB  
a. Legislation  
Law on structure work and income (SUWI) Wet SUWI 
Decree on experimenting SUWI. Besluit experimenten SUWI 
Decree SUWI Besluit SUWI 
Regulations SUWI Regeling SUWI 
b. Other documents  
Letter minSZW. Approval annual report 2006. Dated 
May 16, 2007. UB/A/2007/9895 
Jaarverslag 2006. Goedkeuringsbrief. 16 mei 2007. 
UB/A/2007/9895 
Letter minSZW. Framework for budget 2007. Dated 
April, 26, 2006. UB/A/2006/32722 
Kaders voor (concept) jaarplan 2007; de meibrief. 
26 april 2006. UB/A/2006/32722 
3rd Quarter report SVB 2007, Dated November 
2007 
De SVB in de eerste drie kwartalen van 2007. 
November 2007. 
3rd Quarter policy report 2007. Dated November 
2007 
Kwartaalbericht SVB. Beleidsverantwoording. 
November 2007. 
Annual report 2007.  SVB Jaarverslag 2007 
Budget and multiyear plan 2008-2012. Dated 
September 2007. 
Meerjarenplanning 2008 tm 2012. September 2007 
Letter minSZW. Approval budget 2008. Dated 
November 30, 2007. UB/A/2007/32307 
Definitief jaarplan 2008. 30 november 2007. 
UB/A/2007/32307 
Handvestgroep publiek verantwoorden: Report on 
assessment of SVB. Dated December 2005 
Handvestgroep publiek verantwoorden. Verslag van 
de visitatie van de Sociale verzekeringsbank. 
 
UWV  
a. Legislation  
Law on structure work and income (SUWI) Wet SUWI 
Decree on experimenting SUWI. Besluit experimenten SUWI 
Decree SUWI Besluit SUWI 
Regulations SUWI Regeling SUWI 
b. Other documents  
Letter minSZW. Framework budget 2007 and 
multiyear budget 2008-2011. no date. 
UB/A/2006/32704 
Kader van (concept) jaarplan 2007 en (concept) 
meerjarenbeleidsplan 2008-2011: de meibrief. 
UB/A/2006/32704 
UWV 3rd Quarter report 2007. Dated November 
2007. Most recently retrieved on June 20, 2010 
from 
http://www.uwv.nl/Images/UWV%20drie%20kwarta
lenverslag%202007_tcm26-149944.pdf  
UWV drie kwartalenverslag 2007. November 2007. 
Annual report 2007. Most recently retrieved on June 
20, 2010 from 
http://www.uwv.nl/Images/UWV%20jaarverslag%20
2007_tcm26-161481.pdf  
Jaarverslag 2007. 
Letter UWV advisory board on annual report 2007. 
Dated March 18, 2008. 
Brief Raad van advies over jaarverslag 2007. 18 
Maart 2008. 
Draft letter minSZW on macro economic variables to 
be used in budget 2008. 
Concept brief macro-economische variabelen en 
concept meerjarenkader. 
Letter minSZW. Approval budget 2008. Dated 
November 28, 2007. UB/A/2007/32634. 
Jaarplan UWV 2008. 28 november 2007. 
UB/A/2007/32634 
Letter minSZW. Framework budget 2009. no date. 
UB/A/2008/11415 
Meibrief 2009. UB/A/2008/11415 
Letter minSZW. Change in Regulations SUWI. Dated 
February 26, 2008. UB/A/2008/5815 
Wijziging regeling SUWI. 26 februari 2008. 
UB/A/2008/5815 
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Vf/Pf  
a. Legislation  
Law on primary education Wet Primair onderwijs 
Statutes Vf, dated June 21, 1999 Statuten Stichting Vervaningsfonds, 21 juni 1999 
Statutes Pf, dated June 23, 1999 Statuten Stichting Participatiefonds, 23 juni 1999 
Decree Vf, dated November 7, 1994 Besluit Vervangingsfonds, 7 november 1994 
Decree Pf, dated June 14, 1996. Besluit Participatiefonds, 14 juni 1996 
b. Other documents  
Annual report 2006 Vf Jaarverslag 2006 Vervangingsfonds 
Annual report 2006 Pf Jaarverslag 2006 Participatiefonds 
4th Quarterly report 2007 Vf Vervangingsfonds, Financiële rapportage, Oct 2007-
dec 2007 
4th Quarterly report 2007 Pf Participatiefonds, Financiële rapportage, Oct 2007-
dec 2007 
Monitoring and management agreement minOCW-Pf Beheersovereenkomst Participatiefonds voor het 
onderwijs 
Monitoring and management agreement minOCW-Vf Beheersovereenkomst Vervangingsfonds en 
bedrijfsgezondheidszorg voor het onderwijs 2008 
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 Appendix 4: Questionnaire ZBOs and parent ministries 
The questions below were the basis for semi structured interviews and have a set of 
preset answers to make classification of the answers given in the interviews for reasons 
of comparison possible. Most questions were post both to ministries and ZBOs. When 
otherwise, an indication is given with respect to whom the question was posed. 
Table A - 3: Questionnaire ZBOs and answer classes. 
General Questions  
Name of ZBO  
Is ZBO subject to kZBO Yes/No 
Interviewee + function Open end question 
How was the ZBO created? By law 
Based on law 
By statute through minister 
By statute, minster & third party 
By statute through third party supported by minister 
By statute through third party only 
What was the motive for creating this ZBO Mass production 
Independent/Impartial judgement 
Cooperation with third parties 
Is the formally given motive also the actual motive Yes/No/don‟t know 
Ownership  
Who is to be regarded as the owner of the ZBO and 
why 
Minister 
Secretary General 
Director General 
Citizens/companies 
Board 
Who is to be regarded as the commissioner and 
funder of the ZBO 
State, directly 
State, but citizens generates demand 
Other public sector entity 
Citizen/company, within framework given by state 
Don‟t know 
Who is to be regarded as the final user of the ZBO‟s 
services 
State, directly 
Society as a whole 
Individual citizen 
Companies/organisations 
Don‟t know 
Authority and governance structure  
What role did Parliament have on the attribution 
and distribution of authority in relation to this ZBO 
(ministry only) 
Accepted proposed law 
Amended proposed law 
Changed proposed law by asking questions 
Don‟t know 
Not applicable 
Did Parliament discuss the distribution of authority 
at another stage than when it discussed creation of 
the ZBO (ministry only) 
Yes, based on NCA reports 
Yes, based on incidents 
Yes, based on evaluations 
Yes, otherwise 
No 
Don‟t know 
In the case of FAPK and NAK, separate mandate 
decrees exist. Other ZBOs that are governed by the 
same laws have no separate decrees. Can you 
elaborate on the background of these decrees? 
(ministry only) 
Open end question 
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What document describes the authority for the 
management of the ZBO 
Law 
Statute 
Separate management contract 
Otherwise 
Don‟t know 
When did the minister uses his authority on the 
following issues most recently: 
a. Approve policy rules 
b. Suspend or dismiss a decision of the ZBO 
c. Approve asset transactions 
d. Approve the creation of reserves 
e. Use his powers in case of negligence 
Fiscal 2007 
Fiscal 2006 
Before fiscal 2006 
Not at all 
Don‟t know 
Did the minister directly or indirectly use other tools 
than the authority attributed to him in order to 
achieve his goals 
Open end question 
What is the frequency of using authoritative power 
by the minister 
More frequent than monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
What powers are used Open end question 
Does the governance structure include other forms 
of monitoring than those attributed to the minister 
Yes, internal monitoring structure 
Yes, separate external monitoring institution 
No 
Don‟t know 
If so, is there a representative on behalf of the 
minister included in these other governance 
structures? 
Yes, civil servant parent ministry 
Yes, civil servant minFin 
Yes, civil servant minBZK 
Yes, civil servants from several ministries 
No 
Can you describe the role of these other governance 
structures within the whole governance structure of 
the ZBO 
Open end question 
Tasks assigned  
What is according to you the main task of the ZBO Stewardship, 
Income transfer 
Monitoring 
Research/Examination 
Licensing 
Otherwise 
Can you qualify secondary tasks of the ZBO Stewardship, 
Income transfer 
Monitoring 
Research/Examination 
Licensing 
Otherwise 
No secondary task 
Do the different tasks of the ZBO result in conflicts 
of interest 
Not at all 
Sometimes 
Regularly 
Frequently 
No secondary task 
Are arrangements made to cope with prioritising the 
different activities of the ZBO 
Yes, namely…. 
No arrangements 
Not applicable 
How important is specific knowledge available in 
your staff relevant for executing your tasks (ZBO 
only) 
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To what extent is flexibility in hiring and assigning 
staff to tasks an important issue in your 
organisation (ZBO only) 
 
Would it be possible to transfer tasks your 
organisation is executing presently to another 
organisation and if so, under what conditions (ZBO 
only) 
 
Commissioning  
How would you qualify commissioning a task to this 
ZBO in terms of performance and funding 
Rule driven, quantity and price leading 
Rule driven, available budget leading 
SLA leading, budget follows 
Resources leading 
Don‟t know 
 
Where (in what kind of document) are the 
arrangements made on performance to be realised 
laid down 
Unilateral budget letter from ministry 
SLA 
Budget proposal bottom up 
No explicit arrangements 
Don‟t know 
What is the role of the minister in the process of 
commissioning 
Funder & specifying SLA 
Partially funding & specifying SLA 
Partially funding, no SLA 
SLA only 
What is the frequency of institutionalised meetings 
between the minister and the Board of the ZBO 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi-annually 
Annually 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
What is the frequency of meetings between civil 
servants and ZBO on matters such as 
commissioning 
More frequent than monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
What is the frequency of meetings between civil 
servants and ZBO on operational issues 
More frequent than monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
Which control tools does the minister use in case no 
commissioning document exists 
Open end question 
What will happen when the ZBO indicates that its  
operational budget is insufficient to realised the 
performance specified in the commissioning 
document 
Report to minister 
Shift activities to next year, no additional resources 
Shift activities to next year, including additional 
resources 
Neither shift nor additional resources 
Renegotiate budget 
Report in annual report 
Civil law based effects 
Don‟t know 
Do measures exist for coping with adapting 
performance specifications or tasks during a fiscal 
year. 
Budget=Budget 
Report in intermediate reports 
Report in annual report 
Adapt SLA 
No measures taken 
Don‟t know 
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Are tasks assigned in the form of an additional 
commission document? 
Yes/no 
Are arrangements made how to cope with 
additionally commissioned tasks 
Open end question 
Is the ZBO asked in advance to assess the 
operational impact of a change in the contents of 
tasks (uitvoeringstoets) 
Yes 
No, change is joint project of ZBO and ministry 
No, 
Don‟t know 
Is the assessment by the ZBO on the operational 
impact of changes in tasks presented to and 
discussed in  Tweede Kamer 
Yes, TK is informed 
Yes, document is debated in TK 
No 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Is the impact on operational resources from 
changes in the program discussed in Tweede Kamer 
Yes 
No, not part of assessment 
No 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Does the ZBO perform activities that are not derived 
from laws (non-legal tasks) 
 Yes/no 
Which arrangements have been made on pricing 
and monitoring with respect to non-legal tasks. 
Operate separate accounts 
Arrangements on fees and cost recoverage 
No arrangements, market determines fees 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Which arrangements have been made to provide 
tasks by the ZBO to other ministries of central 
government 
Always approval in advance 
Approval afterwards 
Not allowed 
No arrangements made 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Which arrangements have been made to provide 
tasks by the ZBO to other organisations, not being 
part of central government 
Always approval in advance 
Approval afterwards 
Not allowed 
No arrangements made 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Who determines the degrees of freedom a ZBO has 
in developing new services 
Minister as a result of demand in TK 
Minister given the ministry‟s programs 
Initiative bottom up 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Preparing budget for next fiscal year  
Who decides on the assumptions required to 
prepare the budget for the next fiscal year 
Minister of parent ministry 
Multiple commissioners 
Bottom up from ZBO 
Don‟t know 
What is included under these assumptions Wage/price index, Net result, Performance standard 
(quantity of services), Cost standard (prices), other 
assumptions (each of these items may be 
mentioned) 
What is the ultimate decisive factor for approval or 
determining of the budget by the minister 
Full cost recovering fee 
Production level and quality 
Total expenditures 
Don‟t know 
How would you characterise the budget of this ZBO Split up in compartments 
Operational budget not necessarily balanced 
Lump sum 
Performance budget 
Don‟t know 
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How would you characterise production of this ZBO Individually funded services 
Group funding, pay as you go 
Group based, funded by parliament 
Pure collective good 
Don‟t know 
Budget and reporting  
Which considerations exist to make a separation 
between operational costs and program costs of a 
ZBO in the budget of the „ parent‟  ministry 
(ministries monitoring income transfer ZBOs only) 
Open end question 
Is the approval or determining of the budget 
separately reported to Tweede Kamer 
Yes, in separate letter 
Yes, in annual report ministry 
Yes, otherwise 
No 
Don‟t know 
Is the approval or determining of fees of the ZBO 
separately reported to Tweede Kamer 
Yes, in separate letter 
Yes, in annual report ministry 
Yes, otherwise 
No 
Don‟t know 
Did Tweede Kamer in the most recent debate on the 
„ parent‟ ministry‟s budget or on the occasion of 
receiving a letter on approval of the ZBOs budget  
discuss the ZBO‟s budget 
Yes, on operational costs 
Yes, on program costs 
Yes, on evaluation 
Yes, other cause for debate 
No 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
If so, did Tweede Kamer include performance 
indicators/data in that discussion 
Yes, 
No, 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Did the debate in Tweede Kamer result in a change 
of operational budgets of the ZBO 
Yes, in budget as a whole 
Yes, including separately earmarked budget 
No 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Does the ZBO prepare a budget including an 
overview over more than one fiscal year 
Yes/no/don‟t know 
What is the basis for preparing a multiyear budget Contract agreement on production volume 
Contract agreement on a licence basis 
Financial framework nominally 
Financial framework, real terms 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Which requirements are given to prepare a 
multiyear budget 
Structural cost recovery 
Multiyear budget, unchanged policies 
Multiyear budget, based on estimated production 
No arrangements 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
What arrangements have been made for financing 
the assets of the ZBO 
Equity and capital markets 
Egalisation reserve and capital markets 
Regulated reserves and capital markets 
Guaranteed equity 
Borrowing from Treasury 
Is included in the budget 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
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Does the budget of the ZBO include a separate 
section on investments 
Yes, with separate decisions 
No, full part of budget 
No, included in the fees to be charged 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Which resources are used to fund irregular non-
investment expenditures  
Separate resources allocated in advance 
Earmarking reserves after consent by minister 
Earmarking reserves reported in annual report 
Only on request of minster possible 
No arrangements made 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Does Tweede Kamer receive documents regarding 
this ZBO other than budget information or letters on 
approval of budgets 
Yes/no/don‟t know 
How would you characterise these documents Includes elaboration in case of answer „ other‟  
How often does Tweede Kamer receive such 
documents 
More frequent than monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
Regularly 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
Did Tweede Kamer discuss these documents Yes, operational costs 
Yes, program costs 
Yes, policy 
Yes, evaluation 
Yes, other cause for debate 
No, 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Would you as owner of this ZBO, even without 
requirements of minFin include data on this ZBO in 
the ministry‟s budget/annual report (ministry only) 
 
Open end question 
Planning & Control  
How will politicians be informed on changes in the 
budget of the ZBO during the fiscal year 
Minister is informed only 
Reported in ministry‟s intermediate reports to TK 
Other form of reporting to TK 
Reported in annual report ministry 
Don‟t know 
When Tweede Kamer is informed on such changes, 
has there been a debate and what was the main 
issue in that debate 
Yes, operational costs 
Yes, program costs 
Yes, both 
No 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
How would you characterise intermediate reports of 
this ZBO 
Strict focus on compliance 
Focus on expenditures/expenses 
Focus on performance 
Expenditures and policy 
Expenditures and performance 
No arrangements 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
Does the „ parent‟ ministry separately control 
program budgets and how does it control them 
(income transfers only) 
Open end question 
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What is the frequency on controlling program 
budgets 
More frequent than monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
Regularly 
Incidentally 
Don‟t know 
Annual reports  
Is the approval/determination of annual reports of 
the ZBO separately reported to Tweede Kamer 
Yes, in annual report of parent ministry 
Yes, in letter accompanying annual report ZBO 
Yes, otherwise 
No 
Don‟t know 
Has the approval/determination of annual reports 
led to a debate in Tweede Kamer 
Yes, operational costs 
Yes, program costs 
Yes, on allocating profits 
Yes, on performance 
Yes, other theme 
No 
Not applicable 
What arrangements presently exist on allocating net 
income 
Decision by minister 
Standardised agreement, including reducing fees 
Standardised agreement, including payback to 
ministry 
Proposal by ZBO 
No arrangements 
Don‟t know 
Would the management of the ZBO like to provide 
more information to Parliament than the annual 
report? Please explain why. (ZBO only) . 
 
How would you like to provide that information to 
Parliament and what is ideally the role of the Board 
in providing that information (ZBO only) 
Open end question 
Evaluation  
When was the last evaluation on this ZBO realised Fiscal 2007 
Fiscal 2006 
Before fiscal 2006 
Not at all 
Don‟t know 
How was Tweede Kamer informed on this evaluation Verbally 
Written in separate document 
Written in budget or annual report 
Not 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
How did Tweede Kamer respond to this evaluation Open end question 
Responsibility accounting  
Does the ZBO‟s budget include revenues to be 
realised and what is the basis for these revenues? 
Yes based on pay as you go funding 
Yes, based on expected sales 
No, government funding 
Don‟t know 
Are estimated costs based on outputs and are these 
outputs homogeneous 
Yes, homogeneous 
Yes, heterogeneous 
No, but homogeneous 
No, heterogeneous 
Don‟t know 
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Which mandate has the management of the ZBO on 
investment decisions 
Full degrees of freedom 
To a specified level of investments 
Within an approved plan 
Is included in the full budget 
Owner is responsible 
Not applicable 
Don‟t know 
To what extent is management of the ZBO able to 
control operational accounts receivable 
Depending on parent ministry 
Direct claims 
Accounts receivable are mainly contributions or pay 
as you go based receivables 
Don‟t know 
Which restrictions exist with respect to (parts of) 
budgets for ZBO‟s management 
Strict compliance 
Separated in staff cost and other operational costs 
Deviation within specified margins allowed 
Full budget responsibility 
No arrangements 
Don‟t know 
Which kind of activities have to be reported in 
advance to the „parent‟ ministry 
Investments, new projects, new commissioners, 
material developments in production volume, other 
issues, no arrangements have been made (multiple 
answers possible) 
Is this ZBO subject to using the Treasury for cash 
management (article 45 CW 2001) 
Yes/No 
Are other arrangements made on cash management Open end question 
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 Appendix 5: Questionnaire politicians 
These questions were used for the interviews with politicians. All questions are open 
ended. 
 
1. ZBOs have different legal forms and characteristics. Which criteria do you use to 
hold the minister to account for his actions towards a ZBO, and what part of the 
minister‟s responsibility would you consider to be the most important part. 
Would you elaborate on this from the perspectives of ownership and 
commission on the one hand and policy development/policy execution on the 
other? 
2. Do you think that you have sufficient information available to monitor the 
activities and performance of a ZBO and eventually intervene in policy 
execution?  
3. Do you include in your debates on the ministry‟s budget proposals the data 
available on the budgets of ZBOs and are there in your opinion gaps in the 
information provision on ZBOs. Could you elaborate on the question when in 
your opinion budgets of ZBOs are really becoming a political topic and would 
that be on operational costs or on program costs? 
4. Do you study annual reports of ZBOs and has that led to asking questions to the 
minister who can be held accountable? 
5. I now present you two schemes with a general classification of ZBOs on a few 
dimensions. Given this classification would you consider to focus on the topics 
included in these schemes or are other classifications more important to you? 
(make reference to schemes) 
6. Are, apart from the debates on ministry‟s budgets and annual reports, other 
occasions that you would like to use to discuss operations of ZBOs with the 
minister? 
7. MinBZK has in her letter of April 1, 2008, provided information on the proposed 
exceptions in the application of kZBO for individual ZBOs. These exceptions 
include „ vernietiging (25*), non civil servant staff (15*), approving ZBOs policy 
rules (7*), creation of egalisation reserve (4*), right to appoint the ZBO‟s board 
(4*) and right to determine fees (3*). Would you reflect on these exceptions in 
general, and more specifically on the issues of the egalisation reserve and the 
right to determine fees.? 
8. The three major Market Authorities are all funded differently. To what extent do 
you consider this consistent to the general idea that oversight on markets is to 
be considered a public task? 
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9. Before kZBO was applicable, some entities at arm‟s length (e.g. Police regions 
and State Forestry SBB) were also regarded as ZBOs. Are there, in your opinion 
sufficient control tools available to Tweede Kamer to monitor such entities that 
are no longer regarded as ZBOs? 
10. Local governments are supposed by law to prepare a separate section in their 
budget documents and annual reports in which they focus on the political and 
financial risks that exist with respect to associated and affiliated parties of local 
government. Would you think a similar arrangement on State level, particularly 
on ZBOs, would be useful to you as a MP? 
11. Government Agencies are separately included and disclosed in ministries‟ 
budgets. Does this presentation contribute to the possibilities you have to 
control Government Agencies. What is your opinion on the fact that actually, 
budgets of government funded Agencies are actually authorised twice? 
12. Do you think it is worth considering to submit intermediate changes in the 
budgets of ZBOs to Parliament and why would you think so. Please note that in 
case of Government Agencies, such a rule does not exist (section 11.5 CW 
2001) 
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 Appendix 6: Questionnaire Gerritsen Committee 
 
Starting point for these questions is the letter of the minister BZK on the proposed 
application of kZBO and the debate on that letter in Tweede Kamer (Parliament 2008ad; 
Parliament 2008ae) 
 
A. Some practical issues 
 
1. In the Gerritsen Committee report is besides following the official statements in 
kZBO and the motives for creating ZBOs, no further differentiation on ZBOs made. 
Did the Committee consider more differentiation, or did  the assignment to the 
Committee only allow for an assessment of ZBOs as was done 
2. The Committee regularly refers in its texts to „Aanwijzingen‟. Apparently, these 
instructions are still relevant, despite of the introduction of kZBO. What were the 
reasons for the Committee to refer so specifically to „Aanwijzingen‟? 
3. In the letter of the minister BZK, a number of 144 clusters of ZBOs is mentioned. 
The Committee mentioned 153 a few months before. Who ultimately decided to 
include 144 clusters and what reasons can be given for this choice 
4. The Committee‟s report specifically mentions „organisations that are part of 
central government‟ (p 30. This is a noticeable statement, given the legal status of 
many ZBOs (e.g. foundations) but also with respect to debates on accountability 
and consolidation that are usually held under accounting standards. What did the 
Committee want to express through this statement? 
 
B. Authority attributed to the minister. 
1. Role of Supervising Board. In order to allow for ministerial responsibility, a 
Supervising Board should not have a position somewhere in between the minister 
and the ZBO. The Committee indicates that in some cases a Supervising Board 
has authority that should be in the hands of the minister. Can you give specific 
examples and would it not be logical to have a Supervising Board, given the arm‟s 
length relationship between minister and ZBO. On the other hand, Advisory Boards 
that still do exist are not mentioned at all in the Committee‟s report. Can you 
elaborate on these issues? 
2. General reserve/general equity. Despite the statements of the Committee, in 4 
cases no general reserve for operations will be allowed by ministries. At what level 
was the discussion on this issue held and did either the minister of FIN or BZK 
intervene? 
3. Authority to reverse decisions „ vernietigingsbevoegdheid‟  in the Cultural Sector. 
An exception is made for „vernietigingsbevoegdheid‟ in the cultural sector, i.e. the 
minister is not allowed to decide on individual applications to the respective art 
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funds. At the same time, most notably in a debate in Parliament on September 3, 
2008, MP‟s state that they have, as politicians, no opinion on (the contents) of 
arts. Despite of that, the debate on the 4year redistribution of budgets to the arts 
sector results in debates on decisions in individual or regional cases. How would 
you explain this contradiction and what does it mean for the motivation given for 
the vernietigingsrecht? 
4. Appointment/Dismissal of the Board. In 4 cases, despite the advise by the 
Committee, an exemption is made on article 12 kZBO (on appointments of 
Boards). This concerns 4 ZBOs. Three of these ZBOs have a quasi-judicial position 
in the system of central government. This specific position does not lead to a 
statement by the Committee to make an exception, whereas in the ultimate 
proposals by the respective individual „parent‟ ministries, this argument actually is 
given. Why did the Committee not allow for a general exception with respect to this 
matter, and in the end the exceptions are likely to be granted? 
 
C. Planning & Control 
1. Change of date on submitting annual report. Can you explain what arguments 
were given that required to make exceptions of the proposed standardisation 
of the reporting date and why in the end in most cases the proposed 
standardisation was accepted. There is now still only one exception. Would you 
also comment on the fact that essentially three ministries claimed for 
exceptions. What were their arguments and isn‟t there a bit of an inconsistency 
in allowing only one exception? 
2. Information provision. In the Committee‟s report and in the debate in 
Parliament in September 2008 attention is drawn to the issue of information 
provision. In the debate in Parliament a link is made towards information 
provision on Government Agencies. What is generally missing is that there is 
no debate on what (financial) information should be provided towards Tweede 
Kamer. Unlike the Government Agency case, there is no arrangement between 
Parliament and ministers to disclose full sales and costs of ZBOs. Furthermore, 
no attention is given to the remarks of NCA on the absence of information on 
the financial position of ZBOs (equity). Can you give an opinion why these 
issues are not addressed? 
3. Staff. Several MPs asked information on the proposed reduction of ZBO staff 
by 1800 FTEs. The interviews I have done during this study at least give the 
impression that minBZK is strongly focusing on the staff numbers in central 
government. But, when one of the arguments for creating ZBOs is that creating 
entities at arm‟s length gives more leeway for management to use resources 
more flexibly, a question is whether the strong focus on staff numbers is 
appropriate. Basically, the division between the ministry and the entity at arm‟s 
length comes down to the degrees of freedom for management to operate the 
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entity and the ministry as commissioner is supposed to address issues on the 
tasks to be assigned to the entity. What is your opinion on the issue of Staff 
control? 
 
D. Miscellaneous 
1. Merger of IBGoep and CFI. One of the arguments used not to rearrange the 
domain of ZBOs fundamentally is the level of transactions costs that may result 
from a large scale rearrangement. Ultimately, one of the more important and large 
ZBOs is in the process of merging with a Government Agency. What has been the 
role of the Committee in the debate on this merger? 
2. Double function/possible conflict of interest NZA. Unlike NMa and AFM, NZA has 
two main tasks: market authority on the one hand and decision maker on 
maximum fees in the health/ care sector on the other. In a debate between 
minister and Tweede Kamer (07 May 2008), it is argued that the minister VWS 
has the power to give general instructions without affecting the impartiality of NZA. 
Theoretically, that might be the case, but there may be a conflict of interest 
between regulating and issuing instructions. NZA is the exception in the domain of 
the large Market regulating authorities. To what extent has this exception been 
discussed within the Committee? 
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 Appendix 7: List of interviewees 
 
ZBO-case Organisation Official interviewed 
Cfv CFV director 
Cfv minVrom/Topzo Head monitoring department 
Cfv minVrom/ DG 
WWI 
Member policy advising staff 
SVB SVB Head secretary to the board 
UWV UWV Member of Board 
Head secretary to the board 
CFO 
UWV/SVB minSZW Director and staff member commissioning and monitoring 
directorate 
 
CVZ CVZ Controller  
CVZ minWVS 2 staff members commissioning and monitoring directorate 
 
NMa NMa 2 staff members strategic consultants to the board 
Controller 
NMa minEZ staff member policy directorate 
  
NZA NZA Controller 
Staff member secretary to the board 
NZA minWVS staff member policy directorate 
AFM AFM Controller 
Head department organisation development 
AFM minFin Head and staff member commissioning directorate 
NAK NAK Legal counsel to the board  
NAK minLNV Staff member commissioning directorate 
VF/PF VF/PF Director 
VF/PF minOCW Staff member commissioning and monitoring directorate 
BKVB BKVB Deputy director  
BKVB minOCW Staff member commissioning directorate  
RRbDen Haag RvR Director 
Controller 
RRb Den Haag minJUS Head of unit in commissioning and monitoring directorate  
Politicians  Former MP SGP 
MP PvdA 
MP VVD 
Gerritsen 
committee 
minBZK Secretary to the committee 
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 Appendix 8: Relevant Parliamentary documents on ZBOs 
Specification of documents submitted to Parliament with respect to the ZBOs studied. 
The documents were found on https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken; an 
official website of the State on which Parliamentary documents can be found. 
Documents were searched for in the period cover September 1st, 2006 till July 1st, 
2009. This covers all documents with respect to fiscal 2007 and 2008. Key search words 
were on the one hand „begroting ZBOx‟ and „jaarverslag ZBOx‟ on the other. In some 
cases more general words were required to find relevant documents. This is indicated in 
the specifications below. The total number of documents found is mentioned for each 
separate ZBO. This form of search results in overlap in documents which were found in 
both queries. Within the documents, the pdf search function is used, but now only on the 
simple word ZBOx or similar. The same document is only studied once. 
Criteria to list a document are twofold: 1. must be submitted to „Tweede Kamer‟ and 
2. must concern operations rather than policy issues. 
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 CVZ 
N=248 documents on „begroting CVZ‟ in text 
N=101 documents on „jaarverslag CVZ‟ in text 
Document regarding CVZ 
Relevance operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885XVI_2 2nd supplement 2006 y 0 
30885XVI_3 2nd supplement 2006 Y 1 
31031XVI_1 Annual report  2006 VWS y 0 
31031XVI_5 Annual report  2006 VWS Y 1 
Fiscal 2007   
30800XVI-2 Budget 2007 Notes y 0 
30800XVI-27 Budget 2007: Questions y 4 
30800XVI-117 Budget 2007: reply minister Y 0 
Proceedings 20062007 31-2033-2068 Y 1 
31061XVI_1 1st supplement 2007 Y 0 
31061XVI_4 1st supplement 2007  Y 2 
31290XVI_2 2nd supplement 2007 Y 0 
31444XVI_1 Annual report 2007 y 0 
31444XVI_4 Annual report y 1 
25268_45 ZBOs Y 0 
25268_59 ZBOs Proceedings y 3 
25268_63 ZBOs Y 0 
31249_6 Change ZVW Protocol Y 1 
30918_3; 30918_6; 30918_8; 30918_13 Change ZVW Y 1 
31201_3 Organisation of government Y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200XVI_2 Budget 2008 Notes Y 0 
31474XVI_2 1st  supplement 2008 Notes Y 0 
3792XVI_2 2nd supplement 2008 Notes Y 0 
31792_4 2nd supplement, questions Y 1 
31924XVI_2 Annual 2008 Notes Y 0 
31924XVI_5 Annual 2008 questions Y 1 
31924XVI_6 Annual 2008 Questions Y 1 
25268_70 ZBOS Y 0 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XVI_2 budget 2009 notes y 0 
31700XVI_23 budget 2009 questions Y 2 
31965XVI_2 1st supplement 2009 Y 0 
Proceedings20082009 1415-1452 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 4031-4051 Y 1 
31950_3 Law on modification to kZBO Y 0 
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 RvR 
N=248 documents on „begroting raad rechtsbijstand‟ in text 
N=103 documents on „jaarverslag raad rechtsbijstand‟ in text 
 
Document regarding RvR Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885VI_2. 2nd supplement 2006 Notes y 0 
30885VI_6. 2nd supplement 2006 Questions y 1 
31031VI_1: Annual report fiscal 2006 y 4 
30436_6. Changes in law on legal aid; protocol of 
debate 
Y 1 
Fiscal 2007   
30800 VI_2: Budget 2007 Notes y 0 
30800VI_99: protocol N 1 
30800VI__111 protocol N 1 
31061: 1st supplement 2007 notes Y 0 
31061VI_2: 1st supplement minJUS Y 0 
31061VI_3 1st supplement 2007 Y 0 
31290VI_2: 2nd supplement to budget 2007 y 0 
31290VI_3: 2nd supplement to budget 2007: Protocol Y 1 
31444VI_1: Annual report fiscal 2007 y 0 
31444VI_4: Annual report fiscal 2007; notes y 0 
31444VI_6: Annual report fiscal 2007; questions y 2 
30492_3: Report on development of staff of 
Government  
y 0 
31201_3 Memorandum employability y 0 
Proceedings 20062007_2011-2032 N 1 
Proceedings 20062007_2094-2110 N 1 
Proceedings 20062007_5420-5428 n 0 
Proceedings 20062007_5431-5440 n 0 
30800VI_138: monitoring report legal aid y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200 Budgetmemorandum 2008, appendix n 0 
31200VI_2 Budget 2008 y 0 
31200VI_13 Budget 2008 y 0 
31200VI_86 Budget 2008; protocol Y 2 
Proceedings 20072008_2061-2072 y 0 
31200VI_108 Budget 2008; questions Y 0 
31200VI_123 Budget 2008; questions Y 0 
31200VI_123 Budget 2008; questions Y 1 
31474_1: 1st supplement 2008 y 0 
31474VI_1: 1st supplement 2008 y 0 
31474VI_3: 1st supplement 2008: questions Y 0 
31200VI_123 Budget 2008; questions Y 0 
31792_1: 2nd supplement 2008: general overview y 0 
31792VI_2: 2nd supplement notes y 0 
31792VI_3: 2nd supplement 2008 questions Y 3 
31924VI_4: Annual report 2008: notes y 0 
25268_63: overview adaption to kZBO y 0 
31753_1 Legal aid Y 0 
Fiscal 2009   
31700VI_2: Budget 2009; notes y 0 
31700VI_7: Budget 2009; monitor legal aid y 0 
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Document regarding RvR Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
31700VI_10: Budget 2009;questions y 2 
31753_10-Legal aid Y 1 
31835_3: Law on merger of RvRs into one ZBO y 0 
31835_8: Law on merger of RvRs into one ZBO: 
Protocol 
Y 3 
Proceedings 20082009_1373-1415 y 1 
Proceedings 20082009_1459-1492 y 1 
31700VI_87: Budget 2009; letter by minister y 0 
31965_1. 1st Supplement 2009 y 0 
31965VI_2. 1st Supplement 2009: notes y 0 
31965VI_2. 1st Supplement 2009 y 1 
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 SVB 
N=269 documents on „begroting SVB‟ in text 
N=180 documents on „jaarverslag SVB‟ in text 
N= 31 documents on SUWI/SVB (26448 SVB) 
 
Document regarding SVB Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885XV_SZW2: 2nd supplement 2006 notes y 0 
30885VI_2Jus: 2nd supplement y 0 
31031_XVI_1 Annual report 2006 y 0 
31031VI_2 Annual report JUS 2006 notes y 0 
31031XVI_1 Annual reportVWS 2006 notes y 0 
31031XV_1 Annual reportSZW 2006 notes y 0 
31031XV_8 Annual report SZW 2006, questions y 2 
26448_294 Suwi Quarterly report Q2 y 0 
26448_296 Suwi Quarterly report, protocol y 1 
26448_309 Suwi Quarterly report Q3 y 0 
26448_331 Suwi Quarterly report; Q4 2006 y 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800VI_2 Budget Justice2007,notes y 0 
30800XV_2 Budget SZW2007 notes y 0 
30800XV_9 Budget SZW2007, questions Y 1 
31061XV_2; 1st supplement 2007 SZW notes y 0 
31290XI_2nd supplement to budget 2007 VROM y 0 
31290XV_2nd supplement to budget 2007 SZW y 0 
31444XV_1 Annual report SZW 2007 y 0 
31444XI_1 Annual report VROM 2007 y 0 
31444XVI_3 Annual report VWS 2007 y 0 
26448_305 SUWI y 0 
26448_315 SUWI y 0 
26448_326 SUWI Protocol y 0 
26448_337 SUWI Q1 2007 y 0 
26448_338 SUWI y 0 
26448_338_Report SVBTien2006 by IWI y 0 
26448_343 SUWI q2 2007 y 0 
26448_350 SUWI Quarterly Q3 2007 y 0 
26448_365: SUWI: annual reports 2007 Y 0 
30545/26448_32 SUWI Protocol y 1 
30545/26448_32 WWB/SUWI; Protocol Y 3 
30492_3: Report on development of staff of Government (Lof 
der Eenvoud) 
Y 0 
31201_3 Government employability memorandum Y 0 
Proceedings 20062007_1161-1188 Y 1 
Proceedings 20062007_1371-1376 y 0 
Proceedings 20062007_1294-1342 y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200_3_Appendix to Budget memorandum 2008 y 0 
31200XI_2VROM_budget 2008 notes y 0 
31200XVIII_2WWI_budget 2008 notes y 0 
31200XVI_2VWS_budget 2008 notes y 0 
31200XVII_2JG_budget 2008 notes Y 0 
31200XV_2SZW_budget 2008r notes Y 0 
31200XVII_5_Budget2008_JG; Questions Y 1 
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Document regarding SVB Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
31200XV_9_Budget2008_SZW; Questions Y 3 
31200VIII_137_Budget OCW2008: providing books for 
secondary education 
y 0 
31474XVI 1st supplement 2008 VWS y 0 
31474XV 1st supplement 2008 SZW y 0 
31474XVII_3 1st supplement to budget 2008 JG Y 1 
31792XV_2 2nd supplement 2008 SZW y 0 
31924XV_1Annual report 2008 SZW y 0 
31924XVII_Annual report 2008 JG Y 0 
31924VIII_Annual report 2008 OCW Y 0 
31924XVIII_Annual report 2008 WWI y 0 
31924XV_6Annual report 2008 SZW questions Y 1 
26448_355 y 0 
26448_363_performance information SUWI. Y 1 
26448_376: SUWI T1 reports 2008 y 0 
26448_378 SUWI y 0 
26448_388: SUWI T2 reports 2008 y 0 
26448_397_SUWI2008 annual reports. y 0 
26448_397 Appendix letter of assessment annual report y 0 
31325_6: provision of books in secondary education y 0 
31924XV_13Annual report 2008 SZW motion Y 1 
31924XV_14Annual report 2008 SZW motion Y 1 
25268_63: implementation kZBO Y 1 
31514_2 Proposed change on SUWI law y 0 
31514_2 Proposed change on SUWI law notes y 0 
20454_95_War victims/PUR y 2 
31586_7: change of regulations on reclaim of incorrectly paid 
or fraudulent benefits 
y 0 
Proceedings 20072008-2073-2095 Y 0 
Proceedings 20072008_2169-2172 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008-2629-2654 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008-2742-2756 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008-3558-3565 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008-4172-4188 Y 1 
2009D26367/31924XVI_5 Questions on VWS annual report 
2008 
Y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XVI_2_Budget2009 VWS y 0 
31700XV_2_Budget2009 SZW y 0 
31700XVII_2_Budget2009 JG y 0 
31700XVIII_2_Budget2009 WWI y 0 
31700XV_11_Budget2009 SZW: questions y 2 
31700XVI_23_Budget2009 VWS: questions y 1 
31700VIII_32_Budget2009 OCW: questions y 1 
31700XV_21_Budget2009 SZW: questions y 3 
31965XV_1 1st supplement 2009 SZW y 0 
26448_390: SUWI budgets 2009 y 0 
26448_406 T1 2009 report y 0 
31772_6. Changes in child benefits: questions Y 1 
Proceedings 20082009-2606-2620 y 0 
Proceedings 20082009 5085-5152 Y 1 
Proceedings 20082009 5507-5581 Y 1 
Proceedings 20082009 5583-5664 Y 1 
Proceedings 20082009 5895-5947 Y 1 
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 UWV 
N= 651 documents containing „ begroting UWV‟ in text 
N= 388 documents containing „ jaarverslag UWV‟  in text 
N= 125 documents on SUWI (26448). 
 
service and kZBO issues. Remarks of different MPs on same subject are counted as one 
remark. 
 
Document regarding UWV Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885XV_2 2nd supplement to budget 2006 Y 0 
31031_XIV_2 Annual report 2006 Y 0 
31031XV_7 Annual 2006 Questions Y 1 
31031XV_8 Annual 2006, questions Y 5 
31031XV_10 Y 1 
31031XV_11 Y 0 
26448_288 SUWI Y 0 
26448_290 SUWI Evaluation N 0 
26448_294 Q2-2006 reports (12th report) y 0 
26448_296_Protocol y 8 
26448_297 SUWI Letter Y 0 
26448_300 SUWI Motion Y 1 
26448_304 SUWI Y 0 
26448_306 SUWI Y 0 
26448_307 SUWI letter Y 0 
26448_309 Q3-2006  Y 0 
26448_310 SUWI Y 0 
26448_311 SUWI Y 0 
26448_312 SUWI Y 0 
26448_314 SUWI Y 0 
26448_331 Q4-2006 13th report y 0 
Proceedings20062007-766-769 y 1 
17050_329 Fraud and improper use of benefits Y 0 
Proceedings20062007-1705-1709 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 Appendix 501 Y 1 
Fiscal 2007 Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
30800XV_2 Budget 2007 Notes Y 0 
30800XV_9 Budget 2007 Protocol Y 3 
30800XV_44 Budget 2007 Motion Y 1 
30800XV_56 Budget 2007 Letter Y 1 
31061XV_2 1st supplement to Budget 2007 Y 0 
31061XV_4 1st supplement to Budget 2007; questions Y 1 
31290XV_2 2nd supplement to budget 2007 y 0 
31290XV_3 2nd supplement to budget 2007 Y 1 
31444XV_1 Annual report 2007 minSZW Y 0 
31444XV_6 Annual 2007, Questions Y 3 
31444XV_7 Annual 2007, Questions Y 1 
30545/26448_32 SUWI-reports y 4 
26448_315 SUWI Y 0 
26448_318 Y 2 
26448_321 Motion Y 1 
26448_322 Motion Y 1 
26448_324 SUWI Protocol Y 1 
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Document regarding UWV Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
26448_326 SUWI Protocol y 13 
26448_328 SUWI y 0 
26448_329 SUWI Y 5 
26448_333 SUWI Questions (Walvis) y 1 
26448_335 SUWI Y 1 
26448_337 SUWI A1-2007 report Y 0 
26448_342 SUWI Y 0 
26448_343 SUWI Q 2 2007 14th report Y 0 
26448_346 SUWI/WALVIS Y 0 
26448_350 SUWI Q3 2007 y 0 
31066_8 y 4 
Proceedings20062007-1161-1181 y 5 
Proceedings20062007-1294-1342 Y 2 
Proceedings20062007-1371-1376 y 0 
30942_3 Organisation Civil service Y 0 
Proceedings20062007-2263-2266 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007-2614-2618 y 2 
30970_6 Law on data provision Y 1 
29461_34 Re-integration Y 1 
29461_35 Re-integration Y 1 
29461_37 Re-integration Y 0 
29461_40 Re-integration Y 1 
31066_9 Walvis AO Y 2 
17050_340 Fraud and improper use of benefits y 0 
Proceedings20062007- 5021-5024 Y 1 
Proceedings20072008-2023-2029 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008-2629-2654 y 1 
Fiscal 2008 Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
31200XV_2 Budget 2008 Y 0 
31200XV_9 Budget 2008 Questions Y 6 
31200XV_30 Budget 2008 Motion Y 1 
31200XV_31 Budget 2008 Motion Y 1 
31200XV_36 Budget 2008 Motion Y 1 
31200XV_59 Budget 2008 Letter  Y 0 
31200XV_62 Budget 2008 Protocol y 1 
31200XV_65 Budget 2008 reply on motions y 0 
31200XV_72 Budget 2008 Protocol Y 2 
31474XV_2. 1st supplement to budget 2008 Y 0 
31474XV_6 1st supplement, questions Y 2 
31792XV_2 2nd supplement to budget 2008 Notes y 0 
31792_4 2nd supplement, questions Y 1 
31924XV_1 Annual 2008 SZW Y 0 
31924XV_6 Annual 2008 Questions Y 1 
31924XV_13 Annual 2008 Y 1 
31924_14 Annual 2008 Y 1 
26448_347 SUWI Y 0 
26448_353 SUWI/WALVIS Y 0 
26448_355 SUWI Y 0 
26448_357 SUWI Protocol y 2 
26448_362 SUWI Y 0 
26448-363 SUWI Y 0 
26448_365 SUWI Y 0 
26448_368 SUWI/WALVIS Y 0 
26448_369 SUWI y 0 
26448_370 SUWI n 0 
26448_371 SUWI Y 0 
26448_376 SUWI Y 0 
26448_379 SUWI Y 3 
26448_380 SUWI Y 0 
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Document regarding UWV Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
26448_383 SUWI Y 0 
26448_384 SUWI N 0 
26448_386 SUWI Y 1 
26448_387 SUWI/WALVIS Y 0 
26448_388 SUWI Y 0 
26448_389 SUWI Y 0 
26448_397 SUWI y 0 
31514_2 and 3. Change of SUWI law Y 0 
31514_7 Change of SUWI law Y 0 
31514-14 Change of SUWI law Y 0 
31514-16 Change of SUWI law Y 1 
31514_22 Change of SUWI law Y 1 
31514_23 Change of SUWI law Y 1 
28719_43 Re-integration y 0 
28719_44 Re-integration Y 3 
28719_56 Re-integration Y 0 
28719_57 Re-integration Y 4 
28719_59 Re-integration Y 0 
28179_60 Re-integration Y 0 
31201_3 Civil service Y 0 
25268_63 kZBO Y 0 
31224_26 Participation youngsters Y 0 
31224_28 Participation youngsters. Y 1 
29362_142 Modernising government. Y 1 
31749 Unemployment youngsters N 0 
31586_Restructuring personal debts Y 0 
Proceedings 20072008_6041-6054 y 1 
Proceedings20082009-1239-1255 Y 5 
Proceedings20082009-1279-1289 Y 0 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered: Y 0 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered: y 0 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered: y 0 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered:  y 0 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered: y 0 
Fiscal 2009 Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
31700XV_2 Budget 2009 Notes Y 0 
31700XV_12 Budget 2009, questions Y 10 
31700XV_29/44 Budget 2009 Amendement  Y 1 
31700XV_51 Budget 2009 Protocol Y 2 
31965_1 1st supplement  to budget 2009 y 0 
26448_390 SUWI y 0 
26448_392 SUWI Y 2 
26448_394 SUWI Y 4 
26448_396 SUWI motion Y 1 
26448_397 SUWI unnumbered y 0 
26448_400 SUWI Y 0 
26448-404 SUWI letter Y 0 
26448_405 SUWI Protocol Y 1 
26448_406 SUWI T 1 report 2009 y 0 
Appendix to proceedings nr 2328  and 2339 20082009 Y 1 
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 FBKVB 
N= 82 documents containing „ begroting beeldende kunst‟  in text 
N= 8 documents containing „ begroting kunstenfondsen‟ in text 
N= 41 documents containing „ begroting cultuurfondsen‟ in text 
N=6 documents containing „ begroting fonds BKVB‟ in text. 
N= 50 documents containing „ jaarverslag beeldende kunst‟ in text 
N=8 documents containing „ jaarverslag kunstenfondsen in text 
N= 27 documents containing „ jaarverslag cultuurfondsen‟ in text. 
N=3 documents containing „ jaarverslag fonds BKVB‟ in text. 
 
 
Document regarding FBKVB Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
31031_VIII_1 Annual report 2006 N 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800VIII_2 Budget 2007 Notes N 0 
30800VIII_8 Letter Y 0 
30800VIII_35 Letter N 0 
31444VIII_1 Annual report 2007 y 0 
31444VIII_8 Questions N 0 
Proceedings20062007 Question 1405 Y 1 
30847_5 Law on arts policy Y 1 
30847_13 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007_3493-3511 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007_3513-3529 y 0 
28989_56 Memorandum Culture Y 2 
28989_57 Memorandum Culture_Letter Y 0 
31201_3 Trendnota arbeidszaken Y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200VIII_2 Budget 2008 Notes N 0 
31200VIII_31 Budget 2008 Questions N 0 
31200VIII_135 Budget 2008 questions N 0 
31924VIII_1 Annual report 2008 y 0 
25268_63 ZBOs Y 0 
28989_76 Art policy y 2 
25434_40 support film industry Y 0 
25434_42 y 0 
31482_15 art subsidies 2009-2012 N 0 
31482_18 art subsidies 2009-2012 y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700VIII_1 Budget 2009 Notes N 0 
31700VIII_13 Budget 2009 questions N 0 
31700VIII_30 Budget 2009  Y 1 
31700VIII_61 Y 1 
31700VIII_134 N 0 
OCW key data 2004-2008 n 0 
Proceedings 18808 Y 1 
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 VF/PF 
N=101 documents containing „ begroting participatiefonds‟ in text. 
N=57 documents containing „ jaarverslag participatiefonds‟ in text. 
N=33 documents containing „ begroting vervaningsfonds‟ in text. 
N=25 documents containing „ jaarverslag vervangingsfonds‟ in text 
 
Document regarding Vf/Pf Relevance operations # remarks by MPs 
Fiscal 2005   
30800VIII_67_Annual reports pf/vf y 0 
Fiscal 2006   
31031VIII_1. Annual report 2006 OCW y 0 
31031_1A: Appendix to Annual report State y 0 
31031VIII_1. Annual report 2006 OCW y 0 
31200VIII_27. Annual reports Pf/Vf y 0 
30885VIII_3_Questions 2nd supplement to budget 2006 y 1 
30800VIII_153. Annual reports Pf/Vf y 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800VIII_2 Budget 2007 OCW notes y 0 
30800VIII_85. Evaluation funding of secondary schools y 0 
31061_1 1st supplement 2006 y 0 
31061VIII_3: 1st supplement budget OCW2007. Questions y 1 
31290VIII_2. 2nd supplement to budget 2007 y 0 
31200VIII_180: announcement annual reports Pf/Vf 2007 y 0 
31444VIII_8: Annual report OCW, questions y 0 
31700VIII_4_Annual reports Pf/Vf y 0 
31201_3: Trendnota arbeidszaken overheid y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200 Appendix to budgetmemorandum 2008 n 0 
31200VIII_2 Budget OCW 2008 notes y 0 
31200VIII_31: Budget OCW 2008 Questions y 0 
31200VIII_47: Employability in education y 0 
31200VIII_85: Budget OCW 2008: Questions y 0 
31792VIII_ 2nd supplement 2008 y 0 
31924VIII_Annual report OCW y 0 
31700VIII_199 announcement annual reports pf vf y 0 
25286_63 Letter implementation kZBO y 0 
Proceedings 20072008_2887-2896 y 1 
Proceedings 20072008_2688-2708 y 1 
Proceedings 20072008_2887-2896 y 0 
31700VIII_2: Budget2009 notes y 0 
31965VIII_2 1st supplement 2009 y 0 
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 AFM 
N= 207 documents containing „ begroting AFM‟ in text 
N = 169  documents containing „ jaarverslag AFM‟ in text 
References to motions and promises by minister in the ministry‟s budget 
documents/annual reports not included. Debates on problem ABN/AMRO & Fortis Bank 
(sale to foreign banks in 2007/2008) not included. 
 
Key issue: increase in monitoring costs 
Document regarding AFM Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885IXB_2 2nd supplement 2006 Notes Y 0 
30885IXB_4 2nd supplement 2006 Questions Y 3 
31031IXB_1 Annual 2006 notes Y 0 
31031IXB_4 Annual 2006 Notes Y 0 
31031IXB_7 Annual 2006 Questions Y 1 
31031IXB_8 Annual 2006 Proceedings Y 1 
30800IXB_36 Annual report AFM Y 0 
30413_53 Pensionplan legislation Y 1 
30413_62 Pension plan legislation, Protocol 
(also Proceedings 20062007 79-100) 
Y 3 
30413_79 Pensionplan legislation, Motion Y 1 
30413_88 Pensionplan legislation. Letter N 0 
Proceedings20062007 439-469 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 511-530 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 595-599 Appendix  Y 1 
Fiscal 2007   
30800IXB_2 Budget 2007 Notes Y 0 
30800IXB_4 Budget 2007 Questions Y 1 
30800IXB_27 Budget 2007 protocol Y 1 
31061IXB_2 1st supplement 2007 Notes N 0 
31290IXB_2 2nd supplement 2007 Notes Y 0 
31290IXB_2 2nd supplement 2007 Questions y 1 
31444IXB_1 Annual report 2007 Y 0 
31444IXB_5 Annual report 2007 Y 3 
31444IXB_8 Annual report 2007 Y 2 
31444XV_1 Annual report 2007 Y 0 
31200IXB_20 Annual report 2007 AFM Y 0 
31200IXB_34 Annual report 2007 AFM, questions Y 24 
30942_3 Organisation Civil service Y 0 
27831_23 Framework for monitoring services Y 0 
29507_45 Law on financial services Y 1 
30928_8 Civil code; consumer protection Y 2 
30419_22 Mergers Y 1 
30598_2 Evaluation of money exchange offices Y 1 
31123_1 Liability of monitoring Authorities Y 0 
28122_23 Reform monitoring financial institutions Y 0 
28122_25 Reform monitoring financial institutions y 3 
31270_3 Adaption of Accounting institutions legislation Y 0 
Proceedings20062007 4287-4301 Y 1 
Fiscal 2008   
31200_11 BudgetMemorandum 2008 Motion N 1 
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Document regarding AFM Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
31200IXB_2 Budget 2008 Notes Y 0 
31200IXB_8 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
31200XIII_4 Budget 2008 Questions N 1 
31200XIII_10 Budget 2008 Letter Y 1 
31474IXB_2 1st supplement 2008 Y 0 
31792IXB_2 2nd supplement 2008 Y 0 
31792IXB_3 2nd supplement 2008 Y 1 
31924IXB_1 Annual report 2008 Y 0 
31924IXB_4 Annual report 2008 Y 0 
31924IXB_7 Annual report 2008 Y 1 
31700IXB_24 and appendix: Annual report AFM Y 0 
31924XV_1 Annual report Y 0 
31201_3 Civil service Y 0 
22112_712. Proposals EU Y 0 
22112_787. Proposals EU Y 0 
25268_56 kZBO Y 1 
25268_63 kZBO Y 0 
28122_29 Restructuring monitoring financial sector Y 1 
29911_16 Organised crime N 0 
30413_119 Pension plan legislation Y 1 
31052_18 ABN-AMRO sale N 0 
31083_10 Corporate governance Y 0 
31093_6_Implementation EU regulations 
(also: 31093_7 and proceedings 20072008 6072-6088) 
Y 4 
31093_8 Implementation EU regulations, change in 
legislation 
Y 0 
31371_8 Financial crisis Y 1 
31477_5 Money laundering Questions Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 614-620 Y 1 
Proceedings20072008 733-745 Y 2 
Proceedigs20072009 6693-6706 Y 2 
Appendix to proceedings20082009_1049 Y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700IXB_2 Budget 2009 Notes Y 0 
31965IXB_2 1st supplement 2009 Y 0 
31965IXB_3 1st supplement 2009 Y 1 
22712_874 EU proposals Y 0 
27562_33 Urban development Y 1 
29507_85 Law on financial services N 0 
31070_24. Coalition agreement reviewed Y 0 
31892_3 Cross border payments Y 0 
31904_6Energy markets Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 6299-6395 N 1 
Proceedings20082009 6397-6440 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 7975-8087 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 Appendix 2333 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 Appendix 3052 N 1 
Not numbered: report on reorganisation civil service Y 0 
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 CFV 
 
46 documents containing „ begroting CFV‟ in text.  
37 documents containing „ jaarverslag CFV‟ in text. 
 
References to promises of minister to Parliament as mentioned in budget documents and 
annual reports are not included in the list below. 
 
Document regarding CFV Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
31031_XI_1 Annual report 2006 Y 0 
29453_110 Housing associations Y 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800XI_2 budget 2007 Notes Y 0 
30995_33 Improving housing N 0 
31444XI_1 Annual 2007 Y 0 
Proceedings20072008: 2319-2337 N 3 
Fiscal 2008   
31200XVIII_2 budget 2008 notes Y 0 
31200_39 Questions to budget memorandum N 0 
31474XVIII_5 1st supplement 2008 Questions N 1 
31924_XVIII_3 Annual report 2008 N 0 
31205_9 Changes in Tax laws N 0 
29453_68 Housing associations N 0 
29453_71 Housing associations Y 1 
29453_80 Housing associations N 0 
29453_86 Housing associations Y 1 
29453_89 Housing associations Y 1 
29453_96 Housing associations N 0 
30995_42 Improving housing N 1 
30995_45 Improving housing y 2 
30995_46 Improving housing Y 1 
30995_59 Improving housing Protocol y 4 
30995_61 Improving housing. Protocol Y 1 
30995_68 Improving housing Y 0 
25268_63 kZBO Y 0 
Proceedings20072008, Appendix 3444 Y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XVIII_2 Budget 2009 notes Y 0 
29453_100 Housing associations Y 1 
29453_115 Housing associations Y 2 
Proceedings20082009 7447-7524 N 1 
Proceedings 20082009 Appendix 1748 Y 1 
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 NAK 
N=25 documents containing „ begroting NAK‟ in text 
N= 46 documents containing „ begroting keuringsdienst‟ in text 
N= 12 documents containing „ jaarverslag NAK‟ in text 
N= 18 documents containing „ jaarverslag „ keuringsdienst‟  in text 
 
Document regarding NAK Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
31031_XIV_1 Annual report 2006 y 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800XIV_2 Budget 2008 N 0 
30800XIV_33 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
30800XIV_103 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
30800XIV_124 Motion Y 1 
30800XIV_133 Y 0 
30800XIV_140 Protocol Y 2 
31061XIV_2 1st supplement to budget 2007 Y 0 
31290XIV_2 2nd supplement to budget 2007 Y 0 
31444XIV_3 Annual 2007 Notes y 0 
31444XIV_8 Annual 2007, questions Y 1 
Proceedings 20062007_5122-5124 Y 0 
30942_3 Letter minBZK Y 0 
31201_3 Letter minBZK Y 0 
Fiscal 2008   
31200XIV_2 Budget 2008 Notes y 0 
31200XIV_158 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
31200XIV_178 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
31200XIV_181 Budget 2008 Letter Y 0 
31200XIV_206 Budget 2008 Protocol Y 2 
31924XIV_3. Annual report 2006 Notes N 0 
25268_63 kZBO N 0 
31809_3. Adaption minLNV legislation to kZBO N 0 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XIV_2 Budget 2009 Notes y 0 
31700XIV_4 Budget 2009 Letter Y 0 
31700XIV_8 Budget 2009 Letter Y 1 
 31700XIV_16 Budget 2009 Letter Y 0 
31700XIV_153 y 7 
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 NMa 
N= 406 documents containing „ begroting nma‟  in text 
N= 240 documents containing „ jaarverslag nma‟ in text 
Neglecting case specific decisions of nma 
 
Regular debates on postal market, cure and care market and the energy market and 
NMa‟s role in monitoring. 
Document regarding NMa Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
30885_1 2nd supplement 2006 N 0 
30885XIII_2 2nd supplement 2006 Notes y 0 
30885XIII_3 2nd supplement 2006 Y 3 
30885XII_5 2nd supplement 2006 Y 1 
31031_XIII_1 Annual report 2006 Y 0 
31031_XIII_4 Annual report 2006 Y 0 
31031_XIII_6 Annual report 2006 Y 2 
31031_XIII_8 Annual report 2006 Y 2 
31031XVI_5 Annual report 2006 Y 1 
30800 XIII_50 Annual report nma Y 0 
27659_80 Licensing care providers N 0 
28244_115 Fraud in building and construction Y 1 
29689_114 Restructuring Care N 0 
30595_5 Housing rents policy N 1 
30595_6 Housing rents policy N 0 
30601_5 Modernising waterboards Y 1 
30601_6 Modernising waterboards Y 0 
30913_3 Monitoring Pilot services Y 0 
Proceedings20052006 6547-6564 Y 0 
Proceedings20062007 501-530 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 973-1000 Y 1 
Fiscal 2007   
30800XIII_2 Budget 2007 Notes Y 0 
30800VI_13 Budget2007 N 0 
30800VIII_38 Budget2007 Y 1 
30800VIII_12 Budget 2007 questions Y 3 
30800XVI_27 Budget 2007 N 0 
30800A_9 Budget2007 Y 0 
31061XIII_2 1st supplement 2007 Y 0 
31061XIII_3 1st supplement 2007 Y 3 
31290_1 2nd supplement 2007 N 0 
31290_XIII_2 2nd supplement 2007 Y 0 
31290_XIII_3 2nd supplement 2007 N 1 
31200XIII_51 annual report nma Y 0 
31444XIII_1 Annual report Y 0 
31444XIII_9 Annual report 2007 Y 2 
31444XIII_16 Annual report 2007 Y 1 
21501_135 EU summit Y 1 
22112_499 EU regulations 
(also 22112_508) 
Y 0 
22112-578 EU regulations Y 0 
27831_23 Vision on monitoring y 0 
29515-197 Reduction bureaucracy costs Y 1 
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Document regarding NMa Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
30891_4 Cabinet formation N 0 
30895_9 Water supply Y 2 
31055_2 Monitoring on competition Y 0 
31055_3 Monitoring on competition Y 4 
31055_4 Monitoring on competition; 31055_5 Y 9 
31123_1 Liability of monitoring Authorities Y 0 
31201_3 Civil service Y 0 
Proceedings20062007 2157-2186 N 1 
Proceedings20062007 3397-3412 Y 2 
Proceedings20062007 3529-3550 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 Appendix 1586 Y 1 
Proceedings20062007 Appendix 2511 Y 1 
Proceedings20072008 848-872 Y 1 
Proceedings20072008 987-995 Y 2 
Fiscal 2008   
31200_6 Opposition‟s budget proposal N 1 
31200_11 budget 2008 N 1 
31200XIII_2 Budget2008 Notes Y 0 
31200XIII_4 Budget2008 Y 5 
31200XIII_21 Budget 2008 Y 1 
31200XIII_58 Budget 2008 Y 5 
31200VIII_201 Budget 2008 Y 0 
31200XII_2 Budget 2008 Y 0 
31200A_94 budget 2008 Y 0 
31474_2 1st supplement 2008 Y 0 
31474XIII_2 1st supplement 2008 Y 0 
31792_1 2nd supplement 2008 Y 0 
31792XIII_2 2nd supplement 2008 Y 0 
31792XIII_3 2nd supplement 2008 Y 4 
31700XIII_55 Annual report nma Y 0 
31924XIII_1 Annual report Y 0 
31924_7 1st supplement 2009 Y 4 
24036_349 competition policy Y 0 
24036_350 Competition policy Y 1 
25268_53 kZBO Y 0 
25268_63 kZBO Y 0 
29247_75 Immediate care provision Y 0 
29247_78 Immediate care provision Y 1 
29515_272 Reduction of bureaucracy Y 0 
29842_33 Sustainable agriculture Y 1 
29842_18 Sustainable agriculture Y 1 
30895_44 Water supply Y 1 
31325_5 Providing educational books Y 1 
31325_6 Providing educational books Y 0 
31354_3 Tendering by government affiliated entities Y 0 
31354_6 Tendering by government affiliated entities Y 0 
31388_2 Fraud indications N 0 
31388_3 Fraud indications Y 1 
31579 Law on services (internal EU market) Y 1 
Proceedings20072008 4102-4107 Y 1 
Proceedings20072008 5255-5256 
Proceedings20072008 5256-5274 
Proceedings20072008 5281-5286 
Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 933-959 
Proceedings20082009 1126-1141 
Y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XIII_2 Budget2009 Y 0 
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Document regarding NMa Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by 
MPs 
31700XIII_7 Budget2009 Y 4 
31700XIII_18 Budget2009 Amendment Y 1 
31700XIII_32 Budget2009 Motion 
Proceedings20082009 1063-1096 
Y 1 
31700XVI_122 Budget 2009 Y 0 
31965_1 1st supplement 2009 Y 0 
31965_3 1st supplement 2009 Y 1 
22122_855 EU Regulations Y 1 
24095_235 Communication Frequencies Y 0 
30536_98 Liberalisation postal market Motion 
Proceedings20082009 5085-5152 
Y 1 
31892_3 Cross border payments Y 0 
31901_5 Fees energy infrastructure Y 7 
Proceedings20082009 3809-3911 N 0 
Proceedings20082009 4757-4802 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 4757-4802 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 4931-5020 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 6698-6725 Y 0 
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 NZA 
N = 391 documents containing „ begroting nza‟ in text 
N= 145 documents containing „ jaarverslag nza‟ in text 
N=  17 documents containing „ begroting ctz‟ in text 
N= 11 documents containing „ jaarverslag ctz‟ in text 
 
No reference to particular research activities of NZA 
 
Document regarding NZA Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
Fiscal 2006   
31031_XVI_1 Annual report 2006 Y 0 
31031XVI_5 Annual 2006 questions Y 2 
31031XVI_6 Annual 2006 questions Y 1 
30800XVI_34 Budget2007 Questions regarding 2006 Y 1 
25268_45 kZBO Y 0 
30831_3 VWS legislation 2006 Y 0 
Fiscal 2007   
30800XVI_2 Budget 2007 Y 0 
30800XVI_18 Budget 2007 Instruction Y 0 
30800XVI_27 Budget 2007 questions Y 3 
30800XVI_129 Budget 2007 Instruction Y 0 
30800XVI_139 Budget 2007 Instruction Y 0 
31061XVI_2 1st supplement 2007 Y 0 
31061XVI_4 1st supplement 2007 Y 2 
31444XVI_1-3 Annual 2007 Y 0 
25268-70 kZBO Annual 2007 Y 0 
27831_23 Framework Monitoring policies Y 0 
29248_39 DBCs Motion 
Proceedings20062007 5078-5079 
Y 1 
29515_181 reducing bureaucracy Y 0 
29689_154 Restructuring Health sector Instruction y 0 
30918_3 Health insurance policy Y 0 
31200XVI_50 Budget 2008 Motion 
31200XVI_82 adapted motion 
31200XVI_83 adapted motion 
Proceedings20072008 1773-1802 
Proceedings20072008 2037-2052 
Y 1 
31200XVI_72 Budget 2008, policy 
Proceedings20072008 1741-1874 
Y 1 
31201_3 Civil service Y 0 
Proceedings20072008 2177-2180 Y 1 
Proceedings 20072008 Appendix 932 Y 1 
Fiscal 2008   
31200XVI_2 Budget 2008 Y 0 
31200XVI_13 Budget 2008 Y 1 
31200XIII_4 Budget 2008 Y 1 
31200XIII_145 Budget 2008, Motion Y 1 
31924XVI_3 Annual 2008 Y 0 
31924XVI_5 Annual 2008 Y 2 
31924XVI_6 Annual 2008 Y 1 
24036_350 Competition policy 
31700XIII_7 Budget2009 
Y 1 
25268_59 kZBO Y 2 
25268_63 kZBO Y 0 
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Document regarding NZA Relevance 
operations 
# remarks by MPs 
26631_250 Modernising care Y 1 
26631_274 Modernising care Instruction y 0 
27295_110 General hospitals Y 0 
29247_78 Immediate care Y 1 
29247_81 Immediate care Instruction Y 0 
29477_59 Motion 
29477_60 Motion 
Proceedings20072008 7612-7613 
Y 2 
29689_237 Motion 
Proceedings20082009 3292_3295 
Y 1 
30597 Future care Y 0 
31016_14 Motion 
Proceedings20072008 4102-4107 
Y 1 
31420_7 Merger health institutions Y 2 
Proceedings20072008 5256-5274 Y 1 
Fiscal 2009   
31700XVI_2 Budget 2009 Y 0 
31700XVI_160 Budget 2009 Instruction Y 0 
31950_3 adaption to kZBO Y 0 
Proceedings20082009 3809-3911 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 4931-5018 Y 1 
Proceedings20082009 Appendix 2261 Y 1 
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 Appendix 9: Responsibility centre assessment 
The table below shows for each of the ZBOs in the case study characteristics that have 
lead to a classification under the responsibility centre model. I have made a separation 
between ex ante (e.a.) known data and what has been found in interviews and 
documents ex post (e.p.). As a result changes in classification are disclosed. 
 
Table A - 4: Ex ante and ex post assessment of responsibility centre types for ZBOs 
studied. 
   Income statement Balance sheet Conclusion 
In
c
o
m
e
 t
ra
n
s
fe
rs
 
CVZ e.a.* Budget received from minVWS to 
improve control (formerly: cost 
recoverage from premiums) 
Liquidity management 
through Treasury 
(WFSV:120) 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Two more or less separate budgets to 
be controlled 
Investments separately approved 
budgets 
Additional pressure due to controls on 
volume of staff 
Uses net equity to cover 
some (incidental) costs 
on instruction of minVWS 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
FBKVB e.a. Recalculation of costs after 4 year 
budget period; excess at disposal 
minOCW  
Detailed staff and cost disclosure 
Liquidity management 
through Treasury 
(CW:45) 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Unchanged Unchanged Discretionary 
cost centre 
Vf/Pf e.a. Fees determined by Board; policy based 
approval by minister 
Fees intended to cover costs 
Liquidity management by 
Treasury (CW:45) 
Residual value to be 
used in line with policy 
minOCW 
Profit centre 
gross margin 
e.p. Change in fees results in change in 
funding of school boards by minOCW; in 
effect indirect funding by minOCW 
Minister has actual 
power to reallocate net 
equity 
Complete cost 
centre 
RvR e.a. Funding arrangement when budget not 
timely approved available 
Prepare activity plan for budget 
calculation 
Liquidity management by 
Treasury (CW:45)  
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Budget instruction uses cost price per 
unit of production 
Cash flow not based on 
production but on budget 
minJUS 
Standard cost 
centre 
SVB e.a. Detailed budgeting disclosed 
No production targets set, but could be 
done 
Emphasis on compliance mentioned 
Recalculation costs local governments 
ex post 
No net equity allowed 
Liquidity management by 
Treasury (WFSV:120) 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Unchanged in 2007 
Budgets of activities on behalf of other 
ministries included in budget 
instruction, but not really controlled 
Service local government to be 
incorporated in task assigned by 
minSZW by 2009. 
Production volume estimate is given 
externally 
Exception on ability to 
use an equalisation 
reserve as prescribed in 
kZBO 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
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   Income statement Balance sheet Conclusion 
 
UWV e.a. Detailed budgeting disclosed 
No production targets set, but could be 
done  
Emphasis on compliance mentioned 
No net equity allowed 
Liquidity management 
through Treasury 
(WFSV:120) 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Production volume estimate is given 
externally 
Exception on ability to 
use an equalisation 
reserve as prescribed in 
kZBO 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
AFM e.a. Fees need to cover costs 
Variance analysis on costs given 
Part budget from minFin 
Liquidity management 
through Treasury 
(CW:45) 
Complete cost 
centre 
e.p. Unchanged Unchanged Complete cost 
centre 
CFV e.a. Return on net equity used to cover 
operational expense 
Liquidity management 
through Treasury 
(CW:45) 
Complete cost 
centre 
e.p. Unchanged Unchanged Complete cost 
centre 
NAK e.a. Fees determined by Board,  approval 
only tested on „general interest‟ 
Restricted Treasury 
Management (CW:45) 
Investment 
centre not 
quite 
e.p. Unchanged As of 2007 control on 
level of net equity, 
excess to be returned to 
funders 
Investment 
centre not 
quite 
NMa e.a. Complies with cash accounting in  
ministries 
Does not exit, cash 
based 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Proposals for additional staff follow 
traditional decision lines in ministries; 
No discussion on using external staff as 
is usual in units within a ministry. 
Not realising revenues not relevant for 
budgeting  
Unchanged Discretionary 
cost centre 
NZA e.a. Detailed budgeting disclosed 
No revenue indications 
Regulation on net equity 
level (5% turnover) 
Restricted Treasury 
management (CW:45) 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
e.p. Not yet ready to use internal pricing for 
activities 
Some pressure on staff volume control, 
but less than CVZ due to start-up phase 
in which NZA is operating 
Cost reduction due to efficiency 
programs imposed 
Contents of activities described 
Investments separately 
approved, funding 
through Treasury 
Discretionary 
cost centre 
* e.a.: ex ante assessment 
e.p.: ex post assessment. 
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 Appendix 10: Comparative overview of actual mismatches. 
Table A - 5: Comparative overview of formal and actual legal impact on autonomy for income transfer ZBOs 
 Type Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
CVZ RvR SVB UWV FBKVB Vf/Pf 
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
1 X* Not appointing civil 
servant in board 
Normative 9 0 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 
2 O Appointment of staff Normative kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
↓ 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
3 X Requirement of data 
protection 
Normative 41 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ 
4 X Appointment based on 
gender and or cultural 
background 
Normative not included ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 P Submit annual report to 
Parliament 
Information 18 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
6 N Frequency of 
intermediate reports set 
in legislation 
Information none 0 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 
7 N General right of inquiry Information 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 P Approval of statement 
of accounts 
Information 34 0 0 ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
9 N Use separate accounts 
for activities 
Information 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 N Board discusses directly 
with Parliament 
Information none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 N Multiple bodies Governance 7 0 0 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 ↑ ↑ 
12 M Ex ante approval of 
mandates 
Governance 8 ↓ 0 ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 
13 N (re)appointment of 
board 
Governance kZBO:12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 N secondary jobs Governance kZBO:13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Type Authority issue Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
CVZ RvR SVB UWV FBKVB Vf/Pf 
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
15 N Decision on and 
disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance kZBO:14; 
WOPT:6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 X Annulling of ZBO 
decisions 
Governance 22 0 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 X Intervention in case of 
negligence 
Governance 23 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 
18 O Asset related 
transactions: borrowing 
and lending 
Governance 32d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 O Asset related 
transactions: others 
Governance 32a-c, e, f 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 ↑ 0 0 
20 X Asset related 
transactions: 
bankruptcy 
Governance 32g 0 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 
21 X Asset related 
transactions:  
dissolvement 
Governance none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 
22 N Frequency of meetings 
board and minister 
Cyclical none 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
23 P Approval of fees Cyclical 17 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 
24 P Rules on structure of 
budget 
Cyclical 27,28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 
25 P Approval of budget Cyclical 29 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 
26 P Submit multiyear plan Cyclical none ↓ ↓ 0 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 
27 P Creating equalisation 
reserve 
Cyclical 33 ↓ ↓ 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 0 ↑ 0 
28 O Audit protocol Cyclical none ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ 0 0 
* M= market element; N= not included in mismatch assessment; O = others included in mismatch assessment; P= Planning & control element, X= not included in 
overall assessment and not included in mismatch assessment. 
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Table A - 6: Overview of expected and actual impact on economic autonomy of income transfer ZBOs 
 Type  
Exepected 
level 
Indicator type CVZ RvR SVB UWV FBKVB Vf/Pf 
 EX
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
MARKET DIMENSION               
1 O* Production type Mass G** 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 
2 M % Funding largest demand 
initiator (2007, annual 
report) 
100 
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 
3 M 
Type of funding charges 
not 
applicable 
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 M 
Budget funding 
activity 
based 
M 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 
5 M Commissioning request M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 M Competitors none M 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↓ 
7 O 
Production form 
contract 
provision 
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
PLANNING & CONTROL DIMENSION               
8 O % fixed assets < 10% G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 P Budget disclosure 
operating costs in 
ministry‟s budgets  
line item 
P 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
10 P 
Responsibility centre type 
standard 
cost 
centre 
M 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 
11 P Approval of budget 
document mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
Yes 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
12 P Approval of fees mentioned 
to Parliament by minister  
not 
applicable 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 
13 P Approval of annual report 
mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 
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 Type  
Exepected 
level 
Indicator type CVZ RvR SVB UWV FBKVB Vf/Pf 
14 P Frequency of reporting by 
minister to Parliament  
Yearly 
P 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 
15 O Performance indicators 
reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ budget 
documents  
Output 
P 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
16 O Performance indicators 
reported to Parliament in 
ZBO Annual reports  
Output 
P 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 
17 P 
Frequency of reporting to 
Minister 
Parliament
‟s 
frequency 
M 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
18 O Number of documents 
submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of 
ZBO  
0 
P 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 
19 P Budget instruction by 
Minister-Principal 
Yes M 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
* In mismatch assessment with legal elements: M: market element, O; other element; P= Planning & control 
** Indicator type G: general indicator; M: indicator on Minister-principal level; P: indicator on Parliamentary level 
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Table A - 7: Comparative overview of impact on formal and actual legal  on autonomy of monitoring ZBOs 
 Type Authority issue 
Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
AFM CFV NAK NMa NZA 
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
1 X* Not appointing civil servant in board Normative 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 O Appointment of staff Normative 
kZBO:15 
(PLA) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 X Requirement of data protection Normative 41 0 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 X 
Appointment based on gender and or 
cultural background 
Normative not included 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 P Submit annual report to Parliament Information 18 0 0 ↑ 0 0 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ 
6 N 
Frequency of intermediate reports set 
in legislation 
Information none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 N General right of inquiry Information 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 P Approval of statement of accounts Information 34 ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ 0 0 
9 N Use separate accounts for activities Information 38 ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 N 
Board discusses directly with 
Parliament 
Information none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 
11 N Multiple bodies Governance 7 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
12 M Ex ante approval of mandates Governance 8 0 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 
13 N (re)appointment of board Governance kZBO:12 ↓ ↓ 0 0 ↓ ↓ 0 0 0 0 
14 N secondary jobs Governance kZBO:13 ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ 
15 N 
Decision on and disclosure of 
remuneration 
Governance 
kZBO:14; 
WOPT:6 
0 ↓ ↑ ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 
16 X Annulling of ZBO decisions Governance 22 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 
17 X Intervention in case of negligence Governance 23 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 
18 O 
Asset related transactions: borrowing 
and lending 
Governance 32d 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 0 0 
19 O Asset related transactions: others Governance 32a-c, e, f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 X 
Asset related transactions: 
bankruptcy 
Governance 32g ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 X Asset related transactions:  Governance none ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Type Authority issue 
Authority 
Group 
reference 
kZBO 
AFM CFV NAK NMa NZA 
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
F
O
R
M
A
L
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
dissolvement 
22 N 
Frequency of meetings board and 
minister 
Cyclical none 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 0 
23 P Approval of fees Cyclical 17 ↓ ↓ ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 P Rules on structure of budget Cyclical 27,28 0 ↑ ↑ 0 ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
25 P Approval of budget Cyclical 29 ↑ ↑ 0 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ ↓ 
26 P Submit multiyear plan Cyclical none 0 ↓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ 
27 P Creating equalisation reserve Cyclical 33 ↓ ↓ ↑ 0 0 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
28 O Audit protocol Cyclical none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ↓ 
* M= market element; N= not included in mismatch assessment; O = others included in mismatch assessment; P= Planning & control element, X= not included in 
overall assessment and not included in mismatch assessment. 
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Table A - 8: Overview of expected and actual impact on economic autonomy of monitoring ZBOs 
 Type 
 
Exepected 
level 
Indicator 
type 
AFM CFV NAK NMa NZA 
 EX
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
E
X
P
E
C
T
E
D
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
MARKET DIMENSION 
1 O* Production type Individual G** 0 ↑ 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
2 M % Funding largest demand 
initiator (2007, annual report) 
100 
G 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
3 M 
Type of funding charges 
not applicable 
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 M Budget funding lump sum M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 M Commissioning state M 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
6 M Competitors none M 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↓ 0 0 0 0 
7 O 
Production form 
contract 
provision 
G 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 0 
 
8 O % fixed assets < 10% G 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ ↓ ↓ 0 0 
9 P Budget disclosure operating 
costs in ministry‟s budgets  
line item 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 
10 P 
Responsibility centre type 
complete cost 
centre 
M 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 
11 P Approval of budget document 
mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 
12 P Approval of fees mentioned to 
Parliament by minister  
not applicable 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 0 
13 P Approval of annual report 
mentioned to Parliament by 
minister  
Yes 
P ↑ 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 
14 P Frequency of reporting by 
minister to Parliament  
Yearly 
P 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↑ 
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15 O Performance indicators 
reported to Parliament in 
ministries‟ budget documents  
Throughput 
P 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 
16 O Performance indicators 
reported to Parliament in ZBO 
Annual reports  
Throughput 
P 0 0 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 0 0 ↑ 
17 P Frequency of reporting to 
Minister 
Yearly 
M 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 
18 O Number of documents 
submitted to Parliament 
regarding operations of ZBO  
0 
P 0 ↓ 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 
19 P Budget instruction by Minister-
Principal 
No M 0 0 ↓ ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 ↓ 
* In mismatch assessment with legal elements: M: market element, O; other element; P= Planning & control 
** Indicator type G: general indicator; M: indicator on Minister-principal level; P: indicator on Parliamentary level 
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 Appendix 11: Instructions on attributing authority. 
Table 20.1: instructions affecting autonomy of ZBOs in „Aanwijzingen‟ and „kZBO‟ 
 Cl nr Classifi-
cation 
Article x 
AW1996 
Applicability Option (O) or 
compulsory (C) 
Impact on 
autonomy  
Art x 
AW2008 
Applica-
bility 
Art x 
kZBO 
Applicability 
Conditions for issuing 
operational instructions by 
ZBO 
4 N 124f All O Yes 124c All   
Task description 4 N 124g All C Yes 124d.2.
2 
All   
Structure of board 2 O 124i.1 PLA C Yes 124e.1 PLA   
Appointment of members of 
interest groups 
2 O 124i.3 All O Yes 124.e.2. PLA   
Appointment in governance 
structures other than Board 
2 O 124i.4 All C Yes 124e.3 PLA   
Law must include relation and 
authority attributed to minister 
and board 
2 O 124l.1/1
24l.2 
All C Yes     
Approval by minister of other 
authoritative decisions by ZBO 
4 N 124l.5 All O Yes     
Change of legislation when 
insufficient authority appears 
to be attributed to minister 
4 N 124l.7 All C Yes     
Including funding method in 
the law  
1 C 124n.1/.
2 
PLA C Yes 124d.2.
3 
   
Requirement that ZBO-case 
law determines financial 
oversight 
3 I 124o.2 PLA C Yes     
Specifications of annual report 
included in ZBO-case law 
3 I 124s.2 PLA O Yes     
Arrangement on transfer of 
assets and liabilities to new 
legal entity 
4 N 124v All? O Yes 124h All   
Arrangement on transfer of 
legal disputes 
4 N 124w PLA O Yes 124i All   
   
 
A-72  
 
 Cl nr Classifi-
cation 
Article x 
AW1996 
Applicability Option (O) or 
compulsory (C) 
Impact on 
autonomy  
Art x 
AW2008 
Applica-
bility 
Art x 
kZBO 
Applicability 
Defining relationship between 
different bodies in governance 
structure 
2 O 124j PLA C Yes 124f All 
(extended 
examples) 
7 All 
Ex ante approval by minister 
for mandates within the ZBO 
2 0   C Yes   8 All 
Prohibition to appoint civil 
servants in board 
4 N 124i.2 All C Yes   9 All 
Approval of internal 
governance statute by 
minister 
2 O 124l.4 PLA C Yes   11 PLA 
(re)appointment and dismissal 
of board 
2 O 124i.1 PLA C Yes Not  12 PLA 
Arrangement on secondary 
jobs of Board members 
2 O   C Yes   13 PLA 
Arrangement on appointing 
staff 
4 N 124u PLA O Yes   15 PLA 
Staff ZBO is subordinated to 
board, not minister 
4 N   C Yes   16 PLA 
Approval of fees by minister 1 C 124l.3 All C Yes   17 All 
ZBO submits annual report to 
minister  
3 I 124s.1 All C Yes   18 All 
General right of inquiry for 
minister 
3 I 124t All C Yes   20 All 
Minister decides on general 
instructions on tasks and 
other limitatively listed issues 
4 N 124l.5a/
b 
All O Yes   21 All, not 
limited 
Approval, suspension or 
reversal of ZBO-decisions 
2 O 124l.5c All O Yes   22 All, only 
reversal 
Intervention by minister in 
case of negligence 
2 O 124m All O Yes   23 All + inform 
Parliament 
Consent with budget and 
multiyear forecast by minister 
1 C 124l.4 PLA C Yes   29: 
approve
ment  
except 
multi  
annual 
forecast 
All 
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 Cl nr Classifi-
cation 
Article x 
AW1996 
Applicability Option (O) or 
compulsory (C) 
Impact on 
autonomy  
Art x 
AW2008 
Applica-
bility 
Art x 
kZBO 
Applicability 
Report on substantial 
differences between budget 
and actual expenditures 
1 C   C Yes   30 All 
Requirement that ZBO-case 
law determines ministerial 
consent to private law based 
decisions (e.g. statutes, lease, 
borrowing) 
2 O 124o.3 PLA O Yes   32, 
limitative 
list,  
All 
Creating equalisation reserve 1 C   C Yes   33 All 
Requirement of statement of 
accounts 
3 I 124p.1 PLA C Yes   34 All 
Minister can set rules on 
structure statement of 
accounts and auditing 
3 I 124p.2 PLA O Yes   35 [C] All 
Requirement to separate 
accounts for ZBO activities 
and non-ZBO activities 
3 I   C Yes   38 PLB 
Requirement for data 
protection 
4 N   O Yes   41 All 
Decide upon ZBOs to be 
subject to kZBO 
4 N   C Yes   42 All 
Board ZBO decides upon the 
budget 
1 C 124o.1 PLA C Yes   26, by 
implicati
on 29 
All 
Minister can set rules on 
structure of budget,  
1 C 124p.2 PLA O Yes   27 [C]; 
28 [C] 
All 
Applicability of rules for PLBs 4 N   C Yes   36; 37 PLB 
Attribution of legal status 4 N 124b All C No Not    
Contents explanatory notes 4 N 124d All C No 124a All   
Wording attribution of legal 
status 
4 N 124h PLA C No 124d.1/ 
124.2.1 
All   
Wording creating internal 
governance statute 
4 N 124k PLA C No     
Prohibition for minister to give 
case based instructions 
4 N 124l.6 All C No 124g All   
Including funding method in 
explanatory notes 
4 N 124n.3 All C No     
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 Cl nr Classifi-
cation 
Article x 
AW1996 
Applicability Option (O) or 
compulsory (C) 
Impact on 
autonomy  
Art x 
AW2008 
Applica-
bility 
Art x 
kZBO 
Applicability 
Board meetings publicly 
accessible based on 
regulations in the ZBO-case 
law 
3 I 124r PLA C No     
Procedure to consult NCA 4 N 124x.2 All C No     
Exclusion of universities and 
high schools  
4 N 124z PLA C No     
Formal legisltative issues 4 N   C No   43-46 None 
Definition 4 N 124a All C No Not  1 All 
Transition arrangements 4 N   C No   2 All 
Reason for using ZBO 4 N 124c All C No Not  3 All 
Creating a ZBO 4 N 124e All C No 124b All 4 All 
Requirement to inform 
Parliament on intended 
proposal to create ZBO 
3 I   C No   5 All 
Procedure to consult minBZK, 
minFin  
4 N 124x.1 All C No 124j All 6 All 
Defining applicability of 
section of kZBO 
4 N   C No   10 PLA 
Minister decides on 
remuneration of Board 
2 O   C No   14 PLA 
ZBO monitors quality of 
operations and reports in 
annual report 
3 I   C No   19 All 
Applicability of financial 
monitoring section 
4 N   C No   24 PLA 
Evaluation of kZBO 2 O   C No   39.1 All 
Public ZBO-register prepared 
by minBZK 
4 N   C No   40 All 
Requirement on evaluation of 
ZBO operations 
3 I 124ij All C No   39.1 All 
Schedule for submitting 
budget to minister 
1 C   C No   25 + 26 All 
(discontinued after 1-12-
2000) 
  124q         
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